Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[MilEME09]

There is a structural problem with CBG battle schools which simply comes from the career profile of the average reservist.

There is a perpetual problem in finding enough Class A reservists to properly man these structures. Vacancies aren't enough, you need warm bodies senior enough to do the teaching and those are typically the ones who have jobs and don't have much time to give during the winter on Class A and certainly not in the summer on Class B.

Conversely, full-time positions, whether Class A or RegF, are generally underemployed in the winter and looking for leave in the summer.

I'll admit my info on this is purely anecdotal and on only a few sample that indicates its a universal problem.

Agreed I would say we need a handful of full timers in the battleschools to run them, followed by class B and class A augmentation

 

[Brad Sallows]

From "Canada's tanks":

Let's be clear. The CA is positioning itself to generate a expeditionary deployable division and another to generate forces for operations in Canada and for augmentation to the expeditionary division.

Bear in mind my response is for "I have no trouble with administrative battalions, brigades, divisions and corps." (@Kirkhill). It's possible to have all kinds of divisions: infantry, armoured, artillery, air, etc - even training divisions. The "domestic" division is going to be some kind of employment organization. I did not get the impression it will command various bases and schools and depots and whatnot all over Canada. There is a point to regionally-based administrative/support/mobilization commands and calling them something that does not militate confusion with combat formations.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Adding in Army specific Areas and Districts just adds to HQ bloat with doing nothing to support or field the Operational Army.

I suppose I'm looking a bit beyond. Canada should crunch some numbers well before a big war starts just how big it's forces are going to be, and plan ahead for that. For the army, a two-corps, six-division force might be the aim. A regionally-based framework for mobilizing to a target and sustaining it is one solution, particularly if it mitigates the need to move large numbers of people around (here for recruit training, there for IT, that place for levels 3-5, etc).

 

[boredtoon]

If we can't get troops onto DP1 because we don't have enough staff (or equipment) to run the course, then I'm not sure how we expect to run an entire additional course as a stopgap until they can get into DP1. Unless the plan is to let units sign people off on certain things locally done on parade nights and weekends, but that further burdens the unit. Are there any details on how this will work?

No details yet on the proposed SQ that I could find. But based on the broad scope of the course, I would be confident betting that staff who can teach BMQ can teach this. At least on the ARes side, we aren't struggling to get troops through BMQ. Its the DP1s.

When you look at staff requirements, for a BMQ its 1x Off, 2Lt-Capt, 1x Sgt-WO Crse 2IC, 3x MCpl-Sgts as sect comds, 3x MCpls as Sect 2ICs, 2x Admin NCO/Drivers. For an RQIP, its the same staff requirements, except now all have to be qualified infanteers, plus a section of demo. In theory, your CBG battleschool staff could teach a BMQ then teach an SQ. The individual units would staff their various DP1s for the summer.

It is for sure a band-aid solution, but with every unit being told to grow, there just isn't enough NCOs/Offiers to run enough DP1s. They need something to do with the new troops until the NCO backlog is handled.

 

[Remius]

No details yet on the proposed SQ that I could find. But based on the broad scope of the course, I would be confident betting that staff who can teach BMQ can teach this. At least on the ARes side, we aren't struggling to get troops through BMQ. Its the DP1s.

When you look at staff requirements, for a BMQ its 1x Off, 2Lt-Capt, 1x Sgt-WO Crse 2IC, 3x MCpl-Sgts as sect comds, 3x MCpls as Sect 2ICs, 2x Admin NCO/Drivers. For an RQIP, its the same staff requirements, except now all have to be qualified infanteers, plus a section of demo. In theory, your CBG battleschool staff could teach a BMQ then teach an SQ. The individual units would staff their various DP1s for the summer.

It is for sure a band-aid solution, but with every unit being told to grow, there just isn't enough NCOs/Offiers to run enough DP1s. They need something to do with the new troops until the NCO backlog is handled.

If it is anything like the last time, SQs were disproportionately manned by combat arms and specifically infantry types which had an adverse effect on manning those DP1s

 

[Seyek]

And from my personal experiences I wouldn't trust the vast majority of non-combat arms to run the SQ, and there aren't a lot to begin with either. If we brought SQ back for combat arms in general and stripped those elements out of our DP1s we could still achieve the same goal but open the instructor pool to all the combat arms (with a couple non-combat arms tossed in to help supplement if needed).

I'm going to beat the same drum I've been beating for years, if you want to run training full time for six months (Co-Op and summer) and almost every weekend outside of that you basically need a full time staff*. You could also run a full time course or two outside the usual schedule if the candidates are there. Same staff would have to understand from the beginning their summers are their busy periods, but for half of the eyar tehy can get most of the week off. Same pers could run PAT platoons for some evenings to to take that burden off units.

*Staff should all be competent, experienced, supervised by equally competent leadership and properly supported with all required kit

No details yet on the proposed SQ that I could find. But based on the broad scope of the course, I would be confident betting that staff who can teach BMQ can teach this. At least on the ARes side, we aren't struggling to get troops through BMQ. Its the DP1s.

When you look at staff requirements, for a BMQ its 1x Off, 2Lt-Capt, 1x Sgt-WO Crse 2IC, 3x MCpl-Sgts as sect comds, 3x MCpls as Sect 2ICs, 2x Admin NCO/Drivers. For an RQIP, its the same staff requirements, except now all have to be qualified infanteers, plus a section of demo. In theory, your CBG battleschool staff could teach a BMQ then teach an SQ. The individual units would staff their various DP1s for the summer.

It is for sure a band-aid solution, but with every unit being told to grow, there just isn't enough NCOs/Offiers to run enough DP1s. They need something to do with the new troops until the NCO backlog is handled.

Maybe its a regional thing but is it not also primarily combat arms, heavy emphasis on infantry, teaching the BMQs where you're at as well?

 

[Kirkhill]

How fast are Ukraine and Russia burning through infantry?

How long does it take to train them?

How long does it take for the shock to wear off and becomr acclimatized to operations at the front?

 

[Underway]

. Are there any details on how this will work?

Of course not. PRes is as always regional and how this works in each region will likely differ. Consider this a warning order. Standby for GI.

 

[boredtoon]

If it is anything like the last time, SQs were disproportionately manned by combat arms and specifically infantry types which had an adverse effect on manning those DP1s

Maybe! SQ was a bit before my time. I taught either the last BMQ-L or the second last BMQ-L to run in the brigade, and only two of the staff were infantry, myself and the Crse 2IC. The rest of the staff were a mix between armoured and artillery (which make up the bulk of the reserve units in that area).

 

[FJAG]

From "Canada's tanks":

Bear in mind my response is for "I have no trouble with administrative battalions, brigades, divisions and corps." (@Kirkhill). It's possible to have all kinds of divisions: infantry, armoured, artillery, air, etc - even training divisions. The "domestic" division is going to be some kind of employment organization. I did not get the impression it will command various bases and schools and depots and whatnot all over Canada. There is a point to regionally-based administrative/support/mobilization commands and calling them something that does not militate confusion with combat formations.

I also have the impression that short of some "all-in" necessity neither division will deploy and command brigades. My expectation is that in ordinary situations we are dealing with the existing CJOC and regional JTF system. My understanding from elsewhere though is that there will be a separate system for infrastructure and support management. In addition definitely the RegF division may need to deploy on an expeditionary operation, like 1 Div is now and that possibly the ARes division may need to deploy as a HQ on a domestic op (remember we did deploy a div HQ on the 1997 Winnipeg flood)

One can have training divisions. But when your aim is to develop deployable brigades and battalions, then the framework needs to be more realistic than an admin headquarters. It should be one where the various battalion and brigade headquarters can be exercised in a realistic setting. Otherwise you are giving up a significant part of the combat potential of the force in exchange for administrative ease. Same issue for equipment. Why buy something limited to domestic training use when you really need a line of serviceable military pattern equipment to replace the hundreds of vehicle casualties you have and to deploy a further expanded combat capable force when necessary. One of the secrets of allied success was how rapidly they could replace combat casualties, both personnel and equipment. The Germans couldn't match that rate.

While districts did exist during WW2 and after until 1953, the formation organizations were all divisions and districts until the the Kennedy board changed everything into commands, areas and militia groups.

Personally I think that one of the tricks of deterrence is to look as combat capable as you can. Districts neither make you look combat capable nor make you combat capable. Canada needs all the help in can get. I'm perfectly happy with JTF's as the employment arms in domestic ops. But the army structure needs proper brigades and battalions.

 

[MilEME09]

Maybe its a regional thing but is it not also primarily combat arms, heavy emphasis on infantry, teaching the BMQs where you're at as well?

The continental division as it is currently being referred to as, isn't that much different from the current reserve structure. The key difference is the CBG's report to an area HQ (3 of them total) who then report to Div HQ. Over all though by 2040 the goal is a massive increase in the ARes footprint. With most brigades doubling in size, no new units, simply increasing authorized strength of units doing well, and allowing them to grow potentially up full peace time strength of 80-90% of what of regiment/battalion should be. This increase in manpower in turn will increase the pool available for domestic and expeditionary ops, and for training. I am also hearing many of schools will once again establish branches in western Canada to suit the needs of the western units.

 

[PrairieFella]

The continental division as it is currently being referred to as, isn't that much different from the current reserve structure. The key difference is the CBG's report to an area HQ (3 of them total) who then report to Div HQ. Over all though by 2040 the goal is a massive increase in the ARes footprint. With most brigades doubling in size, no new units, simply increasing authorized strength of units doing well, and allowing them to grow potentially up full peace time strength of 80-90% of what of regiment/battalion should be. This increase in manpower in turn will increase the pool available for domestic and expeditionary ops, and for training. I am also hearing many of schools will once again establish branches in western Canada to suit the needs of the western units.

Good to hear the possibility of new schools. Shilo and Wainwright would be excellent locations for Arty School West and Armoury School West respectively.

 

[MilEME09]

Good to hear the possibility of new schools. Shilo and Wainwright would be excellent locations for Arty School West and Armoury School West respectively.

Armour school west just makes sense, if 1 CMBG is going to be heavy cav with two Tank battalions, but the rest will be MCAV, having a school just for tanks in suffield or wainwright makes logical sense, why would we send people to learn tanks in gagetown if they are all in edmonton?

 

[PrairieFella]

Armour school west just makes sense, if 1 CMBG is going to be heavy cav with two Tank battalions, but the rest will be MCAV, having a school just for tanks in suffield or wainwright makes logical sense, why would we send people to learn tanks in gagetown if they are all in edmonton?

Armour School East could be MCAV/LCAV and supplementary courses like UAS and Assault Troop. All tank prioritized in Wx.

 

[IRepoCans]

And from my personal experiences I wouldn't trust the vast majority of non-combat arms to run the SQ, and there aren't a lot to begin with either. If we brought SQ back for combat arms in general and stripped those elements out of our DP1s we could still achieve the same goal but open the instructor pool to all the combat arms (with a couple non-combat arms tossed in to help supplement if needed).

I'm going to beat the same drum I've been beating for years, if you want to run training full time for six months (Co-Op and summer) and almost every weekend outside of that you basically need a full time staff*. You could also run a full time course or two outside the usual schedule if the candidates are there. Same staff would have to understand from the beginning their summers are their busy periods, but for half of the eyar tehy can get most of the week off. Same pers could run PAT platoons for some evenings to to take that burden off units.

*Staff should all be competent, experienced, supervised by equally competent leadership and properly supported with all required kit



Maybe its a regional thing but is it not also primarily combat arms, heavy emphasis on infantry, teaching the BMQs where you're at as well?

Since I'm in the loop within your AOR, there is a full time instructional staff, has been for four years doing both full time and part time courses concurrent (who have been responsible for keeping the bde's IT afloat for the same time frame). The problem within that particular bde has been the class A pers (lack thereof or quality of instructor) to instruct despite being the largest CBG around, hell the only Tor Scot that actually taught on DP1s/BMQs with actual consistency within the past 5 years was Kevin before he took a more stable job for his family.

As much as I like to bitch about institutional problems (and trust me I do), 32 CBGs issue is a cultural one, the bde's gotten 60 or so new infantry MCpls or Sgts within the past four years. Yet all I've seen in person and in CFTPO are the same 16 or so instructors on 4-6 BMQ/DP1s (plus the other courses they have to run and support) every year (most of whom are the FTIC) and then units have the gull to complain about the lack of candidates they get through BMQ/DP1 (when they have provided zero instructors) and laurel themselves over barely supporting an IBMG or supporting a PLQ (by sending their RSS staff to teach on it because none of their dozen or so NCOs in these units can't be assed to do so).

 

[Brad Sallows]

Three things we've chewed over ad nauseum:

• people moving into the zones of MCpl and Sgt are also moving into the zones for the long-term patterns of their lives, many of which do not accommodate long full-time (summer) taskings
• there is a critical mass below which units lack enough NCOs to simultaneously staff part-time (weekend) courses and exercises to achieve annual collective training benchmarks, or for which a sufficient fraction of NCOs will be available for the long taskings; most units are probably below it
• the causes which prevent units from reaching that sufficient NCO mass are various: imposed size ceilings, interruptions of the recruiting/training stream (mainly due to budget on/off fuckery), crappy unit and formation planning that produces lumpy surges in the pipeline, crappy unit leadership, rise and fall in demand for Res F augmentation which has a short-term (people away) effect and long-term (people opting for CT afterward) effect

Assume some given standards of IT, and some given BTS to be met within, say, 3 year cycles. I suppose the Res F is too small to execute both on its own. Assume there is some size at which it could do all that without much Reg F staffing (leaving aside all the other excellent reasons for a blended Res F). To get there would require a plan and an uninterrupted commitment to providing the resources without which the plan fails. Based on history, achieving the latter requirement - an uninterrupted commitment spanning years into decades - is improbable.

To push through the unsatisfactory status quo requires a long-term structural change to Res F schools: more of them, without a dependency on Res F staffing, some established where the people to be trained live (part-time courses). That would take care of the recruiting/training stream. I suppose adoption of one of the handful of commonly-proposed Reg/Res blended unit models would take care of pretty much everything else.

 

[PrairieFella]

On the armoured side at least a large bottleneck for the reserves is the change in policy requiring reservists to have a PCF gunnery course to take RQ MCpl/Sgt. Makes sense at first look but then you realize they wont load us on LAV or tank quals unless deploying and reserve units often arent allocated any 40mm for TAPV courses, assuming any of the brigade tapvs are runner-gunners (many of which arent). This has created a huge bottleneck where dozens of people scramble for a handful of reserve gunnery course positions a year. Its unsustainable. Its a textbook example of not considering second-order effects of policy adjustments.

 

[Remius]

On the armoured side at least a large bottleneck for the reserves is the change in policy requiring reservists to have a PCF gunnery course to take RQ MCpl/Sgt. Makes sense at first look but then you realize they wont load us on LAV or tank quals unless deploying and reserve units often arent allocated any 40mm for TAPV courses, assuming any of the brigade tapvs are runner-gunners (many of which arent). This has created a huge bottleneck where dozens of people scramble for a handful of reserve gunnery course positions a year. Its unsustainable. Its a textbook example of not considering second-order effects of policy adjustments.

Kind of like removing the C6 Pwt and kicking to units. But ammo is only allotted for IBMGs which troops can’t go on without that sup. And since IBMG is an ISCC requirement it means we can’t make MCpls…

 

[dapaterson]

The CAF is unwilling to invest personnel in the individual training enterprise.

 

[Seyek]

Since I'm in the loop within your AOR, there is a full time instructional staff, has been for four years doing both full time and part time courses concurrent (who have been responsible for keeping the bde's IT afloat for the same time frame). The problem within that particular bde has been the class A pers (lack thereof or quality of instructor) to instruct despite being the largest CBG around, hell the only Tor Scot that actually taught on DP1s/BMQs with actual consistency within the past 5 years was Kevin before he took a more stable job for his family.

As much as I like to bitch about institutional problems (and trust me I do), 32 CBGs issue is a cultural one, the bde's gotten 60 or so new infantry MCpls or Sgts within the past four years. Yet all I've seen in person and in CFTPO are the same 16 or so instructors on 4-6 BMQ/DP1s (plus the other courses they have to run and support) every year (most of whom are the FTIC) and then units have the gull to complain about the lack of candidates they get through BMQ/DP1 (when they have provided zero instructors) and laurel themselves over barely supporting an IBMG or supporting a PLQ (by sending their RSS staff to teach on it because none of their dozen or so NCOs in these units can't be assed to do so).

We probably know each other then, shoot me a PM if you want to rant together - tracking the FTIC, which is one of the best things that's happened to provide some consistent staffing. There's been more than just Kevin teaching, (heck I've been course 2IC and an instructor on a bunch). The unit also runs 3-5 BMG/HMG/AGLS courses a year heavily or entirely staffed by the unit, and support to the DFS cell. I actually built out an excel table out of curiosity to see ratios of people teaching relative to # of NCOs they have and it's shocking what a couple units seem to get away with. I do agree new MCpls/Sgts should be teaching at some point, but for full time courses it's unreasonable to ask adults with full time careers to take 2-3 months off to teach a DP1 or PLQ, in addition to their regular duties. Part time wise - also a bit unreasonable to ask part time personnel to spend almost every weekend on either regular unit duties or weekend training.

I think we under appreciate how much of a burden even teaching a weekend course is. Even a BMQ is, what, 10 weekends? That means most of your part time NCOs are already working full time (or in school), maybe with a family that would presumably like to see them, gone even just one parade night a week (assuming no admin nights or other support like Pre-PLQ, PLQ Mod 2/etc) is only going to be home Sunday nights after the weekend and thee weeknights for half the year. There were a few years when I was class A that it wasn't unusual I'd only be home a few hours Monday and Wednesday nights, Sunday nights were laundry and go to bed for half the year than do full time for a 2-3 months. It's not particularly sustainable and it should hardly be surprising that only a set number of people who either really like it or are unwilling/unable to do anything else stick with it, while most just...go about their lives, doing what they signed up, one weekend a month and one night a week with the odd Stalwart Guardian thrown in. I don't have kids, but I did split and get back together with my partner thanks in no small part to it.

The CAF is unwilling to invest personnel in the individual training enterprise.

I dream of a world in which BMQ/DP1 level training (for reserves) is handled primarily by full time instructors, well trained and selected for the role, with minimal supplementation as needed to fill spots and to help build experience for those people supplementing. I also dream of having enough equipment in working order (C6 situation has gotten better, we still desperately need NVGs) to support it, so I'll probably be dreaming for a long while.

Who knows, with the army modernization hopefully we'll see improvements to reserve side training (or training overall really).

EDIT:

Three things we've chewed over ad nauseum:

• people moving into the zones of MCpl and Sgt are also moving into the zones for the long-term patterns of their lives, many of which do not accommodate long full-time (summer) taskings
• there is a critical mass below which units lack enough NCOs to simultaneously staff part-time (weekend) courses and exercises to achieve annual collective training benchmarks, or for which a sufficient fraction of NCOs will be available for the long taskings; most units are probably below it
• the causes which prevent units from reaching that sufficient NCO mass are various: imposed size ceilings, interruptions of the recruiting/training stream (mainly due to budget on/off fuckery), crappy unit and formation planning that produces lumpy surges in the pipeline, crappy unit leadership, rise and fall in demand for Res F augmentation which has a short-term (people away) effect and long-term (people opting for CT afterward) effect

Assume some given standards of IT, and some given BTS to be met within, say, 3 year cycles. I suppose the Res F is too small to execute both on its own. Assume there is some size at which it could do all that without much Reg F staffing (leaving aside all the other excellent reasons for a blended Res F). To get there would require a plan and an uninterrupted commitment to providing the resources without which the plan fails. Based on history, achieving the latter requirement - an uninterrupted commitment spanning years into decades - is improbable.

To push through the unsatisfactory status quo requires a long-term structural change to Res F schools: more of them, without a dependency on Res F staffing, some established where the people to be trained live (part-time courses). That would take care of the recruiting/training stream. I suppose adoption of one of the handful of commonly-proposed Reg/Res blended unit models would take care of pretty much everything else.

This is a more general point about reserve instructors and NCOs -> do we want to train NCOs to be NCOs, acting as section 2ICs, commanders and eventually platoon 2ICs and SMs? Or do we want a perpetual cycle of instructors to teach the next batch of instructors? Because we need both but without investing in resources (personnel and equipment, because I've yet to see a course outside of BMQ or HMG (where the unit running it has the equipment needed) with the TP mandated equipment unless I personally poached it) we'll never reach the critical mass of NCOs needed to do both and constantly trying to force everyone to do both just leads to constant burnout and our constant shortages.