Preparing for NATO’s Failure

[ruxted]

Link to original article on ruxted.ca


Preparing for NATO’s Failure

Several recent reports1 indicate that efforts by Canada and others, including the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, himself to convince NATO members to beef up their military contributions to Afghanistan or, at least, to reduce some of the restriction on the use of the troops which are already there, have fallen short.

Some commentators2 suggest that if NATO cannot succeed in its first major ‘out of area’ mission then NATO, itself, might become increasingly irrelevant.

The Ruxted Group made the case, nearly a year ago, that NATO was in danger of moving from a cornerstone of Canada’s foreign and defence policy to being a stumbling block.

Some other recent articles3 have suggested that we need a replacement for NATO – an ‘alliance’ able to act for the United Nations when military operations are beyond the skill set of the UN’s staff – which almost any operations requiring the use of force will be. The Ruxted Group has also suggested such a solution to the perceived problem with NATO. In essence, Ruxted proposes that Canada should push for a new ‘alignment’ of like minded, modern democracies and traditional allies4 which can provide a military C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) ‘superstructure’ around which multi-national military forces can be assembled to execute complex UN mandated operations.

The time is ripe, we believe, to resurrect this proposal.

NATO heads of government will meet in Romania in April 2008. Defence Minister McKay has already signalled that Canada wants action on Afghanistan. The problem with Minister McKay’s statement is that there is no “or else.” It is time for Prime Minister Harper, in our parliament, to start setting out the “or else.”

He (Harper) has indicated that there will be another debate in parliament between end January 2008 (when John Manley’s group reports) and the April 2008 NATO meeting. During that debate he (and his ministers) should:

1. Issue a clear warning to NATO that it risks failure – with all the consequences attached – unless it steps up and ‘wins’ the Afghanistan counter-insurgency campaign.

2. Invite leaders of those ‘like minded, modern democracies’4 to consider if they might be willing to work more closely together, to replace NATO, the next time the UN calls for a mission lead organization.

At the April 2008 meeting, regardless of the outcome, Canada should:

1. Admit that it is not without sin when it comes to shirking its alliance responsibilities.

2. State that it will not participate in any future NATO military operations if the notorious ‘national caveats’ are still going to be put in place by e.g. France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

3. Announce that it favours having ‘competitive’ military command structures available to the United Nations so that the best command system can be put in place for UN mandated mission. NATO will, surely, be one of the options available to the UN but it should not be the only choice.

NATO remains an important and, for Canada, useful ‘window’ into Europe. It provides Canada with an irreplaceable ‘seat at the table’ in Europe, too. But, Europe is no longer a region of primary importance to Canada – we care, just as much, about East and South Asia, the Middle East and West Asia and, above all, the Americas. NATO is just one tool in our kit – as we have said it is no longer the ‘cornerstone’ of our foreign policy.

Canada should not threaten to withdraw from NATO but it should make it clear that it has reservations about NATO’s ability to organize and conduct ‘out of area’ military operations.

ISAF highlights one of NATO’s weaknesses. NATO is a ‘Eurocentric’ organization and some – probably most – 21st century problems will require broader, more global solutions. Traditional allies, like Australia and New Zealand, and newer friends – like minded nations – like Sweden are all participating in ISAF even though they are not NATO members. We need to make it easier and more comfortable for non-NATO nations to participate in UN sanctioned multi-national endeavours.

But, ‘out of area’ (out of NATO’s area) operations are likely to be the wave of the future. As former Defence Minister Graham said, “the dangers of the Cold War have been replaced by new and evolving threats, threats caused by failed and failing states, by global terrorism, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and by instability.”

Canada wants to lead, it is in our national interest to lead. NATO appears less and less able to provide a platform from which we can lead. NATO needs to be augmented, indeed, it needs some good old fashioned competition. Canada should take the lead in organizing a competitive, global, 21st century ‘alignment’ of nations which can conduct complex multi-national military operations on behalf of the United Nations.

The Government of Canada should, now, follow its own advice. In the recent throne speech, Governor General Michaëlle Jean enunciated her government’s proper goal when she said: “our Government will continue Canada’s international leadership through concrete actions that bring results.”


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1. See, for example: Report: Dutch general advises government to reduce presence in Afghanistan, Secretary Gates this week is expected to press the alliance to supply more trainers for the Afghan police and Army, a key to countering resurgent violence there and NATO allies offer troops, resources for Afghan mission
2. See, for example: NATO in Afghanistan: A Test Case for Future Missions and NATO's future on the line
3. See A new global force and An Anglosphere Future
4. Some or all of Australia, Denmark, India, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States might be candidates for this group.

 

[geo]

+1 Ruxted

The "anglo" alliance & it's friends will have their day

 

[karl28]

                    I honestly in my opinion think that NATO should rethink who gets to stay as members based on who contributes to the combat role of the mission in Afghanistan .    What's the point of having an alliance of nations when only a few of the members due the dangerous work ?

 

[geo]

Let's face it.  NATO is more of an EUROFORCE than anything else.  Possibly, it should be relabeled accordingly.
NATOs day has come and gone - same as happened for SEATO.

Time to come up with a new formula.

A "Commonwealth multi-national force" that includes the US & some other old & dear friends would probably more effective in the long run...  Time for a new Empire?

 

[Greymatters]

Hmmm, the article fails to address Russia's increasing military activism (or should I say, a return to previous levels of military activism), the whole point upon which NATO was formed.  What is Ruxted's opinion on this?

 

[karl28]

geo

    I am in agreement with you on  a new  alliance .  I would like to see one done up with  Canada , USA , Great Britian ,  Japan ,  Australia as a corps  foundation  .    Maybe  some of the other  new  members could be  included from the  Middle east  so that way we could have a location to keep an eye on Iran  and have accesses to major oil facilities .     
          Regardless of what we think  Oil will be a major source of problems  in the near future  until we can reduce our reliance to it . 
The main thing that would have to be stressed in this new  alliance is that when on a major operation like Afghanistan  as an example they would all have to contribute combat operations to hold on to there member status .  You could even call this new Alliance the G.A  Global Alliance

 

[a_majoor]

Hmmm, the article fails to address Russia's increasing military activism (or should I say, a return to previous levels of military activism), the whole point upon which NATO was formed. 

Europe might be well advised to get their act together for Europe, but Russia will attempt to use the energy card as the trump against Europe, rather than the military card. Europe will be in a massive bind anyway; depending on energy from a hostile Middle East or a hostile Russia is hardly a choice, and they no longer have the military, economic or diplomatic muscle to do anything about that.

Canada can certainly retain membership in NATO as well as an "Alliance of the Willing", and turn her attention to particular problems using the appropriate vehicle.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, from today’s Globe and Mail is an indication that: NATO is failing and NATO is probably doomed to fail – in Afghanistan and in other dangerous, deadly ‘out of area’ mission – which is what Sudan/Darfur will be when, not if, it comes:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071102.wafghanconference02/BNStory/Afghanistan/home

Infighting among NATO members snarls Afghan mission, ex-commander says

DOUG SAUNDERS

From Friday's Globe and Mail
November 2, 2007 at 4:35 AM EDT

LONDON — Chaos and competing goals among NATO nations involved in Afghanistan are preventing progress there, according to the British general who commanded the Afghan mission until February.

"The nations contributing to [the NATO mission in Afghanistan], together with the Afghan government, have yet to agree, and to start efficiently implementing, a coherent strategy," Sir David Richards told a conference of leaders yesterday organized by the Canadian government in London.

Gen. Richards was frank about the reason for this deterioration: "General Dan McNeill, the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] commander, has too few troops to conduct the operation in a manner that meets the basic rules of a counterinsurgency campaign."

One senior official experienced with the war said that "we need at least a doubling of ISAF presence - and probably a lot more than that - if we are to achieve the minimum goals of the campaign." There are currently more than 41,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan.

Canadian officials, in off-the-record interviews, acknowledged that the nation-building and aid efforts run by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military efforts led by General Rick Hillier are poorly co-ordinated and that top officials are increasingly at odds with one another.

Gen. Hillier was criticized by officials from the office of Prime Minister Stephen Harper on Wednesday for saying it will be at least a decade before Afghanistan is able to field a military capable of managing its security on its own.

But most officials say privately that, at current troop and funding levels, there is little chance of any lasting progress in the conflict-ridden south of Afghanistan, where Canada's 2,500 soldiers are headquartered.

NATO's former top general, Klaus Naumann, agreed yesterday with Gen. Richards that too few of the troops in Afghanistan are in combat roles. When he was in Afghanistan last year, he said that NATO could at best deploy no more than 5,000 troops to combat roles and had no reserves available with which to escalate military operations.

"NATO nations have to end the lukewarm way they handle these conflicts," he said in an interview after a presentation to the Atlantic Treaty Association, a meeting of academics, diplomats, military officials and policy makers from the 26 NATO member nations taking place this week in Ottawa. He said if Canada withdrew its 2,500 soldiers, it would leave the cohesion of the military alliance in "big jeopardy."

In private conversations, NATO commanders generally agree that the number of troops are inadequate for the task of stabilizing the south enough to bring in effective governance, as is the amount of aid funding, which is less than that devoted to the much smaller nation of Bosnia during the war there in the early 1990s.

Canadian officials say they are alarmed by the lack of progress in building a functioning police force, which was considered a basic step in the reconstruction mission.

"There are more Afghans at work, there are more Afghans at school, there are more Afghan police forces on the streets, there are more Afghan army units working side by side with ours," said Arif Lalani, who has been Canada's ambassador to Kabul for the past six months. "But the biggest challenge, and one we hear about most, is the police. We have a long way to go on police."

There is a feeling among many leaders that coalition partners, especially the United States, led the Afghan people to believe they could expect a level of nation-building that will be impossible to deliver on the current budgets and troop levels. Some officials said that Afghan expectations need to be lowered.

"We have said a lot of things to the Afghan people that we have not delivered on," one senior official said. "You don't make promises you can't deliver on, and I think everyone here knows that we've done that too many times."

Gen. Richards spoke of "the current, rather balkanized situation, in which each nation - understandably - wants to succeed in its province, but sometimes, sadly, at the expense of the operation as a whole."

Senior officials said Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been unable to build an effective government because he has become frustrated by the conflicting agendas of member nations. He reportedly told one senior official, "The international community has to decide what you want me to focus on."

Canadian officials acknowledged that the need to change the approach to Afghanistan, and particularly in the balance between military objectives and social nation-building goals, is urgent.

"I think we need to have a transformation in some of the key files," said Mr. Lalani, the ambassador. "If you look at education and you look at the health sector ... we can build on the success. On other files such as police, governance, corruption, counternarcotics, I think we need actions that are going to transform those files."

Mr. Lalani and his colleagues spoke optimistically of progress being made in Afghan society, and Gen. Richards said that officials now have a better understanding of the Afghan situation. But he added "we have yet to translate that understanding into a coherent, complementary implementation of what are currently many different plans and priorities."

"The perception as well as the reality in the south [where the Canadians and British are fighting], and to a lesser extent in the east, is certainly less good." Gen. Richards said.

"Here, the picture is one of slow progress, broken promises, unmet expectations and poor security."

With a report from Alan Freeman in Ottawa

NATO’s problem is not military – French and German soldiers are just as capable and brave, etc as American and Dutch soldiers; French and British generals are just as able as British and Canadian generals. The problem is political. France and Germany, the French and German peoples, don’t want to be in Afghanistan – especially not doing anything that even remotely resembles supporting George W. Bush’s ill conceived ‘Global War on Terror.’

Because NATO is a full fledged, formal alliance, with all manner or legally binding rules, politics must take pride of place when military operations are conducted.
 

 

[Greymatters]

Karzai's comment makes a good point though - with limited budget and resources you cant meet all the demands of seperate plans and actions being put forward by all contingents at once.  Although it makes him look like the tool so many anti-war groups claim him to be, he cannot meet every one's expectations by only partially funding and partly supporting 20 different projects, which is made more difficult by countries threatening to hold back their contributions and resources if their plans aren't run the way they want them to be.

 

[tomahawk6]

http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/subscriber/editorial/story/4066827p-4669322c.html

Waterloo for NATO

Mon Oct 29 2007

THE Dutch are debating whether to withdraw their troops from the hot zone of southern Afghanistan and move them to the safer and more comfortable coffee shops of Kabul and northern Afghanistan, where their German, French and Italian fellows-in-arms -- if one can call them that -- from NATO sit out the war.

The configurations of the Dutch debate have come to include Canada and were raised at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in the Netherlands last week. The Dutch fear that if they withdraw from the war zone, where they, along with Canada, the United States and Britain, bear the bulk of the burden of actually fighting the Taliban, that would lead to an abandonment of the war, an effective if unofficial surrender to the terrorists.

The Dutch are probably right. At the NATO meeting that ended Thursday, Germany made it clear that it has no intention of putting its more than 3,000 soldiers in harm's way in Afghanistan; the French offered a few airplanes to help out other NATO allies who have troops on the ground; and the Italians were not to be heard from. The Danes, however, did offer about $1.5 million to buy video equipment that would enable NATO to document Taliban atrocities and show them on European and North American television screens. Such is the mighty fighting force, the solid alliance that once was NATO.

A Dutch withdrawal would certainly heat up the debate over Canada's role in Afghanistan, already a controversial issue in this country. If it were to happen and no other NATO ally were to step up to take the place of the Dutch, it would create an almost irresistible pressure on the federal government to follow suit.

That would, in itself, be a disaster for Afghanistan and an insult to the sacrifice that Canadian soldiers have made there. It may already, however, portend an even worse disaster in the long run than that -- the end of NATO as an effective military alliance.

For a time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO appeared to have lost its bearings -- there was no enemy to fight anymore. But it found its footing again during the Balkan wars when it did what the United Nations would not; when it expanded its membership into the central and eastern European nations; and extended its mandate to a global scale, from Kosovo to the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan. But the lean-on-me part of an alliance -- which is integral to the very nature of NATO -- must be mutual throughout its membership. In Afghanistan it is not, and in the Netherlands last week some of NATO's original and most powerful members, such as Germany, France and Italy, indicated that they don't much care. Under those terms, NATO itself cannot survive. With a Russia resurgent and increasingly bellicose, they may come to regret their apathy in Afghanistan.

 

[pbi]

I think E.R. has it right:

NATO’s problem is not military – French and German soldiers are just as capable and brave, etc as American and Dutch soldiers; French and British generals are just as able as British and Canadian generals. The problem is political. France and Germany, the French and German peoples, don’t want to be in Afghanistan – especially not doing anything that even remotely resembles supporting George W. Bush’s ill conceived ‘Global War on Terror.’

Because NATO is a full fledged, formal alliance, with all manner or legally binding rules, politics must take pride of place when military operations are conducted.

The "old NATO" nations signed up to something that was, IMHO, understood by their electorates to be about defending teir homelands against the Soviet Hordes. This was relatively easy to accept at one time in history (although there was always left-wing political resistance to it in most European countries...), but as the Warsaw Pact threat declined, that raison d'etre began to dwindle, conscription was cut back or abolished, and defence expenditures slashed.  I don't believe that most Euro electorates ever imagined that being in NATO meant fighting a war in SW Asia. On top of that, in the "old NATO" nations, anti-US sentiments have been on the gradual rise for years, spiking dramatically during OIF.  I think that, just like the Canadian electorate, there is a blurring of Iraq and Afghanistan in many European minds. Fighting in Afghanistan just doesn't sell in France, or Germany, or Italy, and the militaries of those countries must obey their elected govts, not the wishes of NATO. That's the problem.

Cheers

 

[tomahawk6]

The only good that has come out of a NATO presence in Afghanistan is that it has freed up US ground forces for Iraq. Next year if progress continues the draw down in Iraq will begin. Which will allow for the US to add additional forces as required. As long as the north remains quiet the allies wont pull out. If the Dutch leave the US can replace them so not a big loss from a tactical standpoint but it would be a PR hit for the coalition.

As the ANA fields units capable of independant operations they probably will move into the hot provinces which will enable the UK and Canadian troops to act as a rapid reaction force. In time it is hoped they will handle all security with ISAF providing logisitical support. I am optimistic about Afghanistan. The taliban/AQ are taking a beating. The problems we are having in Musa Qala are directly related to General Richards essentially surrendering a key town to the Taliban that we must now retake by force. His command tenure will not want to be repeated after McNeil leaves so Washington will exercise a veto of who the next commander will be. I would prefer a US General but would be comfortable with a Canadian or Australian General.Link below is to a nice map of Afghanistan and zones of control of ISAF.

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf

 

[ArmyRick]

Maybe the nations of US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand can form a new alliance? I know we already share lessons learned and some doctrine stuff throough ABCA.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think part of NATO’s problem is precisely that it is an alliance. An alliance is a formal, political organization – the members are bound together by a treaty. Treaties impose obligations and provide options and ‘opt outs’ – caveats, for example.

The great strength of ABCA, AUSCANZUKUS and CCEB – as examples – is that they are NOT alliances. They were created and are maintained by national chiefs of staff – there are few rules and fewer restrictions. They do what they agree, amongst themselves, to do. There are no ministerial meetings much less ‘heads of government’ or ‘plenipotentiary’ meetings.

As the ABCA site says: “...the focus of the Program is on interoperability, defined as: the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks." When you stop and think about it that’s most of what we need to conduct operations. What’s missing is a tiny slice of NATO: the part that plans and mounts operations. I will defer to serving officers, but my SWAG (Scientific Wild Assed Guess) is that a combined (multi-national) and joint (multi-service) staff of less than 50 can do whatever is necessary – because most of the really hard work (J1, J4 and J6) will be, of necessity, sub-contracted out to nations and coordinated by the ‘affiliated’ combined & joint staff.

 

[George Wallace]

I think part of NATO’s problem is precisely that it is an alliance. An alliance is a formal, political organization – the members are bound together by a treaty. Treaties impose obligations and provide options and ‘opt outs’ – caveats, for example.

The great strength of ABCA, AUSCANZUKUS and CCEB – as examples – is that they are NOT alliances.

Sounds good, until you added this contradictary statement:

As the ABCA site says: “...the focus of the Program is on interoperability, defined as: the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks."

Still, it does show the different problems faced in the various Alliances, Associated Partnerships, Agreements of Understanding, etc. that bind many of the Western Nations in relative peace.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Notwithstanding what the twits who write the booklets say: There is no ABCA treaty; ABCA is not an 'alliance' in the proper (NATO) sense of that term. ABCA (and all the related groups) are creatures of the respective military chiefs of staff; they have no 'treaty' status - they are absolutely informal arrangements which do not bind the nations at all. That's why they work as well as they do.

 

[tomahawk6]

I think thats the way forward. Ad hoc coalitions to accomplish one specific aim. For other operations the US may have to build a diplomatic coalition to support a military operation.

 

[Edward Campbell]

But not too ad hoc, please. We do need ways and means to develop, maintain and use interoperable C[su]2[/sup] (in the broadest sense of that term). That means we need some sort of a small, tight core staff around which we can, quickly, build a HQ and a multinational force.

I wasn't there, but I heard, on the rumour net that the ad hoc multinational HQ for Desert Storm was a bit of a nightmare - waaaaay too ad hoc.

One key, I think is to keep national force commanders out of the combined (multinational) HQ. National commanders, with all their rights and duties, are an essential part of a combined operation but the HQ must serve the commander and the formations and units - regardless of nationality. What that means, inter alia is that 'big' force contributors do not, as a matter of right, get a big 'slice' of the HQ.  It may be that a major troop contributor to an operation will not have very many officers with the language skills, staff experience and, above all, familiarity with the combined force staff procedures - they must not be allowed to clutter up the HQ with largely useless senior staff officers.

 

[geo]

+1 Mr Campbell...
Ad hoc only results in having a bunch of people "come as you are" with very little preparation.
Not a good formula for success.

 

[tomahawk6]

The definition of ad hoc is "for this purpose". Any military operation that I can think of will have a US headquarters already in place. Most if not all of our dotcoms also have allied officers on staff so we are hardly talking about something put together on the fly - except maybe the coaltion members.