Niche roles are great favourites amongst many senior people here in Ottawa because they promise to do (even) more with (even) less[/u].
They (niche roles) gained additional favour in PMO after Jennifer Welsh's (Oxford) book and (brief) tenure as 'editor' of the International Policy Statement. In my, personal, opinion Welsh didn't really understand what she was implying when she used Norway as a model for niche roles â “ she's a first rate scholar, she just overreached a bit there.
One may suggest that we started down the niche road in about 1917 when the Canadian Corps became, de facto the shock troops of the BEF.
From 1918 onwards there have been tensions between a military establishment which craves a general purpose combat mandate â “ with the consequential organizations and manning, and their political-bureaucratic masters who are, constantly, enamoured with smaller, lighter, cheaper and safer niche roles â “ conscription, like hanging, does focus the mind.
Pearsonian peacekeeping became the Trudeau government's favourite (only) niche role: cheap, safe and easily publicized. The effect (and the intention) of the '69 policies was to render Canadian operational forces irrelevant in combat terms. (From my vantage point in HQ AFCENT over 25 years ago the Canadians in Lahr had no military utility. We did not even bother to 'show the flag' on the situation/briefing maps/reports unless a very senior Canadian was visiting. In fairness, HQ AAFCE and 4ATAF did count the Canadian aircraft.) It was Mulroney, in 1990 (but not before) who began the turnaround when he finally understood â “ despite the advice of many of his most senior officials â “ that rundown and rust-out and all such terms really did have meaning. Mulroney wanted to send ground combat forces to Kuwait/Iraq. I believe he actually promised some to President Bush Sr. I, personally, participated in doing the appreciation of the situation which persuaded the DM and the PCO that 4CMBG was not, in any way, combat capable and â “ even with virtually all the army forces in Canada added â “ could not be made combat capable and moved to the Middle East and sustained in battle in anything under many, many months. It is my belief that many (perhaps most) senior officials, including many inside DND, learned the true state of our military affairs only in 1990. It is my opinion, also, that only a tiny handful of the commentariat ever did grasp the problem and that few failed to inform the Canadian people â “ perhaps intentionally. So much for niche roles!
I remain adamantly opposed to the idea of niche roles for Canada â “ so long as we remain amongst the top 10% of the world's nations â “ as I expect we shall for the next half century. We are, in 2005, a hugely unbalanced power â “ we are a major economic player (our ½ of 1% of the world's population produces nearly 2% of the global economic activity* â “ more if we don't use PPP measures), with a puny (no better word) global presence. We are valued as a good example of prudent national housekeeping (thanks to Mulroney's GST) but we have no 'voice' because we have no useful diplomatic and military (= political) power.
I am especially opposed to the idea of sending experts (usually Sr NCOs) out as trainers until we have reformed our own domestic training systems and produced enough senior people to staff our units and schools. When we have solved our own problems, as I perceive them from deep in retirement, we can consider sending our most valuable resource elsewhere.
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* The USA, China, Japan and India, together, account for over 49% of the global economic activity â “ no one else accounts for as much as 4.5%. On that basis, 2% matters.
