Mortars: 51 mm, 60 mm, 81 mm, 120 mm & more

[ArmyRick]

Further to add how US Stryker Infantry battalions employ mortars

Each company mortar squad carries 60mm mortars for dismounted use in addition the 120mm mounted. At the Battalion mortar platoon, they have dismountable 81mm in addition to their 120mm mounted. Man, thats alot of space gobbled up in the back.

In the Stryker ISTAR Squadron (Armoured Recce Regt, yank terminology Squadron = Regt), there are only the 120mm mounted mortars, no dismountable mortars.

Each SBCT, has a total of 40 of 120mm Mortars mounted (divided between 4 units), 18 x 60mm mortars and 12 x 81mm mortars. Keeping in mind, SBCT doctrine is meant to be able to fight both mounted and dismounted operations (aim flexibility)

As far as a complex system? The 120mm Mortars are mounted on turntables in the back (Do not confuse the M1129 with the GDLS 120mm turretted mortar that Saudis use).

As for logistics, a 120mm Mortar bomb weighs 30 lbs vs an 81mm weighing 10 Lbs. So yes, there would be a decrease in amount that could be carried. But a 120mm mortar has a more devasting effect on target.

I also agree that we do not let weapons size/caliber dictate wether it should be a Company, battalion or Brigade assett. Personally, if it were up to me, an Arty Regt would have 3 x batteries of 155mm Guns (1 Bty for each BG) and a battery of HIMARS (Big wish list) for big ops that require HUGE destructive fire power (Deliberate attacks such as the fire support premeditated OP MEDUSA '06)

Standing by Mike (our mortar DS?), waiting for my debrief.

Gnyhwy, The Stryker M1129 is what your talking about (mortars in back)

 

[GnyHwy]

The link I posted was talking about the 120mm that the Saudis are using ( an independant firing unit). I was unaware of the M1129, but yes now that I am aware, the M1129 would be my choice my far.

 

[Michael OLeary]

You still have to start by deciding what your primary capability requirement is. If it is to be suppression of infantry in the open, in exposed entrenchments or soft-skinned vehicles, then more rounds at higher rates of fire normally have an advantage over fewer rounds even if larger calibre.

If, on the other hand, you propose the larger calibre because of alternative munition options, then you're changing the argument and not defending a return of the old mortar platoon capability - but a new one altogether.

There will no doubt be roles which the M1129 would be ideally suited to perform, but that system doesn't necessarily answer all the capability issues across the spectrum of possible requirements. Choosing the heavier weapon and sacrificing mobility options is the same road we are arguing in the other thread regarding the CASW.

 

[ArmyRick]

Mike,

IF, big if, I were the King of Canada and everything (as warped as could be) was my way, I would purchase for the infantry the following toys (with capabilities) in this priority

1. Javelin Anti-armour missile system. I realize our current threat in A-stan doesn't use AFV but sooner or later if we keep playing with guns internationally, we are probably going to end up agaisnt a potential armour threat. The Javelin would beat Eryx garbage hands down (600m vs 2500m and fire & forget). I would select Javelin over Spike because our closest allies are using the same (USA, UK, New Zealand and I think Aussies got it too). Capability; Anti-Armour Rick's Pick; Javelin

2. 60mm Mortar. For dismounted troops that need a weapon capable of enemy suppression that can be quickly brought into action and has a reasonable man portability, I would select the M224 60mm Mortar (can operate in sustained fire or hand held role). Again commonailty with our brothers in the south and the UK have started using the Hirtenberger (when you look at it, its the same damn thing). Capability; Man Portable Indirect Fire Support Weapon for suppression. Rick's Pick; M224 Mortar

3. Platoon level sharpshooters. I would love to add in platoon or maybe company level sharpshooters equipped with something along the lines of 7.62mm HK417 Rifle and a damn good scope. Yeah Snipers can do this but its kind of a waste of their talent when they could be taking bigger missions. An example, a platoon commander spots an enemy pers with radio, directing or reporting our movement, he task his sharpshooter to knock him down. Capability; Precision Elimination of Key enemy targets to a range of 800m tasked out to PL/COY level  Rick's Pick; HK417 7.62mm Rifle

4. A Mounted mortar that belongs to the infantry and provides a quick, reaction of suppressive fires agaisnt enemy in open or fortified. Because an M1129 can haul 60 x rounds (not bad), I beleive that would be enough for a scrape or too. I would go for 120mm over 81mm for slight increase in range (+2 KM), more devasting fire power and hopefully future 120mm precision rounds become availible (direct hit/fewer colateral damage). Capability; Vehicle mounted Indirect Fire Support weapon for suppression. Rick's Pick; M1129 Stryker Mortar carrier with M121 120mm mortar.

(Submitting my next plan to DS, waiting outside CP for a debrief, good or bad)

 

[Kirkhill]

Arty is benefiting from technology - fewer gunners can supply more rounds on target to greater effect at greater ranges.  Ultimately that means that the CF needs Batteries and not Brigades of guns. 

However the technology generally benefits the larger calibers which need heavy vehicles which can carry big servomotors and which can compensate for the disadvantage of reduced mobility with increased range.

Given that, that means that the gunners have excess PYs (at least compared to Cold War standards) and are not likely to get more guns for those gunners.

Accordingly, I guess, the gunners were given the 81s to suck up those PYs and because the training was broadly similar.

The question that keeps coming to my mind is why the gunners haven't embraced infantry cooperation to a greater extent and formed infantry support troops of 8 tubes to be issued to infantry battalions together with a large FOO organization - Capt command with FCCS, FISTs for the Coys and MFCs for the platoons (maybe even issue the MFC tms with 60s).

That would maintain gunner badges, concentrate a common training group, maintain gunner career progression, relieve PY pressure on the infantry, improve infantry/arty cooperation, and ensure that the infantry retains the fire support they need at the battle group level, if not the battalion level.

 

[vonGarvin]

The question that keeps coming to my mind is why the gunners haven't embraced infantry cooperation to a greater extent and formed infantry support troops of 8 tubes to be issued to infantry battalions together with a large FOO organization - Capt command with FCCS, FISTs for the Coys and MFCs for the platoons (maybe even issue the MFC tms with 60s).

That would maintain gunner badges, concentrate a common training group, maintain gunner career progression, relieve PY pressure on the infantry, improve infantry/arty cooperation, and ensure that the infantry retains the fire support they need at the battle group level, if not the battalion level.

This is the big one for me too.  It's not so much to have infantry mortars, for me, but to have integral indirect fire support at the battlegroup level.  They could be RMS clerks for all I care, but to have it there as part of the battalion (in garrison) and battlegroup (on deployment) ORBAT, that's all that matters.  Hell, they could have 40mm AGLS if it had the range....

 

[dapaterson]

This is the big one for me too.  It's not so much to have infantry mortars, for me, but to have integral indirect fire support at the battlegroup level. They could be RMS clerks for all I care, but to have it there as part of the battalion (in garrison) and battlegroup (on deployment) ORBAT, that's all that matters.  Hell, they could have 40mm AGLS if it had the range....

"Please complete the CF81-M-47 in triplicate, indicating the type of fire you would like to request.  Be sure to include the NSN for all items.  I'm on leave next week, but I hope to get to your fire mission the following week between PT and the CO's coffee break."

 

[Michael OLeary]

Accordingly, I guess, the gunners were given the 81s to suck up those PYs and because the training was broadly similar.

The question that keeps coming to my mind is why the gunners haven't embraced infantry cooperation to a greater extent and formed infantry support troops of 8 tubes to be issued to infantry battalions together with a large FOO organization - Capt command with FCCS, FISTs for the Coys and MFCs for the platoons (maybe even issue the MFC tms with 60s).

That would maintain gunner badges, concentrate a common training group, maintain gunner career progression, relieve PY pressure on the infantry, improve infantry/arty cooperation, and ensure that the infantry retains the fire support they need at the battle group level, if not the battalion level.

The Gunners didn't get the PYs to go with the mortars.  The PYs went to the VCDS and probably ended up in the dotcoms, soldiers' positions traded off for staff officer/NCO jobs. Mortars and Pioneers went away because two infantry Colonels decided they were an expendable capability to try and protect riflemen positions (failing to realize we could backfill riflemen a lot more easily than replace the lost capabilities when needed - which we didn't accomplish with Sappers and Gunners covering them off despite the theoretical discussions of them doing so).

The Guns got the mortars to be employed as alternate weapon systems, or in lieu of guns for some detachments/batteries with no offset of manpower.

The Guns also simply replaced mortars for guns at the detachment level when they were used, maintaining the same battery organization and fire control training requirements to fire 81mm mortars as they did for howitzers.

The problem with discussing a return of 81 mm mortars to the infantry is that the last of the Advanced Mortar qualified Officers and NCOs will soon be gone. To recreate it, we do not want to bring mortars back with the staffing and organization of the Artillery fire control system with them.  It's a time limited opportunity to restore the medium mortar to the infantry battalions with the infantry officers and NCOs who have the training we would want to recreate.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I hear that parts for the 105C3 are getting harder to find, perhaps towed 120mm mortars for Reserve arty units might be in order, smaller logistical footprint, off the shelf tech and would allow the introduction of this weapon system into the CF so they can experiment with it's deployment, also the reg force arty units can transition from the 81 towards the 120. Can't for the life of me figure why the arty is running the 81mm.

 

[Michael OLeary]

I hear that parts for the 105C3 are getting harder to find, perhaps towed 120mm mortars for Reserve arty units might be in order, smaller logistical footprint, off the shelf tech and would allow the introduction of this weapon system into the CF so they can experiment with it's deployment, also the reg force arty units can transition from the 81 towards the 120. Can't for the life of me figure why the arty is running the 81mm.

The Arty is running the 81mm for two reasons, neither of which have anything to do with reasoned decision-making for field force structures.

A. The infantry had to give up PYs and the Mortar (and Pioneers) were sacrificed.

B. Giving the 81s to the Guns let the Army claim the capability wasn't given up.

 

[dapaterson]

The Gunners didn't get the PYs to go with the mortars.  The PYs went to the VCDS and probably ended up in the dotcoms, soldiers' positions traded off for staff officer/NCO jobs. Mortars and Pioneers went away because two infantry Colonels decided they were an expendable capability to try and protect riflemen positions (failing to realize we could backfill riflemen a lot more easily than replace the lost capabilities when needed - which we didn't accomplish with Sappers and Gunners covering them off despite the theoretical discussions of them doing so).

The divestment of the mortar an pioneer PYs predates the dot COMs significantly.  It was an Army decision (not just by two Infantry Colonels) where those capabilities were sacrificed to protect other Army capabilities.  The VCDS required PYs for investment in a variety of areas (and took them from other organizations as well, not only the Army), and the Army decided to pay the bill that way.

The dot COM positions were created out of the 5000 Reg F expansion.  Whether a force expansion intended to put more boots on the ground should have been used to grow additional HQs of limited utility is another issue - and a question that the former CDS, Gen Hillier, has never adequately answered.

 

[Michael OLeary]

I stand corrected, for the purpose of this thread the main point is that the Mortar/Pioneer PYs didn't get reallocated within the Infantry, or go to the Guns with the 81s.

 

[Kirkhill]

Treading on eggs here....

Given the Afghanistan rotations are Gunners working as many rotations as the Infantry?  The reason I ask is that my previous comment was predicated on the notion that technology means that fewer guns and gunners are needed to supply adequate gunfire support to infantry operations generally and for "constabulary" duties like Afghanistan in particular.  That seems to be borne out by the relatively small number of guns deployed and (I believe) low rates of ammunition expenditure.

Is there a possibility that a higher rate of turnover could be used to generate the PYs for the field force to supply the Infantry Support Troops?

As to the medium calibre guns with their high rates of fire and suppressive abilities, appropriate to higher intensity conflicts - isn't that compatible with maintaining that capability in the reserves with the C1-3s?

 

[dapaterson]

Gunners provide more than just the gun dets; there's fire co-ordination that's required; AD gunners provide some low-level airspace co-ordination as well.

We must also be careful that we do not structure the military to fight today's battle at the expense of its ability to fight future battles.  Saying "Massed guns are so 1917; let's re-role the guns into (insert today's sexy but doctrinally unsound buzzword here)".

And to use ammo expenditure as a measure of utility would be troubling; by that metric, a platoon that creates a safe environment by patrolling and working with the locals would be seen to be less effective than one that managed to get all the locals pissed off and taking potshots at them.

 

[Old Sweat]

Kirkhill

Could you run that one by me again? All I got was the bit about the ammunition expenditure. In the early rotos the ammunition expenditure was quite high, but it has decreased as the situation stabilized. The four guns in TF 3-06 fired something like 8000 rounds, which in terms of bullets per gun per month averaged about a third of 2 RCHA's total usage of 25-pdr in Korea. That is: 2 RCHA @24 guns @12 months fired almost 300,000 rounds or roughly 1000 rounds per gun per month on the average. E Bty (TF 3-06) @4 guns @6 months fired about 8000 rounds or roughy 333 rounds per gun per month on the average.

This figure is comparing apples to watermelons as a 155mm projectile is roughly four times heavier than a 25-pdr bullet. Can you say, "having fun with numbers?"

Dapaterson has noted that gunners do other things, as well as the tasks he mentioned, there are the FOO parties and the locating device detachments, and of course the OMLT.

 

[ArmyRick]

Looking at the PY issue. General Leslie has stated he intends to reduce the HQ bloat in the CF. If thats the case, maybe we can bring back mortar platoons? That would also help with the overbourne infantry trade.

Kirkhill, wow, please don't take offence to this but man, I had to read your post about five times to figure it out (My simple infantry mind kicked in). Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

I apologize - I knew as soon as I posted that question that I was on very thin ice.

No criticism was intended. I was, as Old Sweat pointed out, having fun with numbers.  Poor grounds for a discussion for people for whom the issue is far from a hobby.

My interest in the numbers was whether or not there was another way to solve the problem of mortars in the infantry support role.

I guess, perhaps a better way to have tackled the discussion would have been to ask if the arty currently has enough PYs to meet current tasking levels. Or if arty regiments are up to strength.... or any number of other ways of entering into the discussion.

Again, my apologies.

 

[McG]

100mm Mortar? Poor compromise, it doesn't even exist as far as I know.

There is at least one, but it is not from a country that I think we should be buying arms.  I raise the question of an intermediate size as an alternative to the either-or discussion of 81 mm vs 120 mm.  Conceptually, an intermediate tube size could offer something that was an acceptable balance of the 81 & 120 strenghts or an unacceptable compilation of 81 & 120 weaknesses.

Some armies have the resources and logistic capacity to provide and support 120 mm mortars down to Coy level - We don't.  Some armies resources and logistic capacity to provide and support both 81 mm and 120 mm mortars at different places within their field force - Again, we don't.  Within NATO and ABCA, Canada would not be unique in having to select a single mortar to satisfy its needs.  If a few contries were collectively interested in an intermediate mortar, the development of a few models for technical and operational trials & evaluations would be a relatively low cost/low risk undertaking.  If it does not work, we walk away.  If it does work, we would not be the only ones using it.

Of course, there is always the possibility that we decide all our needs are already satisfied within either the 81 mm or the 120 mm; in which case an intermediate size should not be consuming any effort for consideration.

 

[Petard]

I apologize - I knew as soon as I posted that question that I was on very thin ice.

I guess, perhaps a better way to have tackled the discussion would have been to ask if the arty currently has enough PYs to meet current tasking levels. Or if arty regiments are up to strength.... or any number of other ways of entering into the discussion.

Again, my apologies.

I don't think they are.
The loss of a mortar Pl in ea Bn has forced the Artillery to generate even more observers and FSCC pers than before.
Then Afghansitan happened
The Bty structure itself changed from 2 Troops to 3 Troops to cover the vast AO.  Latent Artillery capabilities, such as UAV's, acoustic and radar weapon locating systems became active over the last 5 years, and also put a drain on man power. The result was that each time a BG deployed, virtually a mini Arty Regt deployed too. As you know, there's only one Arty Regt per Bde
But the numbers were not "up" to begin with. Consequently as much as 25% of each of those mini-Regt's were made up of reservists.

This kind of Arty structure will most likely become permanent, in particular for Reserve units, once an ongoing Arty transformation settles down over the next few years; any staff planning I've seen seems to indicate this anyway

The Artillery should not be the source for any organic indirect fire capability in Bn's anyway, they are after all a Bde resource. Even if its only a mega-Bty that was force generated and deployed with the BG, it will still get employed like a Bde resource.

I agree Infantry units need some kind of fire support that remains within the Bn, that it needs to be able to deliver lethal and non lethal effects, in sustained or precision delivery methods, over complex terrain. But the numbers don't exist within current Artillery units to support that consistently at the Bn level, not as far as I can tell.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks Petard.

You clarified the issues I so clumsily tried to address.