PM's New Bde of Peacekeepers (5,000 new soldiers), could it be a SOC Light Force?

[Kirkhill]

Darn Zipper - I hope you remember to INhale from time to time.

All this sighing going on I'm afraid for your health.  Too much may lead to oxygen deprivation.  ;D

 

[Zipper]

LOL! Good one Kirk.

I meant to say Lt. Gen, but oh well.

How about that budget? I haven't checked to see if there is a separate thread or not, but I'll get there.

Encouraging.

 

[Kirkhill]

Encouraging right enough.

Next up defence review and international policy review then we should have a pretty good picture as to where they are headed.

Not unhappy here 

 

[Zipper]

I will say that I am a little scared about the foriegn policy review. The way they worded it last night (the defense minister was on CBC), the new policy is "all new" which means we are going in a whole different direction by the sounds of it.

Why does that send chills down my spine?

Are we looking at yet another softening of our military (hence all LAV's) role in the world?

 

[Edward Campbell]

I will say that I am a little scared about the foriegn policy review. The way they worded it last night (the defense minister was on CBC), the new policy is "all new" which means we are going in a whole different direction by the sounds of it.

Why does that send chills down my spine?

Are we looking at yet another softening of our military (hence all LAV's) role in the world?

What scared me was in Goodale's speech.   He directly quoted Jennifer Welsh in saying, in the penultimate sentence of his budget speech, that: â ?... A confident people, respected and trusted as model citizens of the world.â ?

That model citizen idea is pure Welsh and if it is being inserted into ministers' speeches then it means that she has won the battle with the banal, boring bureaucrats and our 'new' foreign policy will have pizzazz!   As I have said elsewhere I prefer thoughts and ideas to pizzazz, but then I'm concerned with protecting ands promoting Canada's vital interests in the world, not re-electing the Liberal Party of Canada's latest 'team.'

Welsh is not, totally, against building bigger, better forces but she has some pretty firm ideas about what roles new, improved armed forces might play, for example, this is a contribution she made to one of DFAIT's ongoing policy discourses:

Model citizen

I introduced this idea of the model citizen because I was becoming increasingly frustrated with the idea of Canada as a middle power. It wasn't working for me as a touchstone for my own thinking about Canada's role in the world, but I also think it wasn't providing an inspiration for Canadians about their country's role in the world. I developed the idea of the model citizen out of alternative visions for Canada that we might engage in, in a post 911 world. There's a model of Canada that says Canadian foreign relations should effectively be about Canada-US relations, that that's where our destiny lies. There's a vision of Canada that is Canada as the "new Norway", the lean mean Scandinavian country that brokers peace agreements, that tries to play a niche role in the international system. There's a view of Canada as a wielder of soft power in the international system, often associated with the Axworthy years. And I think I draw a bit from that last concept, but I increasingly think a huge aspect of Canadian foreign policy is simply being what we are, which is a highly successful model of a liberal democracy. And that has a foreign policy function, because it is an incubator of ideas, of models, of experiments in nation-building for other countries around the world. So that's one aspect of modeling.

I use the model citizen and the word "model" as a verb as well. "To model". Not on the cat walk, but on the idea that you model for someone else, you demonstrate, you assist, you instruct. Not necessarily imposing and providing the answer, but helping someone else help themselves. And I see this as a bit of an analogy for what Canada might do in state building and state reconstruction. Again, that's a slightly different approach from what you might see coming out of the United States, it's probably slightly more akin to the European approach to reconstruction. But it is also very uniquely Canadian. We have our unique niche to play. My own view is that Canada's value-added on state building can be in the area of rule of law and issues related to building a judiciary, a functioning Charter, a civilian police force. When I think of where we have expertise, that would be a major area.

The citizen idea, if I can just say a word about that, really comes from viewing the global space as a community with citizens in it. And that Canada will rarely act alone or independently, but will be contributing alongside others - much as a private model citizen might do. So I try to get across this idea in the book of both citizenship and modelling as a way of thinking of Canada.

Using the Model Citizen Concept to Engage Canadians

I think what it does is that it can provide two things. First of all, it can provide a sounding board - does this seem right to you as a way of thinking about our country, or do you have another vision of Canada that you want to engage against this one? I think it's always useful to have a vision out there or an idea out there that people can react to and mold themselves. But I think, secondly, the reason why it's useful is that it's a very participatory concept. Model citizen suggests that you are engaging ordinary citizens as well in your foreign policy.

This step needs to come first. We talk about our values and interests being so important to what we do in the world, but before you can articulate those, you have to have a sense of what you are, and who you are. So it's a nice way for Canadians to engage in that thinking process - "what do we want to be?". And then your interests and your values flow from that. But this primary discussion is very important.

Multilateral Institutions

I think in a sense the Iraq war shone a spotlight on some of the challenges of our multilateral system. I'll mention three of them. The first challenge is that they are very slow moving in their decision-making. We're seeing this now also over Darfour. Because the systems   have developed consensus decision-making, it's very hard to get quick results. As you see in a crisis like Darfour, or even Rwanda, that is just not good enough if you actually want to be able to respond to things that are happening.

The second problem with our multilateral institutions is that they are increasingly being seen as illegitimate, as secretive, as operating according to one code in private, and another code in public. They are not necessarily representative of all the parts of the world; they are influenced by petty politics and aren't generating the outcomes people would like to see.

The last problem facing multilateral institutions is the challenge that the United States poses. How do you manage a multilateral system when you have one very powerful state? I would argue this isn't a new problem, but it's a particular configuration of that problem.

Those are some of the issues facing multilateral institutions. I think some of the solutions lie most obviously with reform: thinking about a different membership for some of our key bodies, like the United Nations. Also investigating leaner decision-making procedures, actually segmenting the type of problems that come to foreign organizations - where certain issues would require full consensus, others you might be able to move with a subset of players in the organization to allow us to respond more rapidly to some of these crises.

I think the last problem is in a way the hardest to solve. But there is a solution for it, and that is to reengage the United States in the multilateral system by reminding the United States of why multilateralism is important and can work. It is to demonstrate that it's a way for the United States to minimize risk, to share burdens. That's an incredibly pragmatic argument to be making, especially in the current environment. Multilateralism is way of sharing the spotlight when things go bad, but also when things go well, and of sharing the burden. For a super power that has interests all over the world and doesn't have unlimited resources, that burden-sharing message might be a way of reengaging the United States.

In her recent book she praises the niche role which, she says, Norway plays in the Western Alliance and suggests that Canada should not, indeed, perhaps cannot have general purpose combat forces.

I am not opposed to all or even most of Welsh's ideas; but I hope that her views will be balanced by those of the banal, boring bureaucrats, including the uniformed bureaucrats (heavily armed civilians as Evelyn Waugh dubbed the military HQ staff) led by Rick Hillier.

 

[big bad john]

I will say that I am a little scared about the foreign policy review. The way they worded it last night (the defense minister was on CBC), the new policy is "all new" which means we are going in a whole different direction by the sounds of it.

Why does that send chills down my spine?

Are we looking at yet another softening of our military (hence all LAV's) role in the world?

Any time I hear the words Politician and review, I start to perspire.  And they say the enemy is the terrs.  lol

 

[Kirkhill]

In her recent book she praises the niche role which, she says, Norway plays in the Western Alliance and suggests that Canada should not, indeed, perhaps cannot have general purpose combat forces.

I've said it before and I'll say it again ;D

If we put into defence and foreign aid proportionately what the Norwegians put in then I would not be unhappy.  With their level of funding we would currently have about a 23 BCAD defence budget and a 7.9 BCAD aid budget (1.9% and 0.665% of GDP respectively) - CIA world fact book 2003 data and today's exchange rate USD to CAD.

Please dear lord, let us be like Norway - niche would have a whole different meaning with budgets like that.

Cheers, 

 

[Zipper]

Please dear lord, let us be like Norway - niche would have a whole different meaning with budgets like that.

There's a vision of Canada that is Canada as the "new Norway", the lean mean Scandinavian country that brokers peace agreements, that tries to play a niche role in the international system.

I agree with this to a point. Norway has many less people then we do and is not (I think) a member of the G-8. So their economy cannot play anything BUT a niche roll.

We are capable of spending more on our military and still be able to have our social programs (like Norway). But we are going to have to get away from this idea that must have lower taxes. We cannot have our cake and eat it too. We either drop the social programs and become more like the States (shudder), or we raise taxes (and like it) and be able to fund our military like the Scandinavian counties who in essence have their cake, and nibble too.

Otherwise. I'm afraid of the new "review" as I said.

 

[Kirkhill]

I has one eighth the number of people we do. (Make that one seventh)

It is not a member of the G8, nor a member of the EU.   It is a member of NATO.  

When I say that we SHOULD try to emulate Norway I mean that in its entirety.   Norway only commits NICHE forces to its international alliances.   Its forces first and foremost are designed to defend Norway.   While they have reduced in size since 1989 and reorg'd since 9/11 the current structure looks like this:

Army - Peacetime - 15,000 (CE = Canadian equivalent based on a 4.5M population vs a 32M population - 107,000)
Army - Mobilized    - 89,000 (CE 632,000)

Navy/Coast Guard - Peacetime - 8,000 (CE 57,000)
Navy/Coast Guard - Mobilized - 22,000 (CE 156,000)

Air Force - Peacetime - 7200 (CE 50,000)
Air Force - Mobilized -   20,000(CE 142,000)

Homeguard(Militia) - Peacetime - 600 (CE 4200)
Homeguard(Militia) - Mobilized - 83,000 (CE 590,000)

The Army operates Leos, M109s, M113s, CV90s and Bv206s as well as Helos

The Navy owns 3 Frigates and 6 subs as well as 14 Fast Patrol Boats (multiply by 7 to get to an equivalent Canadian Number = 21 Frigates, 42 Subs, 100 Fast Patrol Boats)
The Coast Guard Operates some 20 Patrol Vessels, some of which are Ice-Strengthened - CE = 140

The Air Force operates 6 Orions, like us supporting 42 CP140s,    6 Hercs (again 42 CE) and 58 F16s (406 Cdn Equivs)

And all of this capability is done on a budget just a little over twice ours.

Or putting this another way - they have a peacetime establishment equivalent to us supporting 240,000 bodies and in war we would have to be able to mobilize 1,500,000 people to match them.

http://www.mil.no/languages/english/start/
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/i-tekster/20.htm
http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/aktuelt/taler/statsraad_a/010051-990115/dok-bn.html

Again I say - dear lord let us be like Norway - in fact send the Norwegian Ministry of Defence over here would you

 

[Zipper]

Jeez I like raising issues and then letting Kirk or Majoor do all the homework. I love you guys... :blotto:

So with that comparison made. Where does the CAF stand now? It would be nice to compare those numbers above with what we have now.

 

[R031button]

I think you guys are forgetting one key thing about Norway; conscription. I've talked to someinternational students from Norway; they sptent one year serving at the equivilant to $30 a day; this is in a country with a minimum wage of $20 an hour (before good old socialist taxes of course). I don't think anyone here wants to be in that perticular kind of a military.

 

[Kirkhill]

No, not many Canadians would like to be in a military like that.  From what I can gather it seems not many Canadians would like to be in any military .

On the other hand consider conscription as a "tax contribution in kind" or if you prefer "sweat equity".  One way or another the Norwegian economy pays for that size of defence establishment.  For the average Norwegian male it is comparable to forgoing a year of wages.

If Canadians don't like the thought of actively defending their country themselves then they could pony up the equivalent cash to hire somebody else to do the work for them.

With conscription in Norway they funnel 1.9% of their GDP into defence.  Without conscription it would be some what higher.

Either way the Norwegians invest more into their Armed Forces than we do and get a lot more out of their investment.

 

[Kirkhill]

As to the comparison:

Canada 1.1% of GDP    Norway 1.9%
Canada 13 BCAD          Norway (as Canada) 22 BCAD
Canada 82,000 Civilians and Regs        Norway (as Canada) 214,000 Civilians and Regs
Canada 22,000 Reserves and Militia     Norway (as Canada) ~1,300,000 Reserves and Militia (590,000 Homeguard Militia and the remainder Reserves)

Canada 16 Auroras            Norway (as Canada)   42 P3 Orions
Canada 32 Hercs              Norway (as Canada)    42 Hercs
Canada ~80 CF188s          Norway (as Canada)   406 F16s
Canada almost 3 subs        Norway (as Canada)   42 subs
Canada 16 DDH/CPF          Norway (as Canada)   21 frigates going towards 35

Etc............

look up the tanks, guns, apcs etc and do the math.....

Cheers.

 

[pbi]

In her recent book she praises the niche role which, she says, Norway plays in the Western Alliance and suggests that Canada should not, indeed, perhaps cannot have general purpose combat forces.

I have not read the book, but IMHO this is not an accurate description of NO forces: they are most definitely "general puropse combat forces": all of the combat functions are present in their land, sea and air forces, and they are quite capable of conventional combat on their own soil. What the NO forces are not, again IMHO (but with some experience...) is "expeditionary": there is no really significant NO tradition of military ops outside the homeland except for fairly low-risk UN ops (until recently in Afgh).

I am a foe of "niche" forces: that is to say forces that are only tailored to deliver a certain circumscribed or incomplete set of combat capabilities, or are only designed to function in a very particular geographic or operational situation. I believe that we have no way of predicting 100% accurately exactly what will be asked of us in the future, or when, or where. Therefore, while we may not posess the"Cadillac" degree of capability in each combat function, we must IMHO posess eaxh function itself. I am particularly concerned to see the apparent disappearance of air defence from "Shield": as the French learned in Cote d'Ivoire, and as the increasing use of UAVs indicates, one can never be sure there will be no air threat.

Cheers

 

[Edward Campbell]

Thanks, pbi.   I haven't seen the Norwegians since the days of AMF(L) and the CAST 'brigade,' but what you say squares with my own recollections.

I enjoyed Kirkhill's Norway/Canada side-by-sides but it is important to bear in mind that Norway grew up in a rough neighbourhood, with Nazi Germany as a conqueror and Stalinist Russia as a neighbour.   A strong, popular (or populist if you prefer) focus on home defence is, probably, natural for Norway and, since 1917, unnatural for Canada â “ it's been a long, long time since we last hear â ?Fifty-four forty or fight!â ? from our neighbours.

My personal preference, in recent years, has been to use an idea I stole, quite shamelessly, from a Patricia: Kent Foster.   I argue that we may not, probably should not be in the military major leagues but, given that by any sensible measures of 'power' we are, now, in the world's top ten and, even after China and India (and maybe Brazil and one or two others, too) elbow their ways into the big leagues, will remain in the global top 10%, we are not playing in the sandlot leagues either.   We should be, I argue, a Triple A nation and we need (and this is the bit I lifted from Kent Foster) Tripe A armed forces:

1. Appropriate for one of the world top nations â “ able to protect and promote our vital interests on the global scene;

2. Available whenever and wherever needed â “ this points to the requirements for strategic 'lift' and sustainability; and

3. Adaptable, because the planners â “ PCO, DFAIT and DND â “ always get it wrong.   (I know, I was one!).

To me that means: general purpose, not niche.

As a bonus, we should add one more 'A' for Affordable.

 

[a_majoor]

I enjoyed Kirkhill's Norway/Canada side-by-sides but it is important to bear in mind that Norway grew up in a rough neighbourhood, with Nazi Germany as a conqueror and Stalinist Russia as a neighbour.  A strong, popular (or populist if you prefer) focus on home defence is, probably, natural for Norway and, since 1917, unnatural for Canada â “ it's been a long, long time since we last hear â ?Fifty-four forty or fight!â ? from our neighbours.

What our chattering class needs to realize is the "neighbourhood" has grown up around us. Events in the Middle east are "next door", and how long will it take before events in Uzbeckisthan have a direct impact on us?

My personal preference, in recent years, has been to use an idea I stole, quite shamelessly, from a Patricia: Kent Foster.  I argue that we may not, probably should not be in the military major leagues but, given that by any sensible measures of 'power' we are, now, in the world's top ten and, even after China and India (and maybe Brazil and one or two others, too) elbow their ways into the big leagues, will remain in the global top 10%, we are not playing in the sandlot leagues either.  We should be, I argue, a Triple A nation and we need (and this is the bit I lifted from Kent Foster) Tripe A armed forces:

1. Appropriate for one of the world top nations â “ able to protect and promote our vital interests on the global scene;

2. Available whenever and wherever needed â “ this points to the requirements for strategic 'lift' and sustainability; and

3. Adaptable, because the planners â “ PCO, DFAIT and DND â “ always get it wrong.  (I know, I was one!).

To me that means: general purpose, not niche.

As a bonus, we should add one more 'A' for Affordable.

This should be the basis for all DND planning.

 

[big bad john]

Isn't Canada next door to Russia and China?

 

[Kirkhill]

That's authorized strength as per the CF web site.  Actual strength is 52-55,000 regs

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about/family_e.asp

You know you really do have to learn how to use Google.


As to the aircraft, I think we bought 138 CF188s and we have about 80 runners, 32 C130s and about 19 runnable with about half of them flyable at any one time, 21 CP140/140As  of which IIRC only about 16 are undergoing the refit.

The numbers are close.

 

[S McKee]

Has anyone heard any rumours about the Regt getting back together, or is this just more of "Taylor's Take" on the news?

History repeats itself with airborne regiment


By SCOTT TAYLOR / On Target

LAST TUESDAY, with as much fanfare and advance hype as Prime Minister Paul Martin's wounded minority government could muster, the Liberals' long awaited policy review on Defence and international affairs was made public.

Initiated back in 2003 when the Liberals governed with a firm majority, the policy review had quickly become the standby response to explain the government's inaction on Defence procurements.

No matter what shortcomings were revealed in the national press - helicopters, armoured vehicles, uniforms, etc. - the Defence minister of the day simply had to look bored, hold out his hands, and explain in a condescending manner: "We are conducting a full-scale policy review, which is due to be released in the fall of 2004."

However, by the time that magical date finally came and went, the Liberals had taken a beating at the polls and were left clinging to a fragile minority. Then, Martin's staffers began "leaking" out word to the Ottawa press corps that the review conducted was "unacceptable" and that a complete rewrite was in the works.

The date of release of the new white paper was pushed back to as late as the spring of 2006. Then along came a series of damaging allegations at the Gomery inquiry.

With testimony of kickbacks and corruption in the sponsorship scandal, public support for the Liberals plunged and the opposition parties started talking about bringing down the minority government.

In a desperate attempt to demonstrate to Canadians that his cabinet could still effectively govern (or possibly to deflect attention away from the Gomery inquiry), Paul Martin rushed out the policy review.

When details of this much-anticipated, two-year blueprint for Canada's national Defence and Foreign Affairs policies was revealed, it was found to be lacking one important criterion: details.

Despite this, newly appointed Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier was his charming best as he carefully walked the media through the Liberals' proposals.

As previously outlined at his change of command ceremony, Hillier intends to establish a central command structure to better facilitate operations at home and abroad, purchase ("off the shelf" if possible) vital equipment such as strategic airlift planes and heavy-lift helicopters, and expand the capability of the elite JTF2 commandos.

It was again announced that the Canadian Forces will recruit an additional 5,000 regular troops and add another 3,000 reservists to their ranks over the next five years. After all of these previously publicized initiatives were reiterated, journalists were left scratching their heads and asking: "So what's new in here?"

Well, one of the few nuggets of heretofore unannounced "new" developments turns out to be another case of Back to the Future (or of history repeating itself).

In addition to increasing the manning levels of the JTF2 and adding to its integral combat support, transportation and intelligence capability, General Hillier talked about the establishment of an elite battalion to augment the commandos.

This new unit would be based on a light infantry battle group, manned with the fittest and most dedicated soldiers, and would need to be highly mobile in order to serve as a rapid reaction force to global hot spots.

So let's see now. "Light infantry" means no armoured vehicles, and "rapid deployment" would best be facilitated by paratroops.

In other words, the Liberal government is planning to re-establish the very same airborne regiment it disbanded in disgrace almost exactly 10 years ago.

After the Canadian Airborne Regiment's disbandment, the army brass maintained a limited airborne capability by forming three separate parachute "jump" companies.

These were attached to the light battalions of their parent regiments in the Royal Canadian Regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Royal 22nd (Vandoos) Regiment.

This very same system of far-flung jump companies had been attempted in the 1950s until it was deemed to be "unworkable." The solution was to create a single airborne regiment to fill the hole as Canada's rapid reaction force.

The more things change ...

 

[George Wallace]

From the article, I would say ST let his imagination get loose on him along a sticky tangent, but not on a wider outlook of things to come.  Perhaps we are headed in an "Air Cav" direction with all those new choppers being mentioned?  Perhaps we are going to create a "Special Recce Force" like the Brits seem to be doing with their SAS; a Force midway between Regular Rifle Infantry and JTF, with other specialized functions, perhaps linquistic or ethnic?  The imagination is not limited to what ST thinks.  The possibilities are endless.....well within reason fiscally.  ;D