Integrated Campaigning Topic Week
By James J. Wirtz
Will unmanned forces transform naval campaigning? Given recent events
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, maritime transformation appears to be well underway. Autonomous and semi-autonomous aircraft and surface vessels have damaged or destroyed Russian surface combatants, air defense systems, and supply depots. Land warfare also has seen its share of innovative applications of autonomous and semi-autonomous technology, from swarming drone attacks against urban areas to single hand grenades precisely dropped on lone soldiers in slit trenches dug into the Ukrainian steppe.
One could also point to recent press reports about a flurry of drone activity across the U.S. Navy. In September 2023, two unmanned surface vessels sailed from Hawaii to participate in exercises with Carrier Strike Group 1 in the Western Pacific, while the Navy’s Task Force 59 based in Bahrain has become the de facto U.S. Navy drone innovation center with its ongoing experimentation with small autonomous vessels as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.1 The Navy needs to consider how else it can leverage unmanned systems in campaigns, and how these systems can open up unique options for enhancing naval campaigns in pursuit of deterrence.
Doubts About Drones
Despite mounting evidence drawn from recent battlefield experience and enthusiastic recognition of the growing effectiveness of these systems,
Navy officers are still expressing reservations about the impact of drones in the maritime domain, especially in the western Pacific.2
They note, for instance, that the Navy is already stretched to the breaking point by the effort to maintain and supply its existing manned surface fleet and that it cannot create the
infrastructure needed to support hundreds of medium sized and large autonomous surface vessels in the relatively short time envisioned by current shipbuilding plans. Others suggest that the
weapons payload carried by most drones is too small to create more than a nuisance. Instead of a five-pound warhead,
a one-thousand-pound warhead would be more appropriate when it comes to disabling a major surface combatant. Unmanned systems also
need a range of thousands, not hundreds, of miles to operate in the Pacific. Drones may have requirements that make them more of a liability than an asset in a contested Pacific, such as drones with limited battery life, or that have to be transported and deployed within reach of sophisticated adversary systems, or drones that require weeks of lead time to be moved into operational areas, or that create windows of vulnerability when they need to be retrieved or serviced in the battlespace. A semi-autonomous drone armed with a Hellfire missile might in fact be the perfect weapon to end Ayman al-Zawahiri’s retirement in downtown Kabul, but using an autonomous weapon to hit a modern multi-mission warship on the high seas is another matter.3
Who has it right, the optimists or the pessimists? They both are...