Military concerned by Canada's absence from American-British-Australian security pact

[FJAG]

Historically DCDS handled operational deployments. When Hillier was Commander of ISAF in Kabul in 2004 he became royally unhappy with DCDS's manner of control over his Canadian contingent's operations. When he became CDS in 05, he started work to take DCDS's ops role apart and ballooned it into CEFCOM (expeditionary ops), Canada Com (domestic Ops) and CANOSCOM (operational support) amongst others in 2006.

Leslie's Report on Transformation in 2011 recommended consolidation of CEFCOM, Canada COM and CANOSCOM. This is one of the few recommendations carried out and CJOC was established on 2012.

 

[RangerRay]

Why be concerned? Everyone should understand Canada wasn't included as we are just another US protected territory. Maybe when we get the new jets, ships, tanks, arty, members, etc etc etc they will consider letting us into the club.

My understanding was we were left out because we have been infiltrated at the highest levels, or otherwise in the thrall of, the PRC.

And it was clear our government wasn’t taking defence seriously.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Historically DCDS handled operational deployments. When Hillier was Commander of ISAF in Kabul in 2004 he became royally unhappy with DCDS's manner of control over his Canadian contingent's operations. When he became CDS in 05, he started work to take DCDS's ops role apart and ballooned it into CEFCOM (expeditionary ops), Canada Com (domestic Ops) and CANOSCOM (operational support) amongst others in 2006.

Leslie's Report on Transformation in 2011 recommended consolidation of CEFCOM, Canada COM and CANOSCOM. This is one of the few recommendations carried out and CJOC was established on 2012.

So another great decision born and bread in the Army foisted on the rest of the organization ? Sounds about right.

If the only thing you bring to the table is additional layers of approval, hard to understand the purpose of their existence. But maybe they are doing all kinds of things up the chain in a black box fashion that aren't obvious at the deployed unit level. to keep SJS and other folks like that happy.

Weird though, because when you are doing the same stuff not under CJOC with ships, SS still manages to figure out how to arrange events with local embassies, coordinate logistics/customs with other countries, etc. Maybe makes more sense for Army or airforce, if you are just sending a platoon or some planes, but might just be another empire.

The RCN didn't and doesn't need CJOC to deploy, we've been doing the same shit since Jesus was a snotty. But if CJOC takes them over it helps build and perpetuate the empire.

That KLE meeting was enlightening to say the least. Medals and money. After that they really didn't want to talk to us.

 

[dimsum]

So another great decision born and bread in the Army foisted on the rest of the organization ? Sounds about right.



The RCN didn't and doesn't need CJOC to deploy, we've been doing the same shit since Jesus was a snotty. But if CJOC takes them over it helps build and perpetuate the empire.

That KLE meeting was enlightening to say the least. Medals and money. After that they really didn't want to talk to us.

The RCN didn’t, and depending on the fleet, the RCAF doesn’t as well. But I can see where some RCAF fleets, and the Army, might.

I do note that in this thread, the two folks most adamant that CJOC doesn’t do anything for them are both RCN.

 

[Halifax Tar]

The RCN didn’t, and depending on the fleet, the RCAF doesn’t as well. But I can see where some RCAF fleets, and the Army, might.

I do note that in this thread, the two folks most adamant that CJOC doesn’t do anything for them are both RCN.

We do have a history of being the rebellious and obstreperous red headed step child in the CAF. Tradition must be upheld and all that old boy

 

[FSTO]

We do have a history of being the rebellious and obstreperous red headed step child in the CAF. Tradition must be upheld and all that old boy

 

[OldSolduer]

We do have a history of being the rebellious and obstreperous red headed step child in the CAF. Tradition must be upheld and all that old boy

You do and for that I thank you.

 

[ueo]

The RCN didn’t, and depending on the fleet, the RCAF doesn’t as well. But I can see where some RCAF fleets, and the Army, might.

I do note that in this thread, the two folks most adamant that CJOC doesn’t do anything for them are both RCN.

Maybe outside eyes are required...

 

[Navy_Pete]

The RCN didn’t, and depending on the fleet, the RCAF doesn’t as well. But I can see where some RCAF fleets, and the Army, might.

I do note that in this thread, the two folks most adamant that CJOC doesn’t do anything for them are both RCN.

Doing nothing would be an improvement; they were an active impedement in a lot of cases (sometimes as a result of not actually doing what they were supposed to push forward requests to get people in and out of theatre). Wouldn't tell us what they needed from us for reporting, generally were smug pricks when they visited and were of very little actual help.

To be fair, our local N37 contact (who was our liason back get support for parts and engineering) was useless as well. Told us things like hand held, battery powered searchlights are fine instead of the big ass fitted ones (they weren't, migrants drowning in the water would agree), actively disagreed with our assessment of equipment status (and were repeatedly proved wrong) and a number of other things that had half of the HODs/CHODs and up wanting to punch them on sight when we got back.

They were useless in getting parts, couldn't be bothered to make sure the right part was shipped before hand despite us specifically asking, and sent a fuel hose assembly for the helo to us in pieces twice (it is supposed to be made to order and tested). I hope they were embarassed when we had to update our OPDEF saying that the assebmly was received in pieces twice when it went to NATO, but probably not.

 

[FSTO]

Doing nothing would be an improvement; they were an active impedement in a lot of cases (sometimes as a result of not actually doing what they were supposed to push forward requests to get people in and out of theatre). Wouldn't tell us what they needed from us for reporting, generally were smug pricks when they visited and were of very little actual help.

To be fair, our local N37 contact (who was our liason back get support for parts and engineering) was useless as well. Told us things like hand held, battery powered searchlights are fine instead of the big ass fitted ones (they weren't, migrants drowning in the water would agree), actively disagreed with our assessment of equipment status (and were repeatedly proved wrong) and a number of other things that had half of the HODs/CHODs and up wanting to punch them on sight when we got back.

They were useless in getting parts, couldn't be bothered to make sure the right part was shipped before hand despite us specifically asking, and sent a fuel hose assembly for the helo to us in pieces twice (it is supposed to be made to order and tested). I hope they were embarassed when we had to update our OPDEF saying that the assebmly was received in pieces twice when it went to NATO, but probably not.

Op APOLLO: The Navy had a dedicated team living in Dubai to support the CDN Task Group (AOR, DDH, and FFG). I know there was a Logistic officer and an Engineering Officer and a staff of about 6 or 7. When it was our turn to go into Jabel Ali for our time alongside we'd send a message to them with all the OPDEF's, Repats, and other myriad of crap that needed to be done. When we'd get alongside everything and I mean everything was ready to go. We even got the entire ship painted and non-skid replaced in 3 days. They were fantastic.

Then the entity in Ottawa got involved and they didn't like that the FLS was in Dubai and they forced them out to the newly established Camp Mirage. It appeared to me that our support was more and more delayed as the Op progressed.

My 2 cents

 

[Navy_Pete]

Op APOLLO: The Navy had a dedicated team living in Dubai to support the CDN Task Group (AOR, DDH, and FFG). I know there was a Logistic officer and an Engineering Officer and a staff of about 6 or 7. When it was our turn to go into Jabel Ali for our time alongside we'd send a message to them with all the OPDEF's, Repats, and other myriad of crap that needed to be done. When we'd get alongside everything and I mean everything was ready to go. We even got the entire ship painted and non-skid replaced in 3 days. They were fantastic.

Then the entity in Ottawa got involved and they didn't like that the FLS was in Dubai and they forced them out to the newly established Camp Mirage. It appeared to me that our support was more and more delayed as the Op progressed.

My 2 cents

Wish they still had an engineering component in the FLS; for a while there was a Cert 3 which was great, but now just some loggies.

Fine for a lot of stuff, but for things like getting pipes repaired etc means the ship EO is running around on their own trying to figure out the specifications etc. I had time doing DWPs, knew the processes/materials, and knew who the SMEs were, so wasn't a big deal, but for someone without that experience it's a big head scratcher to figure out where to even start. Similarly for vetting fuel standards, fittings and all kinds of other things not having a technical person pushes it all back on SS who are usually very very busy.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Op APOLLO: The Navy had a dedicated team living in Dubai to support the CDN Task Group (AOR, DDH, and FFG). I know there was a Logistic officer and an Engineering Officer and a staff of about 6 or 7. When it was our turn to go into Jabel Ali for our time alongside we'd send a message to them with all the OPDEF's, Repats, and other myriad of crap that needed to be done. When we'd get alongside everything and I mean everything was ready to go. We even got the entire ship painted and non-skid replaced in 3 days. They were fantastic.

Then the entity in Ottawa got involved and they didn't like that the FLS was in Dubai and they forced them out to the newly established Camp Mirage. It appeared to me that our support was more and more delayed as the Op progressed.

My 2 cents

Yup old FLS. Log O, Eng O, Storesman(x2), Tfc Tech, Stoker and MP. Now its usually a Log O, Storesman and Tfc Tech (if we can find one).

They were useless in getting parts, couldn't be bothered to make sure the right part was shipped before hand despite us specifically asking, and sent a fuel hose assembly for the helo to us in pieces twice (it is supposed to be made to order and tested). I hope they were embarassed when we had to update our OPDEF saying that the assebmly was received in pieces twice when it went to NATO, but probably not.

That's so frustrating. @NavyShooter can attest that now all parts are inspected before going out the door. But you're right, we had a bad stretch.

Wish they still had an engineering component in the FLS; for a while there was a Cert 3 which was great, but now just some loggies.

Fine for a lot of stuff, but for things like getting pipes repaired etc means the ship EO is running around on their own trying to figure out the specifications etc. I had time doing DWPs, knew the processes/materials, and knew who the SMEs were, so wasn't a big deal, but for someone without that experience it's a big head scratcher to figure out where to even start. Similarly for vetting fuel standards, fittings and all kinds of other things not having a technical person pushes it all back on SS who are usually very very busy.

IMHO the Cert 3 wasn't needed, and the MARTECHs had a hell of a time filling that position. SS should be able accurately articulate their requirements.

 

[GR66]

Maybe outside eyes are required...

Perhaps we could hire McKinsey to do a study?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Perhaps we could hire McKinsey to do a study?

 

[Grimey]

Op APOLLO: The Navy had a dedicated team living in Dubai to support the CDN Task Group (AOR, DDH, and FFG). I know there was a Logistic officer and an Engineering Officer and a staff of about 6 or 7. When it was our turn to go into Jabel Ali for our time alongside we'd send a message to them with all the OPDEF's, Repats, and other myriad of crap that needed to be done. When we'd get alongside everything and I mean everything was ready to go. We even got the entire ship painted and non-skid replaced in 3 days. They were fantastic.

Then the entity in Ottawa got involved and they didn't like that the FLS was in Dubai and they forced them out to the newly established Camp Mirage. It appeared to me that our support was more and more delayed as the Op progressed.

My 2 cents

The non-skid did flake off in a matter of weeks though

Support back then from the N37 equivalent was excellent as was the FLOG. Both helped make two cruise engine change-outs run as smoothly as possible. It helped that the MWO running it knew most of us senior Mar Eng bods from her prior service on HUR.

Things just seemed to gel back then.

 

[FSTO]

The non-skid did flake off in a matter of weeks though

Support back then from the N37 equivalent was excellent as was the FLOG. Both helped make two cruise engine change-outs run as smoothly as possible. It helped that the MWO running it knew most of us senior Mar Eng bods from her prior service on HUR.

Things just seemed to gel back then.

My memory is getting fuzzy then. I thought the non skid was really good.

 

[Navy_Pete]

My memory is getting fuzzy then. I thought the non skid was really good.

Preparation is key; if you don't spend a lot of time de-salting, prepping the surface (metal profile, feathering at the edges etc etc... lot of NACE terminology) it might look awesome but won't last.

Good example of where you need some expertise for the tech spec, and not something SS normal are aware of (until they've been on a DWP).

Edit to add: one recommendation for the remote mainternace period (RAMP) was that SS be augmented with some SMEs for the required work, that are onsite ahead of time to help ensure things are good to go. So for example, for non-skid your want some kind of coating person (usually hull inspectors, so good for structural repairs too). Could do it as a 4 week tasking to allow a bit of time before/after the RAMP.

It's basically a 2 week SWP, sometimes critical to get to the end of the deployment, so having SS run everything creates risk, and also kneecaps the idea of giving a window for some people to get a break. I think I got 1 full day, 2 half days off and an overnight break or something silly in two weeks, so wasn't even normal weekends over the two week alongside.

 

[Furniture]

Preparation is key; if you don't spend a lot of time de-salting, prepping the surface (metal profile, feathering at the edges etc etc... lot of NACE terminology) it might look awesome but won't last.

Good example of where you need some expertise for the tech spec, and not something SS normal are aware of (until they've been on a DWP).

Edit to add: one recommendation for the remote mainternace period (RAMP) was that SS be augmented with some SMEs for the required work, that are onsite ahead of time to help ensure things are good to go. So for example, for non-skid your want some kind of coating person (usually hull inspectors, so good for structural repairs too). Could do it as a 4 week tasking to allow a bit of time before/after the RAMP.

It's basically a 2 week SWP, sometimes critical to get to the end of the deployment, so having SS run everything creates risk, and also kneecaps the idea of giving a window for some people to get a break. I think I got 1 full day, 2 half days off and an overnight break or something silly in two weeks, so wasn't even normal weekends over the two week alongside.

Flying over support staff might cut into the budget every GOFO and their CPO/CWO use to fly into nice ports for a grip-and-grin, and a "We're all proud of the work you're doing over here" hands fall in.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Flying over support staff might cut into the budget every GOFO and their CPO/CWO use to fly into nice ports for a grip-and-grin, and a "We're all proud of the work you're doing over here" hands fall in.

It would keep them out of trouble though for ignoring "VVIPs" getting drunk and molesting air crew.

 

[Edward Campbell]

There were serious disagreements in 1942-45 between the Battle of the Atlantic's main Canadian Force Employer, RAdm Leonard W Murray who was Commander Newfoundland Escort Force and then Commander in Chief Canadian NorthWest Atlantic - arguably the most important commander in all of Canada's military history - and RAdm/VAdm George C Jones Commander of the RCN's Atlantic Fleet and later Chief of the Naval Staff and the Canadian navy Force Generator.

When Murray sent ships to Halifax for repair or refit Jones striped them of many of their most important officers and petty officers because he needed to put at least a few seasoned sailors on new ships that were constantly entering service. Murray was, understandably, miffed at losing teams that were just getting to work well ... neither man was wrong but the system didn't work as well as it could/should have, in my opinion. Part of the problem was that Murray was not in the Canadian chain of command - he reported, in theory to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington, in practice, although a commander in chief, he dealt, mainly, as a junior partner to Adm Sir Max Horton the CinC Western Approaches. Horton didn't have that problem in Britain - it appeared that the RN force generation system was sufficiently efficient and effective to meet the needs of all British navy force employers without robbing Peter to pay Paul - but Horton also didn't have much influence with Nelles and later Jones in Ottawa and they, both being dimwits somewhat less than really strategically capable, thought that there were things more important than the Battle of the Atlantic. Thus Nelles and Jones were building a Navy that was suitable for important roles but NOT maximized for the only battle that really mattered and the Canadian political leadership - Mackenzie King and Angus L Macdonalald - were, to be charitable, somewhat detached from the real strategic issues at hand.

Anyways, force generation vs force employment has been with us for a long time and it hasn't always worked well.