New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Oldgateboatdriver]

You still need an AD variant, Chris.

The reason they use them for their carriers (and I should have said, their Mistral's also) is that any task group deployed as a group in an area where combat is possible needs to have air cover for the task group. It's just that France usually deploys such a group around their carrier or Mistral's as command ship.

In our case, our Canadian task Groups deploy around a supply ship and a few destroyers or frigates. You still need a command ship and to provide area air cover - it's just that in our case it is the Area air defence ship which is both at the same time instead of being separate vessels.

 

[Kirkhill]

No.  I don't need an AD variant.  Me and my muddy boots will never go to sea in one of your task forces.  >

Apparently you need an AD variant to protect your speed boats and the gas station you need to take with you.  ;D

 

[jollyjacktar]

No.  I don't need an AD variant.  Me and my muddy boots will never go to sea in one of your task forces.  >

Apparently you need an AD variant to protect your speed boats and the gas station you need to take with you.  ;D

Don't knock it until you try it... soup at 10, beer at sea, banyans with beer, steak night, duty free when you come home, swim-ex (rare nowadays), three hots and a cot, a real toilet that flushes, showers.  It's better (mostly) on the dark side. 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

No.  I don't need an AD variant.  Me and my muddy boots will never go to sea in one of your task forces.  >

Yeah! That's why, I figured a long time ago, you always seek to impose all your cockamamy plans on us poor sailors: You don't have to sail with the results.  ;D 

 

[GR66]

I have my own opinion of course about what kind of capabilities I would personally like to see Canada have, a different opinion on what is likely (or at least should likely be) affordable for a country like Canada, and a third opinion on what I think the current Canadian Liberal government is likely to agree to.

That being said, I think that a trading country with a coastline as  long as Canada's and with substantial proven and probable resources within its maritime EEZ has a certain baseline minimum requirement in order to adequately patrol and monitor our waters (even in absence of a perceived direct military threat), provide governmental support to citizens living along our coastlines, and to meaningfully participate in collective overseas operations with our allies.

My gut feeling is that this could likely be adequately provided by a total of 16-24 ships, likely of two or possibly three different classes.  One would have to be roughly analogous to the current Halifax-Class Frigates with military spec construction and reasonable all-around general purpose capability (embarked ASW helicopter, towed-array sonar, self-defence AA capabiliities and moderate ASuW capability).  I'd think that an absolute minimum of 8 of the total number of ships (preferrably 12?) would have to be of this type. 

The balance of the ships could probably be more like the AOPS/Kingston-Class of vessels.  Ideally each of these (or at least half of them) should be able support helicopter operations and have some type of flex-deck capability in order for them to be able to fullfill the roles of "lillypad"-type forward base units, provide capability of deploying personnel and/or equipment to any domestic or overseas area required (non-combat situations), have the ability to embark an ASW helicopter and mission module towed-array sonar/Mine countermeasures kit, and fast craft to conduct boarding operations.

The Canadian shipbuilding industry should be contracted to produce these ships on an ongoing basis so that we always have the baseline fleet available in a constant state of renewal and are never again in the position of having to completely rebuild the RCN from scratch.

There are other ships and capabilities that Canada may/should want, but these requirements may change over time (and our ability to fund them may come and go as well) so they should be separately funded on an as-required (as-affordable) basis.  This would include things like high-end ASW destroyers, AAD destroyers, helicopter carriers, LPDs, submarines, etc.  Funding these "specialty" vessels as required should never come at the expense of funding our baseline requirements.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yeah! That's why, I figured a long time ago, you always seek to impose all your cockamamy plans on us poor sailors: You don't have to sail with the results.  ;D 

Well, solve the problem.  My back is itchy and needs scratching.  How about you plan on carrying a bunch of guys with muddy boots from the get go?  They might be a bit more understanding of the need for a well equipped escort.

I am sure the USN and the USMC appreciates your efforts. 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

And, as I have explained before in various threads, the decision to carry muddy boots at sea is not the Navy's, but our political masters. And it seems that every time they look at what it implies and would cost, they back off.

In 1970, our friend Mr. Hellyer asked the Navy to be able to integrate with the army and carry it where needed. The Navy, then organized around one carrier escort group and four ASW escort groups, offered to switch to one carrier strike group and two groups built around one Iwo Jima class amphibious ship each. Hellyer liked it, but when it was presented to the government o the day, with its actual cost, it was rejected.

Not long ago, we learned that the CDS recommended to the government that they jump at the opportunity that we had to acquire the two "Russian" Mistral's from the French. The CDS did not come up with that recommendation on his own: You can be sure that he consulted with the RCN and that if the RCN had been anything but enthusiastic at the idea, he would not have made the recommendation. What we learned, however is that the civil head of the department (the DM) advised the government against it because it could have affected the shipbuilding strategy. The government declined.

When we have ships that are likely to have to support landings (and those are NOT frigates and destroyers) of forces, we make allowance for that: The AOPS, the most likely to have to support small land parties, will each have the capacity to embark and land 20 troops together with their ATV's or snowmobile or trucks/Bv's, most likely to help with Rangers patrol going from one island to the next when the ice does not permit safe passage. Similarly, the JSS's will have embark capacity.

So it's not the Navy blocking muddy boots from ships - just from ships where they don't belong and serve no purpose, such as frigates and destroyers.

But you have to be mindful of the cost, which seems to be the government big block in all cases: Buying amphibious warfare vessels, which are still expensive vessels, just to park them for 25 years in Halifax and Esquimalt and use them once or twice a year for a two weeks army exercise is a stupid waste of money.

If on the other hand you wish to make more regular and constant use of them, then where do you get the muddy boots? Last I checked, the army was having a hard time filling all of its current combat arms units and provide the personnel for their existing taskings. If you wished to, say, maintain one amphib per coast with 500 "boots" on them, would that not require triple that to maintain? That amounts to 3,000 extra soldier just as the fighters. So you probably need about 1,000 more as on shore support. Then you have to add maybe 1,500 to 2,000 more people in the RCAF to provide the extra air assets that such ship would require. That is what is scaring the government away.

As for the Navy, well Ready Aye Ready! We'll do what our masters tell us to do ... but so far that have not asked for an amphibious capability. Period.
 

 

[ArmyRick]

The army perspective

What type of force do we need to land and to do what mission

I see the following as realistic missions for an amphib ship
-Support humanitarian missions (lets get the liberals all excited)
-NEO
-Missions like Somalia that were reasonable proximity to sea shore (Could the amphib act as a floating service support base?)
-NATO joint exercises (with the USMC, Royal Marines, Dutch Marines, etc) I see these as not just exercises but a display of capabilities
-Supporting some sov ops in the North (during the balmy months of the year perhaps?)
-CANSOFCOM probably has a list of things they could do with it but can not tell us
-Assistance to SAR missions (like Flight 111 air disaster? Floating Rescue base? RCMP, Medics, etc operating off one ship?)
-Of course a few boot stomping exercises with good old ground pounders (like me)

You do not need a special unit, just create battle groups or company groups, etc from existing Brigades. You may need to coordinate things for the Pathfinder cell in Trenton and combat engineer divers to adapt/develop procedures for operating with these ships

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Van Doo's practiced off the French Mistral. I suspect mostly a lot small changes, like waterproofing, dealing with corrosion, adapting some equipment. The LAV is good for this and worked with the landing craft. The mix would require a robust Combat Engineer team, with TLAV’s an something that can fulfill a BARV function. The Infantry battalions can rotate through, but a dedicated Combat Engineer and Svc Battalion group would be needed as they would be the specialists in the landing craft to shore interface. It would not need to be a large group, but the skillsets and knowledge base would need to be kept alive.

The Airforce would have to make the biggest changes, stand down some or all of the Griffions, replace them with the same airframe as the Cyclones (without the ASW kit) and they can perform both the marine and land helo functions. The helicopters being marinized will be more expensive upfront, but save money on training, parts and less maintenance for the ones not working in the marine environment.

The RCN runs the landing craft and I don’t see many issues there, some good and interesting taskings for Petty Officers and ratings.

Having amphibs would be for the RCN what the C-17 is for the RCAF, it would change what and how they do it. It would give the government of the day huge flexibility in what we do, with whom , when and how. The ships would likely pay for themselves in the international horsetrading that goes on between allies. The Amphibs along with the C-17’s would give Canada significant capability to support NATO & non-NATO mission.

 

[jollyjacktar]

They also were on USS Gunston Hall in 06.  Very rough trip for them.  They were as green as their cadpat.  We called them Van Spews.  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

To be clear - This is addressed to my friend OGBD  :nod:

Money is what money is.  I can always create an unaffordable plan.

Alternately I can have ships built that include space on each ship for a joint staff element, an SOF team, a FOO/FAC team and a platoon to provide them security (and conduct boarding on the side).  That represents an accommodation of about 60 bodies or so in addition to the berths the RCN deems necessary to fight the ship and carry a helicopter.

Most of the modern "combat" ships seem to have those provisions.  Does your navy include those provisions?


Step up plan 1

Add a Company Combat Team to each Task Force that deploys.  That could be accommodated in a "gutted frigate" like the Absalon.  Same hull, same engines (just fewer), same systems, just a big, sheltered deck for carrying muddy boots and their gear and the necessary connectors.  The Absalon still has enough speed to keep up with a Task Force - or do you regularly advance at rates in excess of 25 knots?

Step up plan 2

Provide lift capacity for a separate Infantry Battle Group complete with a Heavy Combat Team for support.  Something along the lines of the Rotterdam.

Absalons and Rotterdams could be gainfully employed in the domestic EEZ, alongside the de Wolf's, supplying floating bases and emergency response capability, when not needed overseas.  Although I rather suspect that Haiti would prefer to see a Rotterdam in Port-au-Prince than an AD frigate.  They may end up getting more sea time than the ADs.

WRT manning.

Marvelous thing about berths is that they do not need to be filled all the time.  And guys that are willing to sleep in bags on the snow are probably not overly bothered if their bunk doesn't have wood trim, especially if they are only going to be in those bunks for a week or so.

The platoon teams that live on board should have naval accommodations but the larger teams?  The bigger issue is getting their gear where they need it.  They can be flown on board to marry up with their gear and sleep on canvas for a week or so.  They could come on board at a local dock in the theater of operations.  They could be ferried out by sea or they could be ferried out by helicopter.

And on the subject of manning:

The good old fleet of three AORs, four DDHs and 12 CPFs supplied berths for some 4600 sailors, currently reduced to 2700 for just the 12 Halifax.

If you went with a fleet of 6 Horizons/Orrizonte (174 + 32 pax) and 9 Aquitaines/Bergamini (Accomodations for 200 with a crew or 108 to 147 depending on source - lets say 147) you still only come up with seaberths for some 2367 sailors.  Short of the 2700 and well short of 4600.

Or are you going to do what the Spanish did with the Bazan/Nansen/Hobarts?  Crew them with 202 when the Norwegians are using crews of 120? 

Note that the Bazan, Nansen, Hobarts, Aquitaines, Bergamini, Orrizonte, Horizons, not to mention the Type 45, Type 26, Type 31, F125 and Iver Huitfeldt - all have provision for "muddy boots".  And all of the fleets have additional provision to bring the ratio of muddy boots to jack tars up to 1 pair of muddy boots for each jack tar.

Finally wrt cockamamie ideas.  Well, the contraire is the idee fixe.  A durable concept well recognized among the Belges. 

;D :cheers:

 

[Baz]

And, as I have explained before in various threads, the decision to carry muddy boots at sea is not the Navy's, but our political masters. And it seems that every time they look at what it implies and would cost, they back off.

In my opinion, OGBD hit it squarely on the head.

I would like to have the Canadian Task Group centered on an Expeditionary Warfare Ship (like Mistral or Canberra) with robust service and support (like JSS or JSS light) and proper escorts (my preference would be all the escorts the same, with AAW and ASW capability, but ColinP and OGBD have gone a long way to convince me that it is in fact a dedicated AAW ship with the Maritime Commander embarked and a couple of ASW escorts).  That capability should be duplicated on each coast, and the combination of one expeditionary, one JSS, and one JSS light would mean we should always have 2 of the three available.  For availability reasons then it means 4 AAW ships (so you don't have to move them coast to coast to fill holes), an absolute minimum of 6 ASW ships (it's not so low because it really covers the need, but something has to give), and 4 subs.  For that I'd give up the Kingstons and let AOPs cover the gap (again, because unfortunately something has to give).

As a taxpayer, if we had such a capability, I'd like to see it robustly forward deployed, conducting exercises with our Allies.  Say, one TG (as small as one Expeditionary, JSS, or JSS light, plus one escort) forward all of the time, with the remainder of the TG ready to join.  With that number of hulls you'd need to rotate ship to shore quite aggressively.

But, what gives on the Army side: that is roughly one Battalion(-) plus Combat Support and Combat Service Support per coast.  That's a minimum of 4 in the rotation assuming only  one Coast is deployable at any given time; more if you want to be able to routinely surge both coast.  And remember, they would actually be routinely deployed.

That's a third of the Army: I would again take that hit and reorg the Army around 3 major capabilities: a light airborne/airmobile 4 battalion force, a medium sea mobile and insertable (but not full amphibious assault ie kick in the door) 4 battalion force, and a heavy (ie armoured) 4 battalion force.  Each battalion would be all arms; the Army knows how to organize them.  Not that unless we go to war that means one battalion of each force is always available.

And then we need to think about the Air Force as well.  Currently there are two squadrons of MH, one on each coast, which don't embark.  That would literally have to double, and each of those squadrons would no longer be just MH; they would have an MH flight for the escorts, a littoral lift flight for the Expeditionary ship, probably an UAV flight, and in a perfect world an Fire Support (ie AH) flight.  At the very minimum that means bringing the number of Cyclones up to 50 (from 28), but still only having 28 MH mission sets (maybe that could be removed and installed on any airframe).

As an aside, if you were going to get AH to support littoral fire support, you may as well put some in the other force squadrons as well.  Could we replace the 412s with AH-1Ys and UH-1Zs built in Maribel?

Based on my exposure to SCTF, something along these lines was exactly what Hillier was envisioning.  Only real differences from my understanding is the whole concept of JSS Light is very new, and AHs weren't in the mix (but the concern over littoral fire support was already understood).  And it wasn't affordable... the Olympics allowed it to go quietly.


OK, so that's not affordable, what about the lighter option, around Enforcer.  So, let's say four of them in rotation:
- still going to need roughly the same escort force
- still going to need roughly the same support force, so let's keep it at two Berlins and two Davies build
- still going to lead, an albeit lighter, Battalion, so the Army reorg is the same
- still going to need to go to two squadrons of helos on each coast, but might get it down to around 44
Now your not really capable of doing Expeditionary Littoral Maneuver, except with robust support of other nations.  still not a bad capability.

But nope, still too expensive for the government (especially this government).


OK, how about 2-3; everything starts to shrink:
- AAW escorts can come down to 2-3 as well
- 2-3 support ships (make them all the Davies build to save money; in other words, get Enforcers instead of Berlins)
- down to 40 helos total, maybe in the existing two squadrons, or maybe one deployable squadron added
- But we still have the problem of re-org the Army...


So, now we are at 2-3 JSSs (Berlins), and:
- if the stars align, 1-2 Davies build
- 2-3 AAW ships
- 6-10 ASW escorts
- 4 subs
- 28 helos, but no dedicated littoral lift or fire support
- can sort of embark on the Berlins, but not organized around it.
ie, exactly what the plan is.

Although I'd prefer (and as a taxpayer would be willing to help pay for) any of the options earlier in the list, the reality is it is that last option (built around a JSS, which is really just a replacement AOR) that the government is willing to support.

 

[Kirkhill]

Baz,

I appreciate the reasoning but I would prefer to see dollars attached.  My biggest problem in all of these budgeting exercises is the vapour ware that seems to create Canadian cost estimates and the seems to generate numbers at odds with those of our allies.

70,000,000 for Aker to build Svalbard.  460,000,000 for Irving to build AOPS.

As for the Army - I know the Army guys will jump on me for this one - but I thought we already maintained an Army expeditionary battle group.  We just don't have any means to get them where they need to be.

And I don't think there would be a problem finding platoons and companies for independent duties.

One thing that caught my eye though was on the MHs and their equipment suite.

I was under the impression from the beginning of the exercise that the MHs were to be equipped with Roll On Roll Off ASW stations so that the Cyclones could be employed in logistics roles such as Vertrep and troop lift.  Not so?

 

[FSTO]

Like all the ideas tossed about but what needs to happen is complete buy-in from the 2 main political parties (sorry NDP, but I just cannot see you guys taking another run for at least 20 years). We cannot afford to have wholesale changes to our defence and foregin affairs policies every 4 - 8 years. We need a white paper that both parties support now and in the long term.
I think the reason why Oz can do a so much better job than us on defence policy is that they have buy in by both the Liberals and Labour and policy doesn't change that much with a change in government. Also not having the US in your backyard and having a potentially hostile (SE Asia) neighbour in your frontyard helps to focus the national decision makers.
So a white paper and bipartisan agreement is a bare minimum for a coherent and sustainable Canadian Defence Policy.

 

[Kirkhill]

Agreed FSTO

But as dim as the politicians might be I have developed a sense that within the Forces there are many folks that fight their corner to demonstrate that the only option is their option.  That doesn't help guide the politicians to anywhere useful.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Those are all good missions, and realistic, ArmyRick. And I wish people would stop getting me wrong: I would support such mission (anybody who reads my posts knows that I was amongst the first to suggest we should jump at getting the Mistrals that became available), but we have to understand what it entails. And then, we have to see if our masters in Ottawa think the cost is worth the price. So far they said no.

I am putting my comments in yellow in you "perspective" below, ArmyRick. They are meant as constructive and for the purpose of helping the discussion. For that purpose, I will assume that we are talking two mMistral types (one per coast)

The army perspective

What type of force do we need substituting "would we like" would be more appropriate to land and to do what mission

I see the following as realistic missions for an amphib ship
-Support humanitarian missions (lets get the liberals all excited)
Agree: But in the last 15 years, we have done three of those, Florida, New Orleans and Haiti. Is it worth spending $2b on ships and $100M per year on O&M funds.
-NEO
Again, agree: But the only one we have ever had to do would have been Lebanon. They needed evacuation now. The French, Italian and Dutch who were all near took one to two weeks to get their ships there. If starting in Canada, you can add another two weeks. Is it worth it at that time - unless we are already in the area by sheer coincidence)
-Missions like Somalia that were reasonable proximity to sea shore (Could the amphib act as a floating service support base?)
Absolutely the amphi could act as service support base. In fact, you may recall that the AOR Protecteur actually did provide such support, with the Sea King helicopters and Navy/Air Force team being at the airport first to inspect the landing strip and ensure the air traffic of the ops.
-NATO joint exercises (with the USMC, Royal Marines, Dutch Marines, etc) I see these as not just exercises but a display of capabilities
Totally agree: For me, that would be the first and foremost reason to acquire. But can the army afford it? Such exercise usually last three weeks in the simulated landing area, add the trip there and back for the army, plus the prior training in all phases to get ready for it, which would include your final point of boot stomping exercise. All told it would be like doing one of your brigade level ex every time. Can it be fitted as extra in what you do now?
-Supporting some sov ops in the North (during the balmy months of the year perhaps?)
Again, agree fully. In fact, Arctic sov is probably one of the best reason to acquire the capability: a lot easier to have a ship that can travel there to fully support an army group and its attached air assets than to deploy them separately by air and have to fly in all the support materiel as things unfold.
-CANSOFCOM probably has a list of things they could do with it but can not tell us.
Then I won't tell either ... but I know what they could do with the capability  .
-Assistance to SAR missions (like Flight 111 air disaster? Floating Rescue base? RCMP, Medics, etc operating off one ship?)
That one is unlikely. What was required for Swiss Air 111 was mostly divers support and underwater exploration gear. We already have other vessels (diving tender and MCDV) that can do that.
-Of course a few boot stomping exercises with good old ground pounders (like me)
Agree. As mentioned somewhere else above, we naval types always enjoy trying to guess if you guys are green in the face because you have applied your camo paint, or not   

You do not need a special unit, just create battle groups or company groups, etc from existing Brigades. You may need to coordinate things for the Pathfinder cell in Trenton and combat engineer divers to adapt/develop procedures for operating with these ships

 

[FSTO]

Likely true.
I just wish there were few more Louis St. Laurents and a lot less Liz Mays in the HoC. The St.Laurents would be able to come up with a coherent vision and tell the CAF to get on with it.
But instead we get empty headed rhetoric like "Return to our Peacekeeping Roots" and Defence of the North in a Sustainable Manner".

 

[Baz]

One thing that caught my eye though was on the MHs and their equipment suite.

I was under the impression from the beginning of the exercise that the MHs were to be equipped with Roll On Roll Off ASW stations so that the Cyclones could be employed in logistics roles such as Vertrep and troop lift.  Not so?

Sort of so... there is potentially a bunch of different configs, and the can be fitted for up to 22 seats, but...

(Disclaimer: I'm pulling the seat counts from memory, so they may be one or two off.)
Full ASW has 6 seats.
The first things out would be the sonar and the sono launchers, which would give you 12ish.  This would be a SAR or Naval lift config.
Pull the console and you're up to 20ish.  There is still an avionics rack you want to keep.
Pull the rack and your up to 22, but lose a bunch of things like any ability to use the mission computer.

However, there is no planned config with the antennas pulled, including the radar.  Therefore, it's not really "troop lift," it's administrative lift.

So what I was alluding to was to have all the aircraft clean configed (with a cover for the radar and a couple of other things), but wired to accept the mission kit.  Another option would be to have green (and painted green?) aircraft without the wiring, which would save money but lower flexibility.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks again Baz, and FSTO, I agree with you on St-Laurent and May.

OGBD:

I enjoy picking on you because I know the feeling is mutual.

WRT the requirement to maintain a deployment capability. Your own statements describe the number of missions we (Canadians) have actually undertaken in the absence of a dedicated capability.  We maintained a capability in Europe for a lot longer and did a lot less with it.

There were politicians, not so long ago, arguing against the purchase of the C17s and the upgrade of the C130s on the grounds that they didn't want them sitting at the end of the runway doing nothing.  One even went so far as to say that if he were elected he would sell off the C17s.  He didn't want to be anybody's fire brigade.

I have no doubt that if Mistrals, DeWitts, Rotterdams, Bays, Enforcers, Canterburys, Absalons, Crossovers were available they would get good use.

 

[Kirkhill]

Tangent from 2006 on the C17s

Harper government may face rough ride over military purchase

For Brian Mulroney and Jean Chretien, the military albatross that dogged their tenures was helicopters. For Stephen Harper, if he follows through with a major spending announcement this week, it could be airplanes a very large, military cargo plane, one of the largest in the world.

BY CANWEST NEWS SERVICE JUNE 12, 2006


OTTAWA - For Brian Mulroney and Jean Chretien, the military albatross that dogged their tenures was helicopters.

For Stephen Harper, if he follows through with a major spending announcement this week, it could be airplanes a very large, military cargo plane, one of the largest in the world. The debate over those plans could be the hot potato that threatens a political firestorm.

Harper is expected to announce a plan to purchase four massive, C-17 military cargo planes at a cost of $2.5 billion. The purchase will be unusual for another reason because it's expected to be sole-sourced that means no competition from other companies to bid on the massive contract.

That will be good news for Boeing, the American manufacturer of the C-17, as well as for the Bush administration. The purchase is expected to be unusual for another reason it will be government-to-government, in what is known in the defence industry as a Foreign Military Sale.

Already, this has sparked the expected political outrage from the Liberals and the Bloc Quebecois, who have serious questions about how buying direct through the U.S. government will deprive the Montreal-based aerospace industry of billions of dollars of lucrative industrial spinoffs in the coming decades.

Harper and his senior cabinet ministers have deflected the political criticism so far, but more serious trouble is brewing on another crucial front: the federal public service believes buying the C-17s is a bad idea and is going public with its concerns.

When the Ottawa Citizen reported earlier this month on the Conservative's plan to buy C-17s, the federal bureaucracy rebelled in another time-honored way: someone leaked an internal Public Works Department document to the Liberal opposition that suggested bureaucrats were getting political pressure from Harper himself to speed up military equipment purchases.

''During the recent election, much was said about the need to improve the capabilities of the Canadian Forces,'' said a two-month-old Public Works backgrounder.

''It is important that the government announce concrete actions and results before the summer. It is also essential that announcements be made in such a way that the broad stakeholder community is fully engaged; that military procurement is seen to be a fair process; and that there is broad public trust in the outcomes of change.''

The document also revealed Harper had formed a steering committee of top cabinet ministers ''to co-ordinate all government action plans'' to craft a ''new and streamlined process for military procurement.''

The document echoed similar leaked memos from the 1990s that showed Chretien had formed a secret cabinet committee to oversee the purchase of a replacement for the aging fleet of Sea King helicopters a smoking gun many critics said provided evidence of political meddling.

Alan Williams, a retired federal public servant who knows more about buying military hardware than just about anybody else in official Ottawa, said the plan to buy C-17s without competition is a bad deal for taxpayers because it robs the government of all leverage in negotiating.

''So politically it's not smart, business wise it's not smart. It's not good for anyone in the military. The only thing potentially it does is allow the government to say, 'look we bought something,''' said Williams, who left the Defence Department in April 2005 after six years as the assistant deputy minister materiel, a job that put him the eye of the storm over every large military equipment purchase including the politically charged $3-billion Sea King replacement.

Before that, Williams spent five years overseeing all federal government contracts as the assistant deputy minister in the Public Works Department.

''It's easy to guess, well, we like C-17s. But you don't know until you test the marketplace whether or not it is the best product,'' Williams, who is writing a book on the lucrative business of federal government contracts, said in an exclusive interview.

If the Conservatives buy the Boeing plane directly through the U.S. government, they will pay a three- to five-per cent premium on the purchase price as the standard ''brokerage'' fee that accompanies such purchases, he said.

Canada will also lose leverage over negotiating the lucrative extras the maintenance contracts and other high-priced spinoffs the Canadian aerospace industry could benefit from. In his 33-year-career in the public service that spanned Conservative and Liberal governments, Williams said he could not recall any major military equipment purchase that was sole-sourced.

But there's another question: does the military even need C-17s?

Gen. Rick Hillier, the chief of the defence staff, has said Canadian troops in Afghanistan have a more pressing need for shorter-haul tactical transport planes to replace the aging fleet of Hercules, as well as helicopters and armoured trucks. Hillier has said the Canadian Forces can meet its needs for now by continuing to rent long-range transport planes on a case-by-case basis.

In a bitter exchange at the Commons defence committee last week with Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay, Liberal defence critic Ujjal Dosanjh accused the Harper government of putting its own political agenda ahead of what the military really needs.

''What you've done is introduced the political agenda into this, of buying the C-17s ahead of the tactical lift,'' Dosanjh charged.

MacKay made a telling deviation from the standard response line other Conservative cabinet ministers Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, Industry Minister Maxime Bernier, Senator Michael Fortier and Harper himself have taken in the last week in fending off questions about the C-17 purchase. Instead of saying the government has made no decision yet and it is hypothetical to discuss buying C-17s, MacKay essentially confirmed the plan at the end of a vigorous line of questioning from Dosanjh.

''C-17 is not needed in Afghanistan,'' Dosanjh charged.

''That's your opinion,'' MacKay replied, without denying it was on table.

At NATO's 2002 Prague summit, Canada entered into a 15-country agreement that gives it access to a pool of large long-distance planes, mostly leased from Russian firms.

The plan entitles the Canadian Forces to 150 flying hours per year on Russian-built Antonov long-distance cargo planes.

Canada is guaranteed access to two Antonovs on 72-hours notice, and is entitled to six aircraft over a nine-day period, Williams said.

Asked whether he thinks Canada's newfound interest in C-17s is political, Williams replied: ''It would be hard for me to fathom a reason why the bureaucracy would want to do it this way.''

An ill-fated helicopter deal played a major role in ending nine years of Conservative reign in 1993, as the Chretien Liberals derided the Conservative's so-called "Cadillac" purchase of $5.8-billion worth of Cormorant helicopters to replace the Sea Kings. The Cormorant deal became a key election issue in the campaign that ultimately brought the Liberals to power.

But over a decade, Chretien's decision to cancel the Cormorant contract dogged him as a paper trail emerged that made a compelling case that political meddling was at the root of the delay in replacing the Sea Kings.

If Harper buys the C-17s, the political fallout too would hound him for years to come, Williams predicted.

''He's going to be on the defensive forever.''

Ottawa Citizen

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