- Reaction score
- 13,069
- Points
- 1,160
A contentious point but.....
[ Article ]
This article's factoid of note:
This raises a number of issues.
Assume that 38,500 bodies are making a difference.
First, under Canadian, and more generally ABCANZUS and NATO common practice it requires a standing force of between 154,000 and 231,000 deployables. Plus the service support and transport necessary.
But let's focus on the deployables.
In the greater scheme of things that is not an astonishingly large number of deployables. Divided amongst the nations of the OECD (the 23? richest countries) that works out to about 7500 to 10000 bodies per nation. Split into 4 to 6 groups of 1250 to 2500 bodies.
Curious concept - the numbers start to look like the two Kabul Rotos that just finished.
Second. Suppose the Canadian effort were to be geared slightly differently.
Our "strategy", we have one seems to entail going into a foreign country, serve alongside allies that are also foreigners in that land, train a couple of locals to act a police/military, wish them well and get out as soon as decently possible. All the while doing our level best to ensure that none of our troopies die (not necessarily a bad idea - if somewhat unrealistic and not conducive to building up good relations with locals that were, are, and will continue to die).
What would happen if our "interventions" were base on the following:
Insert a 1500 to 2500 body reinforced battle-group that forms the core element of a 5 group brigade. We supply logistics support and command and control as well as the core element of a Quick Reaction Force. Group 2 would be supplied by somebody like Denmark, Holland or Singapore. Groups 3,4 and 5 would be raised locally, trained and accompanied on patrol by personnel from groups 1 and 2, and would be equipped at the Canadian taxpayers expense.
I have to think it causes some raised eyebrows if you are patrolling in Kevlar helmet and Bullet Proof Vest, complete with ceramic inserts, and have an armoured G-Wagen or LAV to jump into, while poor old Abdul you are patrolling with only has a rusty AK, a blue shirt that seldom gets washed and no radio. I find it interesting to contrast American joint patrols, where unarmored locals are accompanied by American soldiers in "full battle rattle" - I believe that is there term - while on British patrols (admittedly probably only when circumstances permit) British troops not only remove their hard hats and go to berets and balmorals, they also will remove their body armour. They are thus accepting the same risks as those they are asking to locals to accept.
It seems to me that the old kindergarten concept applies here: "I hope you brought enough for everyone, otherwise you can't have it Johnny".
Conversely if Johnny does bring gum for everyone, he is going to make friends awful fast.
And in Canada's case, it is cheaper to train and equip locals to keep the peace than it is to maintain a brigade of $60,000 a year Canadians overseas.
[ Article ]
This article's factoid of note:
This raises a number of issues.
Assume that 38,500 bodies are making a difference.
First, under Canadian, and more generally ABCANZUS and NATO common practice it requires a standing force of between 154,000 and 231,000 deployables. Plus the service support and transport necessary.
But let's focus on the deployables.
In the greater scheme of things that is not an astonishingly large number of deployables. Divided amongst the nations of the OECD (the 23? richest countries) that works out to about 7500 to 10000 bodies per nation. Split into 4 to 6 groups of 1250 to 2500 bodies.
Curious concept - the numbers start to look like the two Kabul Rotos that just finished.
Second. Suppose the Canadian effort were to be geared slightly differently.
Our "strategy", we have one seems to entail going into a foreign country, serve alongside allies that are also foreigners in that land, train a couple of locals to act a police/military, wish them well and get out as soon as decently possible. All the while doing our level best to ensure that none of our troopies die (not necessarily a bad idea - if somewhat unrealistic and not conducive to building up good relations with locals that were, are, and will continue to die).
What would happen if our "interventions" were base on the following:
Insert a 1500 to 2500 body reinforced battle-group that forms the core element of a 5 group brigade. We supply logistics support and command and control as well as the core element of a Quick Reaction Force. Group 2 would be supplied by somebody like Denmark, Holland or Singapore. Groups 3,4 and 5 would be raised locally, trained and accompanied on patrol by personnel from groups 1 and 2, and would be equipped at the Canadian taxpayers expense.
I have to think it causes some raised eyebrows if you are patrolling in Kevlar helmet and Bullet Proof Vest, complete with ceramic inserts, and have an armoured G-Wagen or LAV to jump into, while poor old Abdul you are patrolling with only has a rusty AK, a blue shirt that seldom gets washed and no radio. I find it interesting to contrast American joint patrols, where unarmored locals are accompanied by American soldiers in "full battle rattle" - I believe that is there term - while on British patrols (admittedly probably only when circumstances permit) British troops not only remove their hard hats and go to berets and balmorals, they also will remove their body armour. They are thus accepting the same risks as those they are asking to locals to accept.
It seems to me that the old kindergarten concept applies here: "I hope you brought enough for everyone, otherwise you can't have it Johnny".
Conversely if Johnny does bring gum for everyone, he is going to make friends awful fast.
And in Canada's case, it is cheaper to train and equip locals to keep the peace than it is to maintain a brigade of $60,000 a year Canadians overseas.
