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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
It was mentioned earlier as I recall and I am talking about the AOP's freshwater valves.
I don't like sounding like a Irving shill but some things are blown out of proportion. I'm sure everyone in the Canadian marine industry has an Irving story they like to tell. Spend enough time around shipyards, the Navy, the Coast Guard, or the offshore sector and you'll hear no shortage of tales about mistakes, delays, welds, inspections, and things that supposedly went wrong. The problem is that many of these stories get repeated so often that they eventually become accepted as fact, even when the details have been exaggerated, taken out of context, or were never accurate to begin with.

Irving has had its share of screwups, but so has every major shipyard in the world. Building modern warships is one of the most complex manufacturing activities undertaken anywhere, and every yard has dealt with construction defects, rework, design issues, schedule delays, and cost growth at some point. The difference is that with Irving, every issue seems to become part of a larger narrative that the yard is somehow uniquely incapable, while similar problems elsewhere are viewed as normal shipbuilding challenges.

I sail on the Harry DeWolf class regularly. The ships have had issues, just like any new class. Some were self imposed, some resulted from systems that met the original specification but perhaps should have been more robust, and some were simply lessons learned through operational experience. Even some of the issues commonly blamed on Irving were not actually Irving's fault. The potable water valve issue is a good example. Irving supplied valves that met the approved specification and standards at the time. The problem arose when Health Canada changed the allowable lead content requirements for drinking water systems, making the alloy used in those valves slightly above the new standard. One day the valves were compliant and accepted, and the next they were not. That was a regulatory change, not evidence of poor workmanship or defective construction. People drink the water every day, the ships still sail, been to the Arctic, Northwest passage, Asia, Antarctica, Europe.

The same applies to many of the rumours that continue to circulate. For years people have repeated stories about blocks being three inches misaligned, systemic quality failures, and ships supposedly riddled with defects, yet hard evidence is rarely produced beyond low resolution photos and second hand accounts. If there is a documented defect, discuss the defect. If there is a proven quality issue, discuss the quality issue. But a blurry photograph and stories that have been circulating for a decade are not evidence of systemic failure.

Everyone has an Irving story. That does not mean every Irving story is true. Criticism is fair when it is based on facts, evidence, and documented findings. What is not helpful is treating dockyard folklore, hindsight, and social media speculation as proof that an entire shipbuilding program is flawed. Irving has made mistakes, just as every shipyard has made mistakes, but the discussion should be based on what can be proven, not on rumours that grow a little bigger every time they are retold.
 
We had a whole conversation on I think this thread (or perhaps the AOPS thread) about how the first mega block had a section of it that was out across the entire ship by ~10mm. Which worked out to 6-5mm on each side. OGBD pointed out that this is pretty standard for first of class, to the point where shipyards all have tried and true methods to correct said mistakes.

The biggest issue is plumbing lining up which requires rework.

However ship two and all the rest after didn't have that issue. It was fixed.
I don't know how that error turned into 3" as 25mm is one inch.

Are we going to complain about shipyard mistakes now? Ok Seapan errors:

  • on their first OFSV where the rescue boat was supposed to be recovered they put the sea water cooling system outflow. Which would immediately started filling the boat with very hot water when they tried to recover the boat. The video is both hilarious and infuriating at the same time.
  • Seapan originally designed the OFSV with an engine cooling system, that DIDNT HAVE AN OVERBOARD DISCHARGE. Intake but no discharge, they had already started building.
  • JSS 1 had a lot of modules that didn't quite fit requiring rework
  • designing the ready torp magazine so you couldn't actually get a torp out of it into the hangar without doing an Austin Powers 28 point turn, it was fixed but created more work
  • completely screwing up the cabling for all of JSS 1 causing months of delays to rework and redo

Its pretty standard to have these sorts of errors particularly on first of class. As long as they are caught and fixed.
 
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