Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

The CAF is unwilling to invest personnel in the individual training enterprise.

That's very obvious from "Inflection" which pounds on ARes self sufficiency.

I'd really have a hard time understanding the failure of the HQs realizing how the life cycle of reservists work until I recall that their principle advisors on ARes matters are Class Bs and Class As that haven't been near a parade square or training centre in a decade.

I'm not sure what it is; most of these folks (except the Class Bs) are bright people who ought to be able to both comprehend and work through these problems. Instead I've watched folks skate past the hard decisions for decades.

I can't really see the rationale behind "Inflection's" outcomes. Yes the ability to field a div is necessary. But the current organizational structure is only a part of the problem. It's dwarfed by the geographical separation and the overall training and support philosophy and their implementation. The two div proposed structure is signalling that the desired solution for the RegF is that "the reserves are dragging us down, we need to get away from them," rather than one of "the reserves are dragging us down, we need to find a solution to bring them up."

I wait for the details with bated breath. IMHO, arty, engrs and CSS need to be taken out of CBGs and targeted at forming and training the necessary divisional and theatre battalions needed to properly support a deployed division.

I know "Inflection" talks about RegF leadership but my guess is that's for the div and area HQs. It's really needed at the unit level if we ever intend to move the yardsticks for ARes individual and collective training.

 

[Kirkhill]

When I joined I was a keen young DEO MITCP subby.

Spent my time scrubbing my kit, studying my pams, prepping my platoon schedule and classes, volunteering for duties, spending my vacation time on courses, spending my pay on regimental requirements, supplementing the regiment with my civvy pay.... never missed an ex.

4 years....

And then I got married.

41 years later I am still married to the same wife.

 

[boredtoon]

The key difference is the CBG's report to an area HQ (3 of them total) who then report to Div HQ.

This is incorrect. The Continental Division is 10 CBGs, and a Canadian Ranger Brigade, reporting directly to Div. They got rid of Area HQs during COA selection as it added an unnecessary level of bureaucracy.

 

[IRepoCans]

We probably know each other then, shoot me a PM if you want to rant together - tracking the FTIC, which is one of the best things that's happened to provide some consistent staffing. There's been more than just Kevin teaching, (heck I've been course 2IC and an instructor on a bunch). The unit also runs 3-5 BMG/HMG/AGLS courses a year heavily or entirely staffed by the unit, and support to the DFS cell. I actually built out an excel table out of curiosity to see ratios of people teaching relative to # of NCOs they have and it's shocking what a couple units seem to get away with. I do agree new MCpls/Sgts should be teaching at some point, but for full time courses it's unreasonable to ask adults with full time careers to take 2-3 months off to teach a DP1 or PLQ, in addition to their regular duties. Part time wise - also a bit unreasonable to ask part time personnel to spend almost every weekend on either regular unit duties or weekend training.

I think we under appreciate how much of a burden even teaching a weekend course is. Even a BMQ is, what, 10 weekends? That means most of your part time NCOs are already working full time (or in school), maybe with a family that would presumably like to see them, gone even just one parade night a week (assuming no admin nights or other support like Pre-PLQ, PLQ Mod 2/etc) is only going to be home Sunday nights after the weekend and thee weeknights for half the year. There were a few years when I was class A that it wasn't unusual I'd only be home a few hours Monday and Wednesday nights, Sunday nights were laundry and go to bed for half the year than do full time for a 2-3 months. It's not particularly sustainable and it should hardly be surprising that only a set number of people who either really like it or are unwilling/unable to do anything else stick with it, while most just...go about their lives, doing what they signed up, one weekend a month and one night a week with the odd Stalwart Guardian thrown in. I don't have kids, but I did split and get back together with my partner thanks in no small part to it.

For sure, I only used Kevin as he was the guy I've worked with the most on BMQs and DP1s (he, Matt, Danny and I basically lived together for the better part of two years out various armouries/bases) and was focusing more so on courses specific to an infanteer reaching OFP. But why I say it's a cultural issue over institutional is for the very reason you list: PT courses are more of a personal and administrative burden on instructors than FT courses (outside of the large singular time commitment one takes), and knowing this units still don't try to make the lives of those supporting brigade cat 1 IT easier at the unit. Tracking and training a section/pl/coy at the unit on parade nights, instructing on a PT course two weekends a month for 5-7 months (BMQ-RQIP), and unit exercises is just too much for anyone. Yet the only guys really advocating and trying to get any semblance of balance are the RSS Ops WOs while the unit command teams are largely silent that we're burning out our instructor pool within the bde.

We have enough people that should realistically cover the courses we actually have to run, but when certain folks get a little ambitious on the numbers we can churn out they need to get a soft shoulder tap from their peers at the Lt Col/CWO level.

I dream of a world in which BMQ/DP1 level training (for reserves) is handled primarily by full time instructors, well trained and selected for the role, with minimal supplementation as needed to fill spots and to help build experience for those people supplementing. I also dream of having enough equipment in working order (C6 situation has gotten better, we still desperately need NVGs) to support it, so I'll probably be dreaming for a long while.

Who knows, with the army modernization hopefully we'll see improvements to reserve side training (or training overall really).

Honestly, probably the most annoying fight I have is having none of the equipment I'm supposed to assess people on. I honestly suspect a specific training centre is hoarding MNVGs that actually might've belonged to the CBGs to begin with because every time I've instructed on a RCR DP1 in Meaford they brought their own STANO and comms from battalion, we didn't pull any of that from Meaford; and that every CBG is supposed to have a platoons worth of in-service STANO (read: not 504Bs) for IT/CT.

EDIT: Also, good chance we did ISCC together and I was one of the guys showing a bunch of dudes in L101 how to use a PVS-14 in the blacked out hallway.

 

[Brad Sallows]

This is incorrect. The Continental Division is 10 CBGs, and a Canadian Ranger Brigade, reporting directly to Div. They got rid of Area HQs during COA selection as it added an unnecessary level of bureaucracy.

That's kind of funny. One man's unnecessary level of bureaucracy is another man's necessary span of control mitigation.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Tracking and training a section/pl/coy at the unit on parade nights, instructing on a PT course two weekends a month for 5-7 months (BMQ-RQIP), and unit exercises is just too much for anyone.

Solutions tend to repeat (be tried again) in cycles. At one point (30 years ago...) 39 CBG policy was that units had to provide instructors commensurate with candidates, courses were two weekends on and one off, and instructors were to be excused all other unit activities except those they chose to attend.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is incorrect. The Continental Division is 10 CBGs, and a Canadian Ranger Brigade, reporting directly to Div. They got rid of Area HQs during COA selection as it added an unnecessary level of bureaucracy.

So here's a question that niggles:

Why can't formations have detachable command elements that take the field with whatever task force is assigned while leaving the remainder of the formation and its support intact?

Update Cardwell with his Depots with a local multi-battalion regiments.

Why not apply the same logic to the Brigade Groups and Divisions?

GOC and Main takes the Div/Bde forwards and leaves DGOC behind at Depot with Training and Support elements and such other units as are required to manage the Div's standing commitments.

 

[MilEME09]

This is incorrect. The Continental Division is 10 CBGs, and a Canadian Ranger Brigade, reporting directly to Div. They got rid of Area HQs during COA selection as it added an unnecessary level of bureaucracy.

Ah I didn't hear about that removal, thanks

 

[boredtoon]

Ah I didn't hear about that removal, thanks

No sweat. The ROD is stamped from like, last Wednesday.

 

[FJAG]

That's kind of funny. One man's unnecessary level of bureaucracy is another man's necessary span of control mitigation.

Yup. I figure you can handle 6-8 organizations handily. 10 becomes a stretch. Still, I'd opt to make the one HQ a bit bigger (maybe with a G3 East and a G3 West - or G3 Combat arms and a G# CS and CSS) than to form three more HQs and add another link in the chain.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Yup. I figure you can handle 6-8 organizations handily. 10 becomes a stretch. Still, I'd opt to make the one HQ a bit bigger (maybe with a G3 East and a G3 West - or G3 Combat arms and a G# CS and CSS) than to form three more HQs and add another link in the chain.

If the personnel of three more HQs are almost entirely present anyways in the one HQ because the same amount of work has to be done, then we follow an illusion and lose opportunities (placement slots) to develop commanders and senior staff. Our problem is that we can rarely do "lean HQ".

 

[daftandbarmy]

Solutions tend to repeat (be tried again) in cycles. At one point (30 years ago...) 39 CBG policy was that units had to provide instructors commensurate with candidates, courses were two weekends on and one off, and instructors were to be excused all other unit activities except those they chose to attend.

This was a good policy and many of my Officers and NCOs enjoyed delivering training in that model.

However, I think that somewhere along the line it became apparent that the Combat Arms units were over represented in the training cadre (e.g., can you send a couple extra to fill gaps?) and were getting burned out.

And threatening Class A Infantry NCOs is never a great look when you're trying to fill a course cadre... more than one at any rate

 

[McG]

Yup. I figure you can handle 6-8 organizations handily. 10 becomes a stretch. Still, I'd opt to make the one HQ a bit bigger (maybe with a G3 East and a G3 West - or G3 Combat arms and a G# CS and CSS) than to form three more HQs and add another link in the chain.

A factor to consider before adding a layer of HQ between division and brigade is the impact on authorities & responsibilities that are mapped across from the public service where organizational distance from the minister is an over-riding factor. There are even CAF regulations that have switched to this language (check out training safety authorities for waivers & exemptions and it is all laid out by L4, L3, L2, and Comd CADTC on behalf of L1). The creation of demo-divisions could see brigade commanders needing to sign-off on things that should be battalion level approvals.

 

[KevinB]

I’m still in the “what does the CA want to be when it grows up” stage.

Given the current strength (which is reportedly still below the authorized strength) the Army sits at 44k (Reg and PRes) of which ~5.5k are Rangers.

So roughly 38k personnel.

Scratch 10% for ‘purple’ base side, and Non Formation positions. 34k

Scratch another 10% for Training/Doctrine Cadre - 28k

1 Armoured Div ~10k

1 Light Div ~15k

3k is left over, for higher level Fires and GBAD.

Keeping the current authorized strength.

 

[markppcli]

That's kind of funny. One man's unnecessary level of bureaucracy is another man's necessary span of control mitigation.

This becomes because we’ve decided we need 10 CBGs for some reason. The document claims mobilization but I tend to think it’s a question of the path of least resistance.

 

[Kilted]

Solutions tend to repeat (be tried again) in cycles. At one point (30 years ago...) 39 CBG policy was that units had to provide instructors commensurate with candidates, courses were two weekends on and one off, and instructors were to be excused all other unit activities except those they chose to attend.

There's the rub in the reserves when it comes to serving two masters at the same time. I've seen Battle School say that instructors are not required to do unit training and seen the unit completely blow that off and they then that they are Class B and they belong to the military, so they will also attend all unit training. I've also seen Battle School tell Class B instructors that they will attend all unit training. I guess it comes from the reserves mentality of stuffing as much as possible in a weekend ex, because it's just a weekend. You're on a five month class b being paid by someone else, wow you're going to do all these extra things for us, don't worry, it's only five months. There is a lot of freedom in doing a Class B geographically far enough from your unit that they don't expect you to come back on a regular basis.

 

[FJAG]

This becomes because we’ve decided we need 10 CBGs for some reason. The document claims mobilization but I tend to think it’s a question of the path of least resistance.

I've said it in another thread -

We don't need army districts - what we need are deployment capable (domestically and expeditionary) units and brigade headquarters. A brigade headquarters can do the administrative and training work that a district can do, but a district, is generally a non deployable entity.

Canada's CBGs already have staff and there is a signals regiment with each brigade now. There are roughly 250--275 positions allocated to a CBG HQ and affiliated Sigs Regt including a core of RegF. A CMBG HQ and Sigs Sqn has around 300 all ranks. That's not a far delta in numbers. That means the only things really missing to turn them into a deployable brigade headquarters is the equipment and a directive to train towards that capability. Terminology matters but only if it is given effect with a proper mission, equipment, people and training.

Apparently the ARes stands around 16,000 (according to their web site) That doesn't require 10 brigades . . . but I see leaner brigades than the 4,500-5,000 in a CMBG. I see specialized brigades of roughly 3,000 each able to slot into a division or above framework - lets say:

1) 2 area denial anti access brigades (one per east and west coast - mixed arty, inf, cav, RCN and Rangers);

2) 2 fires bde;

3) 2 sustainment bdes (including health services and MP unit);

4) 1 engineer bde; and

5) 3 manoeuvre bdes.

Long story short - reorg the existing 10 CBGs into specialized brigades. Form their staff and affiliated sigs regiment into a deployable mission specific bde HQ. Reallocate existing ARes units to specific bdes. Rework the ARE and grow the force.

Those ten HQs can support an expanded force of 30,000, as is being predicted, and even comfortably up to 45,000 or so. More importantly, to me 3,000 pers is a realistic size for a CS and CSS brigade and even a more streamline divisional manoeuvre brigade.

 

[Brad Sallows]

This becomes because we’ve decided we need 10 CBGs for some reason. The document claims mobilization but I tend to think it’s a question of the path of least resistance.

If we're going to have 10 fully-manned and -equipped brigades, similar to USAR or USNG, it makes sense. Otherwise, we're just cosplaying "operational" formations and would be better off with a (probably geographically partitioned) structure that has a training and administration backbone in each region to do mobilization intake, IT, and unit collective training before assembling units and handing them over to a gang responsible for assembling formations (brigades and divisions) and putting them through their paces (readiness confirmation) prior to a theatre commitment. Even if we had the 10 full brigades we'd probably still want that structure to mobilize beyond those.

Once the force is fully mobilized as designed, the regional mobilization structures (we could call them areas or districts) would focus on providing an individual replacement stream. Collective training in a unit context (at most) would be the end point before delivering them to a theatre, perhaps firstly to divisional schools (informal or formal, in the Comm Z or rear of the Combat Z) designed to prepare and orient greenhorns for theatre particulars and "the stuff they didn't teach you at battle school".

 

[Kirkhill]

That's kind of funny. One man's unnecessary level of bureaucracy is another man's necessary span of control mitigation.

If I have 10 inanimate objects sitting on a shelf how much supervision do they require?

On the other hand one actively engaged may require more supervision than one person can handle.

 

[markppcli]

I've said it in another thread -




Those ten HQs can support an expanded force of 30,000, as is being predicted, and even comfortably up to 45,000 or so. More importantly, to me 3,000 pers is a realistic size for a CS and CSS brigade and even a more streamline divisional manoeuvre brigade.

Assuming those CBG HQs are fully manned and equipped - which is a big assumption.