Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Greene]

Just saw this on Canadian army website. I guess this is the basic restructuring plan that will be rolled out. They specifically mention a fires brigade and integrated combined arms reserve battalions for the maneuver division. I wonder how that will shape out without a massive infusion of personal and kit.

The Evolving Canadian Army - Canada.ca

The Canadian Army (CA) is modernizing to counter evolving global threats and safeguard national sovereignty. As part of this transformation, the Army will increase its agility and empower its soldiers by shifting operational management to the divisional level, while the CA Headquarters (HQ)...

www.canada.ca

I don't think anyone else has posted this yet. There's a new 20-page overview of the modernization priorities and force structure:

Inflection Point 2025 - Canada.ca

Inflection Point 2025 signals a generational shift in how all elements of the Canadian Army (CA) will be structured, equipped, trained, sustained, and integrated.

www.canada.ca

 

[Kilted]

You are being intellectually lazy. No model presented in this thread does what you describe. There is a proposals that converts established mission sub-units into units and consolidate them into larger formation battalions. It has also been explained to you that such proposed reorganizations would consolidate the training organizations (and unit BTLs) into separate larger organizations. Bands also get hived off into fewer consolidated organizations.

You keep banging on about some large number (originally 250 now seemingly 320) that you seemingly plucked from your backside, and then comparing it to 120 (also plucked from the same backside) and declaring a that means personnel are being reduced. But your made up unit numbers don’t mean anything, and they are not even useful hypotheticals when you seemingly don’t know/understand where those numbers come from in the current organization - which are OFP in the mission sub-unit(s), which are training staff, which are BTL on or await course, and how many are in the band.

I'm referring to the graph that presented each unit as being reduced to a sub-unit. 250 (actual) and 320 (authorized) are approximates from my own unit I am referring to that specific example. 120 is the approximate size of a dismounted Infantry company. I am well aware of the extra elements that make up battalion and brigade headquarters, I am simply saying that even taking these into consideration, there would still be a large number of individuals left out in the cold based on the specific ORBAT shared a few pages ago.

 

[McG]

I'm not sure where he's getting those figures from either, but the ARE does provide for units as large as he is indicating. For example the Lorne Scots are configured for a unit HQ and two rifle coys that bring them to an establishment of 300.

Yes, there are units established with two mission sub-units. But he was also told the proposal he is railing against preserves extant mission sub-units as new company sized units. There is no 320 (or 250) becoming 120 unless one fundamentally doesn’t understand how units are actually organized.

 

[McG]

I'm referring to the graph that presented each unit as being reduced to a sub-unit. 250 (actual) and 320 (authorized) are approximates from my own unit I am referring to that specific example. 120 is the approximate size of a dismounted Infantry company. I am well aware of the extra elements that make up battalion and brigade headquarters, I am simply saying that even taking these into consideration, there would still be a large number of individuals left out in the cold based on the specific ORBAT shared a few pages ago.

What unit?
How many established mission sub-units?
How many OFP vs pre-OFP?
Is there a band?

Did you look closely at the org chart that concerns you to see how many companies were proposed to perpetuate the regimental name?

 

[Fabius]

• Combined arms Reserve battalions for flexible operations

Promising.

Here’s what might be in discussion for this.

Likely a total of 4 CARBs.
Reservists would sign up for 12-24 months of Class C. Talk is mostly of 24 with some push back that 12 is more realistic to expect.

Readiness would rotate among them and the individual augmentation to the deployed Reg force would come out of these Bns.

These aren’t really permanent Bns, but open to any applicable trades and are separate and on top of the existing reserve units.

Not real clear but basically a new form of discontinued ARCG and TBGs.

Dismounted Inf and Light Cav focused with minimal new equipment. Intended to reinforce the Manoeuvre Div on mobilization as rear area security units.

Overall all indications are the reserves will be tasked with domestic operations (support to civilian agencies for fires, floods etc) and defence of Canada tasks such as vital point security. Mobilization of the Reserves into a second war fighting division is a theoretical capability retained by the national division.

 

[PrairieFella]

Minimal new kit is fucked, reserve kit quality and VOR is beyond critical.

I hope theyre careful with this and do not allow deployments only for reservists that sign up for the 24 month class c. Gutting outcans in favour of domops for the general reserve is a fantastic way to crater reserve morale. Most reservists did not sign up to be primarily tier 3 wildland firefighters. They signed up to soldier.

 

[ueo]

Given the fact that there are many reserve regiments who compliments much larger than a company, how would the military reduce them in strength? Would they try to create incentives for extra people to leave the military, or would they not allow these units to recruit until they shrunk below company size? I know some units have at least twice the personnel who would be required.

Which ones?

I'm agreeing with you but just a minor correction.

I'm not sure where he's getting those figures from either, but the ARE does provide for units as large as he is indicating. For example the Lorne Scots are configured for a unit HQ and two rifle coys that bring them to an establishment of 300. The folks with the blue hackles in Ottawa are ARE'd at 349. Most units, by far, are around 200 more or less but vary widely. On top of that, the ARE establishment is the max establishment and not necessarily the paid strength of the unit nor it's trained strength nor its allocation to mission elements.

There has, in the past been constant tension as the possibility of amalgamating units as was done in the 1960s. With good reason - it was poorly done and didn't work. Units, however, are amalgamating unofficially into tactical groups to ease administrative and training issues. They've been amalgamating for exercise purposes as long as I can remember back to those same 1960s.

IMHO, amalgamation into full units, does need to be done if the army ever decides to get serious about ARes reform. But it must be under very specific circumstances:

1) the establishment should parallel the RegF equivalent and provide for the equivalent equipment holdings;

2) where possible amalgamated units should form distinct companies in the same battalion - i.e. a coy of Wexford Highlanders, a coy of Belville Fusiliers and a coy of the bay City Regiment. - The reason for this is two fold: a) quiet the opposition from within the ARes establishments and local communities; and b) facilitate expansion under mobilization where a given battalion provides the core of three mobilized battalions.

3) there must be an integral RegF cadre - IMHO the battalion HQ and one full rifle coy are the minimum - these provide full oversight, an administrative and training cadre, a quick mobilization base/operational deployment base and RegF authority and responsibility for the unit

4) all the other things about employer legislation, mission roles etc etc that I've been banging on for years.

1. above has been tried several times, seems to run afoul of regtl senates and local politics.
3, Agree, presuming the RF cadre DAGS fit, to date many posns have been used by CMs as "holding" for those no longer interested in soldiering.
Dynamite the whole thing and start over. What worked in 39-45 doesnt' make it any more. Served on early RSS and later iterations so opinion based on primary obsn.

 

[ueo]

An effective Senate leverages senior former members and Honoraries to help the unit through the CO and RSM.

A poor quality Senate hangs around the bar and complains about the Rosa Rifle and everything after.

And how many "effective" senates are there? Most are old farts trying to protect what once was or local pols trying to ride a train on which they have no experience and, beyond reelection, don't give a RA! As an aside, why does it take 2-3(minimum) years to have Honoraries approved?

 

[dapaterson]

And how many "effective" senates are there? Most are old farts trying to protect what once was or local pols trying to ride a train on which they have no experience and, beyond reelection, don't give a RA! As an aside, why does it take 2-3(minimum) years to have Honoraries approved?

When I had some peripheral involvement in that process years ago, the longest delays were internal to units and brigades.

 

[FJAG]

Which ones?

1. above has been tried several times, seems to run afoul of regtl senates and local politics.

What hasn't been tried is to fully equip the unit and to give it a mobilization task beyond that of individual augmentation. The closest it came was 10/90 in the artillery where several regiments were given the equivalent of a full C3 battery, additional RegF staff and roles to provide a battery to a given RegF regiment. It was successful in the artillery but fell apart in the army due to the cock-up that the infantry made of their 'experiment' and because the post 4 CMBG glut of personnel had evaporated and the RegF corps wanted their PYs back.

3, Agree, presuming the RF cadre DAGS fit, to date many posns have been used by CMs as "holding" for those no longer interested in soldiering.

This is why, IMHO, designated war-tasked ARes units should be commanded by RegF officers who will call out and push back against those types of practices. What I see in the current model to go back to an ARes that is mostly separate and apart from the RegF is even greater abuses.

Dynamite the whole thing and start over.

Yup! and No! There is a structure there to build on but it needs some radical surgery in order to save the body.

What worked in 39-45 doesnt' make it any more. Served on early RSS and later iterations so opinion based on primary obsn.

Yeah. Me too. Did an RSS tour back in the mid 70's. before leaving the artillery to become a ResF legal officer. I've seen the warts of the system and can see a way forward. It should be successful because it ruffles ARes and RegF feathers equally. Both sides need to be taken out of their comfort zones. The way that this latest attempt at transformation looks, is IMHO, designed to cater to the RegF side of the "total army" while ensuring that the ARes side withers into total uselessness for actual war-fighting.

 

[Rifleman62]

The way that this latest attempt at transformation looks, is IMHO, designed to cater to the RegF side of the "total army" while ensuring that the ARes side withers into total uselessness for actual war-fighting.

It is similar to the Militia of the 60's when I joined. We did National Survival. Training was rescuing citizens after a nuclear bomb. Knots and lashes, first aid, methods of rescue from distinct types of bldg. collapses. Issued black coveralls, a WW1 steel helmet , belt and water bottle (from WW2). No other kit.

We still did annual range practices with WW2 wpns - BREN, Sten and eventually the FN replacing the Lee Enfield. This is the early 60's!

We still had a fair number of Second World War and Korea Vets in the unit and they were disgusted.

The Reg F head shed doesn't want to spend funds on the PRes.

 

[PrairieFella]

Im not liking what im hearing about the reserves. Theyre bringing back SQ which is excellent but from what Ive heard DP1 may be optional or done when augmenting the field force. Cutting even more from the reserves...no kit, no training and a bunch of sandbagging...I hope Im hearing wrong.

 

[FJAG]

Im not liking what im hearing about the reserves. Theyre bringing back SQ which is excellent but from what Ive heard DP1 may be optional or done when augmenting the field force. Cutting even more from the reserves...no kit, no training and a bunch of sandbagging...I hope Im hearing wrong.

DP 1 isn't optional. At some point it needs to be done and, like @Rifleman62, I'm an old guy, whose service goes back to 65, and I've seen different iterations of how things are done and all of them can work.

If you take a look at the ARE which currently governs the ARes structure, you find that every unit's HQ & Svcs coy/sqn/bty has a Trg Offr (C-Lt) and NCO and a training Cadre of 9 pers (1 offr, 4 Snr NCOs, 4 Jnr NCOs) all of which are over and above the bn's/regt's field coy, sqn or bty(s). That ought to be adequate to sustain annual DP1 and DP 2 training at the unit level.

Each bde has a G3 cell of 10 people (6 offr, 4 Snr NCOs) who manage individual and collective training. There is no staff, like at the unit for effecting training.

The divisions do have divisional training centres that cater to both RegF and ARes training. Their establishments vary but give or take around 100 RegF and 30 or so ARes each.

The problem is how all of these are staffed and tasked throughout the year and especially during the max ARes training periods in the summer. The number of positions allocated by the system to ARes individual training is adequate to run both DP1 and 2 non-commissioned member training (officers is a different issue left to the CTC). Staffing it, how its staffed and managed is another issue entirely.

Like you this restructure concerns me. I see it regressive for many reasons.

It's hypocritical to at one level talk about "integrating the force" and at another level dividing it.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If Inflection Point 2025 suggests the army should become more innovative and open to experimentation, an early experiment for DomOps would be to establish a standing tasking for a company group's worth of strong backs that Res F needing or wanting FT employment can sign onto for 6 month stints, living in dorms (quarters) and conducting IT or OJT alongside Reg F when not otherwise employed. See whether it flourishes or flounders, and whether it overcomes the "can't call out enough Res F bodies in time to make a difference" problem.

 

[Rifleman62]

Does this reorg of the CA PRes mean the end of the Artic Response taskings; the end of the QOR of C jump tasking?

New qualification badge to replace cross rifles etc:

 

[boredtoon]

Having read the draft canadian Army Modernization Order, seen the approved army restructure, we can all calm down. No PRes unit is going away, or being reduced in size. the CAMO specifically states that healthy reserve units may be tactically grouped with under strength units until they can grow to full strength. The purpose of the reserve division is described as a dedicated and surge formation, the operational backbone for territorial defence and provides the framework for mobilization. None of what is written in the CAMO is any different than what it is already understood to be the roles of the reserve.

RQIP (Infantry DP1) isn't going away. A new 'Employable Functional Point" is being introduced. After BMQ, if soldiers cant get onto a DP1 within 2 months, they will complete an SQ-esque course that will allow them to be employed by their units while they wait on DP1. This course teaches the basics of weapons handling, section attacks, and field craft. It will be a particular benefit to the PRes, who often have more troops waiting on DP1 than there are spots. This will allow soldiers to get out of PAT platoon. This is desirable, historically, soldiers who don't get out of PAT platoon within their first 12 months in the PRes VR before getting trade qualified.

 

[FJAG]

If Inflection Point 2025 suggests the army should become more innovative and open to experimentation, an early experiment for DomOps would be to establish a standing tasking for a company group's worth of strong backs that Res F needing or wanting FT employment can sign onto for 6 month stints, living in dorms (quarters) and conducting IT or OJT alongside Reg F when not otherwise employed. See whether it flourishes or flounders, and whether it overcomes the "can't call out enough Res F bodies in time to make a difference" problem.

Every time I see a solution which includes a standing force offering FT employment to reservists I think we're missing the plot and the purpose of reservists is that they are, by definition PT service until required.

Do we want a company group of strong backs then by all means designate several Ares engr units for that task and when needed a) ask for volunteers for the temporary duty, and b) if not enough volunteer then call the balance out for service by order of the MND pursuant to QR&O 9.04(3) in the event of an "emergency" and if not an "emergency" by the governor in council pursuant to the NDA s 33(2)(b).

Here's the innovation: the government actually uses the powers it has rather than the CAF coming up with expensive solutions that simply expand on the size of the RegF by other means.

 

[MilEME09]

Having read the draft canadian Army Modernization Order, seen the approved army restructure, we can all calm down. No PRes unit is going away, or being reduced in size. the CAMO specifically states that healthy reserve units may be tactically grouped with under strength units until they can grow to full strength. The purpose of the reserve division is described as a dedicated and surge formation, the operational backbone for territorial defence and provides the framework for mobilization. None of what is written in the CAMO is any different than what it is already understood to be the roles of the reserve.

RQIP (Infantry DP1) isn't going away. A new 'Employable Functional Point" is being introduced. After BMQ, if soldiers cant get onto a DP1 within 2 months, they will complete an SQ-esque course that will allow them to be employed by their units while they wait on DP1. This course teaches the basics of weapons handling, section attacks, and field craft. It will be a particular benefit to the PRes, who often have more troops waiting on DP1 than there are spots. This will allow soldiers to get out of PAT platoon. This is desirable, historically, soldiers who don't get out of PAT platoon within their first 12 months in the PRes VR before getting trade qualified.

I've also read the Res force battleschools at the CBGs will see an increase in manning and scope which should allow more DP1 courses held locally by the CBGs. Already my unit is working on a DP1.3 Weapons course proposal, approved by the school, waiting on CO and Div approval, once implemented it would mean we could do all of DP1 in house.

 

[FJAG]

I've also read the Res force battleschools at the CBGs will see an increase in manning and scope which should allow more DP1 courses held locally by the CBGs. Already my unit is working on a DP1.3 Weapons course proposal, approved by the school, waiting on CO and Div approval, once implemented it would mean we could do all of DP1 in house.

There is a structural problem with CBG battle schools which simply comes from the career profile of the average reservist.

There is a perpetual problem in finding enough Class A reservists to properly man these structures. Vacancies aren't enough, you need warm bodies senior enough to do the teaching and those are typically the ones who have jobs and don't have much time to give during the winter on Class A and certainly not in the summer on Class B.

Conversely, full-time positions, whether Class A or RegF, are generally underemployed in the winter and looking for leave in the summer.

I'll admit my info on this is purely anecdotal and on only a few sample that indicates its a universal problem.

 

[Seyek]

Having read the draft canadian Army Modernization Order, seen the approved army restructure, we can all calm down. No PRes unit is going away, or being reduced in size. the CAMO specifically states that healthy reserve units may be tactically grouped with under strength units until they can grow to full strength. The purpose of the reserve division is described as a dedicated and surge formation, the operational backbone for territorial defence and provides the framework for mobilization. None of what is written in the CAMO is any different than what it is already understood to be the roles of the reserve.

RQIP (Infantry DP1) isn't going away. A new 'Employable Functional Point" is being introduced. After BMQ, if soldiers cant get onto a DP1 within 2 months, they will complete an SQ-esque course that will allow them to be employed by their units while they wait on DP1. This course teaches the basics of weapons handling, section attacks, and field craft. It will be a particular benefit to the PRes, who often have more troops waiting on DP1 than there are spots. This will allow soldiers to get out of PAT platoon. This is desirable, historically, soldiers who don't get out of PAT platoon within their first 12 months in the PRes VR before getting trade qualified.

If we can't get troops onto DP1 because we don't have enough staff (or equipment) to run the course, then I'm not sure how we expect to run an entire additional course as a stopgap until they can get into DP1. Unless the plan is to let units sign people off on certain things locally done on parade nights and weekends, but that further burdens the unit. Are there any details on how this will work?