Light Infantry - a definition, roles, requirements, capabilities, and a vision for the future

[Kirkhill]

Bitter PPCLI Cpl:

I am sorry you feel that way. And you may have a point about the length of my posts and why I do them. Unfortunately I have always had a tendency to talk too much.  As much as anything the exercise of putting down the words helps me to sort out what I am thinking.

As to the issue of Light versus Mech - I do not feel that mech is a waste of time. Far from it.  Likewise however I do not feel that light is a waste of time.  I do feel that right now, that there seems to be more of a demand for light troops than for mounted troops.  Show me I am wrong.

I am trying to see, how it is, with a small army, that the army and the government, can best utilize those people, like yourself, that have put themselves at the service of the country.

What is your suggestion? Are things right as they stand with 6 LAV and 3 light? Does the manpower get employed well and equally? Do you think that the troops, yourself, get enough of the right kind of training prior to deployment?

Cheers, and I will try to lay off the Dragoons seeing as how it gives so much offence.

Good day.

 

[Jungle]

Perhaps planning could start from the basis of getting 600 infanteers on the ground, then add kit, then add other capabilities.

Planning has NEVER been done this way, and will NOT start now !!! Do NOT try to get any kind of logic into our planning process...  

Here's the way things are planned:
Warning Order is sent to unit, Bde, Area and Command, along with TO&E...
week 1: Unit puts names in slots, advises people and starts DAG
Week 2: BDE makes changes to TO&E, removes bayonets to augment NSE. Unit advises members about changes...
Week 3: Area makes changes to TO&E, removes bayonets and NSE pers to augment NCE. Unit is doing daily parades to keep up with the changes...
Week 4: Command changes composition of NSE and NCE to augment bayonets... Unit looks like a circus !!! People are playing musical chair in the Coys...
48 hours before departure: Ottawa orders everyone to go back to original TO&E. Members who were told last week they would not deploy, are now told to bring ther unaccompanied baggage in the next day, as they are leaving the day after !!!  ;D

OK, back to topic now...  >

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks for reality check Jungle. ;D

 

[McG]

Or do mech and air and amphib and helo and mountain and tree-climbing operations all require dedicated, task specific troops?

Not necessarily.   Certain tasks would require standing specialised troops while others may only require a brief work-up trg or covered as a secondary role.   Each of those listed tasks do have their own unique trg requirements.

Are things right as they stand with 6 LAV and 3 light [and 4 armour]?

I think the right number is 4 x light and 8 x mech (with 0 x   pure armour regts).

 

[Kirkhill]

Not necessarily.   Certain tasks would require standing specialised troops while others may only require a brief work-up trg or covered as a secondary role.   Each of those listed tasks do have their own unique trg requirements.
I think the right number is 4 x light and 8 x mech (with 0 x   pure armour regts).

OK then perhaps here is the crux of the matter.  All tasks have their own training requirements.  What skills are common? What skills need to be taught? How much time is necessary for a retasked unit to become proficient in a different environment? How many units of a given skill set are necessary at any given time and at what degree of readiness?

I know paras can become mech infanteers.  They can even become good at it given enough time I am sure.  Likewise I am sure that mech infanteers can learn to work out of boats, or helicopters or even with mules. Again given enough time and instruction.

The question is how best to organize the force to ease the transition from one role to the other, to minimize the amount of conversion training.  If it takes a year and the government decrees 2 simultaneous six month deployments then we need 4 units in role (2 deployed, 2 ready) 2 more units in conversion training and 2 more units told off to prepare for conversion while continuing with their primary assignment.  This has worked.  The Brits used it for donkey's years.  However they have scrapped the system partly because they felt that the lack of continuity resulted in loss of proficiency.  Great generalists, adequate specialists.

The Americans have troops dedicated to task but discovered recently that skills not exercised are skills lost.  Every soldier goes through basic (even light) training.  But unless they use the skills, have the weapons and are exercised in sections and platoons then they need to relearn those skills.  This was a particular problem for Tankers and Gunners that were converted to infantry tasks because there weren't enough infanteers.

As to numbers McG: you are a brave engineer.  To continue to suggest the disbandment of the Armoured Corps and convert all units to some sort of infantry structure - even if they do get to retain hatbadges in 3 units.

By the way, what is the 4th armoured unit?  RCD, LdSH(RC), 12 RBC and what?  Is the 8CH being stood up again or is the new MMEW unit to be in addition to the LdSH?

Cheers.

 

[McG]

Oops.  Should have been 3.

 

[BITTER PPLCI CPL]

I know this is far fetched and probably would never happen (but then who would have thought 2 planes flying into buildings by extremists) but imagine these 2 scenario's. First, an armoured brigade advancing supported by artillery and other assets, waiting for them 3 light infantry battalions, no armour of any type, just light Bn. weapons. Now the light infanteer's would fight and fight hard, who would have a fighting chance. Or the second, 3 maybe 4 mech. bn's w/tow and armoured recce, in this case who do think would have a fighting chance. Like I said it's far fetched, I'm not an officer so I'm not good at writing scenario's.

​

 

[a_majoor]

The scenario would be a very extreme case; why would the light Bns be deployed in the sort of terrain that favors mechanized troops unless they were the last and only troops left? The Mech forces would have a very difficult time if they were advancing against 3 Light Bns in Yugoslavia or Afghanistan, where the constricted terrain favors the light troops (or negates the advantages of the mechanized troops, take your pick).

I once had the opportunity to work with (now) LCol Schreiber in Gagetown as staff on a RESO course. Our course was Non Combat Arms, and on the final EX, we were pitted as enemy force against the RESO Phase III and IV candidates operating a "square" combat team. We were equipped as Light Infantry, and besides the 3 X M113s and trucks we were allocated as transport, had no fighting platforms or weapons heavier than GPMGs and M-72s. "The enemy" had a squadron of Leopards and a company of mech infantry mounted on Grizzly WAPCs, plus attached mortars and artillery (FOO and MFC riding around in Bisons).

Using his considerable knowledge of psychology to lure the combat team into traps based on even slight advantages in terrain (nothing obvious to tweak them that we were about to hand them their a***s); combined with aggressive patrolling to keep them off balance (imagine not being able to complete DPs or get a good night's sleep in the hide); I would say we did very well indeed; with the objective evidence of the Umpire staff supplemented by driving past the combat team formed up in the leaguer with the assembled Phase III and IV candidates getting a ferocious bolloking from their DS staff.

The point is that light forces can be quite potent given quality training and leadership. Kirkhills point is that we need to examine the ratio between light and mech forces in the CF to see if we have a proper balance based on both historical trends and projected future deployments. Places like Afghanistan, Haiti or Rwanda are ideal for light forces; Somalia, Ethiopia and the Sudan have open terrain suitable for mech forces. Add the logistics requirments for the different types of forces, and the available transport to get them to the various hot spots in the world, and light forces have a very definite place at the table.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not farfetched at all BPC.

In your scenario, certainly there would be an advantage to having the heavier weapons that a mechanized force supplies.  It would be good to have them on the ground for that eventuality and they must be retained to keep their skills up for that eventuality.  No question.

The question is would the Canadian government be able to put them in the same space as the assaulting force. Would it want to?

Related question is do all missions require a full set of LAVs to be deployed? Or can the mission be accomplished with only the infantry component (the dismounted component)?  

One of the problems that I see being faced is that we trained to win battles, with enough time then we could set ourselves up to win a war.  Gulf War I actually just qualifies as a battle and a short one.

Gen. Leslie's vision calls for forces to be deployed as a garrison force in a non-permissive environment for a generation.  

When fighting a battle troops were deployed to be used for 72 hours and then withdrawn.  Wars were expected to be decided in months if not weeks.  This meant that troops could be over-extended for the limited duration of the conflict.  One, maybe two units might be adequate to accomplish the war aims.

When looking at manning a garrison manning requirements seem to me to be different.  You can't leave one battalion in place for 25 years while the rest of the army trains for the real war.  Other countries have done that in the past.  They brought the survivor home, pinned a medal on his chest, sent him home on half pay and retired the colours.  From where I sit it looks like manning a garrison under those circumstances is more like manning a city police department or any other industrial organization.  For every person in theater actively working, for example manning an OP, you may need up to 4 or 5 others not on duty.  

Look at it this way 50 weeks of 40 hours equals 2000 hours.  There are 6800 hours in a year.  To have that OP manned 24/7 for a generation means 3 to 4 sets of operators per OP to cover a normal 40 hour work week and probably a fifth set to allow for leave, sick leave and other absences.  If this sounds like a job rather than soldiering.... may be it is... but that is the job that soldiers are likely to be asked to do.

The other issue that I keep stumbling over is a really silly one.  Its the number of people that a LAV can carry.   I understand CDS has mandated that the vehicle will have a permanent crew of 3 and the turret will be manned at all times.  That only leaves seats in the back for seven infanteers.  Those seven infanteers, when operating with the LAV carrying their gear and lots of ammunition are a very effective team.  I don't know if you have 6 or 4 actuals but in any event, the carrying capacity of the vehicle means you have access to a variety of weapons and a lot of ammunition.

By contrast Light Infantry, or lets just say Infantry operating without vehicles, seems to be using a minimum of 8 men in a section, perhaps as many as 13.  This is apparently necessary to carry a suitable assortment of weapons and ammunition.  I don't know the reason.

I do know that the Light Infantry organization doesn't readily squeeze into LAVs, nor does it seem that the LAV organization can just leave their vehicles behind and conform to the same structure used by the Light Infantry.   Can the LAV dismounts (sorry) be organized in such a fashion that they could immediately start operating as Light Infanteers without their vehicles?  Would the crews be used to top up the sections and if so how much transition training time might be necessary to convert from one role to the next?  When C/2VP converted were your sections disrupted or were completely new sections formed?

This is where I am at.  I can accept that man for man a mech infanteer can do the job of a light infanteer.  The question in my mind is can a common organization be found that permits all 9 battalions to operate in both Mech and Light roles with minimal disruption during transition?

Also as regards jumping out of planes: does the organization need to change just because some infanteers get to their place of employment tied to a bit of silk?

Cheers.

PS (In the bad old days) a mech infantry battalion was expected to dismount, dig in, and when augmented by a Squadron of tanks and the Battalion's TOWs, hold off a full Regimental/Brigade assault, as I remember the MTPs.  Have things changed in that regard?

I think that is less than 6000 words

 

[a_majoor]

The other issue that I keep stumbling over is a really silly one.  Its the number of people that a LAV can carry.  I understand CDS has mandated that the vehicle will have a permanent crew of 3 and the turret will be manned at all times.  That only leaves seats in the back for seven infanteers.  Those seven infanteers, when operating with the LAV carrying their gear and lots of ammunition are a very effective team.  I don't know if you have 6 or 4 actuals but in any event, the carrying capacity of the vehicle means you have access to a variety of weapons and a lot of ammunition.

Not silly at all; the size of mech sections (US =squads) is much smaller than comparable "motor" or light infantry because of the turret and ammunition stowage issues of an IFV.  I recall in the Persian Gulf War (1991), there was a great deal of concern by US commanders regarding the limited numbers of infantrymen in M-2 equipped battalions, there was even a call to bring in battalions of National Guard infantry mounted in  M-113s to round out the divisions and get an acceptable number of infantry soldiers into the battle. While I am a bit unclear as to the details, I believe this plan was never carried through because:

a. National Guard units of that era were not capable of achieving their pre deployment training objectives in the time allotted, and;

b. There was no practical way to get them into the theater anyway, all available transport bing required to bring the "Heavy Metal Army" forces of US V Corps from Germany to Kuwait and XVIII Corps from the United States and maintain the logistics train for the force.

In any event, the "Desert Storm" air campaign paved the way for a 100 hr "Desert Sabre"  ground campaign, and the extra infantry were not needed.

Dragoons, Tank Marines, Panzergrenaidiers, Mech Infantry, whatever you like to call it, will have different TO&E and TTP issues than Light Infantry. My point remains; being "light" or "Mech" is more than just mounting and dismounting a vehicle. Any soldier can be trained to do either job, and most can probably be cross trained to do either, but the training and practice required for the various specialty roles, to operate in a particular ORBAT and use particular TTPs suggests it is more efficient to specialize.

 

[a_majoor]

Light Infantry TO&Es and TTPs might need a very long rethink. LCol Banks article in the CAJ 8.3 describes not only highly dispersed companies, but also highly dispersed platoons with squads working from 5 to 30 km away from the Pl HQ.

In a complex urban environment, the channeling effect of urban infrastructure and electronic "shadows" caused by buildings and electromagnetic interference could isolate patrolling sections just as effectively as distance and mountainous terrain does in Afghanistan. To my mind, this means the "weapons platoon" (or support platoon depending on what day it is) grouping the company heavy weapons assets is, perhaps, mistaken. There will be few occasions where the firepower resources could be used effectively, and then only in the high intensity part of the "Full Spectrum". On the other hand, "penny packeting" GPMGs, 60mm mortars etc. to individual sections is also problematic. We are talking about true light infantry, quiet and stealthy on foot. Lumbering along a goat trail or back alley with a GPMG and 440 rds link sort of goes against that model.

If we move in Kirkhill/FM Slim's model of an infantry soldier with a rifle and 50 rds, then we no longer "need" a dedicated weapons platoon. Soldiers could be issued the lightest man portable anti-armour weapon available if there was a need to reduce bunkers or improvised fortifications, perhaps modern rifle grenades might be able to do the trick. If the soldiers in the Light Battalions were actually armed with an accurate 7.62mm rifle, and trained to "Marksman" standards, then the requirement for sustained support fire from an LMG or GPMG is also reduced. (A support version of the rifle with a bi-pod, HBAR and "Snail drum" magazine would still be needed).

The fourth platoon per company could then either be dispensed with, or retained as the QRF platoon. As Kirkhill points out most of the jobs of Light Infantry in the "Full Spectrum" environment are similar to Police work, and require manning 24/7, including backfill for leave, sickness and injuries, so the fourth platoon would be an important manpower resource. The CQ's locker would hold GPMGs, Javelin or Gill/Spike missiles, 60mm mortars etc. to be issued out when needed, and for annual refresher training.

At the risk of carrying over the acrimonious debate from the "Dragoons" thread, I will say that closer examination of the Light Infantry concept shows a lot more differences than simply what vehicle you jump out of. A four platoon company, larger sections and different TO&E exist even with todays ORBAT, and going deeper into "Light" territory would make the changes even more pronounced. Individual soldiers can and will be able to transition between roles, but to expect to transfer a complete sub unit between roles may be difficult unless a considerable effort is made in the transitional training.

 

[KevinB]

Okay this thread evolved while I was enjoying my leave period.

Key to all of this is a concensus upon what roles we feel are needed in the the CF, and then fitting units into filling the needed roles.  If this requires an adverse adjustment of training and doctrine then so be it.

Going back to Kevin's world.  I still think the 4man brick/det (whatever we want to call it) is the perfect building block for LI/SOC Inf.
Everything above that (bayonet wise) is either loosely based or admininstrative organisation.

The 4 man det must be able to shoot-move and communicate.
Internal to it - should be communications and medical skills - especially important for LRRP capable.
It can be twinned for longer duration patrols and tripled for static FID assignments or whatever.

Seemless intergration for "doorkicker" DA missions as well - and for a more conventional airborne assault they can still be deployed enmasse - seizing an airfield, until relief by more conventional units.

In my closing for this soapbox speach - I think it is important, essential even to intergrate technology down to the lowest level, for some of the point made earlier on the historical aspect are no longer as relevant given current tech.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

Kevin

I agree with your 4-man det and your observation on organization at higher levels.  I also agree with your point about comms and meds being integral for LI-SOC teams.  Larger groupings of teams that are intended to work in close proximity to each other can be serviced by smaller proportions of specialists of all sorts and the 4-man dets may be able to cover some of the requisite tasks with lower levels of skills and training - eg gate guard vs tank-hunting.

On the technology front the point that I am trying to make is that an infanteer is an infanteer regardless of the kit employed.  The technology enables the mission.  It doesn't define the infanteer. A junior infanteer can perform some infantry missions without a wide variety of skills and kit.  A senior infanteer with broader experience and training, and access to a bigger toolkit that can be competently employed, can be entrusted with a wider variety of missions, and more independence of thought and action.

Cheers,

Chris

 

[KevinB]

FWIW I think that gate guard is a waste of LI-SOC units.

IMHO and probably less flatering to some opinion thew reserve Inf units are best set for that.

it takes months of continuous training to make skilled firebreathingdoorkickers - and while I agree that simple patrollign take no great skill - that advanmced trauma medicine and sattilite data transfer of encoded video and audio data does take a bit more time than going for a walk in the woods.

Perhaps I just see the up-he sees me and shoots me dead- down as a waste of skilled soldiers -

Moutaineering, Urban Ops, etc are require specific tools.  this is what I mean (and adv trauma medicine and comms) by pushing tech out there.
The skills to use these items and the items themselves are not found in many units.  The same goes for MFP insertions for "layback" type SR missions.

The determination must be made of WHAT the End Goal is of the LI-SOC and tune it to that.

 

[tomahawk6]

One only need to look at Egyptian infantry armed with ATM's savaging the Israeli armor corps. They had air defense in depth that countered the Israeli air force. As the Israeli's had let their artillery atrophy in favor of air power they had no indirect fire capability.

 

[Infanteer]

The technology enables the mission.   It doesn't define the infanteer.

So, would you consider an infanteer an 031 if he is a LAV gunner, has driver and gunnery courses, spends alot of time maintaining the thing, and for career progression will be learning how to command the vehicle?

 

[Kirkhill]

So, would you consider an infanteer an 031 if he is a LAV gunner, has driver and gunnery courses, spends alot of time maintaining the thing, and for career progression will be learning how to command the vehicle?

OK Infanteer you might have me there.  But one of the things that I have been stressing is that the Infanteer does the job on foot.  They close with the enemy, right enough and go face to face, and if the situation warrants they kill the individual.  The technology to which I was referring was that which the Infanteer can carry.

The individual you described, like a sailor or an airman is a servant of the vehicle and does their job mounted, from a distance (ok that last is relative).  In my mind that individual is a cavalryman.

An infanteer whether armed with club, rifle or ZOT-button that transports the enemy to another dimension is still an infanteer.  That's what I mean by being independent of technology.

And Kevin while gate-guard could be adequately performed by a less experienced soldier with less training than a LI-SOC troop, thus making better use of available man-power, if the LI-SOC unit is to be first into the field to answer a crisis, shouldn't it be expected to find its own gate-guards.  Or should a sub-unit of lesser trained troops be attached to supply the gate-guards?

What I am failling to convey is that infanteers, people that work on the ground, in direct contact with other people will always be necessary.  Where those other people are found, their temper, their disposition, their support, will define the threat to the infanteer and the infanteer will have to be organized accordingly.  Given that the world is full of imaginative people I don't think a playbook can be generated to cover all eventualities and in the absence of such a playbook it seems difficult to me to define specialists. 

Following from that the infanteer is likely to be constantly retasked depending on the threat and needs.  Then it comes down to what kind of training and organizational regime can you come up with to minimize the amount of conversion time necessary to field a competent unit and how much lead time can the government supply by accurately assessing and predicting its needs?

 

[KevinB]

Kirkhill - Ah I see your point.

I think LI-SOC can do force protection and interim "gateguard jobs" - but IDEALLY - they would seize and hold then other units come into to "shore up" the positions -- if they needed fixed positions.

I'm basing this off my idea of a mix/slurry of a 75th RR / USSF role for the LI-SOC
I am also for specialising the LI-SOC liek the MEU-SOC unit where the true SOC portions woudl not do gate but have 'junior' folk do that.

IMHO the idea of spending cash getting guys more speicalised for urban DA's and the like works out to a poor bang for buck in "got a pulse" tasks.

I know this smacks of elitism - but why spend time and efforts getting them to intergrate with Tier1 (JTF2) assets and then squander the dollars.

Maybe do like the Rangers and let your HUA's (non tabbed) get the lesser roles where your experience is out ont he edge -- ina  few years the former HUA's are into the full fold and the new ones doign the pleabe work - true you will always need NCO's - but more of a cadre.

 

[Kirkhill]

Kevin:

I think we might be beginning to agree here.  The outstanding issue perhaps is whether LI-SOC troopers should be grouped in a specialist unit like the Rangers, whether they should be in separate units within the Regiments as you are just now or should they be integrated at unit level in specialist sub-units like a recce coy, or recce platoon.  Or should the progression be an alternation of troops from HUA to unit specialist to Jr NCO to LI-SOC to Sr NCO etc.

At bottom I keep searching for a structure within the units that can support 9 identical battalions allowing for max flex but perhaps also allowing for 1 or 3 of those battalions to be staffed with experienced personnel that can be more independently tasked.


I think my preference is to try and minimize the drain of the elite on the line units that concerned Field Marshal Slim. At the same time there is a need to provide growth outlets for soldiers beyond simple command positions and also to take advantage of increases in small unit technical capabilities as well as the increased operational capabilities of bright soldiers who are just not cut out for command but are quite capable of working independently or as part of a more egalitarian small unit.

 

[KevinB]

I think 9 identical units is impossible unless you want units that are incompetant with both roles.

My own personal feeling is we are better off making ALL 9 units LI.
make specialty sub routines in the different units.

send the LAV to the Armour (heck aren't they looking for roles?) They are the SME's on crewing it anyway.
If you want to have a hard vehicle to role up to a DA in - LI-SOC dudes can figure out how to drop a ramp if nec...

I would use reservists as the regular dismounts for the "CAV".  They can learn the system on pre-tour run up - with specilized theatre set ups for the system (hangin out the airsentry family hatches etc.)
They can be used for CAV QRF and local force protection.