RCAF Authorities / Future Unmanned Aircraft for RCAF

[SupersonicMax]

I think you meant page 9 but note that this doctrine and those residual authorities apply ONLY to RCAF assets that have been transferred from the RCAF as force generator, to the Comd CJOC as force employer (and subsequent transfer to the JTF Comd). They do not automatically belong to assets that already belong to the Army or the Navy. More importantly air space management is not one of the residual authorities. It belongs to the JTF comd who will use various agencies including CA, RCN and RCAF ones to complete that job.

I meant page 8. This is where the section starts.

I wouldn’t be so sure.
That same doctrine defines this:


Air Doctrine Authority (ADA) (it is the Comd RCAF)
The Royal Canadian Air Force officer with authority over all aspects of the development, production, and dissemination of Canadian Armed Forces air doctrine.

Air doctrine, in my mind, is not limited to Air Force assets. Whether this is only how the RCAF sees itself or not is a different matter but in practice, those authorities reside within the RCAF although the Comd (and the other authorities) sometimes delegate them to other organizations.

For example, the Technical Airworthiness Authority remains DGAEPM for the Skaldar, used by the RCN and CANSOF.

 

[FJAG]

I meant page 8. This is where the section starts.

I wouldn’t be so sure.
That same doctrine defines this:


Air Doctrine Authority (ADA) (it is the Comd RCAF)
The Royal Canadian Air Force officer with authority over all aspects of the development, production, and dissemination of Canadian Armed Forces air doctrine.

Air doctrine, in my mind, is not limited to Air Force assets. Whether this is only how the RCAF sees itself or not is a different matter but in practice, those authorities reside within the RCAF although the Comd (and the other authorities) sometimes delegate them to other organizations.

For example, the Technical Airworthiness Authority remains DGAEPM for the Skaldar, used by the RCN and CANSOF.

I've looked that over a half dozen times now and can't find what you are quoting. At page 9 under residual authority for air doctrine I find the following:

a. Air doctrine. RCAF air doctrine establishes officially sanctioned beliefs and principles that describe and guide the proper use of air power in military operations. Air doctrine is developed and promulgated under the authority of the Comd RCAF, who fulfils the role of RCAF Air Doctrine Authority

I'm looking at the document at the link that you supplied. Are we looking at different documents? Just a point, the same general statement is in B-GA-400-000/FP-001 Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine at para 16 on page 1-5 which reads:

16. RCAF doctrine is developed and promulgated through Air Force Order 8000-0, Air Doctrine, on the authority of the Commander (Comd) of the RCAF. The Comd RCAF is the Air Doctrine Authority (ADA) with authority over all aspects of the development, production, and dissemination of RCAF doctrine.

 

[SupersonicMax]

My bad, it was in the Capstone doctrine, page 52: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-368-2016-eng.pdf

 

[SupersonicMax]

Further to the OGBD - SSM Doctrine discussion

Where in the RCAF spectrum would the Black Hornet fit?
Used by a ABCANZUS troops.
When the kit was issued (after less than a day's instruction) the troops immediately started experimenting and developed their own TTPs.

The battery was only used to power the blades to hop from one perch to another. The 30 min life of the NUAV was extended by going quiet and just letting the EO package operate while acting as an OP.

And how about this one

The airworthiness directives were still being drafted last year but where it was going was very similar to what our allies are doing. It was to be based on a maximum kinetic energy (too much means it can hurt people and damage things), operating altitudes (operating in the way of manned aircraft), range from users (operating in the way of manned aircraft) and payload consideration (safety considerations). If any of the threshold was met, it was to go through the whole or at least parts of the airworthiness process.

 

[FJAG]

My bad, it was in the Capstone doctrine, page 52: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-368-2016-eng.pdf

Got it. I note that is the Glossary and that it conflicts with the body of the text (especially p5) which deals with the concept of RCAF air doctrine.

This gets us back to basic principles. Comd of the RCAF has command and authority of all air forces allocated to him by the CAF just as the commander of the Army has command and authority for all land forces allocated to him. This includes formulating and promulgating doctrine for their respective forces.

You (and you are not the only one in the RCAF) are interpreting air doctrine as doctrine which applies to anything that operates in the air rather than systems which are a component of the RCAF. By your definition all artillery, all rockets, even rifle bullets which fly through the air ought to be subject to air doctrine. Clearly that would be ridiculous. The most relevant long standing example of divided doctrine are naval and army air defence resources which are not subject to air doctrine (but are heavily coordinated with the RCAF which has its own air defence role and resources (ie its aircraft and anti air weapon systems) and doctrine for those weapons. The three agencies interact and coordinate but each of the Navy and Army develop their own doctrine in this respect for the resources which they own and use.

It is the same with UAVs. There is a developing need to establishes doctrine for new weapon systems being brought on line. As I mentioned above there are more and more unmanned weapon systems which are being piloted from the ground and which fulfill a multitude of functions. The RCAF has no role in developing doctrine for a GPS guided rocket or projectile or one that is flown onto target by a laser designator other than to assist in developing joint policies that will reduce the risk to RCAF resources which need to share the air space. Remember that doctrine goes far beyond mere air safety and air worthiness issues.

The issue with UAVs is a developing one. The requirement to field Sperwer came as a surprise to the RCAF which had not previously concerned itself with UAVs beyond the long range (and I do mean long range in time JUSTAS project). The army was responsible for its developing doctrine for Sperwer use because it was "owned" by the army when first deployed. That changed in 2006. After incessantly whining about the the Army losing aircraft and airworthiness the RCAF finally winkled its way into the Sperwer business and 408 Sqn took over the role. At that point the Sperwer being an RCAF resource quite clearly came under RCAF air doctrine. Coincidentally the RCAF had supervised Sperwer airworthiness from 2003 to 2006 with on site RCAF personnel (both air crew and maintainers) while the Army operated it in Kabul. The RCAF subsequently lost more Sperwers than the Army when it took over in Kandahar which was flat and level and not amongst hostile mountains as in Kabul.

As result of the Manley Report the government funded acquisition of the Heron which was leased and also operated by the RCAF and again therefore was subject to RCAF doctrine. The Heron was even bigger and flew higher than the Sperwer. The problem here is that under the JUSTAS Concept of Operations the dividing line between "tactical" UAVs (operating from the rifle company to brigade) is a maximum ceiling of 5,000 feet and line-of-sight operations while HALE/MALE UAVs operate at the strategic and theatre level, above 5000 feet and in beyond-line-of-sight operations. (As an aside the RCAF operated Heron LOS anyway. It might have been unfortunate that the Sperwer and Heron, while clearly being used as a tactical resource, had the capability to operated at up to 16,000 feet which is probably why the RCAF got its nose out of joint in the first place - as an aside Kabul sits at around 6,000 feet and the surrounding terrain is higher so even with a max altitude of 16,000 feet the Sperwer was struggling and easily stayed less than 5,000 feet above ground level while there - which proves that class divisions by altitude is relative)

The sad part is that after having clamored for a hand in the tactical UAV area and running it until the end of Afghan operations the RCAF has gone back to floundering around in the JUSTAS program leaving the Army alone to develop its own doctrine and suite of true tactical UAVs. I don't wander the halls of CAF headquarters so don't know where things stand on the doctrine for tactical UAV usage arguments these days but it's very clear to me that there is a great need to make some major decisions about future "flying" weapons systems ownership (and consequentially doctrine ownership) for all the new things coming on line. The CAF can't afford to have the RCAF bumble around in another JUSTAS for two decades saga

Not sure if you have a JSTOR account but there's a fairly good article on this (Schaub Jnr, Gary. But Who's Flying the Plane? Integrating UAVs into the Canadian and Danish armed force 2015) You'll need a password to access it.

 

[Good2Golf]

FJAG, I think you’ll find very few ‘True (Light) Blue’ RCAF types truly understand the interaction of things Air-Land. ALI is poorly understood by most RCAF types and few know of the terrestrial ‘Trinity’ of all things air...until they attend AOC or some other form of non-autosychophantical enlightenment...

 

[SupersonicMax]

Got it. I note that is the Glossary and that it conflicts with the body of the text (especially p5) which deals with the concept of RCAF air doctrine.

This gets us back to basic principles. Comd of the RCAF has command and authority of all air forces allocated to him by the CAF just as the commander of the Army has command and authority for all land forces allocated to him. This includes formulating and promulgating doctrine for their respective forces.

This is not quite true. The person holding the position of Comd RCAF has been designated the Airworthiness Authority for the Canadian Armed Forces by the MND.

There is a bit on the Airworthiness Process here: https://www.canada.ca/en/department...thiness/airworthiness-authority-overview.html

Essentially, there is an Airworthiness Authority (AA - Comd RCAF), the Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA - DGAEPM), the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA - Comd 1 CAD) and the Airworthiness Investigation Authority (AIA - Director Flight Safety). The OAA, TAA and AIA are designated by the CDS. There are two others but they have no formal roles beyond their specialties (the Flight Test Authority (FTA - CO AETE) and the Aerospace Medical. Authority (AMA - RCAF Surgeon)) who are designated by the AA. The OAA, AIA and TAA are not subordinate to the AA (they are all technically equal) and have different roles and responsibilities. If we look at the resitual authorities, here's where the responsibilities lie:

Operational Airworthiness - OAA
Technical Airworthiness - TAA
Flight Safety - AIA
Training and Standards - OAA
Doctrine - AA

 

[Good2Golf]

Max, if you’re going to take information from the source, you should take the time to be accurate. Only the AA as Comd RCAF is Designated by the MND. OAA, AIA and TAA are not designated by the MND, they are designated by the CDS. The CDS takes direction to do so, from the MND, but it is the CDS designating the three subordinate Authorities. There is nuance to the difference in designations that influences the execution of the roles, particularly the TAA under civilian oversight of ADM(Mat), which given your current role, you appreciate.

 

[SupersonicMax]

FJAG, I think you’ll find very few ‘True (Light) Blue’ RCAF types truly understand the interaction of things Air-Land. ALI is poorly understood by most RCAF types and few know of the terrestrial ‘Trinity’ of all things air...until they attend AOC or some other form of non-autosychophantical enlightenment...

G2G: You really should know that supporting land forces is one of many roles the RCAF conducts. Your sole purpose as a Tac Hel pilot may have been to support the Army but there is a lot more done on a regular basis that doesn't involve the Army. Three of the four CF-18 combat deployments did not involve supporting land forces (Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya) and none of the other operational deployments (Op Reassurance, Op Ignition, Op Mirador) or any of the domestic operations (NORAD, Op Podium, all the G7/8/20) remotely supported an Army scheme of maneuver.

Perhaps this is why our doctrine is written that way?

 

[SupersonicMax]

Max, if you’re going to take information from the source, you should take the time to be accurate. Only the AA as Comd RCAF is Designated by the MND. OAA, AIA and TAA are not designated by the MND, they are designated by the CDS. The CDS takes direction to do so, from the MND, but it is the CDS designating the three subordinate Authorities.

Great. That doesn't change anything. I edited my post...

 

[Good2Golf]

Great. That doesn't change anything. I edited my post...

I guess accuracy isn’t important in your business?

 

[SupersonicMax]

I guess accuracy isn’t important in your business?

That is semantics. Directed by the MND, designated by the CDS. The end-result is the same. I went from memory, not from reading the website. It is a forum. I don't proofread 100% of my posts especially when on a tablet.

 

[Good2Golf]

G2G: You really should know that supporting land forces is one of many roles the RCAF conducts. Your sole purpose as a Tac Hel pilot may have been to support the Army but there is a lot more done on a regular basis that doesn't involve the Army. Three of the four CF-18 combat deployments did not involve supporting land forces (Gulf War, Kosovo, Libya) and none of the other operational deployments (Op Reassurance, Op Ignition, Op Mirador) or any of the domestic operations (NORAD, Op Podium, all the G7/8/20) remotely supported an Army scheme of maneuver.

Perhaps this is why our doctrine is written that way?

So you’re saying there was never any interaction with JTACs or the TACP or any coordination with JFLCC elements such as the FSCC or ASCC in any of those ops...interesting indeed...

 

[SupersonicMax]

So you’re saying there was never any interaction with JTACs or the TACP or any coordination with JFLCC elements such as the FSCC or ASCC in any of those ops...interesting indeed...

Op Friction (Gulf War): For the vast majority of the war, CF-18s conducted Defensive Counter Air. They conducted a couple of air-to-ground missions at the very end. From speaking with people that went, it was killboxes. No interactions with JTACs.
Op Echo (Kosovo): There was no allied land forces involved.
Op Mobile (Libya): There was no allied land forces involved. While we supported rebels, there was no real coordination (that I would call ALI), definitely not at the tactical level and a very basic one at the operational level.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

FJAG, I think you’ll find very few ‘True (Light) Blue’ RCAF types truly understand the interaction of things Air-Land. ALI is poorly understood by most RCAF types and few know of the terrestrial ‘Trinity’ of all things air...until they attend AOC or some other form of non-autosychophantical enlightenment...

I do. Just sayin...

 

[Good2Golf]

Op Friction (Gulf War): For the vast majority of the war, CF-18s conducted Defensive Counter Air. They conducted a couple of air-to-ground missions at the very end. From speaking with people that went, it was killboxes. No interactions with JTACs.
Op Echo (Kosovo): There was no allied land forces involved.
Op Mobile (Libya): There was no allied land forces involved. While we supported rebels, there was no real coordination (that I would call ALI), definitely not at the tactical level and a very basic one at the operational level.

Which explains your view of fast air contributions. Don’t mistake Canadian fighter force narrow operational employment in DCA and strike for an all-encompassing, broad operational experience. Not having done BAI or CAS limits the fighter force’s ability to understand the relationship between the land forces and those that support them, be they aviation (who often share tables at the DFAC), JTACs (who do understand intimately the land forces’ plight), fast air CAS assets (who may not ever see the faces of those on the ground, but have shared a bond over the radio) and then...well...the DCA/OCA/strike folks who will never see the faces of those blue forces on the ground that are often in the thick of it.

You no doubt have some great back-slapping stories to share with your fast air peers. Shame you may have not have had as much experience working with others different than you, where an interdependent relationship in a combat environment is an experience to be respected and appreciated.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Which explains your view of fast air contributions. Don’t mistake Canadian fighter force narrow operational employment in DCA and strike for an all-encompassing, broad operational experience. Not having done BAI or CAS limits the fighter force’s ability to understand the relationship between the land forces and those that support them, be they aviation (who often share tables at the DFAC), JTACs (who do understand intimately the land forces’ plight), fast air CAS assets (who may not ever see the faces of those on the ground, but have shared a bond over the radio) and then...well...the DCA/OCA/strike folks who will never see the faces of those blue forces on the ground that are often in the thick of it.

You no doubt have some great back-slapping stories to share with your fast air peers. Shame you may have not have had as much experience working with others different than you, where an interdependent relationship in a combat environment is an experience to be respected and appreciated.

I did participate, twice, in Op IMPACT, which was mostly (95%) CAS with some limited SCAR. I am not saying we do not work i support of the Army, SOF and Navy. I have worked closely with Land forces on Op IMPACT thank you. I consider this type of work to be the most rewarding and the most important. I am saying, however, that it is only one of many roles we have (and one that, aside from Tac Hel, we don’t actually do often operationally). Having a capstone and keystone doctrine purely based on Air Land Integration would be flawed. The RCAF, aside from Tac Hel, does not exist to only support land forces.

Ironically, it seems you are the one that can’t see we don’t only support land forces.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I did participate, twice, in Op IMPACT, which was mostly (95%) CAS with some limited SCAR. I am not saying we do not work i support of the Army, SOF and Navy. I have worked closely with Land forces on Op IMPACT thank you. I consider this type of work to be the most rewarding and the most important. I am saying, however, that it is only one of many roles we have (and one that, aside from Tac Hel, we don’t actually do often operationally). Having a capstone and keystone doctrine purely based on Air Land Integration would be flawed. The RCAF, aside from Tac Hel, does not exist to only support land forces.

Ironically, it seems you are the one that can’t see we don’t only support land forces.

That is not at all what G2G just said. You are twisting his words. He acknowledged that you have a certain expertise, but noted that your expertise may lack breadth. He never said that the only role for fighters was to support the land fight. That is a ridiculous non sequitor.

I am not sure why you are taking this so personally.

 

[Kirkhill]

....

This from CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine. Link below.

https://military-justice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Canadian-Military-Doctrine.pdf

The concept and purpose of doctrine

0103. Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding. The CF definition of doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”1 It embraces established wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning, and is sometimes defined as simply “what is taught.”

....

This concept of Doctrine has always intrigued me. As much as the concept of Dogma does.

Rugby.

My favourite sport. Probably because it is the only one I could play in a half-assed fashion.

We trained so that during a game we had a bit of a clue as to what our team-mates were going to do, what support we could expect and what support we could offer. We didn't broadcast that to the opposition much. Not that there was much to broadcast.

Selection and Maintenance
Preservation of Morale
Offensive Action
Surprise.....

Surprise...

On the Rugby pitch you try to surprise the opposition. Ideally your mates know that it is coming. But the opposition doesn't have a clue.

Sometimes you may take it on yourself to surprise both the opposition and your mates. In which case you have to expect to be exposed for a bit until your mates get over the shock and catch up with you.

“fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions"

How does one achieve surprise if everyone pedantically and dogmatically follows doctrine that is publically distributed for all to read?
Just curious.

How does one adapt to working with people in an environment requiring constant adaptation if one never learns how to accommodate "Surprises" - including own team surprises.

Not every war gives the likes of Norman Schwarzkopf the luxury of developing an Encyclopedia Brittanica sized playbook that he can refer to from the sidelines and call shots.

Some wars hinge on the likes of LayForce in France and the efforts of people like O'Connor in North Africa.

Working with what's available and using it in unexpected, non-doctrinal, manners.

Rugby.

The game of the Reverend William Webb Ellis of the Church of England who, when a schoolboy at Rugby

... WITH A FINE DISREGARD FOR THE RULES OF FOOTBALL
AS PLAYED IN HIS TIME
FIRST TOOK THE BALL IN HIS ARMS AND RAN WITH IT
THUS ORIGINATING THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF
THE RUGBY GAME
A.D. 1823

Doctrine may save lives in peacetime. Not convince that doctrinal Generals save lives in wartime.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

A good up to date example of that might the Armenian army, their doctrine had not changed for quite some time and their opponent used that to their advantage.