Preserving Army Fleets

[Infanteer]

And the cheapest solution is vehicles you don't use and troops you don't pay. Even with the cost of warehouses and offices.

Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force. I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.

 

[McG]

Are thread splits still possible?

 

[Kirkhill]

Warehouse costs about $20 per square foot to build - steel structure upper end.
Bison is 21x8.5 ft or 178 sq ft
178 x $20 = $3560 per vehicle
Assume a 70% loading efficiency and you are looking at about $5000 per vehicle.
Assume 199 Bisons still available and you are now looking at a modest 50,000 sq ft (5000 m2) warehouse costing just about $1,000,000. Co-locate with a reserve service battalion at something like the Roper Street Armouries in Edmonton and you have minimal cost supervision and training. You could put all the existing Bisons under cover for 20 years for less than the cost of one new ACSV from GDLSCda.

A similar facility would house all the Coyotes.

Etc.

 

[FJAG]

Most of that structure is repurposed to look after the new fleet. The new fleet needs LCMMs, supply managers, and shelf space at the depots. There is an opportunity cost to keeping our garbage.

One man's garbage is another's prized possessions. This is why thrift shops exist everywhere.

No one is arguing for "garbage". I was quite precise about talking about equipment that was still serviceable. Hell, our fleet of reserve force 105mm howitzers is about to enter its seventh decade of service. And yes, they do have maintenance issues for a number of reasons. Korea still has some 800 of them which they've modernized and self propelled by mounting them on a truck with new sighting systems.

We already have LCMMs for this gear. Yes we'd need a few more for a new line but that's a handful of people. Shelf space? Give me a break. We can find accommodation for 17,400 administrators in some 28 locations in Ottawa (some of which is half empty) but we can't find a warehouse and some supply folks to stock truck parts?

Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.

We both know that there is no chance in hell of that because the metrics are greatly skewed in favour of disposal over increased capability for the reserve force. Think about the regular force. We disposed of critical kit needed to function operationally, from AD to anti-armour to tanks (at one point) because we assume the capability they bring to the force is either not necessary or will be provided by someone else.

We'd rather spend money on having several thousand Class B chairwarmers in Ottawa than providing equipment that would help the training and retention of Class A reservists because the perception is that they are really not that necessary for the defence effort.

I'm kind of with @Kirkhill on this one. This topic clearly shows the divide that exists between a large portion of the RegF leadership and the Class A reserve community. I'd like to think that the divide is between those that think day-to-day and those that think long term but that in itself is skewing the issue a bit.

Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force. I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.

And there it is! Let me guess though ... you do spend money on house, life and car insurance.

As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F. When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.

And here I have to agree (although I reserve on the issue if its truly the "biggest enemy", but an enemy it is, and I'll say that having sat at the big boys table for almost a decade.

At worst, I can say that you don't get to that senior leadership table until you've taken a healthy dose of the "regular force Kool-aid." Even there an unhealthy amount of effort is tilted in favour of the Class B crowd (and during Afghanistan, quite rightly the Class C soldiers). There's a tendency to accept reg force push back on issues without enough critical analysis and most of that analysis comes from the RegF and Class Bs. I'm not saying that these are bad folks but there is a very clear situation where the Class A members and their purpose and needs have a low priority.

At best I can say that at the most senior ResF level is that they have very little authority to initiate or effect change. Most are advisors and not commanders. They generally have little staff, if any, and have come up through a system that does not provide them with the fundamental knowledge to allow them to navigate the highly specialized bureaucratic structures that exist within DND. It does not surprise me at all that reform initiatives, even when started, stagnate. Most of my time on Chief of Reserves Council was being fed briefings at the end of a fire hose with very little requirement that we actually made decisions. At most we offered the various project managers/directors some off-the-cuff feedback.

I'll close by saying this. Most of the people around that table were very smart business men and women who were highly knowledgeable in their day jobs and quite talented (a few were career Class Bs or transferees from the RegF). It disappointed me then and now about how little impact we really had.

Finished with the steps. Off to the model railroad.

 

[McG]

Warehouse costs about $20 per square foot to build - steel structure upper end.
Bison is 21x8.5 ft or 178 sq ft
178 x $20 = $3560 per vehicle
Assume a 70% loading efficiency and you are looking at about $5000 per vehicle.
Assume 199 Bisons still available and you are now looking at a modest 50,000 sq ft (5000 m2) warehouse costing just about $1,000,000. Co-locate with a reserve service battalion at something like the Roper Street Armouries in Edmonton and you have minimal cost supervision and training. You could put all the existing Bisons under cover for 20 years for less than the cost of one new ACSV from GDLSCda.

A similar facility would house all the Coyotes.

Etc.

Plus utilities, plus PILT, plus building & vehicle maintenance.
Plus the fleet re-life costs and the continued fleet lifecycle costs.
Plus the pay of the fleets equipment management team (LCMM, supply manager, etc).

You keep waiving your hands to demonstrate how cheap you think this can be, but you have not come around to explaining what you propose give-up to cover the costs.

Shelf space? Give me a break. We can find accommodation for 17,400 administrators in some 28 locations in Ottawa (some of which is half empty) but we can't find a warehouse and some supply folks to stock truck parts?

You are wishing away the problem. The depots are stuffed. If your proposal is to open a new depot, then from where do we take the funds to pay for a new depot?

 

[MilEME09]

You are wishing away the problem. The depots are stuffed. If your proposal is to open a new depot, then from where do we take the funds to pay for a new depot?

Depots are full(I'm skeptical of that) because we closed 90% of them, we only have 7 CFSD in Edmonton, and our depot in Montreal. Edmonton is tiny, Montreal is larger by far but we have a very reduced storage capacity compared to pre 1990

 

[McG]

Depots are full(I'm skeptical of that) because we closed 90% of them, we only have 7 CFSD in Edmonton, and our depot in Montreal. Edmonton is tiny, Montreal is larger by far but we have a very reduced storage capacity compared to pre 1990

Whinging about impacts of 1990's budget cuts will not create depot space today. If you want new depots to keep old vehicles, then those depots are new costs that need to be covered from anywhere.

Also, what were the other 90%? That would be 18 depots close.

 

[KevinB]

Yes systems still need to be supported, it's useless to keep equipment we do not have parts, but look at the C3, we didn't have parts, but we had a need and found companies who are now making new barrels, etc... for us. If we need it, industry can find a way, if we wanted to sustain the Coyote, I would place money the GDLS would find a way if we asked.

Admittedly the C3 was the one piece of kit I think should have been divested.

 

[Kirkhill]

Plus utilities, plus PILT, plus building & vehicle maintenance.
Plus the fleet re-life costs and the continued fleet lifecycle costs.
Plus the pay of the fleets equipment management team (LCMM, supply manager, etc).

You keep waiving your hands to demonstrate how cheap you think this can be, but you have not come around to explaining what you propose give-up to cover the costs.


You are wishing away the problem. The depots are stuffed. If your proposal is to open a new depot, then from where do we take the funds to pay for a new depot?

OK. if we are going to continue playing silly buggers then I would ditch 2 CMBG and Petawawa and retain 1 and 5 Brigades. I would also ditch all but 2 divisions. One for operations and the other for training and crisis response.

Does that help?

And dry warehousing in a 10C environment with the lights off, an onsite security system supplied by part timers that are already on the premises, purchased for cash and self-insured (it is the Government of Canada after all and it is not as if you are going to go out and buy replacements for storage losses) is going to be very low cost.

It is time for me to stop.

The Mulberry Bush still stands.

Cheers for now.

 

[Underway]

So the M113 fleet got a big upgrade a few years back to turn them into TLAV's with an extra road wheel, rubber bands, new power pack, some of them got the old Grizzly Turrets (I'm sure someone will correct my errors in memory on this), .

The LAV ACSV program is going to replace the Bison and TLAV's to consolidate the fleet so arguing about keeping platforms is moot at this point. We might be better off doing what we did with the Cougars and offloading sending them to Ukraine. I'm sure the TLAV's will find some use and commonality with the other M113's being sent.

There is literally no vehicle task that TLAV's and Bison used to do that will not be replaced by the ACSV program. And as such there is no need to retain the older vehicles anymore, and there are huge arguments to simplify the supply chain for the the CAF overall.

 

[MilEME09]

Whinging about impacts of 1990's budget cuts will not create depot space today. If you want new depots to keep old vehicles, then those depots are new costs that need to be covered from anywhere.

Also, what were the other 90%? That would be 18 depots close.

New depots or expanding current ones is going to become necessary.

Below is the depot that was in Hamilton


I'd wager its a big bigger then 25 in Montreal. 25 we can't expand because it's in the middle of a city, 7 could but I'd argue we need to diversify our stock locations.


Ask your self this, if the flag went up right now, every PRes and SupRes member was called up, and we were at war. Do we have the equipment holdings to fully equip these forces to a set standard? I bet that answer is no, because our procurement has been about ordering the bare minimum fir decades.

 

[dapaterson]

At worst, I can say that you don't get to that senior leadership table until you've taken a healthy dose of the "regular force Kool-aid." Even there an unhealthy amount of effort is tilted in favour of the Class B crowd (and during Afghanistan, quite rightly the Class C soldiers). There's a tendency to accept reg force push back on issues without enough critical analysis and most of that analysis comes from the RegF and Class Bs. I'm not saying that these are bad folks but there is a very clear situation where the Class A members and their purpose and needs have a low priority.

At best I can say that at the most senior ResF level is that they have very little authority to initiate or effect change. Most are advisors and not commanders. They generally have little staff, if any, and have come up through a system that does not provide them with the fundamental knowledge to allow them to navigate the highly specialized bureaucratic structures that exist within DND. It does not surprise me at all that reform initiatives, even when started, stagnate. Most of my time on Chief of Reserves Council was being fed briefings at the end of a fire hose with very little requirement that we actually made decisions. At most we offered the various project managers/directors some off-the-cuff feedback.

I'll close by saying this. Most of the people around that table were very smart business men and women who were highly knowledgeable in their day jobs and quite talented (a few were career Class Bs or transferees from the RegF). It disappointed me then and now about how little impact we really had.

Very few make an effort to understand the institution they claim to be leading. If all they do is show up at meetings and take briefings, they are not leaders of any use.

Again, with Land Force Reserve Restructure, given all but carte blanche to revitalize the institution, they were unable to develop or implement anything resembling a coherent plan other than "Increase recruiting" without planning for foundational things like training or materiel to be in place to support that.

The Whinging Res F voices, enabled by the delusions of the puttering class of Honoraries with vivid dreams of a glorious past that never existed, do themselves a disservice.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Putting a portion of a fleet into preservation while you keep using the rest is one thing, and indeed this is done for a variety of reasons. Putting an entire fleet into preservation is another. You need the parts and tooling which will need preservation as well. Can you realistically have a supply of spare parts to keep that fleet going if you bring it back into service? What is the cost of all that, and how does that stack up against the benefit?

Cascading fleets from the Regular Force to the Reserves to be used on weekends is a whole other matter - now you have an additional fleet to maintain and those OMM costs are going to keep going up as the gear gets older. Tanks without spare parts are monuments about to happen. So again you need to look at the cost and benefits. What is the envisioned role of these Reserve units with cascaded equipment? What is the demand signal saying, and where is that demand signal coming from?

The calculus for a country at war or between wars of survival might well be different. Israel during the first few decades of its existence would take and keep whatever equipment they could get their hands on. Lacking a tank industry at the time they were reliant on imports that could be cut off for a variety of political reasons. So they were happy to have very mixed fleets because it was better than the alternative. Their reserve units consisted of soldiers who had all served two years full-time and those units had bone fide operational wartime roles.

Ukraine, I imagine, is not too worried about life-cycle costs right now.

Perhaps some envision the Reserves whipping a random pile of equipment into shape like B.A. Baracus before defeating the enemy each week?

Anyhoo.

 

[MilEME09]

Perhaps some envision the Reserves whipping a random pile of equipment into shape like B.A. Baracus before defeating the enemy each week?

Anyhoo.

No,I imagine an army that stops buying equipment that can't be taken into battle, MILCOT, MSVS, etc.... why are we wasting money in kit that cannot be used on the battlefield? A near peer war isn't going to wait 6 months for work up training, if we were serious about having a reserve force that mattered, we would do everything to reduce the training delta between reg and reserve, and part of that is training on the same kit, kit that we can put in a C17, fly to Latvia with 1 VP, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, or who ever and immediately be able to use it.

 

[KevinB]

Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force. I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.

Everyone should read this post.

The fact is the Canadian Army is an expeditionary Army.
Due to the fact you guys live above us, you don't really need to worry about foreign invasion. So the concern about having equipment to mobile in case of invasion isn't a concern, like that of European nations.

Due to this, CAF units that are deployed should have top of the line kit - and while some cascading to reserves could be looked at, in all reality the likelihood of reserve forces being deployed is extremely slim.

 

[McG]

kit that we can put in a C17

This deployment criteria is entirely inconsistent with the fleets that you are asking to keep. We are not going to deploy companies much less BGs or Bdes with LAV, TLAV, or Coyote via C17.

 

[MilEME09]

This deployment criteria is entirely inconsistent with the fleets that you are asking to keep. We are not going to deploy companies much less BGs or Bdes with LAV, TLAV, or Coyote via C17.

With how few C17s we have we aren't deploying anything via C17, our navy has no ships to transport. In reality our military can't get any where without an ally or civilian assistance.

I was using C17 as an example for this scenario of a common fleet, if that is what you are honing in on, you have misses the point I'm trying to make

 

[dapaterson]

Per unit cost of SMP vs MilCOTS is prohibitive. That bifurcation of fleets is imperfect, but avoids significant reduction in the quantity of equipment we are able to acquire within budgets.

 

[FJAG]

There is literally no vehicle task that TLAV's and Bison used to do that will not be replaced by the ACSV program. And as such there is no need to retain the older vehicles anymore, and there are huge arguments to simplify the supply chain for the the CAF overall.

Just a thought. In Afghanistan no one had thought about buying gun tractors for the M777s - not til around 2008 or so. (actually that's only partially true - some people thought about it but no one did anything) So they pried some 10 tonners out of someone's cold grasping hands and sent those over. But those had no room for the detachments by the time you stuffed them full of ammo and defensive stores because no one had ammo trucks for the artillery - those were all in Kandahar with the NSE. So they thought about using Nyalas for that but they ended up distributing those among the light infantry and the PRT ... so they gave everyone TLAVs. Worked like charm.

I'm just guessing here, but while one or the other versions of the ACSV would do the job, I betcha there ain't no armoured gun det carriers in the ACSV allotment. 'Cause we're not at war now and a 10 tonner is just fine. I'm wondering what they're using in Latvia right about now?

Very few make an effort to understand the institution they claim to be leading. If all they do is show up at meetings and take briefings, they are not leaders of any use.

Again, with Land Force Reserve Restructure, given all but carte blanche to revitalize the institution, they were unable to develop or implement anything resembling a coherent plan other than "Increase recruiting" without planning for foundational things like training or materiel to be in place to support that.

All very true. I was providing advice to the ill-fated RFEP (which was mostly run by retired RegF guys) but never heard anything being discussed about LFRR because it was an Army and not Chief Res issue. I would dearly loved to have been involved at the time.

The Whinging Res F voices, enabled by the delusions of the puttering class of Honoraries with vivid dreams of a glorious past that never existed, do themselves a disservice.

It's kind of funny having sat on multiple sides of the equation. There's plenty of whinging coming from everyone although in each of their eyes its the other guy whinging about what to them is a perfectly rationale position.

Bureaucracies have little trouble burying or destroying programs they do not favour. With respect to the reserve force that has been a successful process for seven decades. Regardless of who stands on what side, I have only to look across the border to see what could be. It too has its warts but simply put it provides a potential capability that can be called on when needed - and its been called on many times. At my most cynical I have the view that the present position the Army is in is because if the government found out it could put the same number of people on peacetime deployments as it does today but would have twice the force to put into the field in an emergency but for a lower year to year pay envelope it might rethink the force ratio. Keeping the reserves ineffective protects many rice bowls.

 

[KevinB]

Let me guess - labour costs are halved?

Close to current front, and a financial penalty to the Germans for their lackluster support for the Ukrainian war effort.