Multi Domain Task Force - Canada

[daftandbarmy]

And the very first sentence has set a negative tone for me.



Perhaps, I'm reading to much into "integrate." IMHO, that's going back to Afghanistan-style brigade headquarters rather than the light, agile and austere things that brigade headquarters, like brigades, should be.

IMHO, Many, if not all, 6 CCSB resources should reside with the Latvian eFP "multi-national div" HQ, whatever it may be but with strong Canadian control over them.

Combined Operations Brigade HQs can be pretty compact...

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[Fabius]

IMHO, Many, if not all, 6 CCSB resources should reside with the Latvian eFP "multi-national div" HQ, whatever it may be but with strong Canadian control over them.

I think this ties into the other thread talking about the Wavell Room article on the UK reserves.
Canada’s Army is primarily an army focused on the Bde as its maximum expression of mass. The elements of the Canadian Army that are or should be considered theatre, corps, division forces are seemingly of minimal relevance unless they are integrated into the Bdes.

The 6 CCSB elements could have been employed in mass as a 6 CCSB operating under a Division HQ, providing direct support and general support to the Bde, in line with Div priorities. However the Canadian Army focus is not the Div but rather the Bde.
So like moths to a light everything gets drawn into the Bde.

 

[FJAG]

I think this ties into the other thread talking about the Wavell Room article on the UK reserves.
Canada’s Army is primarily an army focused on the Bde as its maximum expression of mass. The elements of the Canadian Army that are or should be considered theatre, corps, division forces are seemingly of minimal relevance unless they are integrated into the Bdes.

The 6 CCSB elements could have been employed in mass as a 6 CCSB operating under a Division HQ, providing direct support and general support to the Bde, in line with Div priorities. However the Canadian Army focus is not the Div but rather the Bde.
So like moths to a light everything gets drawn into the Bde.

True enough. But the Canadian led multinational brigade is a subordinate formation of the NATO Multinational Division North run by the Danes, Estonians and Latvians as the framework nations. The division reached FOC Jul of 2023 and has Canadians embedded amongst its staff.

 

[McG]

Canadian doctrine went with “pan-domain” where US Army used “multi-domain” so go look up what’s written on pan-domain to find how Canadians doctrine & concept writers expect the idea will scale to us.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think this ties into the other thread talking about the Wavell Room article on the UK reserves.
Canada’s Army is primarily an army focused on the Bde as its maximum expression of mass. The elements of the Canadian Army that are or should be considered theatre, corps, division forces are seemingly of minimal relevance unless they are integrated into the Bdes.

The 6 CCSB elements could have been employed in mass as a 6 CCSB operating under a Division HQ, providing direct support and general support to the Bde, in line with Div priorities. However the Canadian Army focus is not the Div but rather the Bde.
So like moths to a light everything gets drawn into the Bde.

Its been a couple of years since I was in 6 CCSB HQ. The brigade's units were indeed intended as a house for enablers of a high-readiness CMBG, with some exceptions. The brigade was always going through all three cycles of the MRP, preparing and detaching out elements for the high readiness CMBG along with some other deployed operations (IMPACT etc). 4 Regt (GS) had the Div FSCC task, which would support 1st Cdn Div HICON on the UR series. 4 Regt (GS) itself had a number of enablers (medium range radars, Blackjack UAS, ASCC) that could be parsed out to a deploying CMBG or Canadian Task Force, but they were not established to be a Divisional fires unit. 4 ESR was a mix of theatre-opening assets and some very tactical elements. The CA Int Regt had all the ASICs for the CA and focused on the FG for Op IMPACT while also supporting CMBGs for UR and MR. 21 EW Regt had a cycle of EW Sqns/Tps. IATF was quite small.

The Combat Support Group (CSG) experiment was an effort to lash together the various sensing assets that 6 CCSB force-generated into a unit and provide an integrating CC for the supported CMBG. Some of the results of that experiment can be seen in the sub-units being generated for eFP.

We are an army focused on the Brigade. Which makes sense given our size and commitments. If it is decided by policy-makers that we must field a division then there must be considerable growth and equipment acquisition. It would not just be reorganizing what we have and we would still need school-houses and the institutional army.

Maybe I am just a prisoner of my experience and lack vision, but I think that we should focus on being good at the very important task that we actually have before getting too far down the road on a task that we do not have. Its one thing to fake it until you make it on a CPX with notional Divisional enablers, but its another to do it for real. We briefed what it would take to field a Division and the sticker shock was evident. Having said that, our experiences at formation-level and some of our existing units and enablers would stand us in good stead should that shift to Division occur.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Maybe I am just a prisoner of my experience and lack vision, but I think that we should focus on being good at the very important task that we actually have before getting too far down the road on a task that we do not have. Its one thing to fake it until you make it on a CPX with notional Divisional enablers, but its another to do it for real. We briefed what it would take to field a Division and the sticker shock was evident. Having said that, our experiences at formation-level and some of our existing units and enablers would stand us in good stead should that shift to Division occur.

I agree!

But what, pray tell, might that task be?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I agree!

But what, pray tell, might that task be?

Leading the Multi-National eFP Latvia Brigade. SSE also talks about operating at CMBG level.

 

[FJAG]

Maybe I am just a prisoner of my experience and lack vision, but I think that we should focus on being good at the very important task that we actually have before getting too far down the road on a task that we do not have.

I don't think that you lack vision (you're decision to fly that last operational Sperwer rather than hold it in reserve told me that) but I think there is an attitude that has pervaded the Canadian RegF for decades now to focus on today's missions and leave aside the possibility of the nation's involvement in a bigger conflict. Canada is fortunate to have the ability to pick and choose its expeditionary missions and when it does decide to go, to fix the size of its commitment. That's a big factor.

I don't think that becoming good at the task at hand is mutually exclusive of preparing for and having a plan to be something bigger. IMHO, being the force of last resort for the government makes preparing for a bigger conflict part of the job description. I've quoted many times General Baril's comments in 2005 about the CF lacking, but needing, a plan to grow into a great host. And yes - it's a question of resource allocation: human and equipment and other infrastructure. The ongoing resource situation for three decades now is very much akin to the alligator and swamp allegory. But there comes a time where you need to refocus on draining the swamp or else be prepared to perpetually live with being up to your ass in alligators.

Its one thing to fake it until you make it on a CPX with notional Divisional enablers, but its another to do it for real. We briefed what it would take to field a Division and the sticker shock was evident.

Believe me, we had the same debates about Corps 86 - the reality vs the training aide. One problem is that Canadians are by nature risk averse and can therefore always find reasons as to why X can't be done rather than finding options to make it possible. That's strange because doing estimates and choosing course open is part of officer training throughout our careers. Looking at the COAs for Force 2025 left me with the impression that the army, as an institution, hasn't the heart to pursue it vigorously. Perhaps its own bureaucracy is just too hard to overcome.

I've always said, forming a real deployable division is like eating an elephant - you do it one bite at a time. Start by identifying those things that are necessary every day of the year and those only needed in an emergency and then organize your RegF and ResF and equipment acquisition and training plans accordingly. But form a goal - something to aspire to; don't just continue to coast in a system that has many demonstrable capability gaps. It can start as simply as the next time trucks are needed, don't buy 1,300 Navistar MSVS MILCOTS for the ResF but buy 600 more MSVS SMP variants to equip the ResF Svc Bns needed for the division's support brigades.

Having said that, our experiences at formation-level and some of our existing units and enablers would stand us in good stead should that shift to Division occur.

I only partially agree with that. Yes we do have good people who have the training and experience to help the transition, but at the same time we continuously throw classifications and trades under the bus when austerity measures has the leadership focus on "preserving the core." Gunners have struggled reviving STA and are now on the third revival of AD. I was there for the first - it wasn't pretty. STA regrew out of a few AIGs who attended UK courses and a bunch of guys who played with model airplanes when Afghanistan grew into something serious. Doctrine development should not rely on serendipity. And I don't even know where to begin about logistics. Canada has been paying lip service to Napoleon's quote on logistics for years.

 

[Fabius]

In terms of the competition, crisis, conflict continuum;
Competition- Leading the Multi National Brigade and the Multi National BG as framework nation.
Crisis- SSE Operate at Bde Level.
Conflict - How does the CA do this? That’s the question all NATO armies are staring at.

In fairness it’s a question that Canada’s army has not had to think about in a very long time. However if we don’t think about it I suspect our allies are going to get annoyed.

 

[Fabius]

I think there is an attitude that has pervaded the Canadian RegF for decades now to focus on today's missions and leave aside the possibility of the nation's involvement in a bigger conflict.

Looking at the COAs for Force 2025 left me with the impression that the army, as an institution, hasn't the heart to pursue it vigorously. Perhaps its own bureaucracy is just too hard to overcome.

I agree with both these statements. I firmly believe that there is a cultural malaise in the CA that exists despite the very smart and talented people that make up the institution.

The CA seems to have lost its ability to execute change management on any meaningful scale.

 

[Fabius]

Canadian doctrine went with “pan-domain” where US Army used “multi-domain” so go look up what’s written on pan-domain to find how Canadians doctrine & concept writers expect the idea will scale to us.

The Pan Domain Force Employment Conept document is very generic. Honestly if the CAF is going to do Pan Domain operations that document offers in my view a limited understanding of what that means.

The Canadian Army needs a subordinate document that lays out what Pan Domain means for the Army.

Note the US Army has issued FM3.0 Multi Domain Operations. It also has this document that predates FM 3.0.

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028

The US documents offer a clearer picture in terms of missions, tasks and expectations of their formations than our doctrine does in my opinion.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I agree with both these statements. I firmly believe that there is a cultural malaise in the CA that exists despite the very smart and talented people that make up the institution.

The CA seems to have lost its ability to execute change management on any meaningful scale.

To be fair, which is unlike me, I'm pretty sure the CAF has been trying to do what it's been told by the political masters of the day.

TBH, given the constraints, it's amazing they can do what they they are doing with what they've got ...

 

[FJAG]

To be fair, which is unlike me, I'm pretty sure the CAF has been trying to do what it's been told by the political masters of the day.

TBH, given the constraints, it's amazing they can do what they they are doing with what they've got ...

To be fair, which I try to be, I'm pretty sure that there haven't been any GOFOs resigning in protest over what the CAF's political masters have been doing to the CAF for many, many years now.

Yes, there's the odd retired one who speaks up but it's a pretty small crowd who do.

 

[daftandbarmy]

To be fair, which I try to be, I'm pretty sure that there haven't been any GOFOs resigning in protest over what the CAF's political masters have been doing to the CAF for many, many years now.

Yes, there's the odd retired one who speaks up but it's a pretty small crowd who do.

Waylon J. Smithers enters the chat

 

[Kirkhill]

I tend to agree with you on linking it to geography and a theatre vs a Corps.


I don’t really see an MDTF contributing any better or worse than any other army formation in competition or crisis or conflict aside from its different capabilities.

I think a Cdn Army MDTF A2/AD concept fits better into countering probable threat scenarios for both the West Coast and the Arctic than current Army concepts largely focused in the case of the Arctic on a light infantry Bn.

The MDTF concept also integrates better into the joint force concepts for the Indo-Pacific than a CMBG. Further the A2/AD concept is useful for assuring our access into Latvia and preventing Russia from interfering with the inflow of additional CMBG forces.

It would force the Canadian Army to think about how to contribute and fight in a joint force vs simply contribute and fight as a tactical ground formation.

The Army has an institutional bias towards shooters over supporters, at least until the ammo runs out or the guns break down.

....

The US envisages deploying the Multi-Domain Task Force ahead of the "Conventional" Forces. It is to be deployed to manage Competition, Conflict and Crisis, or the full spectrum of conflict or Krulak's three block war.

It's playbook includes soft-kill capabilities as well as hard-kill capabilities. That means that it can counter low level incursions, hybrid incursions and, with the Long Range Precision Fires, as well as the Air Defence capabilities, the ability to counter, at range, with lethal force, the occasional, small scale surprise incursion from air, sea or land.

Those capabilities allow the MDTF to act as a screening force that maintains contact with the enemy's probing attempts and to manage the follow on forces that might be called for.....IMO.

To me that means that a Canadian national MDTF, manned by the Army 24/7, in conjunction with the Maritime Component Commanders and the Joint Force Air Component Commander, under CJOC, would be positioned to materially assist with the day to day defence of Canada and would be equipped with a powerful back stop capability, in the form of the missile forces. I am regularly told that there is no need for such a capability because the RCAF has it handled under NORAD. But, following that philosophy, 4 CMBG would have been able to rely on the RCAF and had little need for the RRCA. I lean more towards a belt and braces solution to ensure an all-weather, all-aspect capability. And I believe that is what the MDTF leans into generally in any event. It becomes a key element in an Integrated Air Missile Defence.

I believe that it also parallels the resurrection of interest in the air space by all armies, but especially NATO ones.

....

Successive Chiefs of Defence Staff, often infanteers themselves, have promoted the notion of the infantry-centric Canadian Army.

As a member of the military, Infantry Soldiers are the Army’s primary combat fighters and are responsible for closing with and engaging the enemy.

Infanteer | Canadian Armed Forces

Infantry soldiers are the Canadian Army’s primary combat fighters and are responsible for engaging the enemy.

forces.ca

The tendency is to think of the infanteer as the ultimate response to any situation.

I'm inclined to think of the infanteer as the last resort. If the situation has degraded to the extent that close combat is required it seems to me that a whole lot has gone wrong. The enemy has got past diplomats and politicians, sensors of all sorts, navies and air forces, missiles and bombs and guns, and even tanks. And even Special Forces.

The infantry represents the people of Canada. It is the human resources of the nation converted to a wartime capability. If the government is having to choose between putting its people into the firing line or maintaining the tax-producing economy on which those people rely, the situation in which the Ukrainians and the Russians find themselves, then things have indeed gone pear-shaped.

To me it makes more sense to build our National Defence outwards from the support and plan to send bullets before bodies. And, to paraphrase, I believe, Jackie Fisher, see the infantry as a missile to be launched. Ideally the last missile.


...

Now, 6 to 12 Battalions with 2 or 3 companies each (including RCAC Regiments) is actually not a heavy commitment for a nation the size of Canada. Those 12 to 36 sub units would arguably be equivalent to the Special Forces of many nations.