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Medium Cavalry: Critical Capability or Poor Man’s MBT?

If that then why not just create permanent combined arms teams?

And what would be so wrong with the cavalry and infantry units being similarly organized and able to cover off the same tasks?
That was tried back around 2007 and after in Gagetown with 2 RCR in what was called an "optimized battlegroup." The idea was to create fairly regular attachments that somewhat mirrored what was deployed in Afghanistan at the time.

It was introduced in "Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations," and carried on for a few years and then petered away. I'm not sure when it came to an official end but guess it would have been around the time Leslie left as CLS as he was the idea's champion.
Words separating us again.

My proposal for discussion was to remove any distinction between the RCAC ("cavalry") and the RCIC ("infantry") beyond the cap badge and train both elements to the same standards in the same tactics.
So let me get this straight. You're proposing that the branch that can't figure out how to train two streams of heavy and light (medium) whatever, cavalry now take over integrating infantry as well.
. . . .

And there is no difference between Dragoons and Mounted Infantry.
And we all remember what happened to dragoons at the Battle of the Greasy Grass.

IMHO, there's a very good reason why troops who fight (and not merely travel) mounted and those who fight (and not merely travel) dismounted are in two separate specialties. Dragoons (as originally conceived and not what they morphed into) and mounted infantry are essentially the same thing - troops who travel mounted but fight dismounted.

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Interesting, I haven’t see that model. I’ll confirm but I’m 90 percent sure the TAPVs we had were capable of both.
Apparently my information was out of date. The decision to drop single weapon RWS seems to have been been made in conjunction with the decision to not buy RWS for every vehicle.

Yes it should. Right now the "medium cavalry" are using TAPV's as a large portion of their cars. That's not medium or cavalry. The Medium Cavalry project and a purchase of new or more tanks are not mutually exclusive. They can both be done concurrently.
CA should rush to buy something now and then later address doctrine to determine if it is even required is how CA got TAPV. Why should CA rush to buy a medium cavalry vehicle if it cannot demonstrate from a doctrinal position that such a thing should exist? Why should CA send two of its mechanized brigades to war supported by the Booker instead of real MBTs?
 
@FJAG

I am saying, precisely because neither corps seems to have a grip on what they have to do and how they want to do it, and they are both competing for the leadership of the defence of Canada, that Bill Murray was right.

 
That was tried back around 2007 and after in Gagetown with 2 RCR in what was called an "optimized battlegroup." The idea was to create fairly regular attachments that somewhat mirrored what was deployed in Afghanistan at the time.

It was introduced in "Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations," and carried on for a few years and then petered away. I'm not sure when it came to an official end but guess it would have been around the time Leslie left as CLS as he was the idea's champion.

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I seem to recall in the 90s 2 VP always got B Bty OC (Major Larocque) as the COs gunner guy, and we always got B Sqn Ldsh as the tanks.

Everyone at the command levels knew their counterparts and what they could bring to the fight.
 
@FJAG

I am saying, precisely because neither corps seems to have a grip on what they have to do and how they want to do it, and they are both competing for the leadership of the defence of Canada, that Bill Murray was right.


Further to....

I know I want continental air defence control of the air approaches. I know I want control of the seas and the maritime approaches.
 
CA should rush to buy something now and then later address doctrine to determine if it is even required is how CA got TAPV.
TAPV was part of a deliberate planning process started late in 2006 to develop a model of what the army should be post Afghanistan. At the time the vision was for a structure that could build one each of a light brigade, a medium brigade and a heavy brigade (hence the CCV at the rate of 108). The complicating factor was the force generation model which was already in existence which called for readiness cycles of symmetric brigade groups as force generators.

The vision for TAPV as a patrol vehicle had several doctrinal slots, not least of which was for the light infantry battalions which grew out of the early use of RG-31s by light companies, PRT, etc in Afghanistan. I had a young infantry officer working for me who ended up posted to 3 RCR around 2010 to work on integrating the not yet arrived TAPV into that battalion as their primary mission vehicle. It didn't work out well.
Why should CA rush to buy a medium cavalry vehicle if it cannot demonstrate from a doctrinal position that such a thing should exist? Why should CA send two of its mechanized brigades to war supported by the Booker instead of real MBTs?
It shouldn't. But one would think that after several years of Ukraine's version of LSCO, and the reams of literature and studies and war gaming coming out of that that the fundamental concepts of a doctrine for future LSCO should be getting clear.

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