Most of that structure is repurposed to look after the new fleet. The new fleet needs LCMMs, supply managers, and shelf space at the depots. There is an opportunity cost to keeping our garbage.
One man's garbage is another's prized possessions. This is why thrift shops exist everywhere.
No one is arguing for "garbage". I was quite precise about talking about equipment that was still serviceable. Hell, our fleet of reserve force 105mm howitzers is about to enter its seventh decade of service. And yes, they do have maintenance issues for a number of reasons. Korea still has some 800 of them which they've modernized and self propelled by mounting them on a truck with new sighting systems.
We already have LCMMs for this gear. Yes we'd need a few more for a new line but that's a handful of people. Shelf space? Give me a break. We can find accommodation for 17,400 administrators in some 28 locations in Ottawa (some of which is half empty) but we can't find a warehouse and some supply folks to stock truck parts?
Anyone arguing that retaining 30-50 year fleets would make the reserve more capable better come with some numbers from DGLEPM and an NP allocation forecast.
We both know that there is no chance in hell of that because the metrics are greatly skewed in favour of disposal over increased capability for the reserve force. Think about the regular force. We disposed of critical kit needed to function operationally, from AD to anti-armour to tanks (at one point) because we assume the capability they bring to the force is either not necessary or will be provided by someone else.
We'd rather spend money on having several thousand Class B chairwarmers in Ottawa than providing equipment that would help the training and retention of Class A reservists because the perception is that they are really not that necessary for the defence effort.
I'm kind of with @Kirkhill
on this one. This topic clearly shows the divide that exists between a large portion of the RegF leadership and the Class A reserve community. I'd like to think that the divide is between those that think day-to-day and those that think long term but that in itself is skewing the issue a bit.
Doesn't sound like a requirement for a military with 150 years as an expeditionary force. I would rather have a Bde in use than a Div packed away doing nothing.
And there it is! Let me guess though ... you do spend money on house, life and car insurance.
As someone who spent five years in the Army HQ, working Res F issues, I will merely state that the biggest enemy of the Res F is the Res F. When funding was made available, Res F leadership refused to come up with anything remotely resembling a plan; refused to understand the structures and processes in place to enable growth in support (both personnel and materiel); and, indeed, shut down their Restructure office without making any effort to institutionalize funding changes, and, rather than provide a viable "lessons learned" or other useful close-out documentation, instead pushed out an ill conceived, poorly designed laundry list of ideas that had gone through no intellectual rigour, review or analysis.
And here I have to agree (although I reserve on the issue if its truly the "biggest enemy", but an enemy it is, and I'll say that having sat at the big boys table for almost a decade.
At worst, I can say that you don't get to that senior leadership table until you've taken a healthy dose of the "regular force Kool-aid." Even there an unhealthy amount of effort is tilted in favour of the Class B crowd (and during Afghanistan, quite rightly the Class C soldiers). There's a tendency to accept reg force push back on issues without enough critical analysis and most of that analysis comes from the RegF and Class Bs. I'm not saying that these are bad folks but there is a very clear situation where the Class A members and their purpose and needs have a low priority.
At best I can say that at the most senior ResF level is that they have very little authority to initiate or effect change. Most are advisors and not commanders. They generally have little staff, if any, and have come up through a system that does not provide them with the fundamental knowledge to allow them to navigate the highly specialized bureaucratic structures that exist within DND. It does not surprise me at all that reform initiatives, even when started, stagnate. Most of my time on Chief of Reserves Council was being fed briefings at the end of a fire hose with very little requirement that we actually made decisions. At most we offered the various project managers/directors some off-the-cuff feedback.
I'll close by saying this. Most of the people around that table were very smart business men and women who were highly knowledgeable in their day jobs and quite talented (a few were career Class Bs or transferees from the RegF). It disappointed me then and now about how little impact we really had.
Finished with the steps. Off to the model railroad.