New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Underway]

The National Post article is obviously badly researched amoung other things.  Certain reporters just keep referencing their own work and don't actually go out and do their own research, just assume what others have written is still the case etc...  Especially when it comes to the Royal Canadian Navy.  Trying to explain the the public that "yes the sub fleet for all intents and purposes is full operational, including the one that had the fire..." is an exercise in futility.  The press makes it worse as they can't/won't shake the subs are lemons story (not to mention our complete inability to properly sell subs as an important defence platform).  We don't do ourselves any favours in the RCN as we see all the warts and are very self critical.

CSC:
If the contract is structured correctly and all indications seem to point that way, then Irving will get more money if they produce more ships.  It could easily be something as simple as they max out profit of "X" dollars per ship built.  So if they don't find a way to keep costs under control and then deliver the full 6 ship product then they lose out on profit. 

Look at the Cyclone project as a rough (very rough) example.  Penalties have been given to Sikorsky as they couldn't meet their contract obligations.  I don't know if they are making any profit but the gov't looks at least as if they are trying to get the best value and still get the helo's.  Of course the Irving family and industries in vote getting places change things. 

The most interesting thing from a cost control perspective is that there are now 3 shipyards in Canada that could conceivably build the CSC, and if Irving shows badly then there becomes a potential for them to loose out on the later builds of the CSC.  What should happen is that the CSC be built in blocks of 4 or so ships at a time, with contracts written only for the next 4 ships.  That way you can pull the next 4 builds from the shipyard should they not meet the requirements.

BLOCK 1:  4 ships, AAW/ C2 variants
BLOCK 2:  4 ships GP variant - start designing the next gen systems for BLOCK 3
BLOCK 3:  4 ships GP variant upgraded with newest mature tech/weapons - designing next gen systems for BLOCK 4 using lessons learned from BLOCK 1/2
BLOCK 4:  3 ships GP variant upgraded again - design CSCII to replace BLOCK 1
BLOCK 5:  4 ships, AAW/ C2 variants of the CSC II project, when complete pay off BLOCK 1...
cont'd....

At each one of those BLOCKs you can either recompete the project or get rid of someone like the Warship Designer/ Combat Systems integrater should they not be meeting the requirements.

But I'm the eternal optimist...

 

[larry Strong]

A stop gap measure.........

Canada looking at retrofitting commercial ships to resupply navy

Posted with the usual caveats.

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-looking-at-retrofitting-commercial-ships-to-resupply-navy-1.2387077

Ottawa is considering retrofitting commercial ships to resupply the Royal Canadian Navy, CTV News has learned.

The measure is considered a stopgap, as the navy no longer has ships capable of delivering food, water, ammunition, spare parts and other necessities to vessels at sea.

Government records released to The Canadian Press earlier this week showed that navy mechanics in Halifax were forced to scour the Internet and use eBay to find parts for one of its two supply ships. Documents show navy mechanics had to use eBay to find ship parts.



Documents also showed that many of the parts on the 45-year-old HMCS Preserver were "beyond acceptable limits," and corrosion issues had begun to compromise its structural integrity.

The plan is to replace the makeshift supply ships in 2020, when the navy's new support ships are expected to hit the water.

The retrofitting plan will be reviewed by the federal cabinet for the third time next week.

Sources tell CTV News' Mercedes Stephenson that should the proposal receive approval, Quebec's Davie Shipyard will be granted the contract.

Cheers
Larry

 

[ringo]

I wonder if there looking at Finnish tankers Purha and Jurmo for conversion?

 

[Underway]

It's the right call, as the govt is backed into a corner and the navy needs a re supply stopgap measure.  Interestingly enough its in a Quebec shipyard in time for an election.....

 

[Pelorus]

And look, it's an icebreaker too!

 

[MarkOttawa]

And here's an icebreaking cargo ship built in Japan for Canadian operator Fednav:

1) First Arctic Cargo Shipped Through NW Passage

By MarEx 2014-09-19 14:18:00

Fednav, a Canadian-owned company and world leader in Arctic navigation, announced that its vessel, the MV Nunavik sailed from Deception Bay en route to China via Canada’s Northwest Passage, with a full cargo of nickel concentrate. The Nunavik will be one of the first commercial vessels to transit the Northwest Passage completely, and the first to do so unescorted with an Arctic cargo, and with Canadian expertise.

The Nunavik is the most powerful conventional (non-nuclear) icebreaking bulk carrier in the world, and sails from Deception Bay, Northern Quebec year round, transporting product from the Canadian Royalties mine. The Nunavik will deliver 23,000 tons of nickel concentrate to Bayuquan in China...

"Fednav is proud to have designed this remarkable ship and to plan the first independent commercial voyage through the Northwest Passage,” said Paul Pathy, President and co-CEO of Fednav Limited. “It is through the extraordinary capabilities of the Fednav team, the ship’s crew, and its world-leading technology that we can undertake this journey with confidence."..
http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/First-Arctic-Cargo-Shipped-Through-NW-Passage-2014-09-19

2) Fednav brings new icebreaker to the Canadian Arctic

Montreal, March 20, 2014 – Fednav announces the arrival in Canada of its latest, highly specialized icebreaker, the MV Nunavik. Built at JMU’s Tsu Shipyard in Japan, the ship will be used to export the concentrates produced at the Canadian Royalties owned Nunavik Nickel mine at Deception Bay in northern Quebec. The vessel will also supply the mine with equipment and fuel, year round.

Rated Polar Class 4, the Nunavik is the most powerful bulk-carrying icebreaker in the world. It is similar in design to the Umiak I, the Fednav ship servicing Vale’s Voisey's Bay operation in Northern Labrador. The Nunavik will sail unescorted in Arctic regions and will operate in the extreme winter conditions of the Canadian Arctic. It is capable of maintaining continuous progress of 3 knots in 1.5 m of ice.

The vessel was designed by Fednav and JMU, and will sail between Deception Bay and Northern Europe on a year-round basis. The engine produces 29,600 hp, three times the power of a conventional bulk carrier of the same size. The Nunavik will be supported by Enfotec Technical Services, a Fednav subsidiary to provide up to date information on ice conditions as well as technical support to the inhouse IceNav navigation system...
http://www.fednav.com/en/media/fednav-brings-new-icebreaker-canadian-arctic

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I always liked the look of these ships which used to come to Vancouver on a regular basis

 

[Underway]

A piece from the Canadian Naval Review spring issue, points out some of the issues facing the procurement of ships, including some of the public issues with selling the navy to Canada. 

Warship Developments:
Why Such Delays and Prognostication?
Doug Thomas

Like the never-ending winter that all but West Coasters are enduring, I am getting very tired of delays in replacing naval equipment, including shipborne helicopters. I hope to live long enough to see the Cyclone helicopter deployed at sea, but there are still 50-year old Sea Kings in the skies over CFB Shearwater. I am currently in good health, but will I see the new AORs? Hopefully. Will I live to see the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) that is intended to replace our current destroyers and frigates? Th at may be a stretch based on the experience of the past few decades!

It is hard to understand why HMCS Harry DeWolf, the first Arctic Off shore Patrol Ship (AOPS), will not commence sea trials until at least 2018. The initiative to build these vessels for the navy was announced by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in July 2007. It was understood at the time that the AOPS design would be heavily based on the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel KV Svalbard – an uncomplicated and relatively inexpensive ship (about US$100 million in 2002). The Canadian vessels will be considerably more expensive yet smaller and slower than Svalbard, but will have improved capabilities in surveillance, supporting other government initiatives in the Arctic, improved habitability and improved ability to support operations ashore. Nevertheless, why didn’t we buy or lease a Svalbard or similar vessel, and gain experience during the years needed to build our own? We would have established a presence in the North much earlier, and gained experience operating in northern waters which could have been applied to operating the new ships.

I appreciate that the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) should help with future naval programs but meanwhile the Tribal-class destroyers and Replenishment Ships Protecteur and Preserver have been condemned to the scrapyard and their replacements are a distant promise. These ships served Canada well, and for considerably longer than expected when they were built.  They were allowed to wear out in service to the point of decrepit old age, when cracks and breakdowns became commonplace. In the future, one hopes that procurement necessary to meet agreed DND requirements will be implemented in a more timely manner rather than be the subject of perpetual political infighting or departmental inaction.

Looking back, the government decision in August 2008 not to proceed with building Joint Support Ships (JSS), due to cost estimates of the two consortia bidding on the contract, was a bad one – there was barely enough available funding ($2.9 billion) to build two ships rather than the required three. So what has happened? We have finally agreed that we will build only two ships, they will be an Improved Berlin-class as operated by the German Navy, and we may have them operational in about 2020 – six years aft er withdrawing Protecteur and Preserver from service. The continuing delay with this project means an increase in the cost of raw materials at the same time as there has been a considerable drop in the value of the Canadian dollar. This will inevitably mean an increase in the cost of JSS, the end of any possibility of adding a third ship, and possible further dilution in capability to reduce cost. Let me see: World War II lasted for about six years, and we will go that long before re-acquiring a capability to operate a Canadian task group with its own underway replenishment capability. What is wrong with this picture?

Our former four Tribal-class destroyers have been whittled down to one: HMCS Athabaskan. However her retention is for a few years at best and at a reduced state of readiness.
I shudder to think of the commentary by the chattering classes regarding the much more expensive Canadian Surface Combatant Project, which will first replace the navy’s area air defence and command and control capability resident in the Tribals, and later the general purpose capability of our current frigates.

Like so many recent procurement programs – many of them naval it seems – ‘sticker shock’ seems to be part of the problem. It is rather like trading-in an elderly family
car: you step into a dealer’s showroom with the aim of buying a safe, fuel efficient and reliable vehicle. You sit down with a salesman to price out something that meets your requirements, only to find that costs have skyrocketed. What do you do? If you need a new car to meet your transportation requirements, you bite the bullet and pay what it costs because you realize that you are not going to get a new car for the same price that you paid for your old car 10 years ago.

Recently CBC television aired what should have been a good news story about HMC Submarine Victoria. Victoria took observers to sea to demonstrate that she had assumed high-readiness and was ready to deploy anywhere the Canadian government might need her. The coverage concentrated on costs and delays, accidents, that these boats are 25 years old and that only Victoria was high-readiness, that two others were at a lower state of readiness, and the fourth in refit. The inference for the viewer was that there was a problem in that only one submarine was fully operational. There was no explanation of what was meant by tiered readiness, whereby ships and submarines rotate through various stages of readiness and availability based on a cycle of refits, work-ups and the need to conduct deployments to more dangerous areas of the world.

Then, to balance what the navy was saying, CBC invited comment from a certain professor from the University of British Columbia who has been a bitter foe of the Victoria-class and other naval programs, and who – not surprisingly – repeated his litany of complaints. There was no mention that the four ex-British submarines were laid up in reserve for a number of years after completion, due to the Royal Navy switching to an all-nuclear submarine force, or that the Chretien government dithered for four years aft erexpressing an interest in acquiring these submarines, or that the purchase price for all four was about the cost of one new submarine. And, finally, there was no mention of the reality that if these second-hand vessels had not been acquired, Canada would have lost its submarine capability as the government was unwilling to pay the cost of new submarines, and that the delay in achieving high-readiness is due to a serious lack of funding rather than an inherent problem with the design.

Surely our national governments – of whatever political stripe – should be able to decide what defence capabilities are needed, and budget for that well into the future. Forward planning should require broad agreement by the major parties as to defence requirements, so that there are no fundamental arguments against a previously agreed capability every time we need to replace a class of ships or an aircraft . If the project seems excessively priced, it is understandable that there will be discussion, but it seems to me that the recent policy of including cost of future maintenance, fuel, personnel, eventual disposal, etc., simply inflames the rhetoric from individuals who don`t agree with spending any money on defence. It seems that there is always a nasty argument against whatever bigticket item is the topic of the day. I would posit that this large G-7 country needs certain defence capabilities. For example, it needs a national general purpose naval task group, deployable anywhere in the world to safeguard national interests and able to operate with Canadian allies. In order to do this we need to equip that task group with suitable area air defence, surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, command and
control facilities that can be integrated with those of our major allies, and an underway replenishment ship carrying supplies, spares, ammunition and helicopter repair facilities for our ships and their Cyclone helicopters. Such a capability is described in the Defence White Paper of 1994 and, presumably, is still in effect.

 

[MarkOttawa]

As for the Coast Guard--costs increase, many new ships many years down the road:

National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy
Technical Briefing on Offshore Fisheries Science Vessel [June 12]
...
The Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels are part of the Fisheries and Oceans Canada/Canadian Coast Guard Fleet Renewal Program [see description here http://www.seaspan.com/building ]. And they are the first project for the non-combat work package under the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.

We are pleased to tell you that the Government of Canada and Seaspan Shipyards have reached an agreement in principle that will see the construction and delivery of three Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels...

Full rate production will begin in the coming weeks and the delivery of the vessels is expected in 2017 [in 2012 the government said the first two vessels would be delivered last year! http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2012-2013/inst/dfo/st-ts04-eng.asp#mcp2 ].

In a few minutes, my colleague from PWGSC will provide the details of the agreement in principle. With those details taken into account, and based on Seaspan cost estimates, the Canadian Coast Guard has determined that the total budget, including project management, design and engineering, spares, training and other costs to put the vessels into operation, as well as the construction of the ships will require a total budget of up to $687 million...

The original OFSV budget of $244 million was developed in 2004 [and was still being used in 2011 http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2011-2012/info/mcp-gpe-eng.asp#dfo ]. It did not contain adequate provision for inflation, project management, engineering and design costs, and did not properly include contingencies required for a project of this magnitude [three 3,000 tonne ships]. The current budget is based on detailed cost estimates provided by the shipyard...

Full production of the vessels is expected to begin shortly, with delivery of the first vessel scheduled for Spring 2017, the second vessel to be delivered 5 months later, and the third 3 months after that...

Canada’s Non-Combat requirements are such that there are no long production runs of the same class of ship [so getting costs down will be, shall we say, challenging]. We will be building three OFSVs, followed by a single Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel, followed by 2 Joint Support Ships, followed by a single Polar Icebreaker [delivery 2021-22 http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/rpp/2015-16/SupplementaryTables/mcp-eng.html#s1.4 ]. It is only after the Polar project that we get into a true production line with up to five Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked vessels and up to five Offshore Patrol Vessels [announced in 2013, to cost $3.3 billion http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=778419&crtr.tp1D=1 ]...

http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/medias-media/dm-ms/2015-06-12-eng.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

As for the Coast Guard--costs increase, many new ships many years down the road:

Mark
Ottawa

Crap! It's contagious.

 

[MilEME09]

Crap! It's contagious.

I would argue the entire project forgot to get its flu shot and is sick

 

[Colin Parkinson]

We are not alone, look at the USCG ship building program

 

[Kirkhill]

Is the problem with LockMart?

Our friends in Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany are a lot less reliant on LockMart for putting their ships together.  I think they were, in part, driven to independent solutions because they couldn't afford what LockMart was offering.

The Yanks and the Brits are heavily tied to LockMart.

 

[Underway]

Is the problem with LockMart?

Our friends in Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany are a lot less reliant on LockMart for putting their ships together.  I think they were, in part, driven to independent solutions because they couldn't afford what LockMart was offering.

The Yanks and the Brits are heavily tied to LockMart.

It might be.  Friend of mine works on the civi side of naval procurement and project management.  He HATES Lockmart and always loves working with Thales,  who are far more involved in the countries you listed above.  One of his main issues is how Lockmart always seems to weasel out of the contract requirements or getting them changed after the contract has been awarded.

 

[jollyjacktar]

One of his main issues is how Lockmart always seems to weasel out of the contract requirements or getting them changed after the contract has been awarded.

Sounds as if hooking them up with Irving is a match made in heaven (or hell in reality).  They both have the same SOP's, I mean business plan. 

 

[Kirkhill]

I know there was an abundance of confusion when the AOPS design was switched from the Left Coast to the Irving Coast.  Contractors that had tendered civilian solutions were informed that it was now a military project.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

So it begins

http://www.nsnews.com/news/seaspan-ottawa-reach-deal-on-three-ships-1.1968322

North Vancouver’s Seaspan Shipyards has reached an agreement in principle with the federal government to build the first three offshore fisheries/Coast Guard vessels under Ottawa’s national shipbuilding program.

The agreement, announced Friday, sets a “target” price of $400 million for the three offshore fisheries science vessels and a “ceiling” of $544 million, said senior government officials.

The total budget to put the three vessels into service — including training, project management costs and contingencies — is up to $687 million, almost three times the project’s originally estimated cost of $244 million.

That’s likely one reason for protracted contract negotiations between Seaspan and Ottawa leading up to Friday’s agreement, which will form the basis of a construction contract.

Officials said Friday the original $244 million estimate, developed in 2004, didn’t contain provision for inflation, project management, engineering or design costs and didn’t include enough contingency.

Before agreeing to the new figures, the federal government had Seaspan’s estimates vetted by an expert third party, which found them “fair and reasonable,” said officials.

Under the terms of the contract, the shipyard will receive extra incentive payments if the three ships come in under the $400- million target budget or are delivered ahead of schedule.

The government will not pay more than the ceiling price of the contract, even if costs run higher.

Government officials said Ottawa will have staff on site at the North Vancouver shipyard while the vessels are under construction to monitor costs and progress on the ships.

Some of the extra money needed to complete the project will come from already-completed helicopter and hovercraft projects, which were finished under budget.
The lion’s share — about $300 million — will be moved from an approximately $3-billion budget for 10 multi-task 65-metre and 75-metre Coast Guard vessels that Ottawa plans to build at Seaspan after the massive navy joint support ships and polar icebreaker are completed.

The imminent signing of the construction contract means work on the federal vessels will start very soon at the North Vancouver shipyard, said Brian Carter, president of Seaspan Shipyards. “This is an important day for Seaspan,” he said. “We’re very, very close to that important milestone.”

Once construction of the offshore fisheries vessels is underway, the workforce in the trades at the shipyard is expected to swell from about 200 currently to more than 500 workers.

He added that the contract will mean spinoff work for suppliers across the country. Seaspan has already contracted to spend more than $200 million with 137 companies as part of its work on the national shipbuilding program.

The first vessel is expected to be finished early in 2017, with the other two following later in that year.

The vessels will be operated by the Canadian Coast Guard and used by fisheries scientists to do assessments of fish stocks and the marine ecosystem, as well as respond to marine emergencies.

The federal government and Seaspan have yet to reach an agreement on the two massive navy joint support ships, which will also be built at Seaspan under the national shipbuilding program.

In 2013, both the parliamentary budget officer and the auditor general raised questions about whether the $2.6 billion set aside by Ottawa will be enough to build the two ships.

- See more at: http://www.nsnews.com/news/seaspan-ottawa-reach-deal-on-three-ships-1.1968322#sthash.brkXIapF.dpuf

also dog and pony show at Irving

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/irving-shipbuilding-cuts-steel-as-test-for-fall-production-1.3118637

 

[FSTO]

If Seaspan can mirror its performance of the ORCA project, these vessels will be ready in short order and will be under budget. I seem to recall the last 3 ORCA's were delivered at least 18 months prior to their due date. Granted these are smaller, simpler vessels but the concept of construction is the same as larger vessels.

 

[Underway]

One of the main differences with that contract IIRC is that the Orca's were built at Vic Ships.  Seaspan doesn't own that drydock, I think they lease it.  So it was in their best interest to get them out faster and under budget to get another project in there (repair job or whatever). 

But yah, completely agree.  I trust Seaspan to get the job done relatively efficiently.  Irving on the other hand...

 

[FSTO]

One of the main differences with that contract IIRC is that the Orca's were built at Vic Ships.  Seaspan doesn't own that drydock, I think they lease it.  So it was in their best interest to get them out faster and under budget to get another project in there (repair job or whatever). 

But yah, completely agree.  I trust Seaspan to get the job done relatively efficiently.  Irving on the other hand...

They lease the Government of Canada Graving Dock.
But there is a culture at Seaspan of getting things done correctly and quickly.
Irving?