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Paper on the early use of helicopters in COIN ops

Enjoyable read, but they seem to have missed the fact that in Korea the US Army had attempting to to weaponize helicopters (and after continued) as well as using them for movement - albeit mostly casevac. Which was pre Algeria, and so the author seems to view the French as the innovator, as opposed to taking a concept and expanding on it.
Then of course missing the entire US action in Vietnam that made the Rhodesian efforts look minuscule in relation to them.
 
Enjoyable read, but they seem to have missed the fact that in Korea the US Army had attempting to to weaponize helicopters (and after continued) as well as using them for movement - albeit mostly casevac. Which was pre Algeria, and so the author seems to view the French as the innovator, as opposed to taking a concept and expanding on it.
Then of course missing the entire US action in Vietnam that made the Rhodesian efforts look minuscule in relation to them.

Since the author provides an email address at "Centre de recherche de l’École de l’air et de l’espace (CREA)", which is a French Air Force organization, it may be safe to assume that he is a Frenchman, or at least has a bias towards trumpeting French exceptionalism. And in my experience, Frenchmen are nothing if not arrogant when it comes to boasting about their accomplishments - something they have in common with Americans.

While I didn't do a close study of the paper nor make a detailed comparison of other innovations in the use of helicopters, I could not but help to notice that the Algerian War was a turning point (starting point?) for the French in developing their rotary wing doctrine. I recently finished a couple of books about Dien Bien Phu. While the American experience in Vietnam was the epitome of helicopter warfare, for the French their concept of "vertical envelopment" in Indochina was the use of parachutistes. The French had only a small presence in Korea, they were preoccupied with Indochina, however their use of "ventilators" mirrored, albeit on a smaller scale, that of the Americans.

. . . In the early days of Dien Bien Phu, however, three H-19s were destroyed on the ground by Viet Minh 105mm artillery and one was shot down by AA fire despite the red crosses painted boldly on their fuselage sides (1). As a result, all helicopter flights to the besieged base were suspended in late March.
. . . The potential use of helicopters in combat was not overlooked however and the reinforcements planned for the 1954-1955 campaign included 50 H-19s. On 22 November 1954, the Army formed its own light aviation branch, the Aviation Légère de l'Armée de Terre (ALAT) to operate its own aircraft and helicopters. The veterans of Indochina would form the nucleus of a greatly expanded helicopter force which, over the next eight years, would make the Algerian War the first helicopter war.
 
Enjoyable read, but they seem to have missed the fact that in Korea the US Army had attempting to to weaponize helicopters (and after continued) as well as using them for movement - albeit mostly casevac. Which was pre Algeria, and so the author seems to view the French as the innovator, as opposed to taking a concept and expanding on it.
Then of course missing the entire US action in Vietnam that made the Rhodesian efforts look minuscule in relation to them.
There is a lot written on the US involvement in Vietnam, but not much on other countries involvement there or elsewhere. Perhaps the author wanted to expand on areas less trodden?
 
There is a lot written on the US involvement in Vietnam, but not much on other countries involvement there or elsewhere. Perhaps the author wanted to expand on areas less trodden?
I think @Blackadder1916 hit the nail on the head with the fact below
Frenchmen are nothing if not arrogant when it comes to boasting about their accomplishments - something they have in common with Americans.
 
Enjoyable read, but they seem to have missed the fact that in Korea the US Army had attempting to to weaponize helicopters (and after continued) as well as using them for movement - albeit mostly casevac. Which was pre Algeria, and so the author seems to view the French as the innovator, as opposed to taking a concept and expanding on it.
Then of course missing the entire US action in Vietnam that made the Rhodesian efforts look minuscule in relation to them.
Not to mention the Brits used them extensively in Malaya and then during Op MUSKETEER.

There were others as well...
 
I think @Blackadder1916 hit the nail on the head with the facts below

FTFY

Frenchmen are nothing if not arrogant when it comes to boasting about their accomplishments - something they have in common with Americans.

Gallic air of superiority aside, their use of helicopters in Algeria was a testing/proving ground for new doctrine.

This 1992 CGSC masters thesis, THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR AND FM 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY: A COMPARISON, includes a brief discussion of French aviation in that conflict.

Developing de-centralized command and control for air assets, the French military fielded new American and French helicopters and incorporated them into their methods for clearing insurgent areas and conducting rapid, detailed reconnaissance. The helicopter provided the French the capability to employ their mobile strike groups quickly. In Algeria, the French were positioned to conduct air assaults of up to two battalions at a time almost everywhere.34 Additionally, the French maximized their use of piston-driven, fixed-wing propeller aircraft for close air support (CAS) and reconnaissance. Operating from austere areas, with minimal maintenance, French air assets could maintain constant surveillance coverage over large sections of Algeria. The smaller, more maneuverable aircraft provided excellent fire support to small elements engaged with guerilla elements of the ALN.

FM 3-24 recommendations on air power in the counterinsurgency fight validate French efforts with aviation in Algeria. Building aviation platforms to be mobile, lighter, and capable of multiple roles (reconnaissance, lift, attack), the French maximized their capabilities in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Moving troops and supplies quickly, with little warning kept insurgent forces off-balance and vulnerable to destruction. Constant surveillance limited the ability of insurgent forces to maintain freedom of movement and reduced their ability to mass for attacks. Additionally, the French understood that bombing and aerial attacks alone could not completely defeat the enemy, and often provided the insurgent with issues to be exploited by propaganda. Because targeting is difficult in counterinsurgency operations, the French focused their
airpower efforts on rapid movement of men and material and surveillance.

And for a more detailed analysis, this looks interesting.

Description
Using recently released French official documents and a variety of other sources, this study explains how the French Army, so recently defeated by the Viet Minh insurgents in Indochina, was able to successfully defeat the Algerian nationalist rebels on the battlefield, while nevertheless losing the war at the conference table. This French success, between 1954 and 1962, was due in large part to the superior logistical system of the French Army and the use of the helicopter to enhance French operational mobility. French counter-mobility measures, particularly the construction of heavily defended interdiction zones on the eastern and western borders of Algeria, proved highly effective against the rebels. Such methods essentially cut off the rebel forces from their bases and from sources of supply located outside Algeria, and consequently strangled and destroyed the rebel forces within Algeria.

No other work on the Algerian War focuses upon the role of logistics in the outcome of the conflict. The detailed statistical data and comprehensive description and analysis of the logistical organizations and methods of both the French and the nationalist rebels are supplemented by excellent maps. This study also provides useful insights into the nature of the wars of national liberation and counter-insurgency doctrines that dominated military affairs in the mid-20th century.
 
Another French study (but translated to English) on the subject. It properly(?) places the French experience in Algeria in the evolution of the military use of helicopters.

 
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