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Little Honking Ships......

The media blows military purchases out of proportion.  The submarines, the F 35, etc -- it's almost like they recycle the same old tired draft.  In the internet age, the Canadian public is better informed and smarter then that.  They don't need to rely on biased sources of information -- they can Google 'northwest passage' and see a direct threat to our sovereignty.  They are proud of Canada's contribution to world security over the past decade and they want to keep up the momentum.  I'd like to think the opposition will lose votes by making political issues of these purchases.

Maybe that's wishful thinking... but I think it's time for a sea-change in Canadian thinking with respect to National Defence.

/rant over
 
I sincerely hope that you are correct but and it is a big but, the majority of seats are controlled by the major cities, particularly Toronto and Toronto is probably more left wing than Moscow.  These folks meet every day over their lattes to discuss how the world would be so much better if Yonge street was designated bicycles only and the only cars permitted downtown were theirs.  These folks have no concept of the price that was paid in lives so that they can enjoy those lattes.  They also don't understand that folks in Eastern Europe, parts of Africa, Pakistan (just to name a couple of sites, there are plenty more) only want the same freedom and have relatives who have died in the very recent past to try and achieve it.  Think Romania!  If we don't pay, we will eventually loose, maybe not this decade but it will happen.  We have too much land, too much water and too much oil to think that someone won't try to take it if we don't stand guard.  But try explaining that in your local Starbucks.  Sadly the major cities control parliament.  Whatever we spend on military has got to be achieved through careful plotting and cannot be done in a straight forward manner.  I think that is the reason for the buy Canada thing.  It is the only way to get these folks to accept the expenditure.  It doesn't help having an antagonistic press filing freedom of information requests for absolutely every piece of paper initiated in Ottawa in hopes of catching some ministry screwing up but particularly defense since the press by and large dislikes the military anyways.  But enough.
 
here is a little video of some of the possibilities:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-byd6Fp5RW4

Article from here:
http://www.45enord.ca/2014/06/deux-cent-militaires-de-valcartier-debarquent-en-gaspesie-photosvideo/
 
Very nice, and an obvious demonstration that with a small amount of training, our soldiers and airmen are perfectly capable of learning the ropes of amphibious ops.

Recapturing the Gaspé airport from terrorists, he! I wonder if anyone remembers that the "hippies communes" of Gaspé in the 1960's is where the FLQ and its terrorist bent was born. (Just trowing in a bit of history here).
 
A bit of blue sky here, but the US Spearhead class "Joint High Speed Ship" seems to have many of the qualities for a little honking ship, except for short legs. The ship is 70% common with a car ferry design, which should reduce some of the price pressure. The fact there is a huge internal bay should allow for some clever modular conversion kits to fulfill other roles as well:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spearhead_class_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel

Class overview

Builders:
Austal USA

Operators:
United States Navy

Cost:
$214m/unit[1]

Built:
2010s

Building:
2[2]

Planned:
10

Completed:
5[2]

Active:
4[2]

General characteristics

Tonnage:
1,515 tonnes

Length:
103.0 m (337 ft 11 in)

Beam:
28.5 m (93 ft 6 in)

Draft:
3.83 m (12 ft 7 in)

Propulsion:
Four MTU 20V8000 M71L diesel engines
Four ZF 60000NR2H reduction gears

Speed:
43 knots (80 km/h; 49 mph)

Range:
1,200 nmi (1,400 mi; 2,200 km)[3]

Boats & landing craft carried:
Can deploy 7-meter rigid hull inflatable boats[4]

Capacity:
600 short tons[3]

Troops:
312

Crew:
41

Armament:
Four mounts for M2 .50 caliber machine guns[5]

Aircraft carried:
Landing pad for a helicopter, up to CH-53 Super Stallion/CH-53K King Stallion,[6] parking and storage area for MH-60 Seahawk

 
Thucydides said:
A bit of blue sky here, but the US Spearhead class "Joint High Speed Ship" seems to have many of the qualities for a little honking ship, except for short legs. The ship is 70% common with a car ferry design, which should reduce some of the price pressure. The fact there is a huge internal bay should allow for some clever modular conversion kits to fulfill other roles as well:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spearhead_class_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel

It looks very similar to the Jervis Bay the RAN was operating during the INTERFET days.
 
Jungle said:
It looks very similar to the Jervis Bay the RAN was operating during the INTERFET days.

I remember the Javis Bay sailing past us every day into Dili. I got to sail on her to start my LTA. She had a really cool rooster tail once she opened up on the open sea.
 
There is much to consider with the JHSV:

The JHSV has a greater level of comfort for the crew and passengers than larger Navy ships for short-term embarkations. The interior is spacious and berthing areas have private features like toilet stalls, outlets, air conditioning, and even thermostats; there is no gym on board. One disadvantage of the ship's design is stability in rough seas and at high speeds. At 10 knots in calm sea states, the hull can rock up to four degrees to each side, while conventional ships would roll very little, which would increase if the ship goes faster in rougher conditions, raising the possibility of seasickness.[6]

As of late 2014, a JHSV costs $180 million to build and has an annual operating cost of $26 million.[2]

Other roles[edit]





The joint high-speed vessel USNS Choctaw County (JHSV 2) awaits delivery at the Austal USA vessel completion yard.
The U.S. 4th Fleet has expressed interest in using the JHSV as a low-cost ship for performing drug interdiction missions around Central and South America. U.S. Southern Command is experiencing a shortage of Navy frigates and Coast Guard cutters available to interdict drug runners due to ship age and budget cuts. In May 2013, the HSV-2 Swift conducted a drug interdiction patrol, showing an aluminum catamaran was capable of performing the role. A JHSV costs less than a frigate, has a smaller crew demand of 22 compared to 200 for a frigate, and is capable of embarking a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET).[4]

The JHSV has no weapons or defensive systems to fulfill combat missions, but the Navy is looking to expand its roles to include re-supplying special operations forces and conducting humanitarian assistance missions.[14] Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has suggested using the ships as a cheaper way to perform counter-piracy missions to free up blue-water combatants.[15] Offensive armament and defensive measures against pirates would be handled by a security team on board, and a JHSV's speed would also be a good defense against an attack by pirates.[16] The Navy is experimenting with using the JHSV as a hospital ship by setting up an expeditionary medical unit (EMU) inside the mission bay. Although it wouldn't be able to conduct the same tasks as a full-size hospital ship, large hospital ships are slow, while the JHSV can serve as a quick transit platform for rapid medical response.[17]

Control system[edit]

The control system for this class is provided by General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems through an open architecture computing infrastructure (OPEN CI). OPEN CI includes the information technology (IT) infrastructure for the combat and seaframe control systems. The infrastructure integrates the ship's electronic systems including, internal and external communication, electronic navigation, aviation and armament systems.[18] The General Dynamics OPEN CI is also used on the Independence-class littoral combat ship (LCS), also built by Austal.

Communication systems[edit]

The Communications suite for this class will be provided by BAE Systems Inc.



The USMC is investigating changes to the JHSV ramp to allow it to place Amphibious Combat Vehicles into the water near the shore.[21] A single JHSV could carry and deploy as many as 20-30 ACVs.[22][23]

Marine Corps General John M. Paxton, Jr. has called the JHSV "a very capable ship" for certain missions, but in consideration for serving as an alternate platform for Marines to use in amphibious operations as substitutes for amphibious assault ships, he claims several deficiencies including ability to operate in difficult sea states, ability to remain survivable in contested waters, a flight deck that cannot handle the heat of an MV-22 Osprey's engines during take-off and landing, lack of a well deck to launch amphibious vehicles at sea, as well as current lack of a "splash capability" where the ramp can allow vehicles to be driven off it into the sea.[24] The JHSV has been rejected as an alternative platform to base the MV-22 off of due to weight and the heat it generates being potentially damaging to its flight deck.[25]
 
I was in Port Canaveral a while ago and I had the opportunity to take a tour of a JHSV. very impressive, much like a high speed ferry and run by civilians. I was told they are having issues with growth on their hulls which restrict their speed. If the ship is in trouble, they assemble internally port and stbd, activate a control, a hatch blows open and a slide inflates much like a commercial jet and the troops and crew slide down into the water. Here's a few pictures I took.

20150325_132522_zpsfh7xyvns.jpg

IMG_20150326_090047_zpsw36zuvxg.jpg

View of the ramp, that can take a M1A1 Abrams and lots of containerized cargo
IMG_20150326_090043_zpsmuhkpwez.jpg

LIPS water jet propulsion
IMG_20150326_090053_zpsmrgustmb.jpg

Brow Area
IMG_20150326_091658_zpskd6zq07x.jpg

Where the troops sit. In front are big screen TV's and weapon cages.
IMG_20150326_092043_zpsdg3lfsqd.jpg

View from the bridge
IMG_20150326_092057_zpskbntffdy.jpg

Helm
IMG_20150326_092619_zpsnrzdw1ys.jpg

On the way to the internal bridge wing
IMG_20150326_092501_zpspg4fgacn.jpg

Bridge wing Console
IMG_20150326_092513_zpsqm49jmvr.jpg

View of the wing repeaters
IMG_20150326_092816_zpseaoum7np.jpg

Flight Deck Console
IMG_20150326_092819_zpstokwry7g.jpg

Looking down at the flight deck
IMG_20150326_093028_zpsgx5ilr5k.jpg

Looking forward on the flight deck
IMG_20150326_093523_zpsq9wm6cdk.jpg

One of the Engine spaces with their MTU's






 
Nice ships....I wonder why the US Navy did not consider this hull when embarking on their LCS program?
 
Ex-Dragoon said:
Nice ships....I wonder why the US Navy did not consider this hull when embarking on their LCS program?

They have. One of the two "contenders" is the same Austal ship designers team and they came up with the Independence class.

See description here: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/

Basically, they selected a trimaran design instead of a catamaran. Good choice in my opinion, since the JHSV is for short distances only (it does not have sleeping accommodation for the soldiers it carries), as the sharp stoping of the sideways motion while rolling that you experience in catamarans gets tiring real fast. A trimaran does not suffer that type of jarring and usually affords more internal space for accommodation also.
 
Some real interesting comments regarding the challenges of amphibious warfare, or even taking non-navalized air assets to sea.  Something to consider when people start stating that the not quite Russian Mistrals are the way to go.  It would take years to have the 22nd Rgt up to speed on amphibious operations.

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-big-boat-doesnt-equal-amphibious-capability/

From the ASPI:

A big boat doesn’t equal amphibious capability
28 Nov 2014|Jan K. Gleiman

Today’s a great day for the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Defence Force. It marks the commissioning of that $1.5 billion, 27,800-tonne behemoth soon to be known as HMAS Canberra. But as much as I hate to rain on this parade, Australia is still some time and many tough decisions away from true amphibious warfare capability. The ship is just a ‘host’ that enables the capability. Political and military leaders will need to take a  two-year appetite suppressant to consider organisational changes and the purchase of additional equipment. When the party on Garden Island ends tonight, the real work continues.

The ADF’s stated goal is to have an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) capability by 2017. That might sound like plenty of time. But amphibious operations involve a complex and dangerous choreography and the seamless integration of joint military services. World-class amphibious players develop over decades. The US, UK, France and others have joint organisations consisting of service units dedicated solely to this kind of operation and have built an organisational culture around them. Amphibious warfare is a truly joint enterprise, requiring diligent and detailed integration of the three services.

The ADF is driven by the individual services and lacks the organisational mechanisms and culture for joint capability development. It will have to overcome those internal obstacles to get from naming a really big boat to conducting amphibious manoeuvres under non-permissive conditions. Here are a few issues to be addressed.

The LHD is a helicopter-centric ship. Its flight deck is big, but its dock is small compared to US or UK amphibious ships, and it will normally carry only four small landing craft. But the landing-force order of battle is vehicle-centric.  Will the Land 400 program include the purchase of vehicles that can swim or that are light enough to be lifted by helicopters in order to relieve strain on the ship’s limited landing craft?

The current landing-force vehicles weren’t designed for wading and can tolerate only about two feet of water. That could be ameliorated by a beach recovery-vehicle to drag drowned vehicles ashore and push off stuck landing craft but the ADF hasn’t got any of those. A large hovercraft could potentially eliminate the problem altogether but Canberra’s dock is the wrong type for those.

If Australia is to achieve its stated capability goals, it’ll need to have someone with sufficient authority to champion the cause when it clashes with perceived single-service interests. At present, the Joint Capability Authority has a coordinating role only and actually doesn’t manage any capabilities or major procurement programs.

Then there are helicopters. HMAS Canberra is apparently capable of holding 18 helicopters (depending on the type of helicopter). Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as placing a helicopter on a ship. Twenty years ago, the US Army found that out the hard way when it placed helicopters on two US aircraft carriers for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Most of those helicopters had to be junked after the operation because they weren’t properly ‘marinised’.

Of course, there are degrees of marinisation. While there has been much criticism of the Army’s MRH-90 model helicopters, those aircraft were chosen largely because they were deemed to be better for amphibious operations. Key features like their composite frame (which doesn’t corrode) and blade brakes make them more conducive to operations at sea. But an ANAO audit recently noted that the MRH90 aircraft ‘has metal parts that corrode, ranging from rivets in the tail assembly to complex assemblies in the landing gear, engine and transmission’. Additionally, the aircraft lacks automatically-collapsible blades, making flight deck evolutions slower and inherently more dangerous, potentially halving the force projection rate. The ARH-90  wasn’t designed to go to sea and will present all these problems plus some more of its own.

Finally, there’ll be support force and enabler issues. The ADF has already dedicated 2 RAR as its amphibious infantry force. But deep amphibious expertise is needed in supporting arms and services, notably intelligence, logistics, aviation, and engineering. The present intent is to draw those from non-specialist brigades as required.  The current Plan ‘Beersheba’ will see them rotate out of that role every year (say it isn’t so).

These issues aren’t showstoppers, but coming up with solutions, techniques, and procedures to mitigate them inside two years will require an intense effort. It means prioritising resources and training and that will inevitably have impacts elsewhere. Whether the individual services are willing to accept those impacts will be the true test of whether the ADF is serious about its amphibious capability.

Yes, the boat is impressive. But it’ll be the teamwork, sacrifice, and leadership needed to build a real amphibious capability that will truly impress. If Australia’s leaders try to use this capability before it’s properly prepared, the results will be disappointing. Fixing some organisational deficiencies and giving more attention to the capability associated with this project will help.

Lieutenant Colonel Jan K. Gleiman is an active duty US Army officer and a visiting fellow at ASPI from United States Pacific Command. These are his personal views. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.
 
So, again, we are saying "Somebody needs to make the bits fit".

See also "Logistics Vehicle Modernization" http://army.ca/forums/threads/100166.0/topicseen.html

Amongst other threads.
 
Underway said:
Some real interesting comments regarding the challenges of amphibious warfare, or even taking non-navalized air assets to sea.  Something to consider when people start stating that the not quite Russian Mistrals are the way to go.  It would take years to have the 22nd Rgt up to speed on amphibious operations.

http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-big-boat-doesnt-equal-amphibious-capability/

Underway: Look this thread up above and the end of the page just before: It's already been done. The Vandoos and 403 TacHel has already done a landing ex from the Mistral.

Don't believe everything you read from US Army officers. Particularly in this case where he seems to imply that the "US" knows how to do this. It's incorrect. The US Marines know how to do this. The US Army hasn't got a clue.

Similarly, the French and the Bits have some very specific units that can do these things (the Royal Marines and the Commando de la Marine), but in the French case, the Mistrals are designed to support the army into operations, not just the commandos, even though the army has title training.

BTW, the single most important aspect of those combined ( I am beginning to hate the concept of "joint") operations is combat loading and logistics. You have to load things onboard the ships in a specific order that takes into consideration both the cargo loading of the ship for stability reasons and the expectations of the unfolding of the fight ashore, so the equipment can be put ashore in the order it is required for the fight. The US Marines have an excellent combat logistics course for this and I know that there are Canadian logistics officers that have attended and passed it.

Other than that, like everything else, you have to train and practice. There is no magic there.

As for the US Army having scrapped helicopters in Haiti operating from a carrier, my only point on that is not that they needed "navalized" helicopter but that their maintenance program was not adjusted. The only way I can see this developing is because they did not know enough to properly wash down and clean their helicopters everyday before storing them of the night, unless they simply abused them without any maintenance during the whole deployment which ain't any smarter.

 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
As for the US Army having scrapped helicopters in Haiti operating from a carrier, my only point on that is not that they needed "navalized" helicopter but that their maintenance program was not adjusted. The only way I can see this developing is because they did not know enough to properly wash down and clean their helicopters everyday before storing them of the night, unless they simply abused them without any maintenance during the whole deployment which ain't any smarter.

Concur.

The biggest part of "marinizing" an aircraft is the maintenance schedule.  This is why we'll wash the aircraft even when no one else on the ship is allowed to wash due to water shortages.  We then spray it down with LPS (something like WD-40) and grease it up (ever look at the hangar face after a few months, its covered in sprayed off grease).  I opened the floorboards on 416 the other day just after a corrosion control and the smell of LPS was so strong I checked with a tech to make sure we didn't have a fuel leak.  We use so much it actually penetrates into the electronic boxes and cable bundles.

I also saw the comment that logistics, C4, and AAW give the capability to deploy; its telling the "RCN" doesn't list surface and sub-surface, which is manifesting in the fleet.  And as for Canada being in the same Tier as Australia, I remain to be convinced...
 
Same in our SRN-6 hovercraft, made just like a 1950's airplane and continuously run through surf and seawater. We had a strict engine wash (soap and water) and craft wash procedures, which added about 5x the life between major rebuilds to the RR Gnome turbine and reduced corrosion significantly on the craft itself. Ah yes LPS our guys used tons of it as well.
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
Underway: Look this thread up above and the end of the page just before: It's already been done. The Vandoos and 403 TacHel has already done a landing ex from the Mistral.

Don't believe everything you read from US Army officers. Particularly in this case where he seems to imply that the "US" knows how to do this. It's incorrect. The US Marines know how to do this. The US Army hasn't got a clue.

Similarly, the French and the Bits have some very specific units that can do these things (the Royal Marines and the Commando de la Marine), but in the French case, the Mistrals are designed to support the army into operations, not just the commandos, even though the army has title training.

BTW, the single most important aspect of those combined ( I am beginning to hate the concept of "joint") operations is combat loading and logistics. You have to load things onboard the ships in a specific order that takes into consideration both the cargo loading of the ship for stability reasons and the expectations of the unfolding of the fight ashore, so the equipment can be put ashore in the order it is required for the fight. The US Marines have an excellent combat logistics course for this and I know that there are Canadian logistics officers that have attended and passed it.

Other than that, like everything else, you have to train and practice. There is no magic there.

Putting troops ashore where "there is no jetty" is a far cry from amphibious warfare.  Yes I know crawl before you can walk etc... but there was a lot of hand holding by the French for that operation.  The Van Doo's were able to access some intitutional memory thanks to their operations in Carolina  with the Standing Contingency Task Force in 2006.

Amphib warfare's challenges lie in logistics quite a bit yes, but also in the planning and combined aspects of the HQ.  Getting navy to speak army and vice versa (don't even get me going on grid references, mils vs degrees etc...).  Creating the institutional knowledge and more importantly retaining it.  When Hillier was all hot to trot for a Marine Commando Regiment, the brass went around visiting other countries that had Navalized Infantry etc... France, Australia, Netherlands, UK and US.  The Commander of the Royal Marines flat out said if we were going to do this it would take 10 years to develop and sustain the capability and experience to do it right.

So with that in mind we did this: 

The Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) of the Defence Policy Statement is also known as a Standing Contingency Force (SCF) or as Integrated Rapid Response (IRR). The SCTF - aside from providing a more significant support for special forces operations - was clearly designed to deal with the threat posed by failed and failing states, which are seen as planting "the seeds of threats to regional and global security," whether in the form of terrorist sanctuaries or refugee flows. Such low to medium-intensity "stability operations" require a significant and reasonably robust "boots on the ground" presence, and this need will likely be fulfilled with the expeditionary and more manpower- intensive SCTF.

What began as the SCTF, was redefined as the SCF, was trialed during the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) and was suspended due to competing priorities two years after the 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS) was released. The navy led a 'proof-of-concept' exercise of the re-named Standing Contingency Force (SCF) in amphibious operations off the coast of North Carolina in November 2006. The navy conducted the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE) with the participation of more than 1,000 CF members. Support was provided from the United States Navy, consisting of mentors and the participation of USS GUNSTON HALL and USS DOYLE. The ITEE helped the CF assess the challenges associated with developing a maritime expeditionary force.

From this website:  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/canada/sctf.htm

Amphib ops are complicated and dangerous.  Not to be taken lightly.

As for navalized aircraft I never knew that it really just comes down to good maintenance practices.  Thanks for the insight.

Baz said:
I also saw the comment that logistics, C4, and AAW give the capability to deploy; its telling the "RCN" doesn't list surface and sub-surface, which is manifesting in the fleet.  And as for Canada being in the same Tier as Australia, I remain to be convinced...

Not quite sure what you're driving at with this statement?  Are you refering to fleet/ship capabilities or amphib warfare capabilities?
 
Underway said:
As for navalized aircraft I never knew that it really just comes down to good maintenance practices.  Thanks for the insight.

I don't think I'd categorize it as "good" maintenance practices; more as specific.  An aircraft is a very different thing to maintain; hence the need for extensive maintenance records for each airframe.  I've experienced the frustration of explaining why we just can't ignore a sup check at sea...

The inspection cycle of the Sea King, and corrosion control program, is different then say the Griffin.  That is part of the reason why the Sea King is seen as maintenance heavy.  You also need to tune the maintenance program to how you intend to schedule (for instance on long deck cycles vs short alert launches) and fly (eg lots of time doing forward flight vs lots of time in the dip) in order to minimize maintenance vs the environment.

There are also design issues that need to be dealt with; more so for small deck rotary or fixed wing.  It is much easier for large deck rotary, as you don't have anywhere near the landing and take-off stresses.

Underway said:
Not quite sure what you're driving at with this statement?  Are you refering to fleet/ship capabilities or amphib warfare capabilities?

I think the Australians have been much more capability driven in their force generation; maybe due to the extant threat to the north.  The current situation in the RCN hasn't come about solely due to government (lack of) action, in my opinion.  Therefore grouping them in the same tier as your quote does is somewhat disingenuous.

As well, the focus on AAW, and less focus on surface (especially, with the asymmetric threat) and sub-surface threats have somewhat limited the ability to go in harm's way *anywhere* in the world.


 
Baz said:
I think the Australians have been much more capability driven in their force generation; maybe due to the extant threat to the north.  The current situation in the RCN hasn't come about solely due to government (lack of) action, in my opinion.  Therefore grouping them in the same tier as your quote does is somewhat disingenuous.

As well, the focus on AAW, and less focus on surface (especially, with the asymmetric threat) and sub-surface threats have somewhat limited the ability to go in harm's way *anywhere* in the world.

Well,... the document was written (circa 2001) and then realize what changes have happened since then.  I didn't change the quote to update it to the current fleet mix.  This year we drop from a Tier 3 to Tier 5 based upon the capability gap of decomissioning of our AAW and resupply.  The FELEX program covers off the C4 to some extent (I don't know how much). 

For years we were far ahead of the Australians in many capabilities.  Our more numerous escorts were more deployable overseas due to mainly endurance and inherent capability (as ANZAC's were to small to do as much as we do on the larger hulls),  the PRO, PRE combo kept us going, and one thing that we had that they never did (and will only just have shortly with the HOBARTS) is an AAW Command and Control ship that could embark a Commodore and his staff.  When Australia joined in for OP APOLLO they were very embarassed that they had to "borrow" a Arleigh Burke to embark their command team to the battlespace (and drove their requirement for the Hobarts home to their government).  Canada showed up with a complete self sufficient task group and got right to work.  From that info we were a Teir 3 navy.  Australia was barely a Teir 3.  Now the situation has changed and until the Queenston shows up we aren't teir 3 anymore.  The only thing they had on us was subsurface capability with the Collins class.

In the last 10 years though the capability has swung the other way, especially in the last 2.

I would agree that in Canada we were obsessed with Afghanistan and completely lost sight of the other services when they didn't help the Afghan mission (C-17, chinooks etc...).  I do agree we are far more limited in our choices.    Ie:  They have a varied helo fleet for the army, we don't.  They use two types of fighter aircraft, we don't.  But some of those choices in Canada reflect our particular situation.  Perhaps because we will never ever be operating alone and Australia might just have to operate alone until the US can show up.  Australia has two types of fighter aircraft because they have a requirement for a strike aircraft (formerly the F-111 now superhornet) and a fighter aircraft.  Canada is interested only in multirole aircraft, etc... etc...

But yah, Austraila has a defined understanding of their place in the world and in Asia in particular.  It informs their defence policy and their national awareness of defence issues, and it seems like most sides of their political system agree on much of the strategic situation and what purchases need to be made.  They periodically publish white papers and take defence seriously and not as a big piggy bank for when the economy takes a dump (like we do).  They don't argue on whether they need two fighter aircraft they argue on what kinds.  They understand the importance of submarines where in Canada we haven't had a single intelligent person come out and explain why we need subs to the public in words that the public will understand at all.  But they have their own issues as well.  There was plenty of push back on even having AAW destroyers where in Canada the replacement project isn't a capability arguement its as cost arguement....which might be worse...
 
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