- Reaction score
- 17,850
- Points
- 1,010
Then, no. Not an FMS case.In this case, lets assume we are buying/ordering from a shipyard.
Then, no. Not an FMS case.In this case, lets assume we are buying/ordering from a shipyard.
That wasn’t the question.You would still have to license the design from the US DoD and go through all the ITAR and other security clearance, so may take a while, and they would probably laugh in Freedom units at our contract terms for IP, training and a few others, and straight up tell us to get lost with the Canadian offset/ IRB/ VP terms.
Or go to Naval (which did offer it) and get the parent French design or go to Fincantieri and get their base design.You would still have to license the design from the US DoD and go through all the ITAR and other security clearance, so may take a while, and they would probably laugh in Freedom units at our contract terms for IP, training and a few others, and straight up tell us to get lost with the Canadian offset/ IRB/ VP terms.
I suspect many in Ottawa are looking at this plan right now. But with a different eye to it. At least Canberra takes the situation as serious. They still want frontline tier 1 and tier 2 combatants plus more VLS's. But need something cheaper...so this plan. I just think the Tier 2 ships will be just as expensive or close too it as the Hunters in the end.Resulting from this new plan, there’s no change in the contract price to build 6 vs 9 Hunter class.
This seems to indicate the project costs jumped quite a bit in the past year.
At the NSS when the option of foreign shipyards was discussed by other departments not part of the core 3 they expected that Canada would still impose all of our normal contract terms and conditions that we would apply to a Canadian shipyard under the NSS, which would be the case if we contracted with a US yard.That wasn’t the question.
FMS isn’t a set 30% surcharge. Some programs are a 5% (some less than that but require volume), some are “over 30%” but a lot of the “over 10%” isn’t truly a ‘fact’.Are warships built in the US and sold to other countries subject to the 30% FMS surcharge?
FMS isn’t a set 30% surcharge. Some programs are a 5% (some less than that but require volume), some are “over 30%” but a lot of the “over 10%” isn’t truly a ‘fact’.
How items are provisioned down here can drastically alter the FMS process, as @SeaKingTacco mentioned above a lot of items are not apples to apples, as there is GFM or GFE supplied to the OEM that isn’t reflected in the ‘cost’ of the product.
It also can be difficult to cost due to spares, as a lot of nations will also (oddly I know right ) want spare parts included with the order so they can support their systems, and not need more export permits etc when it comes to maintaining them.
Probably more likely to get an AB before the Connie’s, as the AB builds are getting better for times now that the orders are firmed up.Plus to add the US shipbuilding yards have some would say less than zero extra capacity to build anything for anyone other than the US government. They are working on more capacity but it sounds like a long way away. I bet if we ordered a Constitution it would be a long time before we see would it. A Burke would be impossible. You could get something small like from Austal or something like that. RAN is betting the farm that they can get them a few subs.
Long term sparing and full initial provisioning is for suckers and that's not how we roll.FMS isn’t a set 30% surcharge. Some programs are a 5% (some less than that but require volume), some are “over 30%” but a lot of the “over 10%” isn’t truly a ‘fact’.
How items are provisioned down here can drastically alter the FMS process, as @SeaKingTacco mentioned above a lot of items are not apples to apples, as there is GFM or GFE supplied to the OEM that isn’t reflected in the ‘cost’ of the product.
It also can be difficult to cost due to spares, as a lot of nations will also (oddly I know right ) want spare parts included with the order so they can support their systems, and not need more export permits etc when it comes to maintaining them.
Probably more likely to get an AB before the Connie’s, as the AB builds are getting better for times now that the orders are firmed up.
But I don’t see a point in the AB’s for Canada unless the budget jumps and recruitment and throughput is drastically improved.
Government wonks are always saying if we raised the defence budget to 2% of GDP we'd have a hard time spending the money. I think we could spend a goodly portion of that extra money on infrastructure and spares, no problem.Long term sparing and full initial provisioning is for suckers and that's not how we roll.
CSC looks better, but the spares coming with JSS and AOPs is... sparse. They went with '6 months worth' (ie enough for initial PM checks) and a few insurance spares on long lead items, but don't have things like spare valves, pumps, motors, gauges or rebuild kits for all the small things that will break within those 6 months. They also flag a lot of stuff as GFE, but didn't tell the people that are supposed to supply it. I don't know that we have AFFF for the two JSSs for example.
I think it's insane, but what do I know? We provided feedback in the ILS meetings from our experience on the in service side, and I think all we managed to convince them to add was a $50 bucket of something.
I'm sure nothing will break during set to works, sea trials and other IOC tests though so will be fine, and we won't be robbing ship 2 to repair ship 1 for JSS.
Edit: Yes, as far as I can tell the initial sparing plan assumes nothing will break if the MTBF is more than 6 months from the OEM and is relying totally on the OEM LSAR for PM items (o-rings, gaskets, POL etc).
As well, any government willing to increase defence spending significantly is likely to change the procurement processes to allow it to be spent.Government wonks are always saying if we raised the defence budget to 2% of GDP we'd have a hard time spending the money. I think we could spend a goodly portion of that extra money on infrastructure and spares, no problem.
As well, any government willing to increase defence spending significantly is likely to change the procurement processes to allow it to be spent.
CAF personnel are equally responsible for problems and delays.The fight here is with the PS mandarins who have made their careers and fiefdoms out of these "processes" and will defend their fiefdoms to the end. And with a PS that I imagine is largely LPC leaning it will be a long slog.
Any sweeping changes to our procurement policy will require sweeping changes in personnel in the PS as well.
There was a significant amount of PS managers who came to maturity with the CPC in power (and may have started under the cost cutting of Chreatin) and were fiscally prudent. Those were the ones who were quite uncomfortable with current government largess with money, budgets and personal increases.The fight here is with the PS mandarins who have made their careers and fiefdoms out of these "processes" and will defend their fiefdoms to the end. And with a PS that I imagine is largely LPC leaning it will be a long slog.
Any sweeping changes to our procurement policy will require sweeping changes in personnel in the PS as well.
There are a lot of Naval Technical Officers (NTOs) in the NSS PMOs, and the entire promotion/succession planning process actively promotes short stints at a wide range of positions to get 'breadth of experience' points.The CAF's biggest problem is APS. Loss of knowledge and expertise slows requirements and acquisitions. Change of opinion because a new dude or dudette occupies a position is equally problematic.
Selection and maintenance of the aim, in major projects, too often is a punchline instead of a principle.
I point out these two problems to people who have never worked in Ottawa and don't understand how much personalities impact everything.The CAF's biggest problem is APS. Loss of knowledge and expertise slows requirements and acquisitions. Change of opinion because a new dude or dudette occupies a position is equally problematic.
Selection and maintenance of the aim, in major projects, too often is a punchline instead of a principle.