Lt.-Gen. G Simonds’ Slept Until Morning, On The Night Op. Totalize Was Launched!

[Chispa]

Hi was rummaging through my SWW stick concerning the Normandy Campaign Phase II, seems I complied a lot of stuff for Aug 1944, however never wrote about it.

The below is extracted from the Montreal Gazette, once you link the begging of the article is on the previous page.

Newspaper: The Montreal Gazette, 5th Oct., 1968: Why aren’t there any monuments to our soldiers? By Guy Simonds, Lieutenant-General (retired).

A Problem for the Canadians was that first they were bombed by U.S. planes and then (“Oh no, not again”) by the RAF.

One morning in June, he and I stood beside the Caen-Falaise road at a point where, 24 years before, on the night of Aug. 7, 150,000 men of the 2nd Canadian Corps had launched Operation Totalize, the thrust that began the closing of the Northern Half of the Falaise Gap. And yet, standing there that morning, you would never know there had been a battle. The grain fields, the woods, the little stone villages, the lines of trees that marked the path of the lateral roads, all seemed eternal and timeless beneath the pale blue sky.

That night in 1944, more than 1,000 Royal Air Force bombers had flattened the German positions east and west of an eight-mile corridor, Simonds had selected for the attack. I asked him what it had been like. “Like all the worst thunderstorms you have ever been in in your life, only worse. The ground was shaking underneath us.” Simonds had watched the bombing and started the attack columns on their way to their objectives. What had he done then? I asked.” He smiled. “I went to bed, he said” You see, people have a mistaken idea of what a general does. I’d spent several days planning the operation. After I’d sent in, there was nothing I could do except wait for the morning.

“When you send in an operation of that size at night, there’s nothing you can do to influence the course of it until you can see what’s taken place, and then, of course, you can do a good deal. I knew that there’d be plenty of decisions to make the fallowing day, so I decided to get some sleep.”

When Simonds woke the next morning, the attack was going well, and he orderd the second phase to go in at noon as scheduled. It consisted of a daylight raid by 492 American heavy bombers similar to the one preceding the attack the previous night, only further along the flanks of the corridor, fallowed by the commitment of another two armourd divisions to the battle.

https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1946&dat=19681005&id=T40yAAAAIBAJ&sjid=GbkFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1329,1334499&hl=en


THK U FR YR TME,

C.U.

 

[Cloud Cover]

I get your drift here... but my guess is that even Generals sleep. What Simonds pulled off in the preceding 10-15 days leading up to the kick off hour was really quite something. Developed and refined new tactics for an entire combined arms corps from different contributing armies,  approved and adopted the Kangaroo armoured vehicle concept including the entire conversion process which occurred in matter of weeks, dealt with Montgomery (constantly), worried about the limitations of his own troops and their leaders, bullied anyone that needed to be throat punched in order to get food, ammunition, fuel, maps(!) and everything else...
He may not have been the best General, but he sure as hell cannot be faulted for lack of effort in planning and oversight.

 

[Chispa]

I get your drift here... but my guess is that even Generals sleep. What Simonds pulled off in the preceding 10-15 days leading up to the kick off hour was really quite something. Developed and refined new tactics for an entire combined arms corps from different contributing armies,  approved and adopted the Kangaroo armoured vehicle concept including the entire conversion process which occurred in matter of weeks, dealt with Montgomery (constantly), worried about the limitations of his own troops and their leaders, bullied anyone that needed to be throat punched in order to get food, ammunition, fuel, maps(!) and everything else...
He may not have been the best General, but he sure as hell cannot be faulted for lack of effort in planning and oversight.

Not quite, just provided an account never published, (that I’m aware of), by any historian concerning G.G. Simonds on the night of Totalize after the first bombardment.

Now You have two Camps: One claiming Op Totalize was a success, others state it was a failure, I’m in the latter camp.

There are two camps when it comes to Simonds, those that champion and those that claim he was incompetent, hot-headed, careless with the lives he commanded, etc, etc., etc., throughout the Normandy Campaign, I’m part of the latter. 


The Journal of Military History 67.1 (2003) 137-173 Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7-10 August 1944 By Jody Perrun Abstract: First Canadian Army's fighting fitness in the Battle of Normandy has long been a point of debate among military historians. Because Operation Totalize did not result in the early conclusion of the campaign, some suggest that the Canadians could have fought more effectively. Heavy air support was a crucial component in the plan for Totalize, but it has received insufficient attention from historians. A focus on the role of air power suggests that previous explanations for the operation's failure, and criticism of Guy Simonds's generalship, are in need of revision.
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/40490


Now you just read: No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944 by Brian A. Reid. Posted in 2005: Book reviewers usually try to avoid high praise or total condemnation, but, in this case, I simply cannot adhere to that custom. This book in every respect merits high praise. In my view, it is one of the very best books written in recent years about Canadian operations in the Second World War. http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no3/br-cl-06-eng.asp

Well, I checked on line all say 2005, on my notes first addition was published in 2004?

Lieut.-Col. RCA retired B.A. Reid aka Old Sweat was quite critical of Cdn command actions, stick poking a score of times in his book, which was considered by Simonds supports as not very RCA: Believe he received flak for it, from traditionalist.

That was an interesting article on the faults during operation Totalize, (this is concerning Prof. David R. O'Keefe). I recently read: Brian A. Reids book No holding Back, Operation Totalize. It was a good book but I was left with the opinion that the author did not like the Canadian Leadership and went out of his way to point that out. Anyway I read it with a grain of salt and gleaned the points that I thought were fair.

Totalise 7/8 August night attack: The sense of nightmare unreality ... the feeling of detached horror at the sight of a man being engulfed by the flames of a burning tank.Yet there remains an atmosphere of romance about this Operation. WD: 33 Br Armd Bde, Totalize.

To assist 4th & 1st Polish Armourd in their movement 2 CAB & 33 BAB: Totalize’s first bombing delivered by 660 heavy bombers. "Because the bombing ended early [called off by master bomber as tgts ‘became obmired’], the ground attack (which had been scheduled to begin half an hour before the last bombs fell on the distant targets) actually began half an hour after the bombardment had concluded. Dust and smoke from the bombing, combined with darkness (and sadly inadequate map- and compass-reading) led many of the attackers to lose direction" Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C Johnston, G. P. Rawling, The Crucible of War, 1939-1945 The Officia1 Story of the Royal Canadian Air Force - Volume III Toronto: University of Toronto Press* 1994), 814.

RG24 10455 Report: An Account of Ops by 2 Cdn Armd Bde, l4-16 Aug 44, 4. “There were numerous halts, due to unavoidable delays by the leading tank ... though collisions were frequent, the work of the tank drives was most commendable.” Vanguard, 52.

RG24 10455 BRAC Battle Report No.2, “Amour Report: 144 RAC - 51 H Div Totalize.” Head of column became split in individual parties led by officers who were attempting through the thick haze to pick up land marks . . . officers were leading tanks on foot…one party…..had gone so far off its line to get involved with a Canadian column on the right…… Charlie Charlie calls to follow Very lights…..normal channels of command ceased to function. No one knew where his troop or squadron leader was and many a good tank commander had little idea of where they were themselves.

Maj.-Gen. George Kitching: I think this made Guy Simonds overly cautious; as a result we lost the momentum of the attack.

Brigadier E. T. Williams: G3 21 Army Group: They tended to go through all the phases. The Canadian Amy never got over the staff college habit of following out every little part of the routine.

Generalmajor der Waffen SS Kurt Meyer: I don’t know the reason for the inactivity of the Cdn forces, after the first obj was gained, but 1 suspect that it was NOT entirely the fault of the front Line tps but rather the result of too much planning by 2nd Cdn Corps

The National Archives:Reference: WO 106/5844, Operation Totalize: 2 Canadian Corps operations Caen-Falaise 7-8 Aug. 1944. http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/record?catid=5435142&catln=6

For a good read etc., etc., from the Professor: David R. O'Keefe 'Double-Edged Sword Part I: Ultra and Operation Totalize Normandy,. August 8, 1944' Canadian Army Journal Vol. 12.3 (Winter 2010). On PDF Free Download: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/doc...l12.3_11_e.pdf


PBA that's all I'm going to say about that, moving on per say.

C.U.

 

[Old Sweat]

Thanks for the kind words. There is one facet to Totalize that I alluded to, but chose not to develop. In the latter stages of the planning Montgomery asked if the operation could be moved ahead 24 hours. Simonds, who was a great admirer of M. agreed. The rest, of course, is history.

What if he had pulled a Montgomery and not agreed to move the operation forward 24 hours? The short answer is that he would have faced an empty battlefield once the assaulting troops overran 89 Infantry Division. You see 12 SS Panzer Division had received orders to move west to join in the attack against the Americans on the night of 7-8 August. If they had done so, the assault on the next day would have faced an empty battlefield from roughly Gaumesnil through to Falaise and down the highway to the Americans. The Falaise Gap could have been closed by 10 August and virtually the whole German force in Normandy would have gone for a Stalingrad. Imagine the strategic implications for the post-war world if the Western Allies had crossed the Rhine in September and reached Berlin before Christmas.

Far-fetched, yes, but not totally impossible.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I get your drift here... but my guess is that even Generals sleep. What Simonds pulled off in the preceding 10-15 days leading up to the kick off hour was really quite something. Developed and refined new tactics for an entire combined arms corps from different contributing armies,  approved and adopted the Kangaroo armoured vehicle concept including the entire conversion process which occurred in matter of weeks, dealt with Montgomery (constantly), worried about the limitations of his own troops and their leaders, bullied anyone that needed to be throat punched in order to get food, ammunition, fuel, maps(!) and everything else...
He may not have been the best General, but he sure as hell cannot be faulted for lack of effort in planning and oversight.

I just read Chris Vokes' auto-biography: 'My story'.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Vokes

It seems that many of our senior officers at the time fit into the 'Active/ Not too smart' quadrant, but got the job done anyhow.

 

[Old Sweat]

I just read Chris Vokes' auto-biography: 'My story'.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Vokes

It seems that many of our senior officers at the time fit into the 'Active/ Not too smart' quadrant, but got the job done anyhow.

His generation was running the army and later the forces for the first 10-15 years of my career. When trying to figure out the rationale for their decisions, the question always was whether they were drunk or stupid or both; nowadays with our modern, clean cut forces, that question no longer exists.

 

[George Wallace]

....... that question no longer exists.

Many new questions exist though.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Simonds going to bed at the start of the battle was very much in the Monty mould - plan the battle yourself and then sit back and let it unfold as you have foreseen. To be fair, though, Generals have to sleep as well and the start of the battle is not necessarily when the Corps Commander has to make decisions.

The failure to close the Falaise Gap will always be a blemish in the narrative of the Canadian Army's WW2 performance. One narrative that I have read is that Totalize showed that the Canadian Army of 1944 was not up to the standard of the Canadian Corps of 1918 that had won the victory at Amiens. To me, comparing the Normandy Canadians to the France 1918 Canadians is not really fair. Totalize was the first battle for one of the Canadian divisions, and even the 3rd Infantry Division had only been in action since June as compared to the thoroughly experienced veterans of the 1918 Canadian Corps.

I think, however, that an interesting deduction can be made by considering the two battles. At Amiens 1918 the Canadian Corps broke through the enemy front line, but then ran out of steam in the enemy depth as reserves moved up and the assaulting troops moved beyond the fire plan. By WW1 standards it was indeed a great victory, but it was essentially a set-piece affair. Totalize in 1944 was essentially the same thing. The assaulting troops broke through the German defenders but then stalled when they were in the enemy depths. It would have been seen as a victory in 1918. Perhaps the Canadian conception of warfare had not really advanced since 1918?

Studying a number of East Front battles has shown to me that perhaps the most critical decision the attacking commander makes is the committal of his exploitation force. Too soon and it can get stuck on the main enemy defences. Commit too late, though, and the breakthrough is sealed by mobile reserves. Several Red Army offensives (like Saturn) showed that the Red Army was actually quite flexible at the higher levels. They committed their exploitation forces earlier than planned to complete the breakthrough and then achieved decisive penetration. The same could be seen in the US decision-making at Cobra. It would seem that fortune favours early committal of the exploitation force, even if it is more risky.

I believe that Simonds remained fixed to his fire plan for Totalize and as a result his exploitation force remained fixed to the ground. This gave precious time to the Germans to organize a new defensive line. It seems that the Canadians, who were really under British doctrine, visualized the battlefield in sequential lines demarcated by the range of artillery. It seems to me that the Germans, Soviets and perhaps the Americans visualized the battlefield in arrows: strike into the depth of the enemy with mobility and assume some risk with the ability of fire support to keep up.

 

[Old Sweat]

Excellent observations, Iain.

I submit that much of the sluggishness of the Anglo-Canadian armies was because commanders had been conditioned to rely on their headquarters as the source for coordinated information. Going to see for yourself was discouraged. There really was only one opportunity to exploit the phase one breakthrough in Totalize and that was from dawn until 0800 on 8 August. Dawn revealed the absence, or at least the observed absence, of resistance on the Corps front. The Allied Air Forces had made it clear that 0800 was the latest time that the phase two bombing could be cancelled. I have been unable to find any indication that word of the breakthrough made it back from reading the various ops logs.

I also believe Simonds was sure his forward troops would be counterattacked in the morning and his troops could defeat them. This, along with the bombing, would then allow the phase two divisions to advance to their objectives. It wouldn't have mattered if he knew the breakthrough had occurred. In my opinion, he would have stuck with his original plan.

Let me turn to the generalship of Kurt Meyer, a dynamic individual who led from the front. His memoirs are stirring and lead one to ask questions about our own doctrine and command style. Unfortunately his memoirs also contain a fair amount of male bovine excrement and omit things, like his counter-attack on 8 August failing, that might reflect badly on him. I suggest one take a look at Marc Milner's Stopping the Panzers for a well-researched examination of the performance of 12 SS Panzer Division in the first week after D Day.

 

[Chispa]

Yes, Generals are aloud sleep, however, there’s a right time and place; you’ll have ample time for it, sleep, once your deep six.

Part of Anglo/CDN SWW Doctrine made no provisions, unlike Patton, Meyer, etc., Anglo/CDN Generals + HQ’s always located in the rear quit a distance from the battle, nor advanced too the forward lines, in order too assess the situation, make immediate changes as needed. As the only exception, known to the BW as “Bloody” or “Killer” Brigadier Megill, went forward 3 times during Spring, warring Granville on what was really unfolding and the Op should be called off. Simonds arrogantly dismissed, and went into a rage when advised there were no more men available, while the German counter attack was in full swing, outcome, Cdn Corps seriously pushed back.

All for the exception of armour and “Us” verses “Them” which now slightly favoured Simonds, although not 3 or 5 to 1, which was and still is the norm, Totalise was a copy of Spring and Atlantic: Envisioned as the last great offensive of the Normandy Campaign. After the first bombardment and finally at the start-line they waited, those spots lights over the horizon nearing the bombardment, the German skeleton force, owing not many left, VR was abandoned, etc., with small scattered groups delaying the advance, alerted the Canadians were on the move. CDN’s halted waiting, confused Fritz, the front lines contacting Meyer who immediately went to check what no good they were up too.

In Op Totalise Meyer aka “Panzermeyer” or “Panzer” Waffen-SS went forward to the 89th Div., and was caught in the bombing, on the road groups of the 89th scattered by the bombardment hastily fled. Meyer picked up a rifle and shouted at the troops, “Are you going to leave me alone to meet the Allied attack? The men stopped and took up defensive positions. 

Scattered groups of the 89th Div were at VR, Schack’s 272nd Div., ca, 1st were on the move, by the 6/7 were no longer around Tilly, in need of supplies, reinforcements, and battered headed east, replaced the 12 SS HJ on the road to Paris: VR was abandoned by the 7th.

Quote by K. Meyer, Hist 12 SS Pz Div., 172, See also: Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers (Munich: Schild Veriag, 1957) 281-282: “For the first time during these long and cruel years…..I see fleeing German soldiers .... Mesmerized, I stare at the leaderless soldiers. My uniform sticks to my skin. Cold sweat breaks from my pores. I know that the fate of the city of Falaise and thus the safety of the two German army’s depends on my decision.”


Hestor Wilmont on Simonds prior to Op Totalize: Like Montgomery, his approach to the problems of battle was that of a scientist. Both were military perfectionists, but, whereas Montgomery was primarily the expert implementer, Simonds was the radical innovator, forever seeking new solutions.

RG24 10635. Crerar letter to J. L. Ralston (Minster of Defence) 8 Sep 44. Crerar claims Totalize was his tactical plan drawn up by Simonds: My basic tactical plan……the attack should secure maximum of surprise as means and methods employed…..neutralize the long range and strength of the enemy's anti-tank defence and to ensure we get through and beyond the enemy zone of dense defensive fire, developed mainly by his mortars and machine guns…..With these principles before him, the detailed plan for the attack was drawn up with very great skill by Lt. Gen. Simonds.

Canadian, & BW historian David R. O'Keefe suggests Simonds's after reading ULTRA transcripts, was convinced 1 SS LAH was still in 2nd Corps' operational area of responsibility: "Without any other information to corroborate the Ultra decrypts, Crerar's Chief of Staff, Churchill Mann, phoned Brigadier Elliot Rodger (Simonds's Chief of Staff) to tell him that there were signs that 1 SS Panzer division was pulling away from the front ....After reviewing Ultra information which came to his attention on August 6, Simonds called Crerar to tell him he had changed Totalize ... Simonds appreciated that the second "breakin" might meet stronger resistance than originally anticipated but felt assured that the original Air plan would now be even more beneficial….he scrapped the original idea of sending the 4th Canadian Armoured and the 3rd Canadian Infantry to attack the second line and instead, put the Polish and 4th Canadian Armoured division together."

From D.D.+ way too many German positions over passed, avoiding contact, then as other Battalions pushed forward got nailed by them. Just like in Saving Pte Ryan all wanted too bypass the radar/radio German nest. Reiben argues they should avoid the station and stay "on mission," however the good Capt. Miller stood firm they should take out the machine-gun, etc.

Breakthrough Vs Breakout?

C.U.

 

[jeffb]

Simonds going to bed at the start of the battle was very much in the Monty mould - plan the battle yourself and then sit back and let it unfold as you have foreseen. To be fair, though, Generals have to sleep as well and the start of the battle is not necessarily when the Corps Commander has to make decisions.

The failure to close the Falaise Gap will always be a blemish in the narrative of the Canadian Army's WW2 performance. One narrative that I have read is that Totalize showed that the Canadian Army of 1944 was not up to the standard of the Canadian Corps of 1918 that had won the victory at Amiens. To me, comparing the Normandy Canadians to the France 1918 Canadians is not really fair. Totalize was the first battle for one of the Canadian divisions, and even the 3rd Infantry Division had only been in action since June as compared to the thoroughly experienced veterans of the 1918 Canadian Corps.

Should it really have been though? The Canadian Corps of 1918 had been in nearly continuous action for 3 years at that point. Simmond's was too young to have served in the First World War and his only command experience in combat to that point had been in Sicily as a Div Comd from mid- July of 1943 until Mid September of the same year and then maybe two months as Corps Commander in Normandy. So in Simmonds there is a guy who at the point of Totalize was a Corps commander who just four years earlier had been a Major and was now putting together an complex plan involving 85,000 troops with only about 4 months experience actually commanding anything in combat. Contrast that to Currie who had been in command of troops in combat since the Second Battle of Ypres three years prior. Staff and commanders take time to develop and given that Simmonds and the staff of II Corps were able to pull off anything with so little experience, I've always been impressed that Totalize wasn't more of a failure then it turned out to be.

Just my 2 cents. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

His generation was running the army and later the forces for the first 10-15 years of my career. When trying to figure out the rationale for their decisions, the question always was whether they were drunk or stupid or both; nowadays with our modern, clean cut forces, that question no longer exists.

My old man, a 3 Div gunner, referred to him as 'Butcher Vokes' or 'Send them in again Vokes', without a trace of good humour.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Should it really have been though? The Canadian Corps of 1918 had been in nearly continuous action for 3 years at that point. Simmond's was too young to have served in the First World War and his only command experience in combat to that point had been in Sicily as a Div Comd from mid- July of 1943 until Mid September of the same year and then maybe two months as Corps Commander in Normandy. So in Simmonds there is a guy who at the point of Totalize was a Corps commander who just four years earlier had been a Major and was now putting together an complex plan involving 85,000 troops with only about 4 months experience actually commanding anything in combat. Contrast that to Currie who had been in command of troops in combat since the Second Battle of Ypres three years prior. Staff and commanders take time to develop and given that Simmonds and the staff of II Corps were able to pull off anything with so little experience, I've always been impressed that Totalize wasn't more of a failure then it turned out to be.

Just my 2 cents.

I think that we are saying the same thing. I think that it is not really fair to compare the 1918 Canadian Corps with the 1944 Normandy Canadians because of their vastly different experience levels. 

An interesting "what-if" to consider is the strategic employment of the Canadian Army during the early years of WW2. Canada seemed to resist sending in troops in small numbers - we wanted to be a big unified formation like we were in the later half of WW1. We finally sent a division to Sicily, but this division could not then go to Normandy. I wonder if we could have sent a division as part of the Torch/Tunisia campaign. It could have gained some real combat experience and still have been available for Normandy.

 

[Old Sweat]

I think that we are saying the same thing. I think that it is not really fair to compare the 1918 Canadian Corps with the 1944 Normandy Canadians because of their vastly different experience levels. 

An interesting "what-if" to consider is the strategic employment of the Canadian Army during the early years of WW2. Canada seemed to resist sending in troops in small numbers - we wanted to be a big unified formation like we were in the later half of WW1. We finally sent a division to Sicily, but this division could not then go to Normandy. I wonder if we could have sent a division as part of the Torch/Tunisia campaign. It could have gained some real combat experience and still have been available for Normandy.

And here is a "what if" to consider. As we know, Simonds brought a number of experienced officers back from Italy. He did a house cleaning in the 4th Canadian Armoured Division including the GOC, CRA and both brigade commanders. Two of the above four above - Kitching the GOC and Booth the Comd 4 CAB - were failures. What if, and this is a big one, he had brought Hoffmeister back to command the division? One never knows, but I'd wager he would have had a much firmer tactical grip that Kitching displayed and perhaps the Gap would have been closed several days earlier.

 

[Chispa]

"What If"....Some were fired owing Simmonds ruled supremely, Cdn Generals frustrated with his arrogance, hothead, etc., Crerar was dazzled by his chin wagging, thought highly of him taking command of 2nd Cdn Corps: Crerar was constantly seeking advise from Simmonds, and if Granville felt strongly, Crerar would carryout all his wishes, per say.

No matter who he brought from the Italian Campaign wouldn't of made any difference, why, Simmonds was calling all the shots and any divination from any Op., he master minded, was futile.

You can have a firm tactical grip, however if lady luck, or other factors are not on your side at times, can prove fruitless.

The casualties mounting in the FWW, you had Rank and file reinforcements that were all Green, yet some Battalions fared better then others, then again, they all had Great and disastrous days.

The Germans were no walk in the park even in dire need of supplies, reinforcements, etc., and on retreat, therefor closing the gap was perhaps biting on more then they were capable of chewing, or just bad luck:

G.G. Simmonds master minded plans certainly did not win the Normandy Campaign, the acclamation goes out too all those green battalion, company, OC's and file under their command that fought overwhelming odds. 2nd Cdn Corps etc., were green, however their tenacity, heart and guts fighting spirit was certainly commendable.

Just my thoughts.

C.U.



   

 

[Chispa]

Should it really have been though? The Canadian Corps of 1918 had been in nearly continuous action for 3 years at that point. Simmond's was too young to have served in the First World War and his only command experience in combat to that point had been in Sicily as a Div Comd from mid- July of 1943 until Mid September of the same year and then maybe two months as Corps Commander in Normandy. So in Simmonds there is a guy who at the point of Totalize was a Corps commander who just four years earlier had been a Major and was now putting together an complex plan involving 85,000 troops with only about 4 months experience actually commanding anything in combat. Contrast that to Currie who had been in command of troops in combat since the Second Battle of Ypres three years prior. Staff and commanders take time to develop and given that Simmonds and the staff of II Corps were able to pull off anything with so little experience, I've always been impressed that Totalize wasn't more of a failure then it turned out to be.

Just my 2 cents.

By 1918 even if 3 years in action how many casualties, even in the last one hundred days, the majority needed too be replaced with, Green Rank & file, some did better then others.


SVP; just asking got my curiosity? Why are U spelling Simonds with two "m's," note in other thread I used, "Simmonds," which has been the norm pour moi for decades, can't remember why.

C.U.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

I think that we are saying the same thing. I think that it is not really fair to compare the 1918 Canadian Corps with the 1944 Normandy Canadians because of their vastly different experience levels. 

An interesting "what-if" to consider is the strategic employment of the Canadian Army during the early years of WW2. Canada seemed to resist sending in troops in small numbers - we wanted to be a big unified formation like we were in the later half of WW1. We finally sent a division to Sicily, but this division could not then go to Normandy. I wonder if we could have sent a division as part of the Torch/Tunisia campaign. It could have gained some real combat experience and still have been available for Normandy.

The Mackenzie-King government's main concern in WW2 was trying to avoid conscription and the political problems it brought for PM Borden in WW1. The government saw supporting the navy in the battle of the atlantic and the Air Force in the strategic bombing campaign (and commonwealth air training planning) as a safer way to engage in the war without taking the types of casualties experienced in WW1. As a result, the government didn't want to engage Canadian troops to combat in secondary theatres as they didn't see the "juice being worth the squeeze" so to speak.

As a result, you are quite correct that the Canadian army that hit the beaches in Normandy was a shadow of the one that led the charge in the last 100 days of WW1. Generally, Canadian army performance in WW2 was average to poor as they were slow to gain the type of experience they had in WW1 and generally suffered from poor leadership, including Simonds.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The Mackenzie-King government's main concern in WW2 was trying to avoid conscription and the political problems it brought for PM Borden in WW1. The government saw supporting the navy in the battle of the atlantic and the Air Force in the strategic bombing campaign (and commonwealth air training planning) as a safer way to engage in the war without taking the types of casualties experienced in WW1. As a result, the government didn't want to engage Canadian troops to combat in secondary theatres as they didn't see the "juice being worth the squeeze" so to speak.

As a result, you are quite correct that the Canadian army that hit the beaches in Normandy was a shadow of the one that led the charge in the last 100 days of WW1. Generally, Canadian army performance in WW2 was average to poor as they were slow to gain the type of experience they had in WW1 and generally suffered from poor leadership, including Simonds.

In fairness to King and Howe, Canada was better prepared than anyone else, even the USA, to be the "arsenal of democracy" in 1940. We had industrial capacity ~ shipyards that could build simple, cheap corvettes, railway and farm machinery plants that could build tanks and aircraft, and, and, and ... we also had that vast Canadian prairie. In some respects the best contributions we could make were to build stuff, grow food and train pilots.

Yes, indeed, the spectre of 1917 hung over King like a sword of Damoclese, but after Churchill came to power (May 1940) and Noble took over Western Approaches (Feb 42) and Murray took command of the Mid Ocean Escort Force (Sep 42) the simple fact was that Canada's most significant combat role in the entire war was the Battle of Atlantic. The RCN just mattered more, in the big scheme of things, than did the Canadian Army ... that fact that it's casualty rate was lower was a bonus. We didn't lose many men or women in factories, either, but I would argue that "Ronnie the Bren Gun Girl" ...

         

... who was a real factory worker named veronica Foster, by the way, and her ilk made just as much of a contribution than did a pretty good slice of the over-HQ'd Canadian Army, and the farmers, factory workers and merchant mariners, and the ships of the escort fleets, were more important to victory than ALL of the Canadian Army.

         

I know this is not the narrative that most Canadian soldiers learned but I think it is a fair heading of the historical facts.

 

[dimsum]

I know this is not the narrative that most Canadian soldiers learned but I think it is a fair heading of the historical facts.

:goodpost:

And to be fair, if I was a Canadian soldier, I wouldn't expect the WWII history lesson taught at the Inf/Armd/etc schools to be "you guys were great, but the Navy and a bunch of farmers were more important in the grand scheme of things."