MGS/MMEV dead yet?

[Infanteer]

Though it may have seemed simpler during the cold war to have a centre of arc on a bearing of 1600 and just fire away!

For sure!

I interepreted it differently.  The age of the tank is over, but the age of Tanks (Plural) has begun.   Looks like it is time for a wider variety of Tanks on the Battlefield, and more of them.

That's how I interpreted.  But I think the definition of "tank" in this case means more than a 70 ton tracked machine of death.  It actually makes me think of the interwar British approach with I-tanks, cruisers, etc, etc.  A "low-intensity" tank is going to be different from an "expeditionary tank" - both are probably different from "some sort of armoured vehicle suitable for Afghanistan....

 

[Kirkhill]

I believe that the watch words for the Armoured Corps are/were Shock, Firepower, Movement/Manouevre.  The idea seemed to be it was a force that would be employed as heavy cavalry used to be - an arm of decision that would go looping across the battlefield in large numbers concentrating on the battle's schwerpunkt.    This was the anti-thesis to World War I's "Willlie", the infantry support tank - a combination of engineer assault vehicle for breaching defences and an artillery platform that could pace the infantry.

What I get out of Infanteer's article is that the demand for tanks in cities was for employment in the dreaded "penny-packets" - troops or even 1s and 2s - to work in co-operation with dismounted infantry.

Let's stipulate that a well-designed MBT is both a "Cavalry" Tank and an "Infantry" Tank - which role is the most likely role in current service and in future service?  Do we need Armoured Divisions (actually I will stipulate that I think that we as a nation can afford to rebuild 4 Canadian Armd Div - 2 Bdes, one Armd, one Inf - don't expect to see it?); or a separate Armd brigade which can train together and detach independent Squadrons for inf spt;  or three separate Armd Regiments as we have,  or perhaps one very large Tank Regiment with something like 5 Squadrons and 3 Light Armoured Cavalry Regiments (Stand up  8CH).

Personally and FWIW I don't see Tank Regiments cruising the Deserts and Steppes much longer.  People look at Iraq 1 and 2 and look at them as exemplars of what the Tank can do on the modern battlefield in open warfare.  But that seems to assume that we own all the tanks AND the PGMs.  What would have happened if Saddam had a better Air Force and had invested a few more of those UN petro-dollars in ATGMs for his home defence Commandos?

I do continue to see a need for heavily armoured vehicles simply because the more armour available the closer you are going to be able to approach the enemy's defences.  But their price will go up as they install counter-measures both active and passive, their availability will decrease as a result and their vulnerability in the open will likely increase as the cost of a round to kill them decreases.  That means that you can afford to buy many tank-killing rounds for every tank you can afford to buy - ultimately the cheap weapon wins.  It just swamps the expensive one.  English Arrows and French Knights, Japanese Zeros and British and American Battleships, Canadian 25 pounder shells and German Infantry Divisions, or ATGMs moving downwards from $100,000 versus MBTs moving upwards from $10,000,000.

The Tank as Specialist Vehicle, much like the vehicles of the Engineer Regiments?  Very useful when properly applied but perhaps not as generally applicable as they once were?

 

[Infanteer]

What I get out of Infanteer's article is that the demand for tanks in cities was for employment in the dreaded "penny-packets" - troops or even 1s and 2s - to work in co-operation with dismounted infantry.

Yup.  I have multiple articles from various US service journals explaining the tactics of doing this.  Seems to work.

People look at Iraq 1 and 2 and look at them as exemplars of what the Tank can do on the modern battlefield in open warfare.  But that seems to assume that we own all the tanks AND the PGMs.  What would have happened if Saddam had a better Air Force and had invested a few more of those UN petro-dollars in ATGMs for his home defence Commandos?

Sinai II?

 

[a_majoor]

The argument that tanks are to be used against tanks is a bad misreading of history. Tanks are to provide mobile firepower, and are best employed when a breach is created in the enemy line and can pour through into the rear area.

This can be inferred from tank war theory dating from "Plan 1919" , to observing the "Independent Tank Battalion" of the Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment was near the rear of the Regimental march column (prepared to perform the exploitation task), or a Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) serving the same purpose for army and front level formations.

The circumstances of modern war suggest that mobile firepower is still important (tanks supporting Infantry in the city fight), but mobile firepower is still important in setting up cordons and preparing the battlefield, Cavalry "tanks" in this era could be performed by LAVs or similar vehicles. Helicopters and perhaps future UAVs might fill in the Cavalry role to provide the ratio of "cavalry" speed to that of the regular formations.

Last observation, although numbers are nice to have, in the fiercest fighting in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis were fighting badly outnumbered in both the Sinai and Golan Heights, and the crossing of the Suez canal was spearheaded by about 30 tanks (against the Egyptian Third Army). If the Iraqis had better weapons and leadership, there would have been more battles and more casualties, but the ultimate outcome would have been the same.

 

[Infanteer]

The argument that tanks are to be used against tanks is a bad misreading of history. Tanks are to provide mobile firepower, and are best employed when a breach is created in the enemy line and can pour through into the rear area.

Ouch, a tick in the "shortcoming" box....

What I mean when I say this remark is that for 50 years, we looked at a tank to be primarily an "anti-tank" weapon - we prepared, in both doctrine and practice, to utilize our armoured forces to engage other armoured forces.  Now, with a shift from "bear to snake", to quote the boss, the raison d'etre changes.  Evan's review underlines this as the shift of defining characteristics - from a weapon system of operational mobility (designed to "provide mobile firepower, and are best employed when a breach is created in the enemy line and can pour through into the rear area") to one focused on providing tactical utility (two moving pillboxes firing the infantry in on a dusty street in Fallujah).

Anyways, some more background reading into the future of armoured employment, courtsey of Colonel Micheal Krause of the Australian Army (I've posted this one before as well):

The Case for Minimum Mass Tactics in the Australian Army

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Oh my...

I try to avoid becoming engaged in these "what if" debates, but my last five minutes of reading has been rather "interesting", so I thought I'd interject.

First, tanks aren't necessarily dedicated to taking on other tanks.  We train(ed) and operate(d) in combat teams for a reason.  In the offence, for example, tanks accompany the infantry onto the objective to provide intimate support, digging the trenches out with the grunts, blasting bunkers and providing overwatch against counterattacks.  Only after the infantry has secured the objective to the tanks peel off to form the "ring of steel" to protect against armour-drive counterattacks.

Also, on the offence (say, during an advance to contact), tanks would lead, simply because tanks are capable of taking on the widest variety of potential threats - other tanks included.

The point of this post is to remind everyone that tanks have never operated alone - they're always accompanied by infantry, who will lead depending on the tactical scenario.  A combat team, with attached engineers and FOO, is perfectly capable of conducting operations in a very wide variety of tactical scenarios, including against the "snakes" in an urban setting.  We should also remember that we can have infantry-heavy or armour-heavy combat teams, again dependant on the scenario.

Do we need three full regiments of tanks?  Probably not.  However, we do need a mix of capabilities that provide the leadership with enough flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions - from invading Iran to peacekeeping in E. Timor.

Typically, I steer away from academic discussions of tactics (and of Jane's book-type discussions of shiny new kit), primarily because tactics are extremely dependent on the actual scenario on the ground and will certainly be adjusted to suit highly individualized situations.  However, we have perfectly force structures to employ in 90% of instances, along with the doctrine to accompany them.  Fallujah isn't that different from Ortona, after all...

T39, jockeying now...

 

[Infanteer]

Do we need three full regiments of tanks?  Probably not.  However, we do need a mix of capabilities that provide the leadership with enough flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions - from invading Iran to peacekeeping in E. Timor.

That is what I was trying to say, but I guess I just muddied the waters.  Damn.

Anyways, here's more for the Jane's crowd:

 

[George Wallace]

I'd like to add something to this.

Although we don't really require three or more Regiments of Tanks, it would be to our advantage to do so.  Why?  The Armoured Corps is in the position it is today, due to the fact that we allowed the Armoured Corps to be reduced to one Tank Regiment, and now we have 'Armoured' officers who really aren't.  Officers who really don't have the knowledge, nor the experience, to be 'Armoured' officers in the true sense.  We need the Tanks to train all our Officers and NCO's to know the capabilities of the Tank, not 'Tank Trainers' or Recce.  

 

[a_majoor]

The debate is undergoing a healthy shift from the benefits/deficiencies of a particular piece of kit (hey, I'm one of the best players!) to a more sober appraisal of what we want to do and what tools we need to do it with. We may end up with force structures totally divorced from what we have used since the Cold War (or WW II for that matter), and the numbers and ratios of various branches will almost certainly change.

In the last few posts, much was made about the utility of heavy armour in a street fight to support the Infantry and Engineers. Would it shock people if Leopard tanks are assigned to the Fire Support Company of an Infantry Battalion, while "Armoured" regiments received a fast moving wheeled fire support vehicle to shape the battlefield?

How about (to revive some older arguments from different threads) a "Mounted Rifles" battalion, being an Infantry heavy combined arms unit which uses its mobility to size and hold ground, with a complimentary "Armoured Cavalry" regiment, also a permanent combined arms formation but organized differently to perform fast patrols, screening and flanking and the ability to perform the persuit? Notice that here we have specified roles and formations which can exist independent of what sort of kit they are issued, LAV, CV-90 family, M-1/ M-2, Leopard/Puma, "technicals" or magic carpets can all be slotted into the TO&E in the appropriate measure to support the role of the formation.

 

[edmjay]

Hi All,

I've been reading through Army.ca as I'm again looking into joining the CF. I have a university degree so I'm looking at an officer position within either the infantry or armour trades. The fact that armour is so up in the air with their equipment now, I'm not sure what that would mean for my experience in that trade.

Anyway, enough with the off topic stuff. In relation to the comments about tanks being effective working in smaller numbers with infantry in urban areas, here is a clip of just that. It's the US army engaging militants in Fallujah.

http://youtube.com/watch?v=sWbDikIO32Q&search=iraq%20battle

J

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

The debate is undergoing a healthy shift from the benefits/deficiencies of a particular piece of kit (hey, I'm one of the best players!) to a more sober appraisal of what we want to do and what tools we need to do it with. We may end up with force structures totally divorced from what we have used since the Cold War (or WW II for that matter), and the numbers and ratios of various branches will almost certainly change.

In the last few posts, much was made about the utility of heavy armour in a street fight to support the Infantry and Engineers. Would it shock people if Leopard tanks are assigned to the Fire Support Company of an Infantry Battalion, while "Armoured" regiments received a fast moving wheeled fire support vehicle to shape the battlefield?

How about (to revive some older arguments from different threads) a "Mounted Rifles" battalion, being an Infantry heavy combined arms unit which uses its mobility to size and hold ground, with a complimentary "Armoured Cavalry" regiment, also a permanent combined arms formation but organized differently to perform fast patrols, screening and flanking and the ability to perform the persuit? Notice that here we have specified roles and formations which can exist independent of what sort of kit they are issued, LAV, CV-90 family, M-1/ M-2, Leopard/Puma, "technicals" or magic carpets can all be slotted into the TO&E in the appropriate measure to support the role of the formation.

I disagree.  There's virtually nothing wrong with the current force structure - if employed properly and fully manned.  The problem with penny-packeting, as you seem to propose, is that you lose one of the singular benefits of massed armour - shock action.  Agreed, this may not be important in every tactical scenario (particularly the ones were currently discussing), but there may well be times when it is critical.  Eliminating the capacity to mass armour and reducing the tank to an infantry support role would be a serious limitation of the capability of the vehicle and a serious mistake.

Again, we already operate in all-arms sub-units that, given the opportunity, can be exceedingly effective and that cover off 90+% of tactical scenarios.  I fail to see how organizationally reinventing the wheel will dramatically improve operational effectiveness.  The Army's suffered enough organizational angst over the last 40 years; why add to it?

Cheers,

Teddy

 

[Journeyman]

Fallujah isn't that different from Ortona, after all...

So, someone's been reading the latest Urban Ops doctrine 

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Doctrine?  We have doctrine? 

 

[Journeyman]

Doctrine?  We have doctrine?   

Well.... saying "Canadian Army Doctrine" sounds more professional than "the pedantic cutting & pasting, by a committee of staff officers, of the lowest common denominator from our Allies' publications"  ;D

But their latest FIBUA, OBUA, Urban Ops, FISH (Fighting In Someone's House) musings do contain case studies of Fallujah and Ortona.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Well.... saying "Canadian Army Doctrine" sounds more professional than "the pedantic cutting & pasting, by a committee of staff officers, of the lowest common denominator from our Allies' publications"

:rofl:

 

[a_majoor]

I disagree.  There's virtually nothing wrong with the current force structure - if employed properly and fully manned.  The problem with penny-packeting, as you seem to propose, is that you lose one of the singular benefits of massed armour - shock action.  Agreed, this may not be important in every tactical scenario (particularly the ones were currently discussing), but there may well be times when it is critical.  Eliminating the capacity to mass armour and reducing the tank to an infantry support role would be a serious limitation of the capability of the vehicle and a serious mistake.

Perhaps I worded that post badly, I am not proposing penny packeting, but rather matching tools to the job. If we look at the role of Armour as mobility and shock action, then the ability to move fast and pack an offensive punch would seem to be paramount (which can be provided by a variety of vehicles), whereas the Infantry role of seizing and holding ground would imply having protection and packing a big punch would support the outcome I suggested (using the Leopard as an assault gun). In the current environment, it seems the PBI will be going toe to toe with the enemy, while the Armoured should be sweeping the countryside to shape the battlefield (isolating them and bottling them up in urban areas is one possible course of action).

As well the proposed force structure is and should be independent of the actual kit; if conditions change the Armoured Cavalry Regiment can do conversion to Leopard 2A6 and Pumas, or laser armed hovertanks, or whatever is appropriate and possible at the time.

 

[ArmyRick]

Here I go. George Wallace and Teddy are gonna open up on me with SABOT rounds when i am done here. I can not put proper punctuations right now because i am using a mac so bear with me.

What about permamently posting a LAV (or whatever system is in use 15 years from now) to an Armoured REgt. During combat team ops, divide the 3 infantry platoons and attach a platoon to each squadron of tanks (Tank heavy CBT TM). Then post a squadron of MBT to certain designated LAV battalions. They in turn would assign a troop of tanks to each company (Infantry heavy CBT TM).

I know in theory we did this for exercises in the past (I participated in alot of CBT TM stuff while i was in 2 VP). But what about actually posting the arm to inf and vice versa.

 

[Red 6]

That's an outstanding idea, ArmyRick.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

But why do it permanently and upset the entire force structure?

For many years 1 CMBG units had affiliations.  Tank squadrons were affiliated with infantry units, as were artillery batteries.  On exercise, they always worked together, building a relationship.

What happened?  Well, we slashed our manning levels to the point where we were piecemealing every exercise and operation.  Squadrons were rerolled into recce, armoured cavalry or whatever the flavour of the day was, while the artillery drifted into heavy and light guns.  None of the units were/are fully manned, making sub-unit cohesion impossible to maintain.

Again, we're reinventing the wheel.  I am firmly - utterly - convinced that, at the unit level, we are in desparate need of stability and a long term plan that will actually be implemented.  We have force structures and experience that covers 90% of the tactical situations likely to be encountered on the battlefield, yet there are constant calls for even more change and turmoil.

Man units to 100%, stabilize their equipment issue, re-implement unit affiliations, and allow those affiliations to routinely go to the field together.  I'd be shocked if that didn't resolve most of the "issues" the people perceive exist within the force structure.

TR

 

[GAP]

Our actual normal "in-country" TO&E for a line company was an average of 60-65% if we were lucky. The few times we bumped into the high 80s/90s we could do wonders. It generally didn't last, what with people getting injured, rotating, R & R, promotions/transfers, etc., but the point that I am trying to make is this. If a simple increment of men and equipment can make such a useful increase in efficiency, then think what that would do if something similar occurred to the entire force. Teddy is right on the money.