Here's more on the Iranian Tomahawk 6 was talking about....an article by Amir Taheri
http://www.nypost.com/php/pfriendly/print.php?url=http://www.nypost.com/seven/03092007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/iran__big_fish_gone_missing_opedcolumnists_amir_taheri.htm
....Always in the shadows, Askari was in charge of a program to train foreign Islamist militants as part of Tehran's strategy of "exporting" the Khomeinist revolution.
In 1982-83, Askari (along with Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Mohatashami-Pour) founded the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah and helped set up its first military units. The two men supervised the 1983 suicide attacks on the U.S. Embassy and on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut - killing more than 300 Americans, including 241 Marines. Iranian sources say Askari was part of a triumvirate of Revolutionary Guard officers that controlled Hezbollah's armed units until the end of the '90s.
Askari led the 500-man Iranian military mission in Beirut from 1998 to 2000 before returning home to work for the Strategic Defense Procurement Committee. In that capacity, he often traveled abroad to negotiate arms deals.
Tehran sources claim that Askari was also involved in Iran's controversial nuclear program, which, although presented as a civilian project, is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. They also say that last November he was appointed a member of the Strategic Defense Planning Commission set up by Ali Khamenei, the "Supreme Guide."
He apparently was in Turkey on his way back from Syria
....The Iranian mission's task was to lay the foundations for a Syrian armament industry, licensed to manufacture Iranian-designed weapons. The 30 or so experts that had accompanied Askari remained in Syria to work out the technical details.
According to some reports, Askari had stopped over in Istanbul to meet with an unidentified Syrian arms dealer who lives in Paris.
That is interesting because it suggests that Iran may be coming to terms with a change in its supply lines. It now finds that is cannot supply its markets in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria. That prompts two further suggestions:
1. They are now concerned that Iraq is lost to them as a conduit because of either the US or Iraqi Government
2. That Iraq has been a reliable conduit in the past, both during the current period of instability since the fall of Saddam, and notably previously, during the build-up of Hezbollah in South Lebanon from 1980. This further prompts notice that that would have happened while Saddam was fighting Iran but that when the US liberated Kuwait Saddam flew his Air Force to refuge in Iran. Some very convoluted state-craft going on in that part of the world.
Finally:
Askari's disappearance fits an emerging pattern. Since December, the United States and its allies appear to have moved onto the offensive against the Islamic Republic's networks of influence in the Middle East:
* Jordan has seized 17 Iranian agents, accused of trying to smuggle arms to Hamas, and deported them quietly after routine debriefing.
* A number of Islamic Republic agents have been identified and deported in Pakistan and Tunisia.
* At least six other Iranian agents have been picked up in Gaza, where they were helping Hamas set up armament factories.
* In the past three months, some 30 senior Iranian officials, including at least two generals of Revolutionary Guards, have been captured in Iraq.
All but five of the Islamic Republic agents seized in Iraq appear to have been released. One of those released was Hassan Abbasi, nicknamed "the Kissinger of Islam," who is believed to be President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strategic advisor.
Among those still held by the Americans is one Muhammad Jaafari Sahraroudi, a senior Revolutionary Guard commander wanted by the Austrian police in connection with the murder of three Iranian Kurdish leaders in Vienna in 1989.
All this looks like a message to Tehran that its opponents may be moving on to the offensive in what looks like a revival of tactics used in the Cold War.
If it is a revival of Cold War tactics it can only be possible because the US has finally developed a critical mass of trusted personnel that can operate in the middle eastern environment. With that mass in place Iran and the other regimes are in much more fragile circumstances than the old Soviet Union ever was. It had the means to control its borders and people and isolate the people from both the physical presence of foreigners and their message. In addition, for the longest while it offered its people the prospect of the western material culture by different means. It fell when it failed to deliver.
The middle east can't control its borders or its people. That is its single defining historical character. The Arabs in particular with their raiding and trading culture of nomadic pastoralism cheerfully ignore borders. Just take a look at the Clan affiliations in Western Iraq and Eastern Syria. As well, despite their "abhorrence" for the west, middle easterners show a remarkable affinity for western products - including pick-ups, complete with gun-racks, for their camels, lacy undies and cosmetics for the women, and a good bottle of Scotch.
It suggests to me an environment reminiscent of the US in the 1920s or possibly even the 1950s. Good church going people recovering in the pews from the hangovers inflicted the night before at the local "speak-easy" in the 1920s. The children of those same church-goers in the 1950s going to the same churches as their parents while contributing to making Hugh Hefner rich and making Las Vegas very profitable as "Sin City". Dubai and Kuwait City, amongst others, seem to be vying to be a combination of Las Vegas and Disneyworld.
It is an environment that can be very easily penetrated and with a population that is susceptible to rumour-mongering. The right message by the right people could cause the governments' no end of problems.
Iran is in a lot weaker position than the USSR ever was and will not survive 40 years of that kind of pressure.
And in a PS - to further cement the tendency to wander that Old Sweat identified - Iran is still likely to lose even if the Democrats win in 2008.
The Democrats are arguing for a change in strategy, to pull combat troops out of Iraq and relocate them in Afghanistan.
President Bush is arguing to stay the course and veto any precipitous move.
President Bush will stay the course until he leaves office in 22 months. That gives him ample time to continue disruption of the ACMs in Iraq, build a stronger Iraqi internal security apparatus and realign Iraqi politics.
At the same time 'agents provocateurs' can become more numerous in Iran creating problems with minorities, students and labour - all the usual suspects.
When Bush leaves the Democrats will come in and declare a change in strategy - shift troops to Iran's eastern front in Afghanistan and Baluchistan, pursue a policy of Hot Trod in Baluchistan and Pashtunistan to get the terrorists, announce a containment policy with respect to Iran and shift the remainder of American troops from the internal security role in Iraq to the borders, with particular attention being paid to the Iranian border.
Thus US domestic politics are satisfied while US foreign policy, as it has done over the years, survives largely intact. I believe that Vietnam was a salutory lesson to the American political establishment on the dangers of a "discontinuous" foreign policy. Parties change, and they need to present new policies to win elections, but the interests of the state don't change.
Afghanistan was right to the jaw of Iran to get their attention. Iraq has been a series of jabs with the left as the US and Iraq spar during the wearing down phase. By 2009, a nice strong body blow from the right might just be enough to finish the match. Coincidental timing as far as Canadian involvement in Afghanistan is concerned.