Multi Domain Task Force - Canada

[McG]

A DM (and the Chief of the Defence Staff) is L0. An ADM (or in the CAF, a commander of a command) is L1. A DG (or a formation commander) is L2. A Director (or unit commander) is L3.

Most directors are Col/Capt(N) and outside of NDHQ most L3 are lesser formations commanded by Col/Capt(N). A unit is usually an L4. However, distance from top is what matters. PSTC would be a L3 despite being a unit because it reports directly to an L2 (CADTC).

 

[FJAG]

I think it is important to understand what 6 CCSB is, what an MDTF is and what JTFN is.

Understanding capabilities and roles is highly important in this developing fields. I think to a small extent the terminology becomes muddled when it crosses boundaries from one nations usage to another.

MDTFs are a case in point. Their primary role was to create an army presence that operated as a theatre presence with the aim of defeating hostile anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks in all domains thus enabling joint forces to execute their operational plans. My reading of that is that, because of its A2/AD thrust, it is more an offensive tool than a defensive one. I'm not saying an MDTF can't function defensively but that, in principle, that's not its role.

The army does have an older joint operations concept in the JIMP-enabled brigade. JIMP (or Joint, Interagency, Multi-national, and Public) is really a concept whereby brigade headquarters were designed and trained to operate in an environment where there were significant roles and contributions for joint forces assets, other government agencies in a multi-national context - think Afghanistan and counterinsurgency operations. That's not really what's needed here either.

@TangoTwoBravo has already explained both JTFN and 6 CCSB above. Let's throw CJOC into the mix as well as the primary, over arching force employer.

I think what we are missing is a significant army operational formation that could and should be available to force generate the necessary operational elements that actually deploy to support JTFN (and CJOC) to conduct the tactical level operations in the north. For lack of a better term, I call it an Multiple Domain Brigade (MDBde). In structure, I see it very similar to an MDTF, but with it's role more aligned to the defence of the north - in effect, rather than being an A2/AD defeating agency, its role is more in the nature of actually being an A2/AD operational force for the north.

The questions that I have left are:

1) should there be a second MDBde more offensively focused as a force to deploy to Europe? Or would it be logical to have one MDBde responsible for force generating two MDRegts: one specifically targeted for defensive operations in the north and one more generally targeted for operations in support of expeditionary operations (particulalry Europe)? (I tend to lean to the two regiments concept)

2) how much of the MDBde/MDRegt should be permanent organic elements - MI, sigs, EW, Svc Bn etc? or how much should be task assigned from other formations - HIMARS, air defence etc?

3) how much of the MDBde/MDRegt should be permanently stationed in the north and how much fly-up augmentation?

4) how much of its staffing should be permanent RCAF and RCN so as to be a true operational-level, joint agency and so as to take most of the local joint operational level command and coordination off of JTFN and CJOC?

Just some thoughts running around my head.

 

[Kirkhill]

Understanding capabilities and roles is highly important in this developing fields. I think to a small extent the terminology becomes muddled when it crosses boundaries from one nations usage to another.

MDTFs are a case in point. Their primary role was to create an army presence that operated as a theatre presence with the aim of defeating hostile anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks in all domains thus enabling joint forces to execute their operational plans. My reading of that is that, because of its A2/AD thrust, it is more an offensive tool than a defensive one. I'm not saying an MDTF can't function defensively but that, in principle, that's not its role.

The army does have an older joint operations concept in the JIMP-enabled brigade. JIMP (or Joint, Interagency, Multi-national, and Public) is really a concept whereby brigade headquarters were designed and trained to operate in an environment where there were significant roles and contributions for joint forces assets, other government agencies in a multi-national context - think Afghanistan and counterinsurgency operations. That's not really what's needed here either.

@TangoTwoBravo has already explained both JTFN and 6 CCSB above. Let's throw CJOC into the mix as well as the primary, over arching force employer.

I think what we are missing is a significant army operational formation that could and should be available to force generate the necessary operational elements that actually deploy to support JTFN (and CJOC) to conduct the tactical level operations in the north. For lack of a better term, I call it an Multiple Domain Brigade (MDBde). In structure, I see it very similar to an MDTF, but with it's role more aligned to the defence of the north - in effect, rather than being an A2/AD defeating agency, its role is more in the nature of actually being an A2/AD operational force for the north.

The questions that I have left are:

1) should there be a second MDBde more offensively focused as a force to deploy to Europe? Or would it be logical to have one MDBde responsible for force generating two MDRegts: one specifically targeted for defensive operations in the north and one more generally targeted for operations in support of expeditionary operations (particulalry Europe)? (I tend to lean to the two regiments concept)

2) how much of the MDBde/MDRegt should be permanent organic elements - MI, sigs, EW, Svc Bn etc? or how much should be task assigned from other formations - HIMARS, air defence etc?

3) how much of the MDBde/MDRegt should be permanently stationed in the north and how much fly-up augmentation?

4) how much of its staffing should be permanent RCAF and RCN so as to be a true operational-level, joint agency and so as to take most of the local joint operational level command and coordination off of JTFN and CJOC?

Just some thoughts running around my head.

One other thought -

Further to your point 4 - Should it be an RCAF led capability focused on JTF-N?

6 CCSB Assets 6 Canadian Combat Support Brigade - Canada.ca

Intelligence
Influence Activities
Electronic Warfare
GBAD
Engineering Support

MDTF Assets - Multi-Domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2035

Intelligence, Sigs, Long Range Sensors and Effects, Info Defense
Air Defence (local?)
Long Range Counter Battery - HIMARS/AMDL (<50 to >500 km), Typhon/Mk70 PDS (<500 to >1500 km), Hypersonics (>2500 km)
Brigade Support Battalion - Service, Security and Engineering support

I note that every GBAD scheme that I have seen recently includes a Counter Battery element to take out the threat at point of origin.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think we could look at the 6 CCSB as being something along the lines of the "protection brigades" in the US structure. Its not an exact fit, but its somewhat close in terms of role and structure. Is that where we would put long-range fires (HIMARs etc)? Not sure. GBAD for certain.

 

[FJAG]

I think we could look at the 6 CCSB as being something along the lines of the "protection brigades" in the US structure. Its not an exact fit, but its somewhat close in terms of role and structure. Is that where we would put long-range fires (HIMARs etc)? Not sure. GBAD for certain.

HIMARS (and its ilk) would generally fit best in the category of a general support regiment/battalion in a divisional or corps artillery brigade.

The US places an air defence battalion in its divisional protection brigades but has additional battalions assigned to a given theatre usually under the command of an air defence brigade. On the other hand, the UK has put their AD regiments in an air defence group assigned to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Quite frankly, I see the Polish structure as a good doctrinal model (somewhat Soviet-based) albeit it needs some equipment upgrading. Each armoured and mech brigade has its own AD battalion which includes light guns (23mm) and VSHORAD missiles (structures and systems vary slightly). In addition the division has an air defence regiment with up to four AD battalions with very low to medium level missile systems.

Canada's experiences varied. In the 70s and 80s we were limited to Blowpipe missiles which were deployed as a battery in the CS regiments. The later 80s and 90s saw the deployment of 4 AD regiment supporting 4 CMBG with Javelins and ADATS. More ADATS and Javelins and 35mm guns existed around our CFE airfields and in five reserve Javelin AD batteries. These died as a result of the decade of darkness while 4 AD held on for another decade.

Our current thinking is influenced by our building block model of task force construction; the need to rebuild and maintain an air defence officer classification and NCM trade structure that is sustainable at the small scale of equipment coming on line; the absence of a true deployable divisional formation; and the changing characteristic of the current and predicted air threat. These are severe limiting factors.

I don't consider 6 CCSB as the optimum place for an air defence regiment, but it is probably the most practical solution considering the current and foreseeable restraints on the army's air defence capability. IMHO, the state of the army's tactical and the nation's strategic air defence, or more properly the lack of it, is the biggest capability gap the CAF is facing. I'm not an AD gunner, and I don't want to be a dick about it, but Canada would have been far better off in 2011-12 to give up one or two of its 9 full-time infantry battalions than its only remaining AD regiment.

 

[KevinB]

The CA’s biggest problem is not having actual combat/operational Divisions anymore.

Stuff that would be Corps or Div assets just seems to get put places without a great deal of thought. Or perhaps more correctly with a great deal of thought, but not necessarily to the actual employment of said assets.


GBAD isn’t one singular item.
It needs to be viewed as layers of an Onion, and distributed and supported along those layers.

Theatre:
Army:
Corps:
Div:
Bde:
Unit:

All have integral AD requirements and linked relationships, but with very different system requirements, and it makes no sense to attempt to lump Theatre level support assets in with VSHORAD guns and missiles.

The digital battlefield, with automation of sensor/analysis capabilities allows much greater refinement of air defense states - so certain portions of a Bde can be placed in a different state as required. But that requires specific personnel, equipment and training.

 

[Kirkhill]

A System of Systems Analysis is Needed for Maritime Strike | Center for International Maritime Security

cimsec.org

This article references explicitly the needs of Maritime Strike given the preponderance of Over-The-Horizon / Beyond-Visual-Range munitions on the developing battlespace. I included it under artillery and the multi-domain discussion because it seems to me to apply equally to the terrestrial and aerial domains.

The article discusses the following munitions:

MST - Maritime Strike Tomahawk (1000 nm @ 450 knots) - Time to target 2 hours 13 minutes
LRASM - Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (200 nm @ 450 knots) - Time to target 27 minutes
NSM - Naval Strike Missile (115 nm @ 450 knots) - Time to target 15 minutes
PrSM - Precision Strike Missile (350 nm @ 3334 knots) - Time to target 6 minutes
SM-6 - Standard Missile 6 (130 nm @ 2334 knots) - Time to target 3 minutes

The argument is the need for better long range targeting info and the requirement to get Space Force data integrated into the kill loops in a timely manner.

I think the PrSM and SM-6 information could be revised a bit.

Starting with the PrSM. This can be launched from the MFOM pods on vehicles like the M270, HIMARS, AML (CAML-M) and Chunmoo

Increment 1 is in service with the Australians since July 2025 - The "Treaty" Range is 500 km which is a bit less than the 350 nm cited above (648 km) - it is designed fo use against static surface targets

Increment 2 is the Land Based Anti-Ship Missile that is in development - the current range is the same as increment 1 but is projected to increase to at least 1000 km, or twice the nominal range of increment 1 and it is expected to be faster - the seeker will engage moving targets.

Increment 3 will add new warheads to the basic missile - anti-structure unitary warheads and smart sub-munitions (drones)

Increment 4 aims to increase the range beyond 1000 km

Increment 5 aims to incorporate the PrSM missiles on to the AML (Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher) / CAML-M (Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher - Medium) - a 6x6 truck similar to the HIMARS.

The PrSM presents some interesting challenges for the RRCA/RCN/RCAF. The same weapon system (the HIMARS truck) will be able to launch against tactical targets at 15 km range and strategic targets at ranges approaching 1500 km. That puts them in competition with the Tomahawk systems.

....

SM-6 aka Standard Missile 6 aka RIM-174 Standard Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM). Recently joined by the AIM-174B - same missile but with the booster removed for launch by F-18s.

The SM-6, currently in widespread service is to joint the Tomahawk in the Typhon Mk70 PDS as a stable mate. That would mean that the SM-6 and the Tomahawk can be launched from aircraft, trucks and other terrestrial platforms, ships and submarines. The Tomahawk will give the system a range of 1500 km.

The SM-6 range cited of 130 nm (240 km) is the published Surface to Air range. When employed in the Surface to Surface role then the range is believed to be in excess of 500 km, possibly considerably so. The Air to Surface (Ground) range, launched from an F18 at altitude and lofted, is unpublished to suspected of being multiple hundreds of nautical miles.

....

The NSM/JSM is launchable from the same platforms as the SM-6 and Tomahawk.

....

The LRASM is validated for the B1 Lancer and the F15E Strike Eagle.
It is being integrated or considered for the F15EX, F/A18E-F, F35, P8, Mk41VLS/Mk70PDS, and HIMARS/AML.

....

All of this suggests to me that the technology is avaialable to overcome the geography of Canada. A relatively small number of missiles, centrally located at 2 or 3 bases (1 to 5 possibly) could supply the government a timely response against a variety of possible but unlikely targets. The issue would be how quickly could they respond for a request for support from a lightly armed observer.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Huh?

Adapting to a changing world: The Pan-Domain Command and Control Concept (PDC2) - Canada.ca

CAF must modernize to address strat competition, disruptors, collaboration and technological advancements. Key aspects include pan-domain situational awareness and linking sensors to effectors to sense-make sense-decide-act.

www.canada.ca