• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Navy Strategic Plan 2017-2022

gwp

Full Member
Reaction score
2
Points
180
http://navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/assets/NAVY_Internet/docs/en/analysis/rcn_strategicplan_2017-2022_en-s.pdf

The RCN Strategic Plan 2017-2022 represents a continued  focus  to  evolve  as  the  RCN  moves  forward  in its second century of existence. Change is critical to the  future  success  of  any  organization – stagnancy or traditionalism has simply never been the bulwark of the RCN.
 
An interesting read. 

We'll see how it all pans out over the next few years.

 
gwp said:
http://navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/assets/NAVY_Internet/docs/en/analysis/rcn_strategicplan_2017-2022_en-s.pdf

The RCN Strategic Plan 2017-2022 represents a continued  focus  to  evolve  as  the  RCN  moves  forward  in its second century of existence. Change is critical to the  future  success  of  any  organization – stagnancy or traditionalism has simply never been the bulwark of the RCN.

Well it's nice to see there is a plan, and the direction to the various subcommands is pretty clear.  It's always important to understand the commander's intent, something I find the navy is not as good at as the army.  Also the strategic direction regarding platforms and their usage is good to see.  Forward deployment of submarines is something new (I'm not familiar with O-boat deployments so maybe old is new again?). 

The four warship task group is reiterated from Leadmark 2050 and Strong, Secure, Engaged. 

The addition of a submarine also bodes well for future submarine replacement.  The fact that Strong, Secure, Engaged allowed for a submarine "upgrade" means that the Liberals are onside with the importance of subs.  This hopefully means a retention of the submarine skillset no matter the government.
 
Interesting publication.

I am particularly interested in the BLog/FMF functions and possible amalgamation, and the logistical functions that it seems to give passing notice about; basically pages 23-25. 

 
Underway said:
Well it's nice to see there is a plan, and the direction to the various subcommands is pretty clear.  It's always important to understand the commander's intent, something I find the navy is not as good at as the army.  Also the strategic direction regarding platforms and their usage is good to see.  Forward deployment of submarines is something new (I'm not familiar with O-boat deployments so maybe old is new again?). 

The four warship task group is reiterated from Leadmark 2050 and Strong, Secure, Engaged. 

The addition of a submarine also bodes well for future submarine replacement.  The fact that Strong, Secure, Engaged allowed for a submarine "upgrade" means that the Liberals cabinet are onside with the importance of subs.  This hopefully means a retention of the submarine skillset no matter the government.

The two highlighted parts are our greatest failure as a nation when it comes to our defence needs. Our procurement cycle in no way matches the election cycle and therefore each party seems to have wildly different visions of defence. Let me correct that, the conservatives and NDP have fairly consistent defence policies. Its the Liberals who seem to swing the pendulum the most. Can you imagine JT committing ground forces to A-Stan like Chretien and Martin did?
The political parties must get together and agree upon a solid analysis of the threats to Canada, how we meet these threats, how many people we need, how will they be equipped and the process to maintain, upgrade and renew that equipment. And this agreement needs to survive the election cycle so that there is no more finger pointing every 4 to 5 years.

To me the SSE is a LIBERAL policy statement not a Dominion of Canada statement (yes call me old fashioned) and it has a couple of holes in that are large enough for the current government to wiggle its way out of living up to their statement.

Another view
http://www.cgai.ca/evaluating_canada_as_a_dependable_ally_and_partner_for_the_united_states
 
Halifax Tar said:
Interesting publication.

I am particularly interested in the BLog/FMF functions and possible amalgamation, and the logistical functions that it seems to give passing notice about; basically pages 23-25.


I zeroed in on that part too.  Based on my current position, can you blame me?


I had some discussion on this today with my boss, and his boss (SDO). 


Some initiatives that I've been aware/involved with make some more sense now.



 
NavyShooter said:
I zeroed in on that part too.  Based on my current position, can you blame me?


I had some discussion on this today with my boss, and his boss (SDO). 


Some initiatives that I've been aware/involved with make some more sense now.

I think an almagamation of the BLog Supply functions and FMF could make sense.  But there will be some big empires in the CAF and PS that will take some overcoming.

It gives me the warm and fuzzies to see the RCN acknowledge logistics and our linch pin role.  Now will action follow words.
 
Halifax Tar said:
I think an almagamation of the BLog Supply functions and FMF could make sense.  But there will be some big empires in the CAF and PS that will take some overcoming.

It gives me the warm and fuzzies to see the RCN acknowledge logistics and our linch pin role.  Now will action follow words.

Well in the big scheme of things, that's the Navy's job. Make the sealanes safe for logistics to do their magic!
 
FSTO said:
Well in the big scheme of things, that's the Navy's job. Make the sealanes safe for logistics to do their magic!

And not many people realize that truth.  Good on you FSTO.
 
FSTO said:
Well in the big scheme of things, that's the Navy's job. Make the sealanes safe for logistics to do their magic!

Well, there is a bit of cold war thinking.  Make the sealanes safe from who?  What purpose do these sealanes serve?  And why are they required? 
 
stoker dave said:
Make the sealanes safe from who?   

Safe from anyone who would want to somehow block them or infringe on the freedom of navigation, or use them for nefarious purposes. Currently, the largest such threat is (yes in 2017-18) piracy, which is why Canada is involved in anti-piracy ops; China, which is building illegal islands and makes wild claims to "ownership" of large tracts of open sea; and, drug trafficking on the high seas. There is also a renewed potential threat from Russian deployment of attack submarines in the Atlantic.

stoker dave said:
What purpose do these sealanes serve? 

The purpose of those sea lanes is access to the ocean's resources and transportation of the world's trade.

stoker dave said:
And why are they required?

They are required because, no matter how much airmen get excited every time they have a slightly bigger airplane, it remains that your average cargo ship carries enough cargo in a single trip to require in excess of 500  round trips by Boeing 747 cargo planes to carry the same amount. Replacing all sea cargo by planes is simply, mathematically impossible. Even today 90% of the world's international trade is carried on ships, not airplanes or land vehicles. For us in Canada, our international trade accounts for 30% of our GDP, and even though our main trading partner is the USA, 40% of our international trade is carried on ships. Just as a simple illustration: There is more cargo transiting through Montreal harbour on containers every year than the totality of Canada's cargo shipped to Europe in the course of the six years of the whole second world war.
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
There is also a renewed potential threat from Russian deployment of attack submarines in the Atlantic.

Just going to add a bit of additional info on this as a 'maritime air' type.  The new red fleet boats (true blue water ones) aren't 'just attack' boats, the traditional SSN like Alphas or Akulas.

The Yasen class is more of a multipurpose boat;  I can't comment how accurate the info provided open source like here in Wikipedia Yasen class info compared to classified sources, but suffice to say the Yasen class can do more than sub-surface attack.  They are supposed to replace the Oscar IIs eventually and anyone who is interested in maritime warfare knows what the Oscar was built to do...and Oscar IIs are still wet hulls today.  If an Oscar can (theoretically) engage a carrier battle group from fairly good standoff...a merc convoy, etc would be a turkey shoot. 

I think NATO, as a whole, needs to consider our TASW ability as it stands today and consider if that level should be stepped up again, despite the "Cold War" being over.


 
Eye In The Sky said:
Just going to add a bit of additional info on this as a 'maritime air' type.  The new red fleet boats (true blue water ones) aren't 'just attack' boats, the traditional SSN like Alphas or Akulas.

The Yasen class is more of a multipurpose boat;  I can't comment how accurate the info provided open source like here in Wikipedia Yasen class info compared to classified sources, but suffice to say the Yasen class can do more than sub-surface attack.  They are supposed to replace the Oscar IIs eventually and anyone who is interested in maritime warfare knows what the Oscar was built to do...and Oscar IIs are still wet hulls today.  If an Oscar can (theoretically) engage a carrier battle group from fairly good standoff...a merc convoy, etc would be a turkey shoot. 

I think NATO, as a whole, needs to consider our TASW ability as it stands today and consider if that level should be stepped up again, despite the "Cold War" being over.

Krasnodar terrifies me, and that's an improved Kilo class.  Cruise missile capable and open source info, impossible to find.  They don't call it the Black Hole for nothing.  Back to Cold War mentality indeed.
 
For those  who don't know about the improved Kilos / Krasnodar...

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-launches-quietest-submarine-the-world-12765

http://www.news.com.au/technology/a-russian-submarines-recent-antics-have-revived-a-cold-war-fear/news-story/4dfdc08d92548f26875fd81c36006ac0
 
Dimsum said:
But isn't ASW dead?  ::)

yes.  the Cold War is over.  That is why no one is still building new boats and arming them with ICBMs and stuff.  :Tin-Foil-Hat:

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/borei-class/

http://www.businessinsider.com/us-russia-submarines-cold-war-era-base-in-iceland-2017-12

8)
 
Sigh. Whatever happened to the helicopter/ asroc deliverable nuclear depth charge/ocean bottom warhead?
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, notices RCN (note ASW, subs):

Canada’s navy and the shape of things to come
Renewed force could make an important contribution to Canada's defence alliances [actually only one by treaty, NATO].

By Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security

The Royal Canadian Navy has just released its latest strategic plan for 2017-2022, at what it describes as ‘a critical juncture' in its fleet recapitalisation programme. In broad terms, the five-year programme offers the latest insight into how navies generally are adapting to the changing maritime environment. But it also underscores that some of the critical decisions and challenges regarding Canada’s future fleet still lie ahead.

The new strategic plan follows a series of other documents over recent years which have sought to map out a future course for the navy in the face of significant hurdles. These have included the withdrawal without immediate replacement of its destroyer force, and the gap in afloat support which is now being filled with the interim oiler MV Asterix pending the arrival of the new Protecteur-class Joint Support Ships (JSSs). The new plan sets out the ambition that the first of the JSSs will be built by 2022, but there are question-marks still over when the ships will be available for service.

The Canadian navy retains the ambition to deploy a blue-water capability ultimately based, according to the defence policy review published in June, on two naval task groups. The new navy plan sets its sights on deploying one such group by 2022 of four surface combatants, a submarine, and MV Asterix as the support ship. And, significantly, a goal is also for the navy to lead a multinational theatre anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise. That reflects the refocusing on complex ASW requirements within NATO in particular, and points to the Canadian Navy’s potential to offer an important contribution in alliance and partnership terms [emphasis added].

Another ambition is to see the Victoria-class submarines ‘deployed globally’, and to get the process under way for a modernisation programme for the vessels. Again, these submarines, originally designed for the Royal Navy as quiet deep-ocean ASW platforms for the North Atlantic, are potentially significant assets. But they are all at least 24 years old already and have had a chequered history. So the plans to modernize them will be critical. And, ultimately, there will also be the issue of replacement sometime in the 2030s.

canada%20navy%20procurement%20plans%20table.jpg


Then there is the long-running Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) programme. The deadline for submitting bids for the CSC contract has now passed, with a choice due to be made during 2018. The government has affirmed a commitment to ‘a full complement’ of 15 ships. But, given the history of the programme, its ambition, and continuing doubts over costs, delivery – again – will be a challenge.

The navy’s new document, like the defence policy review, emphasises the need for adaptation. In that sense, one might question the fact that the basic future shape of the core fleet will look very much like the fleet of the past. But there have been significant changes in organisation and structure. And, in an age when all major navies are challenged with meeting commitments and are looking at increasing partnerships and interoperability, the prospect of a modernised, capable, and largely homogeneous Canadian fleet of surface combatants and submarines holds significant attraction.

There are also important niche capabilities in the offing, like the new Harry DeWolf-class arctic and offshore patrol ships. And the promise of investment in maritime unmanned systems. Much will still have to come right to produce the new CSCs, FSSs, and modernised submarines as planned. But the real significance of the Canadian navy’s strategic plan may be as much in how it fits in with the developments plans of other similar allied and partner navies as they also modernise, as much as it does in Canadian national capability terms.
https://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2018-f256/january-c1e6/canadas-navy-5ad9

Mark
Ottawa
 
Back
Top