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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Improve the existing legislation to protect the Reservist in case of call up. Make sure the legislation also "rewards" employers for hiring them and helps take the sting out of the cost involved. Once that is in place. Start by calling up a unit as whole to provide support for a domestic emergency. With a set date for return, if needed rotate another unit in. Each unit in a Brigade is tagged as the "On call" unit for the next call out. Brigade HQ can look at the numbers and determine if they have to alert the next unit in line as well. This spreads the burden out so a reservist is unlikely to be called out more than once every 5 years. It also means that the unit leadership have to start planning for what they may need to do for that time. The called up unit get priority on all equipment in the brigade. The brigade can also maintain a list of people willing to go on a callout to supplement the tasked unit. do this for 10 years and then start tasking then to safer callouts overseas. By that time you have worked out the bugs, the military personal are acclimatised to the concept, as well as the public and employers.
 
For @KevinB. I'm tracking your discussion on needing an army to generate sufficient candidates for SOF. I know that some time ago the US Army went for direct recruit to Ranger training or to Special Forces training. Any idea how successful that has been and how many recruits they generate through those programs rather than from previous service candidates?

:unsure:
The 11X and 18X programs did not have a very good rate of return.
The Ranger program didn’t do nearly as badly, as they still went through ‘normal’ gates as it’s still an Infantry MOS.
Infantry -> Airborne -> Ranger.
Just sooner than most.
Ranger Reconnaissance Training Course was the real test for folks in the Rangers anyway.
Of course it (RRTC) was just axed based on the outgoing OIC I spoke to in Jan.

The 18X was a really different, as usually it’s a ‘remuster’ trade. The min working rank is Sgt (and realistically SSGT due to the pipeline time from Q Course to one’s Trade Qual.
But they chopped languages out of due to time and pass rates - so now you don’t need a secondary (Group) language to get qualified.
IMHO Army SF shot themselves in the head due to GWOT and McR’s fascination with DA missions, and made a mess of the trade that is going to take a decade plus to fix.

I know a few folks who went 18X and became very skilled and experienced team members, but the rate of those were very low compared to standard entry.
 
That gets us right back to the fact that you need a large enough conventional RegF army that is capable of generating a sufficiently qualified number of career officers and NCMs for the force itself (including units, schools and headquarters) as well as sufficient quality candidates to fill the special operations community. I'll add to that the requirement to generate enough RegF officers and NCM to form the core leadership of the reserve forces.

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Look, there are a ton of great people in this organization, but we do them no favors by holding them to the professional standards as the full timers when they don't have the time or the experience to be substantive in that ability

Do not confuse professionalism and expertise. Because we lack expertise, we (ARes) need to be more professional in the PoA. I much prefer a 90% professional with a 50% expertise level (which can be bring up in a fairly short notice) then the opposite.
 
Do not confuse professionalism and expertise. Because we lack expertise, we (ARes) need to be more professional in the PoA. I much prefer a 90% professional with a 50% expertise level (which can be bring up in a fairly short notice) then the opposite.
You can't make a 12 year Sgt in 6 years...

I also think what @Halifax Tar was getting at is the experience, and knowledge of the things beyond just the trade specific knowledge. But even with trade knowledge, I'm getting questions from full time pers in my occupation that have moved very fast, and don't know some of the basic "boring" stuff people who have been around for 20 years know. Things like how to calibrate a tipping bucket rain gauge...
 
You can't make a 12 year Sgt in 6 years...

I also think what @Halifax Tar was getting at is the experience, and knowledge of the things beyond just the trade specific knowledge. But even with trade knowledge, I'm getting questions from full time pers in my occupation that have moved very fast, and don't know some of the basic "boring" stuff people who have been around for 20 years know. Things like how to calibrate a tipping bucket rain gauge...

Infantry drive by be like ;)

Homer Simpson Cartoon GIF
 
You can't make a 12 year Sgt in 6 years...

I also think what @Halifax Tar was getting at is the experience, and knowledge of the things beyond just the trade specific knowledge. But even with trade knowledge, I'm getting questions from full time pers in my occupation that have moved very fast, and don't know some of the basic "boring" stuff people who have been around for 20 years know. Things like how to calibrate a tipping bucket rain gauge...

Well, how did we won WW2? We build an intire army in 2 years.

Of course you can’t make a shot of 12 years in 6, even less with peace time requirements. ARes is for expansion. You don’t need all that knowledge to lead flankings. I wonder how the Ukrainian are doing it.
 
Well, how did we won WW2? We build an intire army in 2 years.

Of course you can’t make a shot of 12 years in 6, even less with peace time requirements. ARes is for expansion. You don’t need all that knowledge to lead flankings. I wonder how the Ukrainian are doing it.
You can do a lot with combat experience, the problem is it comes with a steep learning curve and a lot of casualties.
 
Well, how did we won WW2? We build an intire army in 2 years.

And the infantry in Northwest Europe took horrific losses. Much like the Ukrainians are now.
Of course you can’t make a shot of 12 years in 6, even less with peace time requirements. ARes is for expansion. You don’t need all that knowledge to lead flankings. I wonder how the Ukrainian are doing it.
ARes is not for expansion. That’s an utter fallacy. If it were we’d have some kind of mobilization plan, and stockpiles of equipment at their locations. Or at least facilities to train. We have none of that. The ARes is for… well that’s a damned fine question really.
 
And the infantry in Northwest Europe took horrific losses. Much like the Ukrainians are now.

ARes is not for expansion. That’s an utter fallacy. If it were we’d have some kind of mobilization plan, and stockpiles of equipment at their locations. Or at least facilities to train. We have none of that. The ARes is for… well that’s a damned fine question really.
Agreed that without a massive investment in vehicles, weapons, equipment, munitions, infrastructure, etc. the ARes definitely isn't for expansion. And frankly I don't see those basic requirements being met by any Government regardless of party.

With our current unit manning levels the Reserves are definitely required for augmentation. We can't deploy a unit without either stripping other units of personnel and/or augmenting with Reserves to fill all the positions. That model (barely) worked for Afghanistan and resulted in a burned out Army.

What happens if we actually get into a major conflict and start taking serious personnel and equipment losses? All of the Reserves as well as increased recruiting will likely be required to sustain our existing units in the field for an extended conflict like Ukraine. Expansion of the force I think is a complete non-starter. That's assuming of course that we could wave some sort of magic wand and have replacement equipment appear.

To my mind it would be better to have the ability to deploy and sustain a smaller force at full strength (in both personnel and equipment) for the duration of a conflict rather than expand our force and not have the ability to sustain it long term.

The question is what type of force do we want to be able to deploy and sustain?

Edited to add: The same goes for the Navy and Air Force. If we want for example to deploy a naval Task Force of X configuration or a deployed Fighter Squadron of X aircraft then we should have enough ships and aircraft to sustain those deployments in the face of combat losses. I think we are very far away from that. I think if the SHTF the entire Canadian military is very much a one shot gun.
 
Well, how did we won WW2? We build an intire army in 2 years.

Of course you can’t make a shot of 12 years in 6, even less with peace time requirements. ARes is for expansion. You don’t need all that knowledge to lead flankings. I wonder how the Ukrainian are doing it.

My Dad joined the RCA in 1941 from civvy street and, by early 1943, was a Sergeant in charge of a gun crew. By June 1944, Normandy, he was a Lieutenant in charge of a Bofors troop.

He said "It took us two years to get rid of all the idiots".

There's some good advice in there... somewhere ;)
 
And the infantry in Northwest Europe took horrific losses. Much like the Ukrainians are now.

ARes is not for expansion. That’s an utter fallacy. If it were we’d have some kind of mobilization plan, and stockpiles of equipment at their locations. Or at least facilities to train. We have none of that. The ARes is for… well that’s a damned fine question really.
The design is for expansion by individual and up to full units (I know, it’s a fantasy). Now, the reality is as real then we are able to supply fully our commitment to NATO, pure fallacy. Design and preparedness are 2 different things.

There’s a mobilisation plan. The CDS called for its review couples or months ago. That doesn’t mean it will be implemented, it will probably be a formalised « hope method » of planning but it will be there.

You are better to have a bunch of 6 years sgt with basic training and to prepare them on workups training then to have what we had in WW2. That way you mitigate the steep learning curve.
My Dad joined the RCA in 1941 from civvy street and, by early 1943, was a Sergeant in charge of a gun crew. By June 1944, Normandy, he was a Lieutenant in charge of a Bofors troop.

He said "It took us two years to get rid of all the idiots".

There's some good advice in there... somewhere ;)
My WW2 exemple is just to point out that it can be done. I know it would not pass the effectiveness vs efficiency test.

Tehcnically, if it took 2 years, imagine a 6 years part time of a 12 years full time, there no more idiot in the CAF now, right :unsure: :LOL:
 
ARes is not for expansion. That’s an utter fallacy. If it were we’d have some kind of mobilization plan, and stockpiles of equipment at their locations. Or at least facilities to train. We have none of that. The ARes is for… well that’s a damned fine question really.
IMHO, the ARes is for expansion. Back in the 00s, the catchphrase was that the ARes provides depth and breadth, i.e more of the same of what the RegF provides and additional capabilities that the RegF doesn't provide. That clearly is expansion.

The fallacy is not in what the ResF's purpose is. The problem is that the system does not provide what the ARes needs to meet its true purpose. And as you rightfully point out, that starts with a proper plan. Not just a mobilization plan but the fundamental doctrine behind the Army's overall purpose and the ARes's place within that and how the Army facilitates that doctrinal objective.

The fact that the ARes can't "expand" the Army is as either a deliberate altering of its purpose by senior leadership or as a result of serendipitous consequences of senior leadership taking its eyes of the ball and husbanding resources with the RegF component.

I'll add to that that the limitation on expansion is equipment and not people. If one wanted to expand using the ARes then there is a fairly solid core of senior captains and and WO/Sgts and MCpls in the RegF to become company commanders, CSMs and Section commanders with the ARes filling out the rank and file. We're much better off for expansion now than we were in 1939 because the RegF is so much larger now than it was. That's a large factor behind 30/70 thinking.

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IMHO, the ARes is for expansion. Back in the 00s, the catchphrase was that the ARes provides depth and breadth, i.e more of the same of what the RegF provides and additional capabilities that the RegF doesn't provide. That clearly is expansion.

The fallacy is not in what the ResF's purpose is. The problem is that the system does not provide what the ARes needs to meet its true purpose. And as you rightfully point out, that starts with a proper plan. Not just a mobilization plan but the fundamental doctrine behind the Army's overall purpose and the ARes's place within that and how the Army facilitates that doctrinal objective.

The fact that the ARes can't "expand" the Army is as either a deliberate altering of its purpose by senior leadership or as a result of serendipitous consequences of senior leadership taking its eyes of the ball and husbanding resources with the RegF component.

I'll add to that that the limitation on expansion is equipment and not people. If one wanted to expand using the ARes then there is a fairly solid core of senior captains and and WO/Sgts and MCpls in the RegF to become company commanders, CSMs and Section commanders with the ARes filling out the rank and file. We're much better off for expansion now than we were in 1939 because the RegF is so much larger now than it was. That's a large factor behind 30/70 thinking.

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I think we could probably put some limits on what "expansion" means when you're talking about the reserves. Some of the limits are self imposed and some are just due to the nature of modern weapons.

One of the biggest factors limiting the capability of the ARes to "expand" the Army are the GOC and DND. Within the GOC there are a myriad of things that compete with major investments in the ARes (vehicles, weapons, infrastructure, legislative changes, etc.) that make expansion plans highly unlikely. Similarly, within DND there are many competing requirements for limited Defence dollars (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35s, etc.) that make it unlikely.

Certainly there are specific military capabilities that can be "expanded" by the Reserves, but I don't think expansion by complete Brigade Groups is at all likely. Firstly because of the lack of will to make the financial investment as noted above, but secondly because I think that the complexity of modern military equipment and the skill levels to use that equipment are greater than in the past.

While I hesitate to take the examples from the Ukraine War as general lessons about the nature of future military conflict, I will note that the Russians despite conscripting hundreds of thousands of additional troops are not creating new maneuver units but simply using those troops to sustain existing units. They are struggling to provide equipment quickly enough to cover combat losses even with their large stockpiles of legacy kit.

While technically I think it could be possible to use the Reserves to generate a series of 30/70 units and even find the vehicles/weapons to equip them I simply don't see a realistic scenario where the GOC/DND would be in a position to provide the kit required to sustain both the Reg Force and (expansion) Reserve Force units.

That being the case I'd suggest that the most logical course of action would be to design the Reserves to be able to sustain existing Reg Force units in a major conflict (with the Reserves providing the personnel and the Reg Force providing the extra equipment and leadership cadres). In addition the Reserves could also focus on expanding specific capabilities for the Army (additional Fires units, ISR capabilities, etc.).

The Ukrainian war I think has shown that the flow of replacement military vehicles, weapons and munitions are a greater limiting factor in modern conflict than the availability of manpower. So if you have a limited amount of military hardware available you could spread it out as thinly as possible (i.e. to Regular formations as well as Reserve formations intended for expansion of the total force) and risk degradation of these forces once they enter combat, or you could instead focus your available manpower and vehicles on sustaining your original formations in the field.
 
The way things seem to be going you may not have the requisite numbers of people to have an Army.
 
Certainly there are specific military capabilities that can be "expanded" by the Reserves, but I don't think expansion by complete Brigade Groups is at all likely. Firstly because of the lack of will to make the financial investment as noted above, but secondly because I think that the complexity of modern military equipment and the skill levels to use that equipment are greater than in the past.
I don't see that either which is why I consider CBGs to be a wasted effort. I do see more brigades coming out of a true total force and adopting of 30/70 concept. In general (subject to adjustment) I see a force of 5 Div HQs, 3 CMBGs, 1 CCSB and 10 CBGs reduced to roughly 2 Div HQs, 6 Bdes, 2 CS bdes and 2 CSS bdes i.e 3 Div HQs and 4 Bdes HQs less than now.

Some equipment is more complex, much is not. Any design of the force must incorporate that complexity. Remember, it's exactly the same raw material that becomes a ResF member or a RegF member. We're not talking about whether or not Reservists are mentally or physically incapable of learning the skills that the Regs do but whether or not they are given the training and experience needed to operate that equipment. When we talk about a Grade 11 student who goes on to a CC or university then we are talking somewhere in the neighbourhood of 8 to 16 months of available summer training while they take their education. There are very few trades in the Army that require that much.

While equipment is a limitation, the concept behind a 30/70 unit with one fully equipped sub-unit and two under equipped res sub-units, is to provide both the equipment and the expertise within the unit to train the reservists on all of the equipment they are expected to use if deployed.

Essentially the first phase of a 30/70 reorganization is to create a better manpower pool out of our existing manpower and our existing equipment.

And don't forget the system also provides for 100/0 Quick Reaction RegF units as well.
While I hesitate to take the examples from the Ukraine War as general lessons about the nature of future military conflict, I will note that the Russians despite conscripting hundreds of thousands of additional troops are not creating new maneuver units but simply using those troops to sustain existing units. They are struggling to provide equipment quickly enough to cover combat losses even with their large stockpiles of legacy kit.
I'm not sure if we have an accurate picture of how the Russians are really reconstituting. There are two basic models - add new pers and equip to attrited units and rebuild them either in the line or behind the line; or build new units from previously non-mobilized units and feed them in as they reach an adequate level of training. Russians had hundreds on uncommitted units with equipment and some level of cadres. Essentially reinforcing committed units or building up uncommitted cadres are the same process albeit the latter have no combat experience. The course to take depends entirely as to what cadre is available in each of the two models. From what I've seen the Russians are using both models depending on circumstances.

The problem we have in Canada is that we have put our cadres into one basket, the RegF one. If we were to commit a RegF brigade and suffer casualties we could only rebuild by taking equipment from another cadre RegF brigade and people from a cadre RegF brigade or the reserves. However, if our reservists have not been trained on the equipment in peacetime, then they can't be fed into the reinforcement stream without additional training. Right now we use almost six months of pre-deployment training. The alternative is to feed them in only slightly better prepared than the Russian conscripts.

The real purpose of a 30/70 reorganization is to create better trained reservists that can be mobilized and fed into the system, whether as reinforcements or in new units and sub-units, much more quickly than we currently can. That ensures that we do not have to rapidly reinforce with RegF members but can keep them back to form new cadres and train replacements.

Equipment is a whole different issue.

While technically I think it could be possible to use the Reserves to generate a series of 30/70 units and even find the vehicles/weapons to equip them I simply don't see a realistic scenario where the GOC/DND would be in a position to provide the kit required to sustain both the Reg Force and (expansion) Reserve Force units.
Fully equipping the 70% ResF components would definitely require a conscientious and procurement process. That would be entirely dependent on a national security study to determine the actual force levels we wish to have available. I always say firing half the people in Ottawa would give us recurring $ to buy equipment with but I say that half facetiously. The reality is we make budgets and squeeze a defence capability out of it. The process should work backward from defined defence needs. Obviously budgets will play a role but current defence tasks are based very much on the tasks to be performed by the CAF during peacetime with only a minor nod as to wartime role. IMHO defence policies must contemplate and point towards a worst case scenario in order to truly provide for national defence.
That being the case I'd suggest that the most logical course of action would be to design the Reserves to be able to sustain existing Reg Force units in a major conflict (with the Reserves providing the personnel and the Reg Force providing the extra equipment and leadership cadres). In addition the Reserves could also focus on expanding specific capabilities for the Army (additional Fires units, ISR capabilities, etc.).
And that's essentially what the 30/70 construct does. But in addition it creates a structure that can very quickly be ramped up to a Phase 2 with the addition of equipment.
The Ukrainian war I think has shown that the flow of replacement military vehicles, weapons and munitions are a greater limiting factor in modern conflict than the availability of manpower. So if you have a limited amount of military hardware available you could spread it out as thinly as possible (i.e. to Regular formations as well as Reserve formations intended for expansion of the total force) and risk degradation of these forces once they enter combat, or you could instead focus your available manpower and vehicles on sustaining your original formations in the field.
"Spreading around" the equipment in peacetime is done to facilitate training. There is nothing to stop the concentration of equipment. The model I've been working on in fact prepositions an entire brigade in Europe. There it is available for combined arms training for both RegF and ResF companies (remember in the construct, all battalion headquarters are RegF). It could be used there the way CMTC works now (with terrain limitations) several times a year including large numbers of reservists in the summer and large numbers of RegF during the spring/fall.

Remember too that most of our Afghan deployments consisted of battalions that had ResF augmentees and entire companies come from other battalions. Building battle groups out of multiple units has been a necessity for a long time because of our manning issues.

That said, there is nothing wrong with the idea that if the prepositioned brigade needs to be mobilized that it could be done by an existing 30/70 brigade using both their RegF and ResF members or, if a rapid mobilization is required, that it come from a battalion deploying its 30% RegF company and augmented by two other RegF companies from other battalions. The point here is there would be options available that aren't currently available.

A 30/70 construct leaves you no worse off than our current situation but would in fact up the number of deployable manoeuvre brigade headquarters from just three to six and also provide deployable CS and CSS brigade headquarters (vice 10 nondeployable CBG headquarters). On top of that the number of deployable manoeuvre battalion/regimental headquarters would go up by between 20-30% allow for longer times between peacetime rotations on operational deployments. The number of deployable RegF companies roughly stay the same.

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The design is for expansion by individual and up to full units (I know, it’s a fantasy). Now, the reality is as real then we are able to supply fully our commitment to NATO, pure fallacy. Design and preparedness are 2 different things.

There’s a mobilisation plan. The CDS called for its review couples or months ago. That doesn’t mean it will be implemented, it will probably be a formalised « hope method » of planning but it will be there.

You are better to have a bunch of 6 years sgt with basic training and to prepare them on workups training then to have what we had in WW2. That way you mitigate the steep learning curve.

My WW2 exemple is just to point out that it can be done. I know it would not pass the effectiveness vs efficiency test.

Tehcnically, if it took 2 years, imagine a 6 years part time of a 12 years full time, there no more idiot in the CAF now, right :unsure: :LOL:
Idiot in the CF,,, calls for n expres mbr wirh long RF service,,, BITE ME!
 
I don't see that either which is why I consider CBGs to be a wasted effort. I do see more brigades coming out of a true total force and adopting of 30/70 concept. In general (subject to adjustment) I see a force of 5 Div HQs, 3 CMBGs, 1 CCSB and 10 CBGs reduced to roughly 2 Div HQs, 6 Bdes, 2 CS bdes and 2 CSS bdes i.e 3 Div HQs and 4 Bdes HQs less than now.
Agreed that any type of fully Reserve or 10/90 structure could never work to generate deployable units for Canada. I think the political, societal and economic realities are sufficiently different between Canada and the US that a US National Guard structure is not one that we could successfully duplicate.

I'm guessing that a 30/70 structure could work for SOME types of units/sub-units but realistically given the geographic, economic and socio-political challenges we face the Reg Force ratio in many/most units would likely be higher.

In your 6 x Brigade/2 x CS Brigade/2 x CSS Brigade structure what would be the proposed Reg/Res ratio of each? Do you envision being able to deploy 2 x Divisions each with 3 x Brigades and one each CS/CSS Brigade? I think that a logical starting point would be to determine what you expect to be able to deploy (and sustain) in your worst case scenario
Some equipment is more complex, much is not. Any design of the force must incorporate that complexity. Remember, it's exactly the same raw material that becomes a ResF member or a RegF member. We're not talking about whether or not Reservists are mentally or physically incapable of learning the skills that the Regs do but whether or not they are given the training and experience needed to operate that equipment. When we talk about a Grade 11 student who goes on to a CC or university then we are talking somewhere in the neighbourhood of 8 to 16 months of available summer training while they take their education. There are very few trades in the Army that require that much.
To be honest I'm not so much concerned about the ability to generate sufficiently skilled personnel if required. Let's be honest, if the threat is dire enough corners will be cut and risks taken.
While equipment is a limitation, the concept behind a 30/70 unit with one fully equipped sub-unit and two under equipped res sub-units, is to provide both the equipment and the expertise within the unit to train the reservists on all of the equipment they are expected to use if deployed.

Essentially the first phase of a 30/70 reorganization is to create a better manpower pool out of our existing manpower and our existing equipment.

And don't forget the system also provides for 100/0 Quick Reaction RegF units as well.
If your 30/70 unit may only require enough equipment to be trained during peacetime but it will need the full complement of equipment if it is to be deployed. Plus enough equipment to sustain itself through losses.

The fact is that unlike the past, it's often faster to replace trained personnel than it is to replace their equipment. In WW2 Ford's Willow Run Assembly Line was pumping out one B-24 Liberator Bomber PER HOUR at its peak! By contrast F-35 production is 156 per YEAR. Obviously those are pretty extreme examples but the fact is that modern armoured vehicles, weapons, missiles and even things like heavy trucks take much longer to produce than in the past (never minds ships, subs and aircraft) and increasingly a major war will be a "come as you are" affair.

I think it's important to keep that in mind when planning force structure. Unless you have deep reserves of vehicles, weapons and equipment to replenish your deployed forces then regardless of your manpower pool you'll be forced to consolidate units due to lack of kit.
I'm not sure if we have an accurate picture of how the Russians are really reconstituting. There are two basic models - add new pers and equip to attrited units and rebuild them either in the line or behind the line; or build new units from previously non-mobilized units and feed them in as they reach an adequate level of training. Russians had hundreds on uncommitted units with equipment and some level of cadres. Essentially reinforcing committed units or building up uncommitted cadres are the same process albeit the latter have no combat experience. The course to take depends entirely as to what cadre is available in each of the two models. From what I've seen the Russians are using both models depending on circumstances.
From the websites and blogs I've been following my understanding is that the Russians have mainly been re-building existing units using mobilized troops rather than creating new units. For example I recall reading that the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade that has taken very heavy losses in fighting around Vuhledar has basically been "rebuilt" three times since the war started.

However, repeating what I said above I think that replacing our equipment losses will (like is happening with the Russians) be in many ways a greater challenge than recruiting and training replacement personnel. Resorting to older/less effective replacement equipment will likely increase your personnel losses in a manner similar to deploying lesser trained replacement personnel.
The problem we have in Canada is that we have put our cadres into one basket, the RegF one. If we were to commit a RegF brigade and suffer casualties we could only rebuild by taking equipment from another cadre RegF brigade and people from a cadre RegF brigade or the reserves. However, if our reservists have not been trained on the equipment in peacetime, then they can't be fed into the reinforcement stream without additional training. Right now we use almost six months of pre-deployment training. The alternative is to feed them in only slightly better prepared than the Russian conscripts.

The real purpose of a 30/70 reorganization is to create better trained reservists that can be mobilized and fed into the system, whether as reinforcements or in new units and sub-units, much more quickly than we currently can. That ensures that we do not have to rapidly reinforce with RegF members but can keep them back to form new cadres and train replacements.
Agreed that a Total Force structure is required to make effective use of the Reserves. We're effectively a 70/0 force structure now because Reg Force units aren't fully manned and the Reserves aren't actually integrated into the Reg Force units. That's kind of the worst of all possible worlds when it comes to maintaining combat capability over time in a conflict.

Creating a workable Total Force means either giving the Reserves access to the proper equipment to train on...or having them fulfill roles that can be done with only equipment that they can hold and maintain internally. I suspect that given the geographic/economic/structural challenges we face only a portion of the Reserves can viably do Option A and the rest will likely have to do Option B. The result is that the resulting Reg/Res ratio will likely end up being somewhat greater than 30/70 in many cases for the foreseeable future.
Equipment is a whole different issue.

Fully equipping the 70% ResF components would definitely require a conscientious and procurement process. That would be entirely dependent on a national security study to determine the actual force levels we wish to have available. I always say firing half the people in Ottawa would give us recurring $ to buy equipment with but I say that half facetiously. The reality is we make budgets and squeeze a defence capability out of it. The process should work backward from defined defence needs. Obviously budgets will play a role but current defence tasks are based very much on the tasks to be performed by the CAF during peacetime with only a minor nod as to wartime role. IMHO defence policies must contemplate and point towards a worst case scenario in order to truly provide for national defence.

And that's essentially what the 30/70 construct does. But in addition it creates a structure that can very quickly be ramped up to a Phase 2 with the addition of equipment.

"Spreading around" the equipment in peacetime is done to facilitate training. There is nothing to stop the concentration of equipment. The model I've been working on in fact prepositions an entire brigade in Europe. There it is available for combined arms training for both RegF and ResF companies (remember in the construct, all battalion headquarters are RegF). It could be used there the way CMTC works now (with terrain limitations) several times a year including large numbers of reservists in the summer and large numbers of RegF during the spring/fall.

Remember too that most of our Afghan deployments consisted of battalions that had ResF augmentees and entire companies come from other battalions. Building battle groups out of multiple units has been a necessity for a long time because of our manning issues.

That said, there is nothing wrong with the idea that if the prepositioned brigade needs to be mobilized that it could be done by an existing 30/70 brigade using both their RegF and ResF members or, if a rapid mobilization is required, that it come from a battalion deploying its 30% RegF company and augmented by two other RegF companies from other battalions. The point here is there would be options available that aren't currently available.

A 30/70 construct leaves you no worse off than our current situation but would in fact up the number of deployable manoeuvre brigade headquarters from just three to six and also provide deployable CS and CSS brigade headquarters (vice 10 nondeployable CBG headquarters). On top of that the number of deployable manoeuvre battalion/regimental headquarters would go up by between 20-30% allow for longer times between peacetime rotations on operational deployments. The number of deployable RegF companies roughly stay the same.

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I don't think we're really terribly far off on our general concepts of integrating the Reserves into the Reg Force structure. I think however I'm much more pessimistic about the amount of equipment that will ultimately be made available to the Army than you are. I certainly don't see the equipment required for six Brigades (plus CS and CSS Brigades) PLUS the additional equipment required to cover losses to those Brigades. I'm also less optimistic than you in a workable 30/70 Reg/Res ratio being workable overall across Brigades. I think it's more likely that in order for any given Brigade to be deployable relatively quickly in many areas you might end up being closer to 50/50.

Where as you might lean toward establishing more Brigades (and generating more deployable HQ options) I think that the lack of depth of equipment would likely result in a fairly rapid requirement to re-constitute Brigades and units from other Brigades and units once they start to take losses. My thought is that it would be better to have fewer Brigades but with greater depth in both equipment and manpower in Reserve in order to sustain those units intact. Both ways I guess are technically workable, but to my mind the latter potentially provides greater cohesion.

Another area where we might differ is force composition, but regardless of how the Army ends up being equipped you still need a clear plan on how it will be manned.
 
In your 6 x Brigade/2 x CS Brigade/2 x CSS Brigade structure what would be the proposed Reg/Res ratio of each? Do you envision being able to deploy 2 x Divisions each with 3 x Brigades and one each CS/CSS Brigade? I think that a logical starting point would be to determine what you expect to be able to deploy (and sustain) in your worst case scenario
In my working model only one divisional HQs - 1 Div - is deployable, the other - 2 Div - is an operational HQ but for within Canada and is static.

The deployable force is up to 1 armoured brigade, 1 artillery brigade (with one or more regiments), 1 sustainment brigade and a divisional HQ with other manoeuvre brigades and other enablers coming from NATO partners. This is based primarily on Canadian equipment limitation yet a political will to show a strong flag in NATO.

The model currently looks like this but is under review. (Note that a) 3 Bde is forward deployed equipment with a bde headquarters and maintainers but otherwise only lightly manned. b) I said 6 brigades but there are in fact 5 brigades and 2 Regts (36 and 38)- I'm considering those two regiments in the aggregate as a brigade strength. c) note that individual elements of 2 Div can be deployed on a variety of peacetime missions and may even be tasked to augment any 1 Div deployed force but its primary objective is defence of Canada and, in conjunction with CADTC and its Depot battalions, of force generation. d) during peacetime, any HQ or unit from both divisions can be assigned operational roles.

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If your 30/70 unit may only require enough equipment to be trained during peacetime but it will need the full complement of equipment if it is to be deployed. Plus enough equipment to sustain itself through losses.
True which is why the full brigade's equipment is forward deployed for operations as well as flyover training. Equipment retained in Canada is for training and sustainment of combat losses. The ratio is roughly 1/3 forward and 2/3 home. Overall we have a sustainment issue. This is an attempt to mitigate that.
The fact is that unlike the past, it's often faster to replace trained personnel than it is to replace their equipment. In WW2 Ford's Willow Run Assembly Line was pumping out one B-24 Liberator Bomber PER HOUR at its peak! By contrast F-35 production is 156 per YEAR. Obviously those are pretty extreme examples but the fact is that modern armoured vehicles, weapons, missiles and even things like heavy trucks take much longer to produce than in the past (never minds ships, subs and aircraft) and increasingly a major war will be a "come as you are" affair.
It's been a "come as you are" affair since the 1960s when we forward deployed a brigade to Europe. We've been steadily eroding our capabilities to do that. One of the things which I expect to come out of the Ukraine (if the lesson isn't suppressed by the professionals) is what the delta is between the A team (superior training equipment) and the B and C teams (less well equipped and trained). In a war where mass matters, B and C teams matter (you'll never be able to afford that every element of your force is an A team. That's what's killing the CA Army right now IMHO.)
I think it's important to keep that in mind when planning force structure. Unless you have deep reserves of vehicles, weapons and equipment to replenish your deployed forces then regardless of your manpower pool you'll be forced to consolidate units due to lack of kit.
Yup.
From the websites and blogs I've been following my understanding is that the Russians have mainly been re-building existing units using mobilized troops rather than creating new units. For example I recall reading that the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade that has taken very heavy losses in fighting around Vuhledar has basically been "rebuilt" three times since the war started.
I think you need to do both. Keep veteran units up to strength and build a new force behind them.
However, repeating what I said above I think that replacing our equipment losses will (like is happening with the Russians) be in many ways a greater challenge than recruiting and training replacement personnel. Resorting to older/less effective replacement equipment will likely increase your personnel losses in a manner similar to deploying lesser trained replacement personnel.
Very true but that additional mass of older equipment may make the difference between victory and defeat then those losses may need to be tolerated. Yes, I want a better defence industry, but just as much I want a better equipment usage format where older equipment is relegated to reserve status before it becomes clapped out scrap metal. At least that provides options which you do not have if you work on a divest to buy policy.
Agreed that a Total Force structure is required to make effective use of the Reserves. We're effectively a 70/0 force structure now because Reg Force units aren't fully manned and the Reserves aren't actually integrated into the Reg Force units. That's kind of the worst of all possible worlds when it comes to maintaining combat capability over time in a conflict.

Creating a workable Total Force means either giving the Reserves access to the proper equipment to train on...or having them fulfill roles that can be done with only equipment that they can hold and maintain internally. I suspect that given the geographic/economic/structural challenges we face only a portion of the Reserves can viably do Option A and the rest will likely have to do Option B. The result is that the resulting Reg/Res ratio will likely end up being somewhat greater than 30/70 in many cases for the foreseeable future.
I'm a very strong opponent in using our current reserve model as a guideline for what we can do. The question really is what do we need the reserves to be and then construct the system to get them there. IMHO every country needs an "in an emergency, break glass" capability. The reserves is the most cost effective way to build that. Putting the vast bulk of your resources into the day-to-day full-time force is simply short-sighted.
I don't think we're really terribly far off on our general concepts of integrating the Reserves into the Reg Force structure. I think however I'm much more pessimistic about the amount of equipment that will ultimately be made available to the Army than you are. I certainly don't see the equipment required for six Brigades (plus CS and CSS Brigades) PLUS the additional equipment required to cover losses to those Brigades. I'm also less optimistic than you in a workable 30/70 Reg/Res ratio being workable overall across Brigades. I think it's more likely that in order for any given Brigade to be deployable relatively quickly in many areas you might end up being closer to 50/50.
The basic idea of the 30/70 structure is to use current RegF and ResF manning ceilings and current equipment holdings to build a better trained and structured force. I could easily see the equipment coming if we ever went to a 2% of GDP budget but if we don't we can still manage to grow the equipment by better life cycle allocation. I've previously suggested that equipment be used actively for 2/3 thirds of its expected full-use life cycle and then go into reserve for its last 1/3 (being in reserve extends that full-use life cycle dramatically because it is no longer being fully used but used at reduced rates) Much of our equipment - such as logistics vehicles do not need major refits or upgrades. Even artillery systems are useable for long terms with only very minor refits (let's face it our C3 howitzers have been around from the 1950s) Other, older gear such as APCs and even tanks and IFVs may still have uses. What we need to do, however, is accept the fact that this equipment still needs maintenance and provide for that maintenance. IMHO I'd happily give up an full-time infantry battalion or artillery or armoured regiment for a full-time maintenance battalion (better yet give up three of them for three maintenance battalions). We can generate grunts, gunners and zipperheads out of the ResF (or even off the street recruits) much more easily than skilled maintainers. So long as we retain enough infantry battalions and armoured and artillery regiments to generate development of their leadership for the total force, we can set aside the generation of the mass of their rank and file to alternate concepts.
Where as you might lean toward establishing more Brigades (and generating more deployable HQ options) I think that the lack of depth of equipment would likely result in a fairly rapid requirement to re-constitute Brigades and units from other Brigades and units once they start to take losses. My thought is that it would be better to have fewer Brigades but with greater depth in both equipment and manpower in Reserve in order to sustain those units intact. Both ways I guess are technically workable, but to my mind the latter potentially provides greater cohesion.
I understand your position. And you are right, once you take losses then you start to cannibalize both people and equipment. That's inevitable regardless of how you organize your force. Regardless of how you organize, your ability to absorb losses is limited to the equipment and people on hand initially and your ability to generate new equipment and people over time. By definition, a reserve force, provides you the ability to absorb those losses (of both assuming you equip your reserves) as well as expand that portion of the force that you've set aside for full-time service.

The whole idea behind 30/70 and expanding the number of full-time headquarters is to firstly create reservists more capable of quickly replacing losses and secondly to provide a structure that can more easily deal with peace-time operational rotations and is one that can be built on.
Another area where we might differ is force composition, but regardless of how the Army ends up being equipped you still need a clear plan on how it will be manned.
Absolutely. Don't get too wrapped around the term 30/70. Some units will need to be 100/0, others 70/30, yet others 50/50 in order to do their jobs in both peace and war.

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