Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Kirkhill]

About the National Shipbuilding Strategy - Canada.ca

Helping restore our shipyards, rebuild our marine industry and create sustainable jobs

www.canada.ca

What the strategy looks like​

The strategy is focused on 3 pillars:

1. Construction of large vessels (more than 1,000 tonnes of displacement)
2. Construction of small vessels (less than 1,000 tonnes of displacement)
3. Vessel repair, refit and maintenance projects

Is there more detail that describes how displacement is measured? Light or Heavy?

A naval vessel traditionally, it seems to me, is usually built with everything it will take to sea minus fuel, water, food and crew. There isn't much difference between light and heavy displacement.

But cargo vessels, for example in the extreme case of a container vessel like the Triple E's from Maersk show a considerable difference between light (empty) and heavy (laden).

196,000 DWT

55,000 tonnes (empty)

[td]Tonnage[/td] [td]Displacement[/td]
Displacement (empty) + Tonnage (DWT) = Displacement (laden) = 251,000 tonnes.
In other words her laden displacement is 5 times that of her empty displacement.

When I look at the Vard Vigilance layout, or the OSVs, or even the Kingstons and the Absalons, I see ships that are more akin to cargo vessels than traditional naval vessels. There is a lot of room for cargoes.

That suggests the possibility, to me, of building a 1000 tonne (light) ship at a small ship yard in conformity with the NSS, and then loading the ship with another 1000 tonnes of mission-adapted "cargo".

...




A large OSV with a gun up for'ard. Everything abaft the for'ard mast is cargo space.

 

[Czech_pivo]

About the National Shipbuilding Strategy - Canada.ca

Helping restore our shipyards, rebuild our marine industry and create sustainable jobs

www.canada.ca

Is there more detail that describes how displacement is measured? Light or Heavy?

A naval vessel traditionally, it seems to me, is usually built with everything it will take to sea minus fuel, water, food and crew. There isn't much difference between light and heavy displacement.

But cargo vessels, for example in the extreme case of a container vessel like the Triple E's from Maersk show a considerable difference between light (empty) and heavy (laden).

196,000 DWT

55,000 tonnes (empty)

[td]Tonnage[/td] [td]Displacement[/td]
Displacement (empty) + Tonnage (DWT) = Displacement (laden) = 251,000 tonnes.
In other words her laden displacement is 5 times that of her empty displacement.

When I look at the Vard Vigilance layout, or the OSVs, or even the Kingstons and the Absalons, I see ships that are more akin to cargo vessels than traditional naval vessels. There is a lot of room for cargoes.

That suggests the possibility, to me, of building a 1000 tonne (light) ship at a small ship yard in conformity with the NSS, and then loading the ship with another 1000 tonnes of mission-adapted "cargo".

I'd like to point out that the document was written just about 15yrs ago. Russia hadn't begun to make its play for the Ukraine, China hadn't declared itself a 'near Arctic nation', China had not built up the Spratly Islands, etc, etc, etc. Things have drastically changed in those 15yrs. Saying that we must conform to this document and ONLY build a 'warship' of less than 1,000 tons should be a non-starter now.

 

[NearingZenith]

I’m kind of surprised hearing the Kingston-class will be retired by 2029, especially with the proposed CMMC replacement not due until 2035+ and not even funded yet.

I thought the MCDVs:
-were in decent material condition considering their age
-were cheap to operate in the roles they perform
-do important work supporting force generation and training
-do important work maintaining the MCM skillset
-have gotten notable upgrades in recent years like fitting a new degaussing system and IPKS which are going to be wasted
-do important work partnering with the USCG to do drug interdiction

Has this changed?

The MCDVs aren’t combatants, but they’re still commissioned ships and the RCN loosing 12 commissioned ships and shrinking the fleet during his term isn’t going to help convince President Trump that Canada is taking defence seriously. Plus, we’d lose a source of positive headlines showing the RCN and USCG working together to reduce the flow of drugs into the US which is an explicit Trump priority.

If the MCDVs have actually deteriorated to become unsafe to sail or actually no longer have any use to the RCN, then sure decommissioning makes sense. But if the ships are actually fine and still doing useful work, then hopefully money can be made available to save them as part of an accelerated timeline to get to 2% GDP defence spending. Maybe the CAF could even try to use the MCDVs’ drug interdiction work to get them funded as part of addressing Trump’s border/drug demands.

It doesn’t seem like all 12 would need to be saved. Perhaps decommission ~5 MCDVs (the 2 worst as immediate parts sources, the next 3 worst kept in minimal maintenance for 1-2 years as reserve ships/for possible sale or donation before also being used for parts) and renew ~7 MCDVs (4 Atlantic, 3 Pacific) for another 5 year cycle into the early 2030s and re-evaluate after that. Or ideally get an up-front commitment for a 10 year extension for ~7 MCDVs to fully bridge the gap to the CMMCs, with the longer time horizon allowing for the consideration of some upgrades to these surviving MCDVs such as adding a NRWS to the former 40 mm Bofors pedestal to improve self-protection while providing a useful EO/IR sensor as well as replacing the boat crane with one able to quickly and safely launch and recover a fully loaded RHIB which benefits the drug interdiction role.

 

[calculus]

Vigilance has had the Mark 70 launchers incorporated as options for quite sometime, it isn't anything remotely new. That is partially why ExLS and CAMM are still present, although a system like that might need to be retained to have some kind of reasonable self defence capability on the footprint present. A RAM launcher would be very poorly suited to Vigilance given the placement forward would cut into proper firing angles.

Has to be new in the last 8 months or so - I didn't see an reference to them at CANSEC last year.

 

[Stoker]

I’m kind of surprised hearing the Kingston-class will be retired by 2029, especially with the proposed CMMC replacement not due until 2035+ and not even funded yet.

I thought the MCDVs:
-were in decent material condition considering their age
-were cheap to operate in the roles they perform
-do important work supporting force generation and training
-do important work maintaining the MCM skillset
-have gotten notable upgrades in recent years like fitting a new degaussing system and IPKS which are going to be wasted
-do important work partnering with the USCG to do drug interdiction

Has this changed?

The MCDVs aren’t combatants, but they’re still commissioned ships and the RCN loosing 12 commissioned ships and shrinking the fleet during his term isn’t going to help convince President Trump that Canada is taking defence seriously. Plus, we’d lose a source of positive headlines showing the RCN and USCG working together to reduce the flow of drugs into the US which is an explicit Trump priority.

If the MCDVs have actually deteriorated to become unsafe to sail or actually no longer have any use to the RCN, then sure decommissioning makes sense. But if the ships are actually fine and still doing useful work, then hopefully money can be made available to save them as part of an accelerated timeline to get to 2% GDP defence spending. Maybe the CAF could even try to use the MCDVs’ drug interdiction work to get them funded as part of addressing Trump’s border/drug demands.

It doesn’t seem like all 12 would need to be saved. Perhaps decommission ~5 MCDVs (the 2 worst as immediate parts sources, the next 3 worst kept in minimal maintenance for 1-2 years as reserve ships/for possible sale or donation before also being used for parts) and renew ~7 MCDVs (4 Atlantic, 3 Pacific) for another 5 year cycle into the early 2030s and re-evaluate after that. Or ideally get an up-front commitment for a 10 year extension for ~7 MCDVs to fully bridge the gap to the CMMCs, with the longer time horizon allowing for the consideration of some upgrades to these surviving MCDVs such as adding a NRWS to the former 40 mm Bofors pedestal to improve self-protection while providing a useful EO/IR sensor as well as replacing the boat crane with one able to quickly and safely launch and recover a fully loaded RHIB which benefits the drug interdiction role.

The last ship in refit is HMCS Moncton and she will be out of the yard by March, her structural integrity certification is 60M after that. She'll be the last to go.

 

[Cloud Cover]

It makes little financial or logistical sense to cancel the River class after 7/8 ships, only to retool Irving to build a new and less capable design or to send the work abroad. It flies in the face of the National Shipbuilding Strategy and the political landscape that comes alongside it. You will be cutting the legs out from under the program at the time when it will be producing ships at the fastest rate and the cheapest price points. Any savings made with a less capable class will ultimately be moot given the effort and funds required to transition.

Pretty much the entire history of CAF procurement and that includes the NSS make little financial or logistical sense. In fact I would argue those two reference points are things that procurement in operation (but not theory) seem to steer to avoid. These are primarily jobs and political pork industries and projects, with only a side plate of warships. To be fair this is also not unlike the practices of many other countries, including the United States.

Second, the T26 River Class edition is marvellously expensive in relation to what is being delivered, which is a very capable, premium priced sensor suite with a less than ideal strike and AAD weapons fit for deadly punch. True it can integrate with other ships and does have 24 cells for deep strike and other missiles, but for the size and the cost it’s just not enough. Again, full marks to the SPY radars and all the electronics and the defensive suite.

And besides all of that, the twin barrels of accelerating decline in GDP and the value of the Canadian dollar is going to blow the costs of these ships right off the order books. The RCN is not going to commission 15 River Class ships, even with a 3% GDP budget it just won’t help.

 

[Rainbow1910]

I’m kind of surprised hearing the Kingston-class will be retired by 2029, especially with the proposed CMMC replacement not due until 2035+ and not even funded yet.

It doesn’t seem like all 12 would need to be saved. Perhaps decommission ~5 MCDVs (the 2 worst as immediate parts sources, the next 3 worst kept in minimal maintenance for 1-2 years as reserve ships/for possible sale or donation before also being used for parts) and renew ~7 MCDVs (4 Atlantic, 3 Pacific) for another 5 year cycle into the early 2030s and re-evaluate after that. Or ideally get an up-front commitment for a 10 year extension for ~7 MCDVs to fully bridge the gap to the CMMCs, with the longer time horizon allowing for the consideration of some upgrades to these surviving MCDVs such as adding a NRWS to the former 40 mm Bofors pedestal to improve self-protection while providing a useful EO/IR sensor as well as replacing the boat crane with one able to quickly and safely launch and recover a fully loaded RHIB which benefits the drug interdiction role.

From what I've gathered, the Kingston class could serve longer but the decision has been made to take the money away from their upkeep/refits and dump it into the Halifax class.

Pretty much the entire history of CAF procurement and that includes the NSS make little financial or logistical sense. In fact I would argue those two reference points are things that procurement in operation (but not theory) seem to steer to avoid. These are primarily jobs and political pork industries and projects, with only a side plate of warships. To be fair this is also not unlike the practices of many other countries, including the United States.

Second, the T26 River Class edition is marvellously expensive in relation to what is being delivered, which is a very capable, premium priced sensor suite with a less than ideal strike and AAD weapons fit for deadly punch. True it can integrate with other ships and does have 24 cells for deep strike and other missiles, but for the size and the cost it’s just not enough. Again, full marks to the SPY radars and all the electronics and the defensive suite.

And besides all of that, the twin barrels of accelerating decline in GDP and the value of the Canadian dollar is going to blow the costs of these ships right off the order books. The RCN is not going to commission 15 River Class ships, even with a 3% GDP budget it just won’t help.

That is exactly why I think you will not see cuts to the River class order numbers, it is political and financial suicide to cut back these long term jobs programs that also serve as meat for influential local industries. Dumping all of the funds thus far into Irving Shipbuilding and the River class, only to pull back from it at the most ideal precipice is beyond laughable. Considering the threats we are looking at now and into the future, some smaller and less capable vessels are simply not workable if we are also sacrificing the backbone of the fleet to get them.

The River class isn't especially expensive for what it is, especially once you carve away all of the fat that comes along with nonsensical Canadian "kitchen sink" program budgeting. Hell, there is a crazy 30% contingency fund built into the program to help hedge against inflation and other concerns. From what I've gathered, the River class won't be meaningfully that much more expensive than the Australian and UK Type 26 variants. To expect we can get a similar capability for a similar or cheaper cost, built at home or abroad while still meeting our domestic shipbuilding commitments is simply impossible, especially when we'd need to cut off the ongoing River class program to even begin doing so. Look at the Constellation class that the US Navy is in the process of building, what they once put forward as a relatively inexpensive platform quickly ballooned out of proportion due to their suspiciously low intended price point. The "other options" realistically are not workable in one aspect or another, whether it be due to capability, finances, timelines or politics.

I'll believe it when I see it as to the cuts to the River class, given how jealously the RCN has protected them and how nobody is willing to touch the golden goose of the NSS. If the Canadian Govt ultimately learns nothing from previous mistakes and does what you say, I'll gladly be here to eat my hat.

 

[Cloud Cover]

“ Hell, there is a crazy 30% contingency fund built into the program to help hedge against inflation and other concerns.”

That’s the first time I’ve heard that.

 

[Rainbow1910]

“ Hell, there is a crazy 30% contingency fund built into the program to help hedge against inflation and other concerns.”

That’s the first time I’ve heard that.

Apologies, it was actually a 15% - 20% contingency fund out of the total $60B program figure that the DND was holding to at the time. That is the figure range given by National Defence spokeswoman Jessica Lamirande back in Fall of 2023.

 

[YZT580]

If she is at or around 1000T with all the bits and pieces located above the waterline I'd be afraid she would rock and roll and not in a good way

 

[don3wing]

I didn't see the Orca section but this is an intersting article on all 8 Orcas sailing together.

Navy's eight Orca-class vessels gather for historic exercise

All eight Orca-class vessels came together for a joint exercise on that extended into the Strait of Juan de Fuca

www.timescolonist.com

 

[Cloud Cover]

I didn't see the Orca section but this is an intersting article on all 8 Orcas sailing together.

Navy's eight Orca-class vessels gather for historic exercise

All eight Orca-class vessels came together for a joint exercise on that extended into the Strait of Juan de Fuca

www.timescolonist.com

View attachment 90896

There was supposed to be 12. Just saying …

 

[Czech_pivo]

There was supposed to be 12. Just saying …

Why am I not surprised.

 

[dapaterson]

I didn't see the Orca section but this is an intersting article on all 8 Orcas sailing together.

Navy's eight Orca-class vessels gather for historic exercise

All eight Orca-class vessels came together for a joint exercise on that extended into the Strait of Juan de Fuca

www.timescolonist.com

View attachment 90896

It's called a pod.

 

[Kirkhill]

If she is at or around 1000T with all the bits and pieces located above the waterline I'd be afraid she would rock and roll and not in a good way

Why not just ballast her down? Does tankage enter into the displacement calculation?

Deadweight tonnage (also known as deadweight; abbreviated to DWT, D.W.T., d.w.t., or dwt) or tons deadweight (DWT) is a measure of how much weight a ship can carry. It is the sum of the weights of cargo, fuel, fresh water, ballast water, provisions, passengers, and crew

....

Swiftships, the company that built, and converted the Fast Supply Vessels that became the M/LUSVs of the Ghost Fleet is also producing a ship that seems like it might be a contending competitor for the Vard design.

The designs are also prepared with varying levels of autonomy incorporated - Fully crewed, minimally crewed, optionally crewed or uncrewed.

75 METER SWIFT CORVETTE – Swiftships

swiftships.com

Technical Specification​

[th][/th]
[th][/th] [td]LENGTH[/td] [td]250.5 Feet (76.3 Meter)[/td] [td]BREADTH[/td] [td]40.9 Feet (12.4 Meter)[/td] [td]WATERLINE LENGTH[/td] [td]229 Feet (69.8 Meter)[/td] [td]DEPTH[/td] [td]18.6 Feet (5.6 Meter)[/td] [td]DRAFT[/td] [td]9.10 Feet (3 Meter)[/td] [td]DISPLACEMENT[/td] [td]1,250 LT[/td] [td]SPEED[/td] [td]29 knots[/td] [td]RANGE[/td] [td]> 5,000 n.m. (@ 15 knots)[/td] [td]MACHINERY[/td] [td]

• Engines: 4 X MTU 20V 4000 M93L, 4,300 kW @ 2,100 RPM, CODAD Arrangement with 2 x WARTSILA CPP System
• Power Generators: 2 x 300 kW Diesel Generators, 1 x 125 kW E. Diesel Generator

[/td] [td]NAVIGATION & COMMUNICATION[/td][td]

• Integrated Communication System (ICS)
• Interior Communication System (IC)
• Integrated Bridge System (IBS)
• COMBAT & Weapon Control System
• Surface & Air Surveillance Radar (Optional 3D)

[/td][td]ARMAMENT[/td][td]

• Main Gun: 1 X 57 mm Mk3 Naval Gun System
• Secondary Gun: 2 x 30 mm Stabilized Naval Gun System
• Medium Range Surface to Surface Missile System (Optional)
• Surface to Air Weapon System (Optional)

[/td][td]SHIP SYSTEMS[/td][td]

• Rescue Boat/Davit: 2 x 5.7m RHIB with Davit
• Helicopter Deck: Helicopter Refueling Facilities, Firefighting Foam Monitoring System, Helicopter Visual Landing Aid (HVLA)
• Fin Stabilizer System
• High Pressure Breathing Air Compressor
• Reverse Osmosis Water Maker
• CBRN Cleansing System
• Integrated Platform Management System (Optional)
• Asset Management Planning System (Optional)

[/td][td]ACCOMMODATIONS[/td][td]

• 1 x 1 CO Cabin
• 1 x 1 Flag Officer Cabin
• 6 x 2 Officer Cabin
• 1 x 6 Aviation Pilots Cabin
• 2 x 4 Petty Officer Cabin
• 1 x 18 Crew Quarter
• 1 x 18 Troops Quarter
• 1 x 15 Troops Quarter
• Total Capacity: 79 Persons

[/td]

 

[NearingZenith]

From what I've gathered, the Kingston class could serve longer but the decision has been made to take the money away from their upkeep/refits and dump it into the Halifax class.

If it’s primarily to try to free up money, it does seem a little short-sighted. The savings from eliminating the lowest-cost platform are going to be limited and as you’ve mentioned, the RCN’s going to be worse off if they end up having to use the more expensive AOPS to cover taskings that could previously be handled by the MCDVs.

That is exactly why I think you will not see cuts to the River class order numbers, it is political and financial suicide to cut back these long term jobs programs that also serve as meat for influential local industries. Dumping all of the funds thus far into Irving Shipbuilding and the River class, only to pull back from it at the most ideal precipice is beyond laughable. Considering the threats we are looking at now and into the future, some smaller and less capable vessels are simply not workable if we are also sacrificing the backbone of the fleet to get them.

The River class isn't especially expensive for what it is, especially once you carve away all of the fat that comes along with nonsensical Canadian "kitchen sink" program budgeting. Hell, there is a crazy 30% contingency fund built into the program to help hedge against inflation and other concerns. From what I've gathered, the River class won't be meaningfully that much more expensive than the Australian and UK Type 26 variants. To expect we can get a similar capability for a similar or cheaper cost, built at home or abroad while still meeting our domestic shipbuilding commitments is simply impossible, especially when we'd need to cut off the ongoing River class program to even begin doing so. Look at the Constellation class that the US Navy is in the process of building, what they once put forward as a relatively inexpensive platform quickly ballooned out of proportion due to their suspiciously low intended price point. The "other options" realistically are not workable in one aspect or another, whether it be due to capability, finances, timelines or politics.

I'll believe it when I see it as to the cuts to the River class, given how jealously the RCN has protected them and how nobody is willing to touch the golden goose of the NSS. If the Canadian Govt ultimately learns nothing from previous mistakes and does what you say, I'll gladly be here to eat my hat.

I don’t want it to happen, but if the government were to cut back on CSC numbers I’d imagine they would justify it by pointing to it allowing an overall increase in combatant numbers. So there could be say 10 CSCs and 14-16 CMMCs instead of 15 CSCs and 12 OPV level MCDV replacements or 15 CSCs and 6-8 CMMCs. The CMMCs would also be built at Irving to make up for the reduction in CSC numbers avoiding a lawsuit over money and avoiding a shipbuilding boom/bust. The batches of CSCs and CMMCs could be interspersed (~7 CMMCs begin construction after the 1st batch of 3 CSCs, then the 2nd batch of CSC, etc). The marketing point would be getting more combatants to the fleet sooner for similar money, but the complexity of adding ostensively simpler and cheaper CMMCs to the build order would more likely increase the total cost and take longer.

 

[Nvlgzr]

I just read that Davie is gearing up with ship designers to come up with a replacement design. They are going after the project apparently.

I know it’s not April Fools yet, but you’re kidding right? They just got onto NSS to do icebreakers. I guess the icebreakers scheduled after Arpatuuq class will slip. I would rather see Davie get the contract than Heddle/Ontario. One has built ships and the other has only ever built a small motorized barge.

 

[Furniture]

If it’s primarily to try to free up money, it does seem a little short-sighted. The savings from eliminating the lowest-cost platform are going to be limited and as you’ve mentioned, the RCN’s going to be worse off if they end up having to use the more expensive AOPS to cover taskings that could previously be handled by the MCDVs.

There is only so much money to spend, and only so many people to do the work. The CPFs are the priority, because they are what we will need when the balloon goes up.

The CRCN has already addressed that some of the tasks currently done by MCDVs will be done by contracted ships. The AOPVS will pick up the military specific tasks, and I suspect the other tasks will be contracted out.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I'd like to point out that the document was written just about 15yrs ago. Russia hadn't begun to make its play for the Ukraine, China hadn't declared itself a 'near Arctic nation', China had not built up the Spratly Islands, etc, etc, etc. Things have drastically changed in those 15yrs. Saying that we must conform to this document and ONLY build a 'warship' of less than 1,000 tons should be a non-starter now.

It's a contract worth collectively over $100B with 3 shipyards across the country. We could change it, but it would cost us a fortune, and the government would be facing political pressure from both coasts and Quebec. The CPCs might not care about that politically, but they would care about the dollar value, especially as this is a completely non-funded project that isn't on the investment plan, or justified under the current defence white paper, and not something they cared about last time they were in government (when the MCDV mid life extension was shelved).

The sub replacement project is supported in principle, but would probably be a similarly eye watering budget as the entire NSS at the moment, and money from that has to come from somewhere.

All that aside, we don't have enough sailors to operated the surface platforms on the books now, and that's continually trending downwards. We don't have enough submariners to operated the 4 subs either, and would be a massive expansion to operated 8-12. On top of that, we don't have enough people to do the shore support on the coasts, or enough people to do the 3rd line support in Ottawa (which is continuing to try and figure out how to operate with a $900M NP cut, and feeling the impacts from that cut last year). And don't forget, these kinds of big projects also require PSPC and ISED support, and both of them are tapped out people wise and shrinking.

The institution has been crying uncle at various levels for at least a decade, so it really doesn't matter if budget triples tomorrow and the taps get turned on; there aren't people to buy, maintain or operate an entirely new class of corvettes, and we'll be lucky if we can actually grow enough to get all the River class, AOPs and JSS crewed up and supported.

 

[Swampbuggy]

Maybe they’re freeing up space because they anticipate Trump trying to shove a few FREEDOM class down our throats as an appeasement to keep tariffs at bay. Neatly sidesteps the NSS issues, if one of the yards gets a contract to deal with the propulsion issues and fit them out for Canadian use, rather than building a new class of corvette.

I’m being facetious about this, but there’s also part of me that would not be surprised if this was one somebody’s mind.