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New PLQ/DP2B structure- More modern training

We had a very brief Commando Leaders Course in the late 80's early 90's - I think it lasted two years...

Problem with the mixed course concept for Infanteers is you then end up with the "half" jacks when someone decided due to budget (or who knows why) to kill the tactics side of the course.

Personally I dont give a rat fuck is a Sgt can teach drill - as long as he can shoot-move and comminicate and keep his guys doing the same.  AND I really dont care how well he can recite the roles of the other arms and write down all that crap on paper - can he relate to them in field environment?

I remember writing out (on a PO check) the roles of the other arms at the RCR BSL (day dreaming as to how this will make me a leader, I got a 96% on the PO so I guess I managed to regurgitate it okay on paper - it took me another couple [been 11 now] years to actually figure out how it works in the real world.

Secondly the PTI "module" sorry a 031 Pte can run PT once he has a half day into by PERI staff (or whatever we call the civy contract guys/gal now)

Mil law side of the house - give them an into - it take a MWO to lay charges these days -all the Jack does is write a barely legible statement of occurance.

 
With an Infantry - specific course with the word "commando" or something along those lines in it though, you are in danger of creating a sense of elitism, or esprit de corps, which would make other trades feel bad, and us feel good, and is therefore completely unacceptable.

::)

 
We could counter it with the WOG course - where one has to waddle down to a trough and fill an ice cream bowl full with a DQ swirl - and teach it to others - gain 15 pounds and then get a ice cream cone - that looks like PPF torch to wear on their uniforms.

 
haha - even funnier because I've seen that happen.  I could only imagine the course.... >:D
 
On a basic leadership course, the simplest and most logistically and time effective venue to develop and assess junior leaders is the Section.  It combines stress, exertion, exposure to the elements, and introduction  to the vagaries of the most unpredictable element on the battlefield - our fellow human beings under stress.   No other format could accomplish so much with so little in so short a period of time.  The JLC/CLC/JNCO was NOT intended as msn specific trg.  The skills, drills, and principles learned on CLC are to be adapted and strengthened during more advanced and varied training.

You could equip a course with pointed sticks, black pajamas, rat meat, bags of rice, and learn just as much about the candidates as our CLC crse did in 1978 with live fire platoon attacks.

Back in 92, a German long service NCO explained  how they selected their leaders.  As the conscripts neared their ETS, their bn offered some commisions and others NCO contracts.  Those who did not want to be officers or NCOs were released - no long service Ptes (or Cpl/Ptes as we call them) were allowed.  The ones who wanted to be officers were retained in the bn, given a small silver cord to denote their status, placed on special instruction and development, and assessed by their own bn which - if they liked what they saw - would send him on to more formal trg.

The NCOs were told they would be sent on an 8 week squad leading course to assess basic leadership.  If successful, they would then be sent on a 12 week Leopard  2 crew commander's course.  If successful, they would be promoted to StabsUnteroffizier (MCpl) in the same bn.  If the officer cadets or NCO candidates were NOT successful at any point, they were released.  Only qualified leaders - officers and NCOs - were retained past their basic engagement.  No 25, 35 or 45 year old basic soldiers existed.  Young Privates (mostly conscripts) and older leaders.  Conscripted but well trained soldiers led by volunteer professional leaders.  Asses leadership at a basic (and economic) level, reinforce success with more detailed and specific training.  

Tom

 
I wholeheartedly agree with TCBF, no amount of modern training can be taught or replace leadership AND the ability to adapt. IMO the ability for a junior leader to think on his feet should be a requirement for promotion, not whether he can simply regurgitate a lesson either in class or on the field and can yell at people really loud. I hate hearing the term over and over but the "strategic corporal" concept rings a bell.

 
While TCBF's point is well taken, it must be observed that not everyone asks for a leadership course, and a goodly number of those put on recent courses have released during or immediatly after the course. The leadership courses do not teach you to lead, or even develop that skill, they merely test your ability to "cram and flush" and stay out of the arcs of the WATC nazis.

So, we are not training volunteer leaders, we are just qualifying Cpls, and then blaming failure on them if they fall flat.

The real problem seems to be that there is little incentive to be promoted, given that the raises are small, the treatment from the NCOs is still the same, and there is an exponential rise in responsibility.



 
gate_guard said:
I wholeheartedly agree with TCBF, no amount of modern training can be taught or replace leadership AND the ability to adapt. IMO the ability for a junior leader to think on his feet should be a requirement for promotion, not whether he can simply regurgitate a lesson either in class or on the field and can yell at people really loud. I hate hearing the term over and over but the "strategic corporal" concept rings a bell.

New leaders to think on their feet should be a criteria, huh ? Who is going to assess what tactical decisions are right or wrong ? One of the best things I have heard is "Right or wrong, make a decision quickly" as well as another good one is "The only tactyics that work are the ones that win you the battle".

The leadership EOs are designed to get a new potential leader to think about battle procedure, follow all the steps and then stick to the doctrine and execute a mission. Leadeing a point recce patrol is a great assessment tool IMO. As well leading a quick attack is valuable as well. They are learning tools and do not think that because a soldier has completed PLQ Mod 6 or PLQ INF that he is some kind of tactics god.

Its a starting point for new leaders in the infanty (who go on to become a section 2IC eventually, so they are still being mentored by their sect commander).
 
Problem is NOW - that half the time that Cpl with his Mod 6 IS the Sect commander...

 
Some interesting points, above.

In a volunteer Army competing for talent, we cannot afford the conscript army luxury of keeping only Officers and NCOs for long service.  We have to retain expensively trained Cpls and pay them well.  This creates a problem.  In an army that does not offer adequate enlistment/re-enlistment bonuses, our only method for retention is the pay and benefits package.  And if we pay as much for tech knowledge as we do for leadership responsibility, how do we convince people to ruck up for a CLC, when they can get paid the same as a Cpl4 Widget Tech?

Should we de-link our pay and benefits package from the public service benchmarks?

What else?

Tom
 
I agree that recce patrols, quick attacks and the like are effective ways of guaging a junior leader. They are also the skills on which more complex infantry tasks are based around. My major issue with the course is all of the time that is spent on skills that are not relevant. I believe that that is the general point of the thread. Spending weeks, even days on counselling when that can be covered in previously take mods. Spending time laying a protective mine field, when do not even emply mines. Spending time learning static defensive drills when every modern army in the world is moving away from these tactics. This time could be spend learning more infantry specialized tasks. i.e. convoy drills, more time spent on Fibua, urban patrolling, vcp drills etc. Like many things in our army our leadership course need to be updated to meet the demands of the modern battle field. Not at the expense of fundamental infantry skills but in addition to them.

Your right, a leadership course should not be warm up training. However, particularily for the reserves, warm up training should not be the first time troops, and leaders are introduced to concepts like convoy drills, vcp's etc. But hey im just a young moolitia cpl what do I know
 
PhilB said:
I agree that recce patrols, quick attacks and the like are effective ways of guaging a junior leader. They are also the skills on which more complex infantry tasks are based around. My major issue with the course is all of the time that is spent on skills that are not relevant. I believe that that is the general point of the thread. Spending weeks, even days on counselling when that can be covered in previously take mods. Spending time laying a protective mine field, when do not even emply mines. Spending time learning static defensive drills when every modern army in the world is moving away from these tactics. This time could be spend learning more infantry specialized tasks. i.e. convoy drills, more time spent on Fibua, urban patrolling, vcp drills etc. Like many things in our army our leadership course need to be updated to meet the demands of the modern battle field. Not at the expense of fundamental infantry skills but in addition to them.

What I am trying to get accross is that we have dual objectives - train leaders, and train leaders to use the 21st Century infantry specfic skill set.

When we train realistically on a leadership course, we have accomplished both. When we train for WW2, we might get a good leader, if the instructors are good leaders themselves.

So why not accomplish both?

Rework the program with the skills brought up at ALL of the post course critiques, and replace the instructors with NCOs who have recently returned from tours.
 
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