- Reaction score
- 2,574
- Points
- 1,260
Apple announced that they are releasing a documentary on 15 March to accompany the series.


This is the anniversary of Mailly-le-Camp.
On 3–4 May 1944, the panzer training camp located a mile north of the town was subjected to a very heavy bombing. The attack was a part of the preparation for the Allied invasion at Normandy, (Operation Overlord). 346 Avro Lancasters of Bomber Command were sent to attack the panzer training center near the village of Mailly-le-Camp. The plan was for targeting aircraft to fly over at low level while the main force of Lancaster bombers orbited some distance away. Once the master bomber was satisfied with the marking the bomb force was to be called in. Although the target was accurately marked, the master bomber was unable to call in the force due to interference over the force's frequency with a USO broadcast and also by unnecessary chatting between nervous pilots. This led to a delay in the main force attack. While they were orbiting, fighter aircraft of the Luftwaffe began to arrive and attack the main force bombers. 42 Lancasters were shot down, 11.6% of the force, resulting in the loss of some 300 aircrew. However 1500 tons of bombs were dropped on the camp, causing considerable damage to the weapons and equipment held there and heavy casualties. No French civilians were killed in the bombing, although there were a small number of casualties when one of the Lancasters shot down crashed on a house.
The Normandy invasion preparation by the air forces was a massive, and interesting, campaign in its own right...
D-Day and the Aerial Battle for Normandy
In all, RAF and USAAF bombers carried out operations against 72 separate rail centres in France, Belgium and western Germany before D-Day - locomotive depots, repair facilities and marshalling yards. The 37 assigned to Harris’s force were all destroyed or seriously damaged. Bomber Command’s night attacks proved more accurate than American daylight strikes – a fact Harris was keen to trumpet. The rail yards at Juvisy and La Chapelle near Paris were completely destroyed after single attacks on each, with minimal collateral damage.
![]()
D-Day and the aerial battle for Normandy
Explore how the Allied Strategic Bomber Forces supported D-Day and the Battle for Normandy.www.iwm.org.uk
Large scale strategic movement of German troops by rail is practically impossible at the present time and must remain so while attacks are maintained at their present intensity.
Your chance of survival through one spell of operational duty was negligible. Through two periods, mathematically Nil.
force Germans to withdraw forces (air and land) from Russia to fight in the west, preferably on unfavourable terms (eg. North Africa for land forces, anywhere within range of Allied fighters for air forces).
The bombers could enable the western Allies to delay agressively, while Russia fought out the huge battles that broke the Wehrmacht, that caused Hitler by June 1944 to deploy 156 divisions in the East against 50 in France and the Low Countries. Neither the Russians nor the Americans could flatly be told that the British proposed to fight no campaign in Europe for years to come. If the Bomber Offensive, fueled by publicity and boosted with American support, and given formidible but not extravagant supplies of aircraft, met with even moderate destructive success, this would be convincing evidence of Britain's commitment to the struggle at a very tolerable cost in British lives. Bomber Commands 56,000 dead would represent, at the end, the lowest possible stake that Britain could have been seen to throw on the tables of Europe, when the Russians were counting their dead in the millions.'
The source is completely wrong, and I suspect it's someone with an axe to grind against the British. The British proposed to fight no campaign in Northwest Europe (ie. cross-channel) until the shipping and combat naval, air, and land forces were in hand to support an amphibious invasion into a part of Europe with a dense network of roads and railways. 1942 was obviously impossible from the get-go (Russian and then US entry into the war), and 1943 was obviously impossible from what was known in 1942. The British were absolutely looking at options in the Med (Sicily, Sardinia, Italy) and in Norway. "Years to come" is an absurd exaggeration - from Dec 1941 to Jun 1944 is only two-and-a-half years, and the British were strongly committed to going in 1944. Subject to seasons and weather, there were really only three windows - summer 1942 (ridiculous), summer 1943 (close to ridiculous), and summer 1944 (first practical window).As far as wishing to force Germans to withdraw from Russia to fight in the West, what i read was this,
"Neither the Russians nor the Americans could flatly be told that the British proposed to fight no campaign in Europe for years to come."
The source is completely wrong, and I suspect it's someone with an axe to grind against the British.
He's wrong. The high-level deliberations and proposals are matters of record. Event-wise, Britain was struggling to cope with the Germans in North Africa until late 1942; a cross-channel attack in 1942 by a few divisions supported by even fewer American divisions would simply have burdened the Germans with more PoWs. Nov 42 (second Alamein, Torch) to May 44 counts as "year-and-a-half", not "years".The source
Though that also contributed to the allies outstripping their logistics chains somewhat as they advanced through France.And before D-Day , Gen. Eisenhower insisted on the Transportation Plan.
By bombing the rail lines, the Allies ensured the German military could not easily rush reinforcements, tanks, and ammunition to Normandy after the invasion started.