Preserving Army Fleets

[Dale Denton]

Basically every popular thread bleeds into other, new threads with people saying the same thing. We know the problems, we have a couple great solutions, but no decision-maker in gov't cares.

I've read interesting takes that circle many thread over and over:

• Leveraging and sustaining defence industry tie-ins
• An army and RCAF NSS
• PRes sustainment and reorg
• Everything reorg
• Vehicle fleet commonality and extended variants
• Missing capabilities (the list goes on)

As an outsider, is the lack of capability perhaps due to us having so many projects at the same time, many of which are delayed? Would we have started new projects but haven't since procurement staff are busy on the pistol project, they can't staff a Mortar project? Is the tasking of procurement staff/attention a larger part of our grand procurement woes? If we pushed every current project out the door we'd have space to started much needed new ones is the thinking.

---------------------

Does this come down to us needing an outspoken Hillier 2.0 or a high-ranking whistleblower giving media some great headlines?
"Defenseless against drones"
"If the Taliban could take out so many of our LAVs, imagine what Russia could do"
"Topgun era jets"
"X would allow troops on the ground to be further away from the fight"
"If we cared about the safety of citizens in the north as much as we do Toronto or Calgary we'd have a much bigger presence in the arctic"

Insert any oversimplification to show the state of the CAF.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Basically every popular thread bleeds into other, new threads with people saying the same thing. We know the problems, we have a couple great solutions, but no decision-maker in gov't cares.

I've read interesting takes that circle many thread over and over:

• Leveraging and sustaining defence industry tie-ins
• An army and RCAF NSS
• PRes sustainment and reorg
• Everything reorg
• Vehicle fleet commonality and extended variants
• Missing capabilities (the list goes on)

As an outsider, is the lack of capability perhaps due to us having so many projects at the same time, many of which are delayed? Would we have started new projects but haven't since procurement staff are busy on the pistol project, they can't staff a Mortar project? Is the tasking of procurement staff/attention a larger part of our grand procurement woes? If we pushed every current project out the door we'd have space to started much needed new ones is the thinking.

---------------------

Does this come down to us needing an outspoken Hillier 2.0 or a high-ranking whistleblower giving media some great headlines?
"Defenseless against drones"
"If the Taliban could take out so many of our LAVs, imagine what Russia could do"
"Topgun era jets"
"X would allow troops on the ground to be further away from the fight"
"If we cared about the safety of citizens in the north as much as we do Toronto or Calgary we'd have a much bigger presence in the arctic"

Insert any oversimplification to show the state of the CAF.

Based on past performance, it seems we'll require a pile of dead soldiers before any big changes are made.

 

[IKnowNothing]

As an outsider, is the lack of capability perhaps due to us having so many projects at the same time, many of which are delayed? Would we have started new projects but haven't since procurement staff are busy on the pistol project, they can't staff a Mortar project? Is the tasking of procurement staff/attention a larger part of our grand procurement woes? If we pushed every current project out the door we'd have space to started much needed new ones is the thinking.

Pistol boondoggle aside, the thing I don't understand is why an ACSV type accelerated process can't be used to fill gaps. Can GDLS not be left on their own to find partners for proposals to fill a suite of vehicles including Direct FIre/ AT, SP Mortar, and Shorad?

 

[Underway]

Pistol boondoggle aside, the thing I don't understand is why an ACSV type accelerated process can't be used to fill gaps. Can GDLS not be left on their own to find partners for proposals to fill a suite of vehicles including Direct FIre/ AT, SP Mortar, and Shorad?

They of course can accelerate, but the plan I think is to ensure continuous build and retain the jobs over time. I expect that there will be a follow on contract for other vehicle types as the ASCV project moves towards a close. SHORAD is its own project as is a number of other projects. Army 2025 review is reaching its own culmination and combined with the direction from Cabinet to rework SSE given the change in the security situation I expect that GDLS will have work after those reviews and projects have been completed or as a result of the same projects.

 

[Kirkhill]

In 1989, France and Canada signed a joint venture to co-produce the ERYX missile.

Back in those ancient days the Eryx was introduced as the SRAAW(H) or Short Range Anti-Armour Weapon (Heavy). Short Range because of its 600 m range and Heavy because of its ability to take out a Heavy Target, a Medium Tank. Its current analog would be the disposable NLAW capable of taking out Medium Tanks at 800 m from enclosed spaces. (minimal signature).

What is forgotten is that Eryx was to be part of a suite of Direct Fired weapons that started with the M72 LAW, the CG-84 (MRAAW (L)??), the MRAAW (H) and the LRAAW (H).

LRAAW (H) was to replace the TOW. Hellfire had been introduced in 1984.
MRAAW (H) was to fill in a blank - It was supposed to be a Milan/BILL type project but there was a new kid on the block - the Javelin

Concurrently the Brits were experimenting with Merlin, an 81mm mortar launched autonomous ATGM.
The Swedes introduced their 120mm version, the Strix, designed in 1983, trialled in 1988 and adopted by the Swedes in 1994

The Canadian response to this wealth of solutions - none of the above. We had Leo 1s and the best anti-tank system was another tank.

 

[Kirkhill]

By the way, that Strix round? Apparently that is one of the 10,000 AT rounds shipped to Ukraine by Sweden from their stocks.


Video from Ukraine’s 54th Mechanized Brigade showing 120mm mortar strikes on Russian vehicles.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1509240875452407812

 

[Kirkhill]

Apparently it seems the 128th Mountain might also be using the Strix round in the Severodonetsk salient.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1517505799416913921

 

[Kirkhill]

The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate -


Mines, NLAW, Javelin, Hellfire/Brimstone, Strix, Bonus, Excalibur, Hero-120, Switchblade 600, Bayraktar. And that is before the Air Force gets on the job.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate -


Mines, NLAW, Javelin, Hellfire/Brimstone, Strix, Bonus, Excalibur, Hero-120, Switchblade 600, Bayraktar. And that is before the Air Force gets on the job.

Don't forget 'bad driving'

 

[Underway]

So bring it back to Preserving Fleets... I'm sure you can make a war stock argument. Or perhaps you are selling the idea of preserving old vehicles in a low oxygen environment?

 

[Brad Sallows]

Army fleet management in Canada would be finding that happy thing, which I can only hope is more common than a unicorn: a chassis which can with incremental changes serve for 30 or 40 years, during which clapped-out earlier pieces are withdrawn and new ones with incremental upgrades added, which serves as the basis for a revolutionary re-design every 30 or 40 years, and which is required in sufficient numbers to keep the manufacturers going in Canada.

 

[IKnowNothing]

They of course can accelerate, but the plan I think is to ensure continuous build and retain the jobs over time. I expect that there will be a follow on contract for other vehicle types as the ASCV project moves towards a close. SHORAD is its own project as is a number of other projects. Army 2025 review is reaching its own culmination and combined with the direction from Cabinet to rework SSE given the change in the security situation I expect that GDLS will have work after those reviews and projects have been completed or as a result of the same projects.

My apologies, the "acceleration" aspect was only one part of the ACSV process that I think should be duplicated for any LAV/GDLS/future common chassis project, the other being amalgamation. ACSV replaced two vehicles and encompassed 8 variants/ roles under the roof of one project. LAV UP delivered 5. The post I quoted mentioned the issue being procurement having too much on their plate. My though was that one way to help with that would be to make use of that "family" approach and replace 3 projects (mortar, direct fire, shorad) with one.

 

[Underway]

My apologies, the "acceleration" aspect was only one part of the ACSV process that I think should be duplicated for any LAV/GDLS/future common chassis project, the other being amalgamation. ACSV replaced two vehicles and encompassed 8 variants/ roles under the roof of one project. LAV UP delivered 5. The post I quoted mentioned the issue being procurement having too much on their plate. My though was that one way to help with that would be to make use of that "family" approach and replace 3 projects (mortar, direct fire, shorad) with one.

Totally agree though the problem with this particular one is the SHORAD, ATGM/direct fire I know for sure are different projects on the books right now. Not sure if mortar is under a project at all, I would have to check.

SHORAD will likely want to deliver a family of systems, as will the direct fire/ATGM project. So perhaps a SHORAD LAV and Direct fire LAV could be part of that family along with dismounted options etc... The ASCV program is likely going to last long enough to get us to the finish line on this one.

What will be interesting is what GDLS brings to CANSEC this year. They know what projects the Army is looking at and tailor their offerings well ahead of time. This is exactly what they did with ASCV and was working on the project, developing options well before the Army asked them what they had. Whatever they bring will either be showing off the ASCV variants to the military audience (here's what we are building for you) or a tell on what we could predict for the future build at GDLS (Oh nice SHORAD LAV system you have there).

 

[Kirkhill]

Back to Preserving Fleets then - at Underway's suggestion

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/udtwz6

 

[Kirkhill]

No idea if this is true but it has comedic value if nothing else.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/udxsyu

Edit- Sorry! Wrong thread. Getting confused.

 

[Infanteer]

The range of threats the tanker now has to accommodate -

Mines, NLAW, Javelin, Hellfire/Brimstone, Strix, Bonus, Excalibur, Hero-120, Switchblade 600, Bayraktar. And that is before the Air Force gets on the job.

So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack. So nothing different than 1944?

 

[OldSolduer]

No idea if this is true but it has comedic value if nothing else.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/udxsyu

Edit- Sorry! Wrong thread. Getting confused.

This is a very Russian thing. Seriously.

It was not uncommon to have the NKVD follow the troops and execute anyone who retreated.

 

[Kirkhill]

So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack. So nothing different than 1944?

Well.... maaaybe. If you discount the precision of the weapons, the cost per kill, the price of the targets and the number of targets. And we forget about the distribution of the weapons.

Now we are talking about a battalion having 24-48 AT Gunners, the Mortar Platoon having 8 tubes capable of launching tank killing rounds, the CO and the OCs having their own private air forces with LAMs and UAVs. And everybody and his brother having an NLAW and a couple of AT4s in their slits with them....


Aside from that, exactly the same. Compared to what we had in the early 80s I would cheerfully take on a Warsaw Pact Tank Regiment with an infantry battalion. Without having to worry about the availability of the Guns, Helos and Fast Air.

 

[KevinB]

So, mines, antitank weapons, artillery fires, and air attack. So nothing different than 1944?

I’d argue that the main differences are the lack of ability to camouflage ones vehicle, and the ability to be precision targeted at range.

ISR assets have made detection extremely easy - and precision munitions have made the K Kill exponentially more likely (especially on Russian AFV’s).

Then factor in a Tank’s range band, versus Anti-Tank systems. Before the tank only really needed to be concerned about Arty out ranging then.

If I am in a small team doing an SR, it’s significantly easier for me to mask my 4-6 man team position visually as well in the EO spectrums than vehicles. Granted I am now fixed in that position and redeployment will lead me to be vulnerable to radar, thermal and other detection methods.

 

[MilEME09]

If I am in a small team doing an SR, it’s significantly easier for me to mask my 4-6 man team position visually as well in the EO spectrums than vehicles. Granted I am now fixed in that position and redeployment will lead me to be vulnerable to radar, thermal and other detection methods.

Not to mention command Launch units that can be tethered to the weapon from a distance. So your team could be behind the hill, with the weapon camouflaged on top, nothing to see on thermal.

Technology forces tactics to change, great example, our doctrine used to be to move convoys of supplies at night because it was safer, modern sensors make that irrelevant. All that kit is expensive though, so we have less of them.