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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

That right there is what I consider to be the crux of "stop rearranging "deck chairs." Under the QR&O we can order a reservist to train, but we don't and can't in practical terms anyway.

My thought process goes to a system whereby a reservist joining the CAF has an obligation for mandatory training and the the option to attend additional voluntary training. In addition the individual is subject to full-time active service if his government orders it and is also able to voluntarily agree to tours of temporary full-time service.

The underlying philosophy is get them while they are young and have the time to train in the summers and need money and then reduce the mandatory training requirements when they are older and have other responsibilities in life to the eventual point where there are no training requirements and they are merely on stand-by for a period of time. So - a career looks like this:

1. on enrollment the individual is put on a BTL and attends mandatory training in their summer vacation (2 months for high schoolers, 3-4 for university/college students) and one weekend per month - until they complete their full DP1 qualification. They sign up for an obligatory term of service that covers their time on DP1 training plus, let's say three years or mandatory training at their unit thereafter. No release is given during this time and a refusal to serve results in recovery of training costs like other obligatory service schemes already in use;

2. once DP 1 is complete and the individual is assigned to a unit he is obliged to mandatory training of one weekend per month for ten months and a two week annual summer exercise. That works out to roughly 41.5 training days. The training is rigorously set by the army based on an essential multi-year unit training plan structured to that unit's readiness requirements and role. Federal legislation is prepared to support that mandatory attendance.

3. The individual is allowed to attend on a voluntary basis whatever additional training programs might be available to progress through DP 2 and 3 levels.

4. After the initial term of obligatory service is complete, the individual either goes onto Supp Res status for a fixed term (let's say three years) or else reenlists for another term of mandatory service of 45.5 days per year (and let's include a reenlistment bonus as an incentive). Again, additional voluntary training and service opportunities are made available.

That's it in a nutshell. Anything that does not include mandatory DP1 training, an obligatory service period and mandatory annual unit training is "rearranging the deck chairs." The key is that the service requirements must 1) fit the life cycle of say the 90 percentile of the recruit base we are trying to attract; and 2) the essential unit training required to create an effective force. Everything else is just playing soldier.

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Much of what you say on this, I agree with. However I think it needs strong political will to make it happen. First the CAF hiearchy has to be sold this is best way forward and then next getting politicians on board.
 
There is no planned force reduction.

There is talk of overhead reduction.

And ongoing efforts to weed out the one night a month crowd.
If you take a unit with an authorized strength of 320 and shrink it to 120, and don't alot the positions elsewhere, that is a force reduction of 200 for one unit, that potentially 1000's of positions across the CAF. Some of them aren't currently filled, but many of them are. We aren't talking about only reducing leadership, we shrinking the size of forces at every rank level, while also potentially not allowing units to recruit for years. This is all based on the model that was talk about before and shrinking every reserve unit to one sub-unit.
 
If you take a unit with an authorized strength of 320 and shrink it to 120, and don't alot the positions elsewhere, that is a force reduction of 200 for one unit, that potentially 1000's of positions across the CAF. Some of them aren't currently filled, but many of them are. We aren't talking about only reducing leadership, we shrinking the size of forces at every rank level, while also potentially not allowing units to recruit for years. This is all based on the model that was talk about before and shrinking every reserve unit to one sub-unit.

There is nowhere that I have seen talk of reductions. There may be talk of centralization of functions like recruiting and training to OFP so that units focus exclusively on collective training / mandatory annual training for trained soldiers.

That said, fifty guys who collectively parade 150 days a year being released would not be a net loss to the CAF.
 
I believe my kind went to war last time someone tried to force that book on us.

Or, you know, because it was Thursday ;)

the simpsons scotland GIF
 
There is nowhere that I have seen talk of reductions. There may be talk of centralization of functions like recruiting and training to OFP so that units focus exclusively on collective training / mandatory annual training for trained soldiers.

That said, fifty guys who collectively parade 150 days a year being released would not be a net loss to the CAF.
Mandatory annual training would be a good start.

Make area concentrations mandatory unless their contribution to other things makes up for it.
 
That said, fifty guys who collectively parade 150 days a year being released would not be a net loss to the CAF.
In a way it is. 50 guys doing three parades a year each can still be placed on active duty when the balloon goes up. 50 released guys can't.

But I get your point and it's mine too. There needs to be a minimum period of mandatory annual service which is both doable by the busy student or worker and which provides a certain collective capability in the unit.

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In a way it is. 50 guys doing three parades a year each can still be placed on active duty when the balloon goes up. 50 released guys can't.

But I get your point and it's mine too. There needs to be a minimum period of mandatory annual service which is both doable by the busy student or worker and which provides a certain collective capability in the unit.

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i found the '1 day a month' thing was helpful for those who had a really busy life for a couple of months, like a new baby while working full time etc.

There were very few 'undesirables' who used that policy just to hang on by their finger nails.

Although there's likely some data out there to prove me wrong, as usual ;)
 
i found the '1 day a month' thing was helpful for those who had a really busy life for a couple of months, like a new baby while working full time etc.

There were very few 'undesirables' who used that policy just to hang on by their finger nails.

Although there's likely some data out there to prove me wrong, as usual ;)
There is a foundational difference between the "short term unavailable" and the "chronic unavailable".

Like the career Cpl whose day job is busy, then rearranges availability to deploy for 6 months while taking a pay cut.
 
And as a former civilian employer any restructuring needs to deal with the issue of job protection. A few collective agreements cover military leave but most don't. And the majority of workplaces are not unionized
 
If you take a unit with an authorized strength of 320 and shrink it to 120, and don't alot the positions elsewhere, that is a force reduction of 200 for one unit, that potentially 1000's of positions across the CAF. Some of them aren't currently filled, but many of them are. We aren't talking about only reducing leadership, we shrinking the size of forces at every rank level, while also potentially not allowing units to recruit for years. This is all based on the model that was talk about before and shrinking every reserve unit to one sub-unit.
You are being intellectually lazy. No model presented in this thread does what you describe. There is a proposals that converts established mission sub-units into units and consolidate them into larger formation battalions. It has also been explained to you that such proposed reorganizations would consolidate the training organizations (and unit BTLs) into separate larger organizations. Bands also get hived off into fewer consolidated organizations.

You keep banging on about some large number (originally 250 now seemingly 320) that you seemingly plucked from your backside, and then comparing it to 120 (also plucked from the same backside) and declaring a that means personnel are being reduced. But your made up unit numbers don’t mean anything, and they are not even useful hypotheticals when you seemingly don’t know/understand where those numbers come from in the current organization - which are OFP in the mission sub-unit(s), which are training staff, which are BTL on or await course, and how many are in the band.
 
Not advocating for that.

Just 10 days or so over the summer. First couple of days is APRV, Force tests and IBTS. The rest can be spent on collective BTS.

The rest of the year is other training and tasks.

The eternal search for consistency across the Reserves in terms of annual training standards has been an amazing odyssey to behold over the years.

The FORCE test/ BFT and PWT were about the only two things that have ever been able to be enforced.

If they want to increase the ability of more troops to DAG Green for OP LENTUS etc, they should probably add a 'dental fit' requirement to those two as that item seemed to disqualify an amazing number of troops on a regular basis...
 
You keep banging on about some large number (originally 250 now seemingly 320) that you seemingly plucked from your backside
I'm agreeing with you but just a minor correction.

I'm not sure where he's getting those figures from either, but the ARE does provide for units as large as he is indicating. For example the Lorne Scots are configured for a unit HQ and two rifle coys that bring them to an establishment of 300. The folks with the blue hackles in Ottawa are ARE'd at 349. Most units, by far, are around 200 more or less but vary widely. On top of that, the ARE establishment is the max establishment and not necessarily the paid strength of the unit nor it's trained strength nor its allocation to mission elements.

There has, in the past been constant tension as the possibility of amalgamating units as was done in the 1960s. With good reason - it was poorly done and didn't work. Units, however, are amalgamating unofficially into tactical groups to ease administrative and training issues. They've been amalgamating for exercise purposes as long as I can remember back to those same 1960s.

IMHO, amalgamation into full units, does need to be done if the army ever decides to get serious about ARes reform. But it must be under very specific circumstances:

1) the establishment should parallel the RegF equivalent and provide for the equivalent equipment holdings;

2) where possible amalgamated units should form distinct companies in the same battalion - i.e. a coy of Wexford Highlanders, a coy of Belville Fusiliers and a coy of the bay City Regiment. - The reason for this is two fold: a) quiet the opposition from within the ARes establishments and local communities; and b) facilitate expansion under mobilization where a given battalion provides the core of three mobilized battalions.

3) there must be an integral RegF cadre - IMHO the battalion HQ and one full rifle coy are the minimum - these provide full oversight, an administrative and training cadre, a quick mobilization base/operational deployment base and RegF authority and responsibility for the unit

4) all the other things about employer legislation, mission roles etc etc that I've been banging on for years.

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