While not military, I do chk background and ATI reports fairly thoroughly.
I ran this by a LCdr(Ret'd) - no names as this site does not do that - who was speaking on CPAC last wednesday about the Victoria-class subs and he noted
"You make a number of important points very well. I am preparing a piece myself, and was struck by the commonality of our thoughts."
I'd actually submitted the following Opinion Piece on Oct 14 but, not surprisingly, the anti-submarine Media did not pick it up.
I myself had two media outlets calling (CBC Calg and Halifax Herald) looking for info (sensationalist scoop) on 'problems or shortfalls' with the submarines. Although, in deference to the closed-door naval inquiry, two simultaneously open watertight hatches in the conning tower over the control room during extremely heavy sea state - when normally at least one should be closed at all times, at the same time as an open door on a normally waterproof electrical panel, in conjunction with a few inches of highly-conductive saltwater, makes for a major communications oops in situational awareness on the submarine. Just my, and many submarine engineers, opinion.
Excellent Value for the Money
Common misconceptions about Canada's Victoria-class (ex-RN Upholder-class) submarines.
The Canadian public seems to be extremely critical about our navy's acquisition of the four Victoria-class submarines from the Royal Navy which does a disservice to our resolute and steadfast submariners. While some criticisms may be valid in regard to the two nearly simultaneous fires and resultant injuries/death aboard HMCS Chicoutimi (ex-Upholder) - for which the current naval inquiry will reveal a course of rectification, most are misconceptions fed by an ignorant media that tends to blame the military without blaming the true source of the problems. Most military trouble can be attributed to the Liberal government that voters have kept in power since 1993 - who have consistently starved the Canadian Forces (CF) of the funds needed for proper equipment and sufficient personnel while increasingly deploying them. Our defence spending at 1.1% of GDP, the second lowest in NATO, is even worse than it appears as only 42% of the defence budget (a mere 6% of the federal budget) goes directly towards the three services, while some C$1 Billion is pension and employee benefits contributions - funding other NATO nations don't include in their defence estimates.
During Tuesday's (Oct 12) Question Period the Official Leader of the Opposition, Stephen Harper, noted Prime Minister Paul Martin and the Liberals shortchanged the submarine retrofit program by cutting C$54 Million from it during the time Mr. Martin was finance minister. "This was a deliberate budgetary decision he took. Isn't it true that the Prime Minister's decision left the navy without adequate resources to properly train and equip the sailors?"
Recent newspaper articles and television commentary (on Global Sunday), by defence analysts and ex-submariners, have let the public know of some of the truth behind the conjecture. Such as:
1. the massive C$1B operational deficit that the CF labours under - the services simply cannot afford to buy adequate spare parts for our ships; planes and vehicles, let alone the fuel required for deployments, or even adequate light bulbs for base buildings. Surely this contributes to the delays in getting the Victoria-class fully operational, especially considering the $54M hit to the sub retrofit program.
2. Lack of adequate maintenance personnel for the submarines Canadianization process. The reduced numbers of maintenance personnel are a direct result of the Liberals cutbacks of the 90s and the navy's massive commitment to the war on terrorism - most remaining personnel were committed to ensuring the surface warships could continously deploy to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.
3. Minor defects, such as the oft-quoted pizza size dent in one of the hulls - easily happens to any ship if bumped hard enough by a tug, while defects happen to most machines constructed nowadays, take the millions of car/truck recalls constantly occuring - sometime parts are defective and require replacement, adequate funding is the main constraint in ensuring that occurs. Unfortunately, the constraints of #1 and the lack of sufficient maintenance personnel from #2 do not bode well for rapid rectification.
4. The submarines were an excellent deal for our Navy, which acquired four modern submarines, and their associated training infrastructure which has been relocated to Canada, for basically what it would cost to build just one new submarine in Canada. As noted by DND in 1998,
"These submarines are a great purchase for Canada, giving our navy a vital capability at a fraction of what it would otherwise cost", four
"virtually new vessels for about the price of a single new one". The reason the Australians passed on them, prior to their
1987 Collins-class construction contract, was that they required six submarines - restarting construction at VSEL would be prohibitively expensive for an additional two Upholders, without the benefits accruing from local construction. Although their indigenous multi-billion$ Collins-class have had an even more scandalous reputation and operational history (save for the unfortunate Chicoutimi incident) and are still not fully operational years after completing construction.
Unfortunately, some of the basic facts seem to keep getting missed, and the media just doesn't pick up on them in their quest for sensationalist stories and their desire to see the disarmament of the CF. The originally planned twelve ship Type-2400 Upholder-class (reduced to four through 80s defence rationalization) are the conventionally-powered offshoot of the successful nuclear-powered seven-boat Trafalgar-class in service with the Royal Navy. Basically the same systems, including: sub-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Tigerfish and advanced Spearfish torpedos, whilst optimised for long-range patrol of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. The four briefly served as patrol ships for the British until they were mothballed because they were diesel powered, and the ever cost-conscious UK Treasury decreed a focus on a slimmed-down nuclear fleet in 1994. Upholder (launched Dec 1986) commissioned into service in June 1990, followed by: Unseen (launched Nov 1989) commissioned June 1991; Ursula (launched Feb 1991) commissioned May 1992; and Unicorn (launched Apr 1992) commissioned June 1993.
[Note: to save money, our navy degraded their 'warfighting' capabilities by conversion to use existing Mk48Mod4 Torpedoes, with no plans to upgrade them to more capable Mk48ADCAP as used by USN, and no acquisition of Sub-Harpoon.]
Decommissioning occurred fairly rapidly from Apr 1994, including precautionary welding-shut of torpedo-tube doors to prevent water infiltration, with Upholder placed into alongside covered storage at VSEL, joined that year by Unseen (now Victoria) and Ursula (now Cornerbrook), followed by Unicorn (now Windsor) in early-1995, with the extremely-quiet (amongst the top five worldwide) class spending an average of less-than three years in operational service. In June 1995, the navy made its first formal request to Jean Chretien's cabinet to approve the purchase of the four, relatively fresh, used British subs for about C$750M - though a 'low-cost' barter arrangement.
For three years, Ottawa dithered and debated over the deal to scrimp a paltry few million in extra savings [<~C$50M], while the docked subs rusted and their electrical systems began rotting from corrosion due to saltwater exposure, as occurs to any mothballed ship. [Most definitely Not the fault of the Navy as 'I havn't got a clue what I'm asserting now' Copps asserts] When Canada finally took them over, the hulls were understandably corroded with rust - due to lack of regular in-service maintenance, their engines malfunctioned, external valves and signal ejectors were faulty due to cracking or corrosion and like the batteries required replacement, plus their sewage disposal systems didn't work. All pretty much preventable if acquisition had been speedily approved by a government whose first concern should have been to ensure our submariners acquired a modern replacement for the outdated Oberon-class in an expeditious manner.
The largest misconception seems to be, 'Does Canada really needs a submarine fleet of any description?' Defence documents indicate the navy's main argument for acquiring the subs remained constant over the past nine years, with the naval brass arguing submarines are
"an essential part of balanced maritime forces. They are highly effective in fisheries protection, drug interdiction and sovereignty operations off the Canadian coastline in our exclusive economic and fishing zones." Unfortunately, due to political pressure from a government that distances itself from anything percieved to involve actual combat operations, the main reason for their acquisition is regularly omitted. As noted in a late-90s article 'TOP FLIGHT UPHOLDERS' at http://www.saoc-central.com/letter.html [Submariners Assoc Of Canada website], the main reason is 'World wide Submarine Proliferation'. Considering that our Surface ships and/or Auroras regularly deploy to threat areas, as even nations like Iran have modern quiet Kilo-class diesel subs, the Victorias allow them to have some pratice against the type of threat they may encounter in the Middle East or Asia - a once well-honed skillset that has seriously deteriorated due to funding constriants. Plus, don't forget that a submarine is always the best method to detect and, if necessary, kill another submarine. Varying thermal layers of differing temperatures, which submarines are very good at hiding in or behind, do not lend themselves to successful 'sensors on the ocean bed' detection of submarines.
END
Also, Ex-Dragoon was correct - while we 'were the best at ASW' we are not the best anymore.
Before naval types jump all over this comment, it is made from the following observations:
1. Period of approx 5 years gap without operational subs to practice against.
2. ATI reports have noted, especially for the Aurora community - and likely similar for the Sea King community, that due to cut-backs in authorized Flying Hours and the prior multi-year Op Apollo committment - ASW skillsets have degraded as aircraft and flight time have just not been available to focus on this skillset. Any time was focused on force generation and concentration on surface recce.
3. As previously noted, no-few allied subs available to practice against.
Unfortunately, a 'use it or lose it' skillset.
