Iran Super Thread- Merged

[Brad Sallows]

China is absolutely loving every second of this

This sentiment keeps cropping up. What is the foundation for it?

China might be loving this if it were ready to move right now.

If China can't move right now and a result of all this is that the US approximately permanently increases :

• stockpiles (and customary stockpile targets)
• manufacturing capacity
• the know-how (knowledge and experience) to rapidly expand manufacturing capacity

then China is further behind where it was.

That is all separate from the opportunity to learn about dealing with unmanned/remote warfare in a small conflict without having to jump into a big one, much like COVID was a benevolently meager pandemic that allowed everyone to learn a bunch of stuff before something with a really scary CFR strikes.

The best time for aggressors to launch their wars was pre-Ukraine, before various countries were prodded to re-examine their materiel and ammunition and force structure and whatnot. That opportunity is gone, and is being further reduced with each additional equipment/ammo/force/etc announcement.

 

[Czech_pivo]

This sentiment keeps cropping up. What is the foundation for it?

China might be loving this if it were ready to move right now.

If China can't move right now and a result of all this is that the US approximately permanently increases :

• stockpiles (and customary stockpile targets)
• manufacturing capacity
• the know-how (knowledge and experience) to rapidly expand manufacturing capacity

then China is further behind where it was.

That is all separate from the opportunity to learn about dealing with unmanned/remote warfare in a small conflict without having to jump into a big one, much like COVID was a benevolently meager pandemic that allowed everyone to learn a bunch of stuff before something with a really scary CFR strikes.

The best time for aggressors to launch their wars was pre-Ukraine, before various countries were prodded to re-examine their materiel and ammunition and force structure and whatnot. That opportunity is gone, and is being further reduced with each additional equipment/ammo/force/etc announcement.

Here's one:

1) Intelligence gathering - learning how the US executes its plans and conducts itself. Iran is most certainly, where its able, providing both Russia and China as much information/data that it can.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Here's one:

1) Intelligence gathering - learning how the US executes its plans and conducts itself. Iran is most certainly, where its able, providing both Russia and China as much information/data that it can.

Maybe. I've concluded that countries actually involved in fighting learn more than countries observing from sidelines, even with the advice of active participants. How much institutional inertia and bias have Ukraine's experiences overcome among various observers? China isn't immune to the problem.

The only way for the US to avoid providing the intelligence-gathering opportunity is to not fight, which seems ludicrously self-defeating. The US does big military things pretty frequently compared to everyone else, so I give it a substantial advantage in fighting at scale. If China hasn't learned more from past wars by observing than the US has from operating, I doubt this one is going to be the one that tips the scale.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Maybe. I've concluded that countries actually involved in fighting learn more than countries observing from sidelines, even with the advice of active participants. How much institutional inertia and bias have Ukraine's experiences overcome among various observers? China isn't immune to the problem.

The only way for the US to avoid providing the intelligence-gathering opportunity is to not fight, which seems ludicrously self-defeating. The US does big military things pretty frequently compared to everyone else, so I give it a substantial advantage in fighting at scale. If China hasn't learned more from past wars by observing than the US has from operating, I doubt this one is going to be the one that tips the scale.

This current action is the closest since the Falklands War that resembles what China would need to achieve to successfully invade Taiwan. So, I'd argue that there's lot for them to learn.

The potential issues that the US may be having with food resupply/quality on some of its vessels would definitely correlate to the US responding to a Chinese real or potential threat to Taiwan is just 1 example.

 

[Brad Sallows]

This current action is the closest since the Falklands War that resembles what China would need to achieve to successfully invade Taiwan. So, I'd argue that there's lot for them to learn.

That part I see differently. To me, the only thing remotely close to what China would need to achieve is the Normandy invasion. They aren't going to be able to establish a lodgement in some undefended area and muster there for a push on defended areas (Falklands). They aren't going to start with a massive overmatch in everything except land forces (Gulf).

China isn't even really at the start point for achieving Normandy, where the Allies already had settled the question of sufficient air/naval dominance to go ahead with an assault crossing.

Very quick staff check: What can China land in a first wave? Maybe a reinforced division? Then a full day of turnaround - at least, just for transit time - for each successive force of similar size? A division every how many days? And they're not going to be able to slow down Taiwan's concentration of forces by attempting to decoy anyone with a fictitious army group poised to invade somewhere else.

As of right now, all this worry about what China might do in the next few months is just a waste of anxiety.

 

[Czech_pivo]

That part I see differently. To me, the only thing remotely close to what China would need to achieve is the Normandy invasion. They aren't going to be able to establish a lodgement in some undefended area and muster there for a push on defended areas (Falklands). They aren't going to start with a massive overmatch in everything except land forces (Gulf).

China isn't even really at the start point for achieving Normandy, where the Allies already had settled the question of sufficient air/naval dominance to go ahead with an assault crossing.

Very quick staff check: What can China land in a first wave? Maybe a reinforced division? Then a full day of turnaround - at least, just for transit time - for each successive force of similar size? A division every how many days? And they're not going to be able to slow down Taiwan's concentration of forces by attempting to decoy anyone with a fictitious army group poised to invade somewhere else.

As of right now, all this worry about what China might do in the next few months is just a waste of anxiety.

I hope that the situation with Taiwan never occurs where either of us can say, 'I told you so.'

 

[Brad Sallows]

I hope that the situation with Taiwan never occurs where either of us can say, 'I told you so.'

Of course, but in the context of this thread, people who keep peddling "but this war something something China and Taiwan" ought to stop peddling their "safety concerns" as something that deserves attention.

 

[Czech_pivo]

In other news, Brent oil is back above 105$USD/barrel on the news that Iran's chief negotiator has resigned.