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The question of the hour is: does the UK MoD have even enough assets to strike Iraq, and possibly Syria, aside from those few RAF aircraft in Cyprus?
Defense News
Defense News
Iraq in Crisis- Merged Superthread
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S.M.A. said:
But, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that newspaper, The Economist argues that airstrikes, alone, cannot work and, anyway, Belgium and the Netherlands (and Canada) are the wrong countries, the locals need to step up, with ground forces, and clean up the mess they made:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/air-strikes-against-islamic-state
Air strikes against the Islamic State
Consensus, but for what?
Sep 23rd 2014,
By Lexington | WASHINGTON, DC
WITH remarkable speed, a broad American consensus has formed in support of air strikes against the Islamic State, even if that means taking the fight across the Iraqi border into Syria. Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress have offered bipartisan support to a first wave of overnight strikes in Syria. This sends a “powerful” message of unity to the world, said President Barack Obama in a brief statement on September 23rd from the White House grounds.
The consensus involves the public, too. Since last year, Americans’ willingness to see air power used in Syria has doubled, a poll for the Washington Post shows. Support for arming the Kurdish forces battling IS in Iraq rose from 45% in August to 58% in the September survey. Yet if the new mood of unity is broad, it is also shallow. Americans know that they want to do something about IS. Air strikes currently fit the bill. But there is a striking lack of agreement about what this use of force is actually for. There is no consensus about whether America is projecting power to bring greater stability to the Middle East, or whether the mission is much narrower: a counter-terrorist operation, backed by regional allies, to neutralise threats at a distance, and thus protect Americans at home.
Last year, a war-weary America hated the idea of intervening in Syria’s tangled civil war. Many bombarded members of Congress with angry calls at the very idea of limited cruise-missile strikes to punish President Bashar Assad for using chemical weapons against civilians in his own country. There is little evidence that Americans are any less weary of war, especially when it comes to complex intra-Muslim conflicts.
What has changed, dramatically, is a perception that IS and other terrorists in Iraq and Syria imperil American safety, notably following the filmed beheadings of two American journalists and a British aid worker. Nine in ten Americans now see the militants as a serious threat to vital national interests, and roughly six in ten call them a very serious threat. That mood of public fear coincides with a collapse in public trust of Mr Obama’s foreign policy. Historians may ponder whether a consensus for air strikes in Iraq and Syria would have formed at all if those journalists had not been brutally murdered on camera. But in public, prominent members of both parties have offered their support. Senior Democrats applauded the president for taking action and finding regional allies to join him. Republican bigwigs welcomed action against IS while grumbling that the president had waited too long. A few hawks, such as Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, urged Mr Obama to add special forces on the ground to the mix.
For his part, Mr Obama has done little to clarify the precise nature of this mission. On the one hand he has called IS mainly a threat to the people of the Middle East, repeatedly declaring that “this is not America’s fight alone” and presenting his country’s military power as a tool of geopolitical influence, which—by being withheld or used in the right way—can prod others in the region to assume their responsibilities. He insists that in Iraq security can only be guaranteed by a multi-ethnic, non-sectarian unity government with the trust of its own people. In Syria, after (very belatedly) moving to ramp up the arming and training of a moderate opposition, Mr Obama calls such rebels the “best counterweight” both to IS and to the Assad regime.
On the other hand, as he seeks to rally public opinion, Mr Obama and his officials have made their mission sound overwhelmingly like a counter-terrorist operation. The president called the initial Syria strikes a sign that “we will not tolerate safe havens for terrorists who threaten our people.”
Much was made of a separate, American-only set of eight airstrikes on the night of September 22nd against the Khorosan Group, an al-Qaeda offshoot, at a base near the Syrian city of Aleppo. Though the American government first spoke of the group in public a week earlier, officials now say that they have been watching it for many months. A White House official told reporters that action was taken after intelligence services determined that Khorosan Group operatives were plotting imminent, major attacks in America or Europe, and that the Syrian government was not able to take action against that threat.
That fits with a domestic debate dominated by talk of securing America’s homeland. Several members of Congress, a few weeks ahead of mid-term elections, have demanded new laws that would cancel the American passports of those who sign up with IS, or would strip allied countries of their visa-free travel privileges if they failed to cooperate with American intelligence and security officials.
But this cannot remain a purely domestic debate for long. Politicians and the public will need to decide soon what they have begun, and what appetite they have for extended interventions far from home, involving painful trade-offs and deals with unsavoury partners.
Air strikes alone have a poor record of defeating enemies, especially when they can hide in urban areas. Though Mr Obama repeatedly says that American forces will not be sent into combat on the ground, military commanders have warned that, if the mission requires it, they may ask to deploy special forces to spot targets and help allies.
There has been much talk of the dozens of countries joining the anti-IS coalition, and the five Sunni-led nations—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain and Qatar—who joined the first night of strikes over Syria. Americans have little love for those Arab allies. But realpolitik may push the country towards still trickier partners. The White House confirmed that America’s UN ambassador had told her Syrian counterpart that action was coming and warned the Assad regime not to threaten American aircraft, though without providing precise timings or targets in advance. Pentagon officials said Syrian radar had been “passive” during the air raids. But Team Obama is adamant that Mr Assad’s regime cannot be part of the solution to the IS threat, just as its officials insist that no deal is possible with Iran that would trade help against IS with concessions over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
On the morning after the first air strikes on Syria a Pentagon commander, Lt General William Mayville, said that this was just the beginning of a campaign that could last years. It is not yet clear that a fearful, terrorism-focused American public is listening closely to such warnings, or is ready to hear them. That is about to change.
Let me be clear: I would be happy to see lots and lots of dead IS** militants or fighters or whatever word the media uses to avoid calling them terrorists or war criminals, which is what they are. But, I suspect that IF we, those who oppose IS**, are going to put "boots on the ground," and I'm not sure we are, then they are unlikely to be the right boots.
Edited to add:
It is clear that the right Middle Eastern states, those who are, in the main, the authors al Qaeda and of IS** and so on, are doing a share but, if, as many experts suggest, "boots on the ground" will be necessary, I wonder if (I doubt) they will be as willing.
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The 1st Infantry Division hq will deploy to Iraq.
http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140925/NEWS/309250057/-Big-Red-One-HQ-will-deploy-Iraq
The 1st Infantry Division headquarters will deploy to Iraq in the coming weeks as the U.S. expands its war against the Islamic State, officials announced Thursday.
The Big Red One, of Fort Riley, Kansas, will be the first division headquarters to go to Iraq since the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.
About 500 soldiers will deploy in late October to the Central Command area of operations, Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby said Thursday in a briefing with reporters.
http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140925/NEWS/309250057/-Big-Red-One-HQ-will-deploy-Iraq
The 1st Infantry Division headquarters will deploy to Iraq in the coming weeks as the U.S. expands its war against the Islamic State, officials announced Thursday.
The Big Red One, of Fort Riley, Kansas, will be the first division headquarters to go to Iraq since the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.
About 500 soldiers will deploy in late October to the Central Command area of operations, Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby said Thursday in a briefing with reporters.
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I could have posted this in any number of threads, but felt it fit here as the army of Iraq has not performed well in recent weeks. The link is to a 1999 article on why Arab armies do not do well. It may or may not be dated, but the argument is moot.
http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars
http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars
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Sigh
Why are we so keen to do Iran's dirty work and heavy lifting? IS** is a creature or creation of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and is implicitly tolerated by the Turks as a counterbalance to Iran's regional ambitions. IS** has seriously damaged Iran's satellite Syria, and taken a fairly heavy toll on the Iranian proxy Hezbollah as a fighting force (they seem to have largely returned to Lebanon, lest they become ineffective there as well due to heavy casualties and disaffection). Let Saudi the Gulf States do what they will with IS** (for the longest time this was the preferred outlet for getting rid of radicals in the various Kingdoms) and Iran can expend its own blood and treasure (currently Quds forces and Hezbollah fighters) dealing with them.
I will repeat what I have said earlier: our only interests in this mess are to ensure that:
a: the spillover does not flow out of the Middle East;
b. The West institutes a "one way" gate, so anyone who wants to go over there as a Jihadi never comes back;
c. *We* provide enough arms and funding to select groups like Israel, the Kurds and others like the Baloch to remain viable and act as "points of entry" should there be any vital interest that requires us to go back there; and,
d. Canada plays its "high card" and starts supplying oil to our friends and allies (Europe, Japan, Korea, India etc.) to make up for the loss of ME oil.
If the Prime Minister wants to find appropriate places to exercise Canadian military and diplomatic power (such as it is), the Ukraine and the South China Sea are more profitable areas to focus on.
Why are we so keen to do Iran's dirty work and heavy lifting? IS** is a creature or creation of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and is implicitly tolerated by the Turks as a counterbalance to Iran's regional ambitions. IS** has seriously damaged Iran's satellite Syria, and taken a fairly heavy toll on the Iranian proxy Hezbollah as a fighting force (they seem to have largely returned to Lebanon, lest they become ineffective there as well due to heavy casualties and disaffection). Let Saudi the Gulf States do what they will with IS** (for the longest time this was the preferred outlet for getting rid of radicals in the various Kingdoms) and Iran can expend its own blood and treasure (currently Quds forces and Hezbollah fighters) dealing with them.
I will repeat what I have said earlier: our only interests in this mess are to ensure that:
a: the spillover does not flow out of the Middle East;
b. The West institutes a "one way" gate, so anyone who wants to go over there as a Jihadi never comes back;
c. *We* provide enough arms and funding to select groups like Israel, the Kurds and others like the Baloch to remain viable and act as "points of entry" should there be any vital interest that requires us to go back there; and,
d. Canada plays its "high card" and starts supplying oil to our friends and allies (Europe, Japan, Korea, India etc.) to make up for the loss of ME oil.
If the Prime Minister wants to find appropriate places to exercise Canadian military and diplomatic power (such as it is), the Ukraine and the South China Sea are more profitable areas to focus on.
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Another US carrier strike group is on its way to relieve the USS George W. Bush which has been conducting its portion of the coalition air campaign over Iraq and Syria:
*article edited to correct the name of the carrier from "Carl Vincent" repeated by the original writer of the article, to Carl Vinson, the actual name. :facepalm:
Military.com
*article edited to correct the name of the carrier from "Carl Vincent" repeated by the original writer of the article, to Carl Vinson, the actual name. :facepalm:
Military.com
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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I like this idea, which is strange because the author is a stinkn' Crab ;D
Dealing with ISIS through “boots with wings”
(RUSI Analysis (London))
If we are to opt for ‘boots on the ground’ in confronting ISIS, military planners should consider airmobile forces that promise agility, force projection and most importantly, a temporary time-span.
Friday’s parliamentary debate put an end to the question over UK’s return to military involvement in Iraq with a positive vote for air strikes and the focus now shifts to the debate over boots on the ground. Strong pros and cons on both sides of the argument make it a complex and emotional debate, and one which is unlikely to produce a good result whatever the choice.
Military leaders have compounded the problem by allowing their thinking to become constrained by a simple choice between no boots, boots only in the form of Special Forces, or long-term deployment of large numbers through Expeditionary forces. The ISIS problem is too politically and militarily complex to be reduced to these two choices, and demands more agile thinking. Western countries have airmobile forces designed to deploy rapidly for small-scale short-term operations. Not used for decades, and it is this capability which could provide better military and political outcomes at lower risk. If used effectively, airmobile forces have the potential to provide a meaningful boost to the Iraqi ground forces without the disadvantages of becoming targets of Iraqi militias or being seen as occupation forces.
Those who want boots on the ground rightly say that airpower is limited in its ability to degrade ISIS, and that eventually land forces will be needed. Opponents point out that the Iraqi Army, Shia militias and the Peshmerga already provide ‘boots’ for that purpose, but sides of the coalition privately harbour doubts about the capability of Iraqis to recapture territory soon, increasing the time, the level of commitment and the risk burden on the West. However, foreign forces in Iraq are linked intrinsically to the idea of occupation and proponents of boots on the ground seem to have forgotten the 2004 massive allergic reaction from both Shia militias and Sunni insurgents which led to widespread attacks on coalition forces. A bloody unstoppable revolt was only averted by the intervention of Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who persuaded the Shia militias to stop fighting the coalition.
With the possible exception of the Kurds, most in Iraq are violently opposed to the idea of Western forces fighting on the ground. Memories of the coalition’s large citadel bases and its belligerent convoys and thousands of civilian casualties of the fight between foreign forces and insurgents remain firmly in Iraqi minds. Western leaders understand that resentment of perceived occupation made coalition troops a perpetual target for Sunni insurgents and for the renegade Shia militias and that is why the US and UK governments currently are opposed to combat troops on the ground.
The case for Airmobile Forces
However, using airmobile forces as part of a well thought out land campaign designed to cut the current ISIS controlled territory into smaller dislocated chunks could make a decisive contribution to speeding up its degradation. The UK’s 16 Air Assault Brigade claims to combine the “speed and agility of airborne an air assault troops with the potency of Apache attack helicopters’’ These troops can be deployed to locations by aircraft capable of landing on desert strips, by helicopters, and by parachute by day and night. They are lightly armed but are capable of defeating small-scale armoured forces. Their strength lies primarily in their ability to deploy quickly, manoeuvre rapidly during combat, seize and secure medium size objectives such as refineries, airfields, bridges etc., and then get out as soon as the job is done.
By seizing key facilities and ground that local forces would struggle to win and then handing it over to Iraqi forces to hold, such airmobile forces will not just make a valuable contribution to the fight, but also will also send out a very powerful political message. This message will help destroy the myth that Western governments use these conflicts as a cover for occupation and control of Middle Eastern lands.
The UK’s Air Assault brigade is dwarfed by the USA’s capability which is supported by an awesome fleet of aircraft including the Osprey vertical take-off aircraft, and squadrons of helicopter gunships. The coalition partner, Jordan, has a small but potentially formidable parachute force. So, there is no lack of resources or doctrine, only an apparent inability and political will by governments and military advisors to think of existing capabilities in a new way. No matter how good a force or tactic is, its success or failure is dependent upon the effectiveness of the strategy within which it is employed. Having set the grand strategic design of using foreign coalition airpower to support Iraqi ground forces as the primary means of degrading and destroying ISIS, President Obama now needs his generals to produce an effective land component strategy which is capable of exploiting the coalition’s huge air campaign advantage.
Iraqi land forces recently have conducted a few successful operations. The recapturing of the Mosul Dam, thwarting ISIS’s attack on the Haditha Dam, and lifting the Amerili siege have all been largely defensive operations. Wisely conducted at a pace that ensured necessary confidence-building through success; the speed of progress has revealed the Iraqi forces’ current inability to take the offensive, and their inability to exploit the advantage of rapid manoeuvre when it does. This is where foreign airmobile forces can be a battle-winning combination. If used to seize ISIS held objectives quickly, for the Iraqis then to hold, and then surge, these airmobile forces could cut dramatically the time required to reduce ISIS territorial control and to degrade its capabilities. If the strategy aims to cut ISIS’s long spines of territory into chunks, then it could destroy it as a cohesive force, dislocate it from the leadership, and isolate it from communication lines which sustain its fighters with money and supplies.
Like all capabilities, airmobile forces must be skilfully and sparing applied and overuse could be counterproductive. They must not be seen as boots on the ground but as ‘boots with wings,’ which fleetingly walk the ground to catapult Iraqi land forces forwards. That way they can make a valuable military contribution while at the same time avoiding the disadvantages of expeditionary land forces of the recent past.
Dr Afzal Ashraf was an Engineer officer in the Royal Air Force (RAF), retiring three decades later as a Group Captain. His tours of duty included counter-insurgency and policing focussed operational tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Dealing with ISIS through “boots with wings”
(RUSI Analysis (London))
If we are to opt for ‘boots on the ground’ in confronting ISIS, military planners should consider airmobile forces that promise agility, force projection and most importantly, a temporary time-span.
Friday’s parliamentary debate put an end to the question over UK’s return to military involvement in Iraq with a positive vote for air strikes and the focus now shifts to the debate over boots on the ground. Strong pros and cons on both sides of the argument make it a complex and emotional debate, and one which is unlikely to produce a good result whatever the choice.
Military leaders have compounded the problem by allowing their thinking to become constrained by a simple choice between no boots, boots only in the form of Special Forces, or long-term deployment of large numbers through Expeditionary forces. The ISIS problem is too politically and militarily complex to be reduced to these two choices, and demands more agile thinking. Western countries have airmobile forces designed to deploy rapidly for small-scale short-term operations. Not used for decades, and it is this capability which could provide better military and political outcomes at lower risk. If used effectively, airmobile forces have the potential to provide a meaningful boost to the Iraqi ground forces without the disadvantages of becoming targets of Iraqi militias or being seen as occupation forces.
Those who want boots on the ground rightly say that airpower is limited in its ability to degrade ISIS, and that eventually land forces will be needed. Opponents point out that the Iraqi Army, Shia militias and the Peshmerga already provide ‘boots’ for that purpose, but sides of the coalition privately harbour doubts about the capability of Iraqis to recapture territory soon, increasing the time, the level of commitment and the risk burden on the West. However, foreign forces in Iraq are linked intrinsically to the idea of occupation and proponents of boots on the ground seem to have forgotten the 2004 massive allergic reaction from both Shia militias and Sunni insurgents which led to widespread attacks on coalition forces. A bloody unstoppable revolt was only averted by the intervention of Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who persuaded the Shia militias to stop fighting the coalition.
With the possible exception of the Kurds, most in Iraq are violently opposed to the idea of Western forces fighting on the ground. Memories of the coalition’s large citadel bases and its belligerent convoys and thousands of civilian casualties of the fight between foreign forces and insurgents remain firmly in Iraqi minds. Western leaders understand that resentment of perceived occupation made coalition troops a perpetual target for Sunni insurgents and for the renegade Shia militias and that is why the US and UK governments currently are opposed to combat troops on the ground.
The case for Airmobile Forces
However, using airmobile forces as part of a well thought out land campaign designed to cut the current ISIS controlled territory into smaller dislocated chunks could make a decisive contribution to speeding up its degradation. The UK’s 16 Air Assault Brigade claims to combine the “speed and agility of airborne an air assault troops with the potency of Apache attack helicopters’’ These troops can be deployed to locations by aircraft capable of landing on desert strips, by helicopters, and by parachute by day and night. They are lightly armed but are capable of defeating small-scale armoured forces. Their strength lies primarily in their ability to deploy quickly, manoeuvre rapidly during combat, seize and secure medium size objectives such as refineries, airfields, bridges etc., and then get out as soon as the job is done.
By seizing key facilities and ground that local forces would struggle to win and then handing it over to Iraqi forces to hold, such airmobile forces will not just make a valuable contribution to the fight, but also will also send out a very powerful political message. This message will help destroy the myth that Western governments use these conflicts as a cover for occupation and control of Middle Eastern lands.
The UK’s Air Assault brigade is dwarfed by the USA’s capability which is supported by an awesome fleet of aircraft including the Osprey vertical take-off aircraft, and squadrons of helicopter gunships. The coalition partner, Jordan, has a small but potentially formidable parachute force. So, there is no lack of resources or doctrine, only an apparent inability and political will by governments and military advisors to think of existing capabilities in a new way. No matter how good a force or tactic is, its success or failure is dependent upon the effectiveness of the strategy within which it is employed. Having set the grand strategic design of using foreign coalition airpower to support Iraqi ground forces as the primary means of degrading and destroying ISIS, President Obama now needs his generals to produce an effective land component strategy which is capable of exploiting the coalition’s huge air campaign advantage.
Iraqi land forces recently have conducted a few successful operations. The recapturing of the Mosul Dam, thwarting ISIS’s attack on the Haditha Dam, and lifting the Amerili siege have all been largely defensive operations. Wisely conducted at a pace that ensured necessary confidence-building through success; the speed of progress has revealed the Iraqi forces’ current inability to take the offensive, and their inability to exploit the advantage of rapid manoeuvre when it does. This is where foreign airmobile forces can be a battle-winning combination. If used to seize ISIS held objectives quickly, for the Iraqis then to hold, and then surge, these airmobile forces could cut dramatically the time required to reduce ISIS territorial control and to degrade its capabilities. If the strategy aims to cut ISIS’s long spines of territory into chunks, then it could destroy it as a cohesive force, dislocate it from the leadership, and isolate it from communication lines which sustain its fighters with money and supplies.
Like all capabilities, airmobile forces must be skilfully and sparing applied and overuse could be counterproductive. They must not be seen as boots on the ground but as ‘boots with wings,’ which fleetingly walk the ground to catapult Iraqi land forces forwards. That way they can make a valuable military contribution while at the same time avoiding the disadvantages of expeditionary land forces of the recent past.
Dr Afzal Ashraf was an Engineer officer in the Royal Air Force (RAF), retiring three decades later as a Group Captain. His tours of duty included counter-insurgency and policing focussed operational tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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:facepalm: :facepalm: This is from the same Iraqi military who crumbled against ISIS fighters merely on foot with RPGs and Ak47s, when the Iraqis were better armed with vehicles like Abrams tanks.
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Notable parallel update at the Syria superthread:
Turkey approves use of ground troops against ISIS in Syria and Iraq
Turkey approves use of ground troops against ISIS in Syria and Iraq
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S.M.A. said:
Watching the Australian v. Canadian government responses for this operation has been interesting. I would have thought that the responses would have been similar; both countries have a Conservative (they call it Liberal) government in power, either majority or a large minority, and public response to the situation and the ruling party is generally the same in both countries.
But no; the Green Party leader had called for a vote but the PM ignored it and sent the force over - it had the support of the Labor Party already. This latest story is just the final permission for fighters to actually drop bombs in Iraqi airspace.
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Dimsum said:
We both share similar constitutions, each based on the Westminster system. In that system the decision to send military forces anywhere, for any reason is the exclusive prerogative of the crown, the executive, the cabinet. Parliament has neither the right nor the duty to decide that issue. The right, the power that Parliament, specifically the HoC in Ottawa, does have is to vote or withhold supply, the money. If the crown has no money it cannot sustain military operations and it must "go to the people" (seek re-election) to regain the confidence of the HoC.
Prime Minister Mackenzie-King started the (unnecessary) custom of calling on parliament to debate a war ... some PMs followed suit, others didn't. In any event, constitutionally there is no requirement for the HoC to say/do anything ... until it is time to pass a supply bill, like the Budget Implementation Bill or a request (from the government) for "interim supply."
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