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Preserving Army Fleets

What should the Army "hand me down" to the reserves? An LSVW? The Coyote?

The M113s. The Bisons. Gut them of all the fancy gadgets and swap the M113s metal tracks for rubber bands.

They would still have provided useful (amphibious, all-terrain) transport in low threat environments. And been air portable.

Wouldacouldashoulda.

Face it. The real reason the Army didn't want to do it was because the storage costs would have detracted from the funds available to buy new kit for the Regs.

The Reserves need their own advocates. And their own budget.
 
Face it. The real reason the Army didn't want to do it was because the storage costs would have detracted from the funds available to buy new kit for the Regs.

Is that the reason? Do you have something to prove that, or are you just pulling it out of thin air.

Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.
 
I think the CAF fails to realize that industry will inform you when you've reached extreme obsolescence.

We're just really bad as country at seeing it coming and acting before hand.

Look at our last Protecteur class AORs. At the end we were using eBay and Florida scrap yards to keep those old gals going.

In a perfect word we would have set replacement dates and the process for replacement would begin at the delivery of the last piece of current equipment.
 
swap the M113s metal tracks for rubber bands.
Canadian M113 have not used metal tracks in many years. You really don’t understand the state of the fleets that you are proposing to keep.

Yes systems still need to be supported, it's useless to keep equipment we do not have parts, but look at the C3, we didn't have parts, but we had a need and found companies who are now making new barrels, etc... for us. If we need it, industry can find a way, if we wanted to sustain the Coyote, I would place money the GDLS would find a way if we asked.
We can also burn money. That and paying a premium for custom parts on unsupported fleets are not conducive to maximize the benefits of defence dollars.
 
Is that the reason? Do you have something to prove that, or are you just pulling it out of thin air.

Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.

In this instance I will cite the absence of evidence as evidence of absence. It conforms to a long standing pattern of money NOT being spent on reserve capabilities and PYs being allocated to support of Regular activities at the expense of reserves. And further, the tendency of the Army to cut Reserve spending, everything from dedicated vehicles, to parade days and transferring workable kit from the reserves to the regs.

I can tell you without hesitation that a functioning 50 year old pickup truck would make section more functional than a section with no transport at all. :)
 
Is that the reason? Do you have something to prove that, or are you just pulling it out of thin air.

Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.
Okay, let's give some examples, USAF B-52, upgraded, rebuilt a hand ful of times, well past its service life, still a useful peace of kit, ditto for F15, and 16. On the ground side the M1 and leopard 2 are 1980s vintage. Still going strong after many upgrades and rebuilds. C3 howitzer fleet is 60s vintage, we are still making parts to keep them going.


Old fleets can still work and kill, we lack the will to make it work, and the leaders who are happy with good enough rather then having the latest and greatest. This current conflict has shown our forces would last weeks in a high Intensity fight. We have no spares, our two tiered training of reg and reserve is only going to bite us in the ass. As long as we continue with the status quo, our forces will never be ready for a major conflict.
 
Canadian M113 have not used metal tracks in many years. You really don’t understand the state of the fleets that you are proposing to keep.


We can also burn money. That and paying a premium for custom parts on unsupported fleets are not conducive to maximize the benefits of defence dollars.
Would it be custom parts though? If we gave the Coyote to GD and said strip it and rebuild it, pretty sure it could be modernized with parts currently readily available.
 
Canadian M113 have not used metal tracks in many years. You really don’t understand the state of the fleets that you are proposing to keep.

No, I don't. I do know that we have rationalized the elimination of dam near everything to the point we have dam near nothing. Just ask the Ukrainians. I wouldn't be surprised if they start donating used Russian kit to us after this is all over.

We can also burn money. That and paying a premium for custom parts on unsupported fleets are not conducive to maximize the benefits of defence dollars.

And there we can agree. It does come down to money. And we could always do with supplying you folks more of it.

But I am with FJAG when I say that, in my personal opinion, the money that is allocated to DND could be apportioned differently to greater effect by better utilizing the authorized Reserve PYs and structure and revisiting the Command and Institutional structures.

As an example. We have apparently joined the Brits and Yanks in operationalizing trainers. You apparently have done a very good job training Ukrainians to train regulars, reserves, territorials, volunteers and Special Forces. How about applying some of those skills at home with your own citizens?
 
In this instance I will cite the absence of evidence as evidence of absence. It conforms to a long standing pattern of money NOT being spent on reserve capabilities and PYs being allocated to support of Regular activities at the expense of reserves. And further, the tendency of the Army to cut Reserve spending, everything from dedicated vehicles, to parade days and transferring workable kit from the reserves to the regs.

I can tell you without hesitation that a functioning 50 year old pickup truck would make section more functional than a section with no transport at all. :)
As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F. When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.
 
Okay, let's give some examples, USAF B-52, upgraded, rebuilt a hand ful of times, well past its service life, still a useful peace of kit, ditto for F15, and 16. On the ground side the M1 and leopard 2 are 1980s vintage. Still going strong after many upgrades and rebuilds. C3 howitzer fleet is 60s vintage, we are still making parts to keep them going.


Old fleets can still work and kill, we lack the will to make it work, and the leaders who are happy with good enough rather then having the latest and greatest. This current conflict has shown our forces would last weeks in a high Intensity fight. We have no spares, our two tiered training of reg and reserve is only going to bite us in the ass. As long as we continue with the status quo, our forces will never be ready for a major conflict.


I'll add to that with this article from this week


There is no definitive plan to end the service life of the Little Bird,” he said. “The H-6 platform was officially introduced in 1966. While the majority of these aircraft were eventually phased out of service, ARSOA identified a significant utility in keeping the airframe in service. With continued maintenance and upgrades, there is currently no service life end in sight.”

These upgrades consist of a “zero-time” aircraft primary structure, he noted.

“Zero-time refers to the amount of time on the aircraft at upgrade,” Slinker said. “As with many military vehicles, ‘new’ doesn’t always mean new. For example, previous iterations of upgrades to the H-6 platform required modifications to an airframe that may have been 40-plus years old. Zero-time means the structure of the aircraft will be ‘brand new’ off the line with no flight time logged.”

The pricey aviation items that often eat up Special Operations Command’s budget are on the other side of the spectrum with the Little Bird, he noted, including CV-22 Ospreys and MH-47G Chinooks.

“That’s just a monstrously different order of magnitude,” Aboulafia said. “Even if you wanted full up, replacement Little Birds, … you’re talking about maybe $5 million an aircraft … as opposed to the $70-something-million for a CV-22.”

He added: “They’re cheap and cheerful. So why not have them on hand?

The Little Bird represents a niche capability that gives the platform longevity, Aboulafia said.

“Every so often you find aeronautical niches that are built that way,” he said. “You just sort of stake out this position [and] no one really comes after you in any meaningful way and you defend it.”
 
The M113s. The Bisons. Gut them of all the fancy gadgets and swap the M113s metal tracks for rubber bands.

What are the Res F infantry platoons supposed to do with them? Are all the skills preceding "learn to get in and out of box" mastered and routinely confirmed?

All the discussions of Res F should at least start with the BTS and an accurate number of available training days, and see whether anyone can actually progress to the point of learning (and retaining knowledge of) mounted drills in the time available. If no-one's estimate ever gets that far, no-one needs to worry about Res F APC fleets.
 
Those are all platforms that were "zero-timed" - so essentially a new vehicle; akin to the LAV 3 to LAV 6.0.

Apples and oranges from a "hand me down."
 
As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F. When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.

I'll take that one as read DAP. But how much of the lack of a Reserve Plan is the lack of Force Wide Plan, or even a stated Intention, that lasts longer than the CDS of the Day? And how much is the quality of the leadership of the Reserves themselves?

I am letting my frustrations get the better of me this morning. This discussion and its variants always bring out the worst in me. The questions and answers are all rehearsed many times over and the monkey is still chasing the weasel round that mulberry bush.

The one conclusion we all continually draw is that there is no conclusion. The world will continue as it has.
 
What are the Res F infantry platoons supposed to do with them? Are all the skills preceding "learn to get in and out of box" mastered and routinely confirmed?

All the discussions of Res F should at least start with the BTS and an accurate number of available training days, and see whether anyone can actually progress to the point of learning (and retaining knowledge of) mounted drills in the time available. If no-one's estimate ever gets that far, no-one needs to worry about Res F APC fleets.

You previously suggested that Bv206s/NTVs/DAMEs/Bisons should be held in Service Battalions and Transport Companies. I agree. Put the M113s and Bisons into warehouses co-located with the Service Battalions.

And the Infantry can get in an out of the back of the box when they need to go somewhere. Just like they can get in and out of helicopter on the ground, a boat on a beach, an aircraft on a runway or a ship at a dock.

Now, if you're talking about dismounting from an M113 or a Bison in a high threat environment with the enemy shooting at you as you dismount on the objective then my tendency would be to say "Don't do that!"

First things first. Supply taxis to move troops and their gear where they are needed.
 
Those are all platforms that were "zero-timed" - so essentially a new vehicle; akin to the LAV 3 to LAV 6.0.

Apples and oranges from a "hand me down."

Only because they are used after being "zero-timed". There is nothing to say that an M113A4 TLAV with rubber bands couldn't have been "zero-timed" to its last production configuration, dried out and put into long term storage with a portion of the fleet drawn from stocks for training and operations to keep the fleet refreshed and to reduce skill fade by driver/mechanics.
 
Would it be custom parts though? If we gave the Coyote to GD and said strip it and rebuild it, pretty sure it could be modernized with parts currently readily available.
Only because they are used after being "zero-timed". There is nothing to say that an M113A4 TLAV with rubber bands couldn't have been "zero-timed" to its last production configuration, dried out and put into long term storage with a portion of the fleet drawn from stocks for training and operations to keep the fleet refreshed and to reduce skill fade by driver/mechanics.
Setting a vehicle fleet life back to day 1 is a major project and costs comparable to buying new vehicles. What do we do without to finance the re-life of an antiquated fleet? Then what else are we doing without to fund the life cycle costs of keeping the fleet in service?

You previously suggested that Bv206s/NTVs/DAMEs/Bisons should be held in Service Battalions and Transport Companies. I agree. Put the M113s and Bisons into warehouses co-located with the Service Battalions.
Now you are introducing infrastructure costs to house and store these preserved fleets in a usable condition.
 
I think Hellyer bought something like 1100-1300 M113s and Lynxes.

The US still uses them. There are thousands still in service.

In the U.S. Army, the M113 series have long been replaced as front-line combat vehicles by the M2 and M3 Bradleys, but large numbers are still used in support roles such as armored ambulance, mortar carrier, engineer vehicle, and command vehicle. The U.S. Army's heavy brigade combat teams are equipped with approximately 6,000 M113s and 4,000 Bradleys.

The M113's versatility spawned a wide variety of adaptations that live on worldwide and in U.S. service. These variants together currently represent about half of U.S. Army armored vehicles. To date, it is estimated that over 80,000 M113s of all types have been produced and used by over 50 countries worldwide, making it one of the most widely used armored fighting vehicles of all time.[7]

M113 production was terminated in 2007. The Army initiated the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program to search for a replacement. In 2014, the U.S. Army selected BAE Systems proposal of a turretless variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to replace over 2,800 M113s in service.[8] Thousands of M113s continue to see combat service in the Israel Defense Forces, although as of 2014 the IDF was seeking to gradually replace many of its 6,000 M113s, with Namers.[9]

The Dutch are donating M113s to the Ukrainians along with the Americans. And their M113s came out of service a decade or so ago. They have been kept in environmentally controlled warehouses, like our Leos were, for use, sale or donation.
 
Setting a vehicle fleet life back to day 1 is a major project and costs comparable to buying new vehicles. What do we do without to finance the re-life of an antiquated fleet? Then what else are we doing without to fund the life cycle costs of keeping the fleet in service?


Now you are introducing infrastructure costs to house and store these preserved fleets in a usable condition.

Absolutely. TANSTAAFFL. It costs money to maintain a defence. The question is how little can we get away with.
And the cheapest solution is vehicles you don't use and troops you don't pay. Even with the cost of warehouses and offices.
 
There's like 400 threads on CAF vehicles, can we get back on track (pun fully intended)?

- Milnet.ca Staff
 
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