- Reaction score
- 12,813
- Points
- 1,160
I don't see that the military chain is overly complex. The Marines have been assigned to McNeill at ISAF for his use and he has "chopped" (I believe that is the common expression) them to his Regional Commander in the South, Lessard, to use them as he sees fit, within limits. Presumably those limits determine whether or not the Marines are to be kept in reserve as a Force in Being/Strike Force/Operational Reserve or some portion, or all of it, can be parcelled out in penny-packets for control operations like patrolling or manning FOBs and Platoon Houses.
My guess, from the press, is that the Marines were brought in as an Operational Reserve. If they are not finding targets against which they can operate that can be interpreted as meaning that they are doing their job. They are discouraging insurgents from concentrating and conducting conventional operations. On the other hand the CF had already accomplished that. On the other hand the CF didn't have the bodies to be able to maintain BOTH a Force in Being AND conduct the control operations. By having the Marines in reserve then, presumably, that allows the Canadians to be parcelled out to maintain a forward presence and both expand their area of influence and also chance their operational emphasis from "combat operations" to "counter-insurgency constabulary" taskings and institution building.
For the Marines that leaves them in the invidious position of being stuck in the dust waiting for something to happen and the Commanders trying to figure out how many Marines it takes to maintain a credible Force in Being and metering out the rest to both keep them employed and expand the zone of control.
I am reminded of the British Airborne being sent to Palestine as a Strategic Reserve in 1946, and in fact through out most of their history. The troopers wanted to go to war. Their fellow soldiers in other units wanted them to go to war. But, for Command their value was in having them NOT at war but available. I think that also summed up the problems of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. You want your Reserve to be the best available but the "best" want to be active but commanders want their Reserve to be inactive, or uncommitted.
If the presence of the MEU is further dampening the activities of the Taliban then they are doing their job.
Unfortunately for them I am reminded of a cartoon that I saw as a kid back in Britain. It was of a street urchin banging a garbage can lid on an empty garbage can and making a racket. When asked what he thought he was doing he replied "keeping elephants away". When it was pointed out to him that there were no elephants in Britain his response was "See. It's working".
The only way you can prove that the MEU is surplus to requirement is by reducing it to the point that the enemy reverts to conventional tactics, then you can say "See. It was working."
My guess, from the press, is that the Marines were brought in as an Operational Reserve. If they are not finding targets against which they can operate that can be interpreted as meaning that they are doing their job. They are discouraging insurgents from concentrating and conducting conventional operations. On the other hand the CF had already accomplished that. On the other hand the CF didn't have the bodies to be able to maintain BOTH a Force in Being AND conduct the control operations. By having the Marines in reserve then, presumably, that allows the Canadians to be parcelled out to maintain a forward presence and both expand their area of influence and also chance their operational emphasis from "combat operations" to "counter-insurgency constabulary" taskings and institution building.
For the Marines that leaves them in the invidious position of being stuck in the dust waiting for something to happen and the Commanders trying to figure out how many Marines it takes to maintain a credible Force in Being and metering out the rest to both keep them employed and expand the zone of control.
I am reminded of the British Airborne being sent to Palestine as a Strategic Reserve in 1946, and in fact through out most of their history. The troopers wanted to go to war. Their fellow soldiers in other units wanted them to go to war. But, for Command their value was in having them NOT at war but available. I think that also summed up the problems of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. You want your Reserve to be the best available but the "best" want to be active but commanders want their Reserve to be inactive, or uncommitted.
If the presence of the MEU is further dampening the activities of the Taliban then they are doing their job.
Unfortunately for them I am reminded of a cartoon that I saw as a kid back in Britain. It was of a street urchin banging a garbage can lid on an empty garbage can and making a racket. When asked what he thought he was doing he replied "keeping elephants away". When it was pointed out to him that there were no elephants in Britain his response was "See. It's working".
The only way you can prove that the MEU is surplus to requirement is by reducing it to the point that the enemy reverts to conventional tactics, then you can say "See. It was working."
