LAV III RWS versus LAV III with turret

[Kiwi99]

Adapt and overcome is a cliche.  And for the combat arms to have spent the last 50-60 years adapting and overcoming simply highlights the fact that the chain of command has not implemented the required lessons learnt form the adapting and overcoming.  Every unit should be so prepared for the task through planning and foresight that the need to adapt and/or overcome will not be required. Hence, we adapted our techniques from the typical wainwright enemy to Taliban TTPs prior to deployment, knowing full well that if we didn't, we would be in the hurt locker. 

i am not going to touch the cbt team thing, however, 

"  Doing the style of CBT TM attacks that we do in WX or Gagetown is not even close to the terrain or enviornment over there.  Maneuver warfare is the key.  Tanks cannot get into places that LAV's can go". - Warchild

I, and many others can say, that Cbt Team trg in Canada in no way at all prepared us for Afghanistan.  And as yet, the training in Canada has not reflected the changes needed  in order for all command levels to be prepared for the mission.  Fight as you train, so train for the warfare that is happening.
We haver all participated in cbt team operations before, but we are also different ranks.  Lets try to avoid a general overall from the top perspective, and lets see what every element needs to accomplish the mission.
Reacting instinctively to key orders. No.  You reactg because you have an officer worth  his salt who knows what he is doing.  I can attest that many soldiers have sat there listening to orders on the radio ove ra nd over again and wondered where in the hell buddy got his commision. Reacting to orders because you have to is one thing, reacting because you want to is something else.  And the orderrs during training are only familiar because we have so much safety that the commander is limited to what he can do.  Not to mention the fact that the commander is limited to the piece of training ground.  Its alway the same one.
And we have always used our Zulu vehicles with the commanders of the vehicles having the trust of the higher commander not to screw it up.  Not having the armour support was not a resticting factor at all.  In fact, armour would have limited alot of the operations.
Change  is not a bad thing.  Lets give it a shot.

 

[Kiwi99]

Dudes,
lets prevent this from becoming a Afghanistan experiance thread .  I am as guilty as anyone in this.  If it is something that is LAV related or LAV trg related, lets hear it.  But Afghan is not  the be all and end all of LAV experiance. Roger.

How do we enhance trg exercises to give realism to LAV Crews? 
How can the current gunner/CC crse be adjusted to accomadate change?
Does the dvr crse for LAV need to be changed?
Armd crewing LAV so 031 can dismount?

These questions are directed at serving members, with no offense to retired members intended.  Operators and trainers,let me know your issues and together lets find solutions.

 

[vonGarvin]

Dudes,
lets prevent this from becoming a Afghanistan experiance thread .  I am as guilty as anyone in this.  If it is something that is LAV related or LAV trg related, lets hear it.  But Afghan is not  the be all and end all of LAV experiance. Roger.

Agreed.

How do we enhance trg exercises to give realism to LAV Crews? 
How can the current gunner/CC crse be adjusted to accomadate change?
Does the dvr crse for LAV need to be changed?
Armd crewing LAV so 031 can dismount?

I'll give my answers to these in series.

Training exercises can be enhanced through CO's accepting some risk and by "creatively" reading 381-1.  I've done it with 2 RCR in 2002 on Ex ROYAL FIST, which was a live fire battle group ex conducted over a week with all attacks (save one: the airmobile) conducted at night.  It involved tanks, engineers, 155mm: everything.  As an example of "risk", there we were, formed up in the attack position as a battery mission of 155 (delay) came in barely 400 m to our front: yes, it's been closer in Afghanistan, but remember, this was in 2002.  That mission was 3 rounds a minute for 26 minutes!  Due to the firepower of the LAV, we tried using them as intimate support vehicles (IFVs) and found that they worked quite well for that (though it WAS a one way range only).  The tanks were used as assault tanks, but didn't punch until after we consolidated (25mm will penetrate the rear of a Leo C2, as I understand it!).  Creative, challenging training, collectively, is required, and this is a unit responsibility, not the Individual Training System Responsibility.

For the second, I'm not sure if drastic change is required.  I have to ask you, however, if you are aware of the content of the Turret Operator Course.  It replaces all other previous versions of 25mm gunnery training, be it the Basic Gunner, DP3A Crew Commander (Armd), LAV III Crew Commander, etc.  It takes a soldier not trained at all on the GM Delco Turret and teaches him or her how to react to "be a gunner" as well as the "buttonology" of the right hand of the turret, including remedying misfires and other stoppages.  Graduates of this course are qualified to be employed as a gunner in a LAV III and a Coyote.  Having said that, this graduate is NOT ready for war.  This course is an individual training course, which means that functioning as an effective gunner will take experience at the unit and on collective training: just as you may learn individual field craft and marksmanship does not make you an effective infantryman.
The current LAV III Crew Commander course teaches the candidate how to be a crew commander, and all that entails: crew supervision, issuing effective fire control orders, reaction to fire control orders from the Pl Comd, etc.  There is a range, but it is not the scripted range seen before.  I don't have 100% visibility on it (I'm not in the LAV APC SME cell at the Infantry School).  The current DP3A Crew Commander course is similar in that the ranges are advanced, and include time and accuracy in engagements, time and accuracy in reporting and effective manoeuvre of the vehicle.  Having said that, both courses again do NOT make a graduate ready for war.  Again, both are individual training courses: time and experience at the unit and on collective training are needed.  In the LAV III crew commander course, for example, the graduate is ready to learn how to fight with dismounts (maybe this has to be added to the course), how to manoeuvre with the other three call signs in the platoon, and so on.

I'm no expert on the LAV Driver Course, so no comment.

Armd crewing LAV so 031 can dismount.  ABSOLUTELY NOT.  Though it may work in concept, "what if" your crew is sick, goes down, is on HLTA, is tasked to watch from 10 to 2 on its arcs, etc.  Although not all 031 are "turret qual", there are enough to provide some redundancy at the section level to allow for crew rotation within the section if that crew is required for longer periods (say at FOB SHARLACHROT, as an example, in MADEUPLAND).  We cannot "wish away" the LAV Crewing to the armoured corps: they have barely enough to do what they have now: to crew 9 battalions worth of LAVs with crew-redundancy as well is impossible, long term AND short term.  It simply is not practicable, as it would take "generations" to recruit and train enough crews for us poor bloody infantry.

In summation, crewing a LAV III is a unique skill set.  I have it on the highest authority that those who have combat experience, as well as those with extensive training experience, have come together, and continue to do so, with the Centre of Excellence to import UNIVERSAL lessons into gunnery training.  There is no "end state", this is a continuing evolution that will have no end.  Well, until we get the LAV IV, I suppose!  ;D

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Kiwi, I fully realize that you want to keep this thread within the realm of those that have combat experience in the LAV.  In other words, you don't want crotchedy old fogies like me, with our walkers and cold war mentality wading in with our lack of LAV combat experience.

Having said that, you have started a thread that is certainly worthwhile, and I'm sure, you're opening the eyes of some.  I, too, have read the document you and the guys working with you have put out, it is surprisingly similar to other reports I have read about the Marines and their experience in the LAV in Iraq, and the US Army reports concerning the Bradley.  Well done.

I have just a couple of comments.  You know where their coming from, so take them as you wish.....

From the very beginning of the LAV project, I was arguing for one RWS per platoon, with the Mark 19.  The newest variants of the Mk 19, with the auto fuze setting, lasers and stab make an awesome area suppression weapons platform.  They can be loaded from inside the vehicle, and have enough ammo variants to keep everyone happy in almost every situation you can dream of.  While they are not much good for engaging the enemy that are inside fortifications, for enemy in the open, or behind fences, hedges, etc, they are deadly.  Nothing I have read has convinced me that this is not a viable concept.  The capability of putting down HE, HE-Frag, air burst, or even smoke is nothing to be sneezed at, in my opinion.

One of the common points in all of the after action reports I have read is the three round HEI burst being thrown out the window in combat.  While the idea is good, even necessary, when engaging armour with AP or Frange, it seems that 10 or even 20 round bursts of HEI are much more common than 3 round bursts.  Also common to all threads (not surprisingly) is the fact that replenishing HEI is time consuming and relatively labour intensive, and normally has to be completed at the worst possible time.  I don't really have an answer to that, aside from larger ammo bins.  Part of the problem, of course, is that HEI has a relatively small lethal burst radius, therefore, more rounds have to be fired to engage are targets, such as groups of bad guys.  The Mk 19 would be of huge assistance here, I believe.

The Armour School has in the past hosted an armour gunnery conference.  I'm not sure who has attended in the past from your Unit, but many (most) of the points you bring up are valid points, and that may be a forum to bring them up.  Perhaps Hauptmann Scharlachrot can give you more information on the invitees, and when it is being held again.

I am one of those that think that tanks should have been sent over much sooner than they were.  While they have their limitations, particularly in the area of the support they require, I bet that you can think of a couple of situations where it would have been nice to have that 105 Hesh round available!

If and when I get out there again, I'll try to make time to get together with you and the rest of your gang, maybe go out for a brew.  As long as you don't have me working in that refigerator again!

 

[Kiwi99]

Lance,
you are more than welcom any time, so feel free to drop in whenever.  With ref to the MK 19, does anyone know where we stand on this wpn.  I may be wrong, but some higher up said that the grenades that didnt go off were considedered to be mines, and that opens a whole new bag of issues.  I disagree.  We still use the M203, and the dudes raved about it in theater.  Even if there was a pintle mount version.  But, like any procurement process, we will take abattle proven weapon and decide to conduct 10 years of trials on it, another 5 to make sure it gets made in Quebec, and then we might get it.  This thread is not for Afghan vets only at all.  it is for anyone that has ideas for LAV, and wants to help the operators kill the jundi more effectivley.

Kiwi Out

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Kiwi;

Whoever made that comment (and I believe it was the MND) obviously didn't think before he spoke.  As if artillery don't have duds, or tanks, or even the 203.  He spoke without thinking things through, in my opinion.  The Mk 19 is a superb weapon!

Also, I apologise for the misunderstanding, I thought that you were trying to keep the posters to LAV combat vets, I'm glad I was mistaken.

I'll drop in with my walker next time I'm in town.

 

[hat]

Some General Points/Observations based on my experience as a Pl Comd, including Op ARCHER Roto 1:

1.  RE Afghanistan experience:
  a.  Experience isn't monolithic.  Different soldiers had different experiences based on the specific fights they were involved in.
  b.  On a personal note, one of the key lessons learned was that our training works (in a general sense, there's still lots of   
      tweaking to be done).  Prior to deployment we spent a great deal of time doing realistic live-fire training, and it was exactly 
      what was needed.  More than a year prior, we conducted Combat Team Live-fire training.  Yes the terrain available for traces
      was limited/familiar.  Yes safety was always a consideration.  However, in my opinion, this training is what got us through the
      tour.  Frequent re-grouping, mixing assets, marry-up drills, drills for admin and replenishment, rehearsals - all of these things
      apply at the tactical level whether conducting COIN or conventional operations.
  c.  I believe that drills/school learning is a point of departure.  Yes, certain things like LOAC are inviolable.  However, modern 
      soldiers get paid good money to think and apply concepts to new situations.  I have used three-round bursts against point targets
      (worked very well).  I have also used frontal-fire edge adjust and area engagements (worked equally as well).  I have used LAVs
      in intimate support and to conduct standoff attack.  I have conducted dismounted ops with my LAVs on a separate task.  All of
      these methods were appropriate in the applicable circumstances.
  d.  Regarding MK19 specifically, I think it is a good weapon but too susceptible to dust.  However, I like the idea greatly and think
      some sort of automatic grenade launcher would be excellent for select vehicles.  However, this should not ever replace the
      60mm mortar, as they are not identical in capability.
  e.  My views on armoured crewing the LAV are that properly trained infantrymen are more than capable and I would rather have
      armoured guys do armoured things.  Likewise, I would rather have pioneers and engineers, mortars and artillery. 
2.  LAV training in general:
  a.  My biggest complaint has always been with resourcing.  More shooting is required because, the more our crews
      do the more proficient they will be at gunnery (by this I mean hand-eye coord and getting rounds on target vice slavishly
      reciting words of command).  More vehicles are needed to ensure troops always have the LAVs to train with.
  b. It takes too long to modify/correct training material.  This problem is not unique to LAV training, but is systemic throughout our
      courses.  The process of updating and correcting course material needs to be streamlined. 

 

[vonGarvin]

Welcome hat
Some good points, I might say. 
As mentioned, the drills should not focus on reciting fire control orders (as you stated), but that also applies to the dismounts.  Remember way back when on Phase II:
"3 section, 200, treeline, left edge, machine gun.  Seen?"
"SEEN!"
"Rapid, fire!"
I'm pretty sure it was more like "THERE THEY ARE!  GET THEM!", if anything was said at all.  Well, not always, but drills are there for a reason: something to fall back on when your brain is thinking of one thing: survival.  If drills are taught well (and if they are effective), then they can then become instinct.  Much like the gunfighter program: trying to get you to do things "as a drill" so you don't have to think about it.  Much like walking home from a bar: you're drunk, but even so, your legs remember how to function (sort of), but well enough to get you home...

 

[1feral1]

.....but some higher up said that the grenades that didnt go off were considedered to be mines, and that opens a whole new bag of issues. 

UXOs as mines?

He'll go far in the NDP and Liberal Party, ha! Beyond PC!

It would be a different story if thats what the nature really was, 40mm bomblets, but a bomblet is not a HEDP rd, in this case, an HEDP which failed to explode on impact.

That guy is out to lunch!

Regards from Baghdaddy,

Wes

 

[Kiwi99]

Live fire training is paramount.  More rounds downrange in WX means less time applying drills in combat.  Practice makes perfect, as the saying goes. 
With ref to perparing for the tour, no amount of live fire and time in the field prepares you, especially in a controlled enviroment like WX.  What prepared our soldier was good NCOs, a good warrat, good CSM and OC, and a Pl Comd who was too busy with paperwork (not his fault) to attend training in garrison.  That is what got us through the tour. Low level training concentrating on instinctive shooting, first aid, initiative and section level operations.  And it is the sect comds and WO that are to be thanked for that.
When speaking pf lessons learnt, we must remember that different levels see things differently, and they are opinions, not fact. 
'HAT' brings up good points from a Pl Comd level, but from my level i disagree with some.  But it is dialougue and that is good. 
Which brings us to a new question.  Is LAV III to generic, or should different levels in the chain have different suites and/or add ons.  I believe that what I need in a fight is the most rugged and simple of LAV models, because as a LAV commander in a rifle platoon, thats where I am.  The CO or OC may need some different kit that  would make their job easier and more fluid.  Lets hear some of those ideas.


Kiwi out

 

[hat]

Kiwi and I will always disagree on certain points.  I believe that, while an infantry officer must be a generalist, there are certain fields in which he must have acumen.  More than just tactics, he should be skilled at the application of all the weapons systems organic to an infantry platoon.  Once we move outside this sphere, it becomes acceptable to be more reliant on advice from various specialist, whether they be other officers or NCMs.  That said, I believe in decentralized training and that a good officer does ride top cover to allow his subordinates to do what they need to do (this is not always what they would like to do). 

The overwhelming majority of the operations we conducted were of platoon level or higher.  Most of these required coordination of different supporting assets.  That said, I will never deny that individual, crew and section skills are the firm base without which everything else is impossible.  It is important that this training be conducted not just prior to deployment, but continue while in theatre.

I believe that LAV suites should be as similar as possible to provide the redundancy necessary for combat and ease of training for crews.  Far better to increase the capabilities of all vehicles (in comms etc..) than to try and tailor to the minimum level of capability required by each user group.  I am a big fan of simple, but believe that the LAV could benefit from better human engineering. 

 

[McG]

I think the idea of missiles on the LAV is excellent.  I think we also need to think of missiles more broadly than just anti-tank.  Each launcher type should have a range of potential payloads.  Top-attack TOW is probably not the way to go for grape-hut smashing.  However, a missile carrying a HESH or Thermobaric warhead would have smashed those things.

There is a version of the Delco turret that has a TOW launcher on either side. …  I would like to know why we didn't do that in the first place.

The missiles would have taken up room inside and cut down on the Dismounts.

Missiles only would have displaced dismounts if the basic load exceeded what was in the tubes.  Each vehicle could carry two ready to fire missiles.  Reloading would occur only in a leaguer with missiles carried by the echlon.  Dedicated missile vehicles would carry additional missiles & the ability to reload under armour. 

There is a version of the Delco turret that has a TOW launcher on either side. …  I would like to know why we didn't do that in the first place.

You would have to expose yourself to reload.

So don’t reload in contact.  Keep dedicated missile vehicles (like TUA) for this.

There is a version of the Delco turret that has a TOW launcher on either side. …  I would like to know why we didn't do that in the first place.

The addition of a missile system to the turret, would have encouraged crews to take more chances in engaging MBTs. 

The solution to this is training.  Train the crews not to take chances engaging tanks.  Train the crews when to engage tanks and when not to engage tanks.  Otherwise, we may as well use this argument to get rid of SRAAW(L) and SRAAW(M).

I am rather curious as to why anyone is considering replacing the turret on a LAV with an RWS anyway? What advantages are "they" proposing an RWS will give compared to a turret?

The only thing that comes to my mind is lower weight/lower profile

There is also the option of more troops in the back because less space is required for the gunner and CC without the turret basket.

I could see the utility of an RWS on a LAV III chassis if the vehicle was being used in the role that Bisons currently fill.

+1

… the RWS could be used on a LAV / Coyote as a secondary support platform.

…

I could picture this system on a Coyote, with the gunners position replacing the 'bird gunners' position.  Due to the height of the RWS system, and with good placement, the system could be used as 'Air sentry' or 'rear guard' when in convoy, and could provide extra fire power when fighting.  This would provide added protection to the crew as they could travel with 'hatches down' all the time.

Much like the German Marder had a RWS to cover the rear arcs.  However, I suspect you are thinking that the surveillance operator (not the gunner) would operate a rear mounted RWS on the Coyote.

I personally like the RWS system on the RG-31, as it automatically applies the ballistics once a target is lasered, and the IR is quite a bit more advanced than the LAVs (not going into specs), and the optics have a 'zoom'...  But I can see where it lacks. 

But the RWS screen in comparison to the LAVs Thermal or Day scope... I'd rather have the screen.  It has a wider field of view (I found anyway) and a more clear view in both thermal and day (which can be switched at a push of a button).

It certainly would be interesting to integrate a more relaxed view sighting system in the LAV (screen).  Done properly, the day, II, and TI could all be available with the flick of a switch.

Connected to a combat id system, the same screen could graphically mark tgts that are known fdly or tgts which have been tagged as hostile by other vehicles/observers.  The CC’s screen could also be toggled to the CSAM view or a digital map/SAS display.

With that in mind,  wouldn't it be better if the turret crew could be further in the belly of the beast (LAV) and still be able to engage?   

There are turret systems where the two man turret crew is fully inside the hull yet still traverse with the turret.  However, I don’t think these turrets provide much option for heads-up operation.

no stab on the RWS and that screen lights up the entire car at night. 

The RWS could have been bought with a stab.  It needs it even on the hwys.  There were recommendations to block the windows in order to hide the glow of the screen at night (& to hide the contents of the veh from outside observation).

Part of the problem, of course, is that HEI has a relatively small lethal burst radius, therefore, more rounds have to be fired to engage are targets, such as groups of bad guys.  The Mk 19 would be of huge assistance here, I believe.

I recall reading that the LAV25 and LAV30 turrets had an option for an automatic grenade launcher (though that will make the turrets a little busy if you also were to take the TOW option).  Has the CF done any testing to compare the effects of HEI from larger cannons (like the 30 mm which would fit in our current turrets)?

I believe that LAV suites should be as similar as possible to provide the redundancy necessary for combat and ease of training for crews.  Far better to increase the capabilities of all vehicles (in comms etc..) than to try and tailor to the minimum level of capability required by each user group.  I am a big fan of simple, but believe that the LAV could benefit from better human engineering. 

I will echo this.  Every LAV should have at least 2 x A+ in the turret (one of these could be a 117F over there).  The OC might want a computer to get the information available in SAS (assuming he is somewhere that it is being used), and the Coy CP probably wants the full ATHENA terminal in the back (but this could be in an RWS vehicle with four radios in the hull).

On the human engineering side, turret space needed to be a bigger factor in the design.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

I recall reading that the LAV25 and LAV30 turrets had an option for an automatic grenade launcher (though that will make the turrets a little busy if you also were to take the TOW option).  Has the CF done any testing to compare the effects of HEI from larger cannons (like the 30 mm which would fit in our current turrets)?

The Mk 19 cannot be mounted inside a turret, it pretty much has to be an RWS or a pintle mounted weapon.  Way to much smoke and fumes, it's simply the nature of the beast.  I still think one RWS equipped with a Mk 19 attached to each platoon would be very worthwhile.

There's been tons of tests completed on 25-50mm cannons.  The bottom line is that most countries agree that 35mm is the minimum caliber capable of firing adequate chemical energy rounds.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Just out of curiosity, would the LAV-III 25mm with TOW turret have proven useful in any situations in Afghanistan to date?

I was just thinking that if we are making an additional purchase of let's say 20-50 vehicles, it seems like a good time to add that capability if it were deemed advantageous.

Specifically, the Bunker Buster TOW seemed to look like it could provide an immediate fire support role that previously would've required either MGS or an MBT.

http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms04_011980.pdf



Matthew.   

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Just out of curiosity, would the LAV-III 25mm with TOW turret have proven useful in any situations in Afghanistan to date?

I was just thinking that if we are making an additional purchase of let's say 20-50 vehicles, it seems like a good time to add that capability if it were deemed advantageous.

Specifically, the Bunker Buster TOW seemed to look like it could provide an immediate fire support role that previously would've required either MGS or an MBT.

http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms04_011980.pdf



Matthew.   

And what make it even more top heavy that what it already is  ???

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

And what make it even more top heavy that what it already is  ???

It's 150kg difference....


Matthew.  ???

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Ok thought that it would weigh more.

Incidentally where would you mount them? On the side of the turret? then the you have to have a stand-off distance from the turret to fire them. Also what about the GIB's in the air sentry roll.

 

[ArmyRick]

Nfld Spr, when you go into action/come under contact, your air sentry should be pulling in. The delco turret with TOW has one launch tube on either side of the turret. You would not be able to stow anything on the back of the turret due to BBDA.

To fire TOW, the vehicle has to remain stationary (and preferably in a hull down position) anyways. So the air sentry can duck his arse back inside.

 

[Kiwi99]

Forget LAV III with a TOW on the turret.  Never going to happen, and thats it.  As for the M113, yes, the argument for is a good one, and so are the arguments against.  At the ened of the day you have to be able to get top the fight, fight it, and then either get out or push forward again.  M113 are maintenance intensive, as is any tracked vehicle.  The LAV III not so much, due to its lack of track.  I do not believe the arguments that a track can go places a wheeled veh cannot .  The LAV III can go anywhere it wants, quickly, a lot quicker than a track.  And all you need is someone commanding the veh that has a schmick and a good driver who understands his veh.

With ref to the air sentry ducking back in...Why?  As long as you are not shooting over the back deck he is perfectly safe and can add his own lil bit of fire onto the enemy.  Especialy true during ambush.  What is the point of having him up if you are not going to use him and his weapon.  

The LAV III platform is solid and dependable, and battle proven.  Suggesting that the Couger be bought back in is another poor idea.  For the reason that they have been sitting somewhere for the last 10 years alone is something.  Let alone the fact that very few people are now qualified.  And if you told me to get out of my LAV and get in one of those I would tell ya to bugger off.  So what if its got a bigger gun than a LAV.  It is not as reliable, lacks the protection required and is a relic of the cold war.  

One thing to keep in mind with the suggestion of M113 and Couger and all these other vehicles is logistics.  Instead of having to supply ofor X number of vehicles, you add another buch in.  The same goes with resupply and ammo redistribution.  keep it simple and smooth and hopefully it all goes well.  

With the TTP from insurgents in Iraq now being seen in Afghanistan, I dare anyone who supports M113 and Couger to go ahead and take said veh to Astan.  We are doing extremely well with what we have, why handicap it with veh and kit older than the troops fighting.

 

[MG34]

Kiwi good points I agree with most of them ,but we have had soldiers killed in the airsentry hatch,it is not a safe place to be under any sort of contact, 4 weer also wounded when the turret was struck by a vehicle and slewed over the back deck hitting them. the idea of remote controled guns and cameras were bounced around so that everyone could remain buttoned up yet still retain SA.