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Reconstitution

Most of them, like me, were there 'cause we liked to train for war.

Serious question - poorly stated - How much of a "fix" would be necessary to maintain that interest?

And I am going to suggest that the training should not be organized by the people training. The trainees should be catered to. Exactly in the same manner that Reg Troops on exercise should be catered to.
 
Serious question - poorly stated - How much of a "fix" would be necessary to maintain that interest?

And I am going to suggest that the training should not be organized by the people training. The trainees should be catered to. Exactly in the same manner that Reg Troops on exercise should be catered to.

Dude... the problem is not getting people interested and maintaining that interest. 18/19 year old kids love soldiering and are really good at it.

All you need to do is the usual things to keep anyone motivated like plan good training, build up to more advanced challenges gradually, make sure they get their career courses on time, and don't f*ck them around. 'Train to excite' is not the way to go. Train to achieve high levels of battlefield competence is much more effective. If your unit has a good reputation, you'll attract people like flies to honey.

But when you have idiots in charge that don't understand this, stupid/ bad/ boring training etc. results, morale collapses, and they drift away to other things. Bad leaders have a much bigger impact on ARes than Reg F units because the ARes have so much more choice.
 
The problem with keeping people interested is that the army is built to validate a given level. That level is a very low base line and we constantly repeat that level as opposed to moving forward. Sure 18-24 year old soldiers love soldiering, but no one loves constantly have to go back to step 0 every year as opposed to trying to bring new members up to the level of the unit.
 
The problem with keeping people interested is that the army is built to validate a given level. That level is a very low base line and we constantly repeat that level as opposed to moving forward. Sure 18-24 year old soldiers love soldiering, but no one loves constantly have to go back to step 0 every year as opposed to trying to bring new members up to the level of the unit.
This is true to form for Reg F units as well. We used to call it "Ex Maple Groundhog Day" for a reason. We'd do the R2HR with one set of Bde Staff, spend 2 months on Ex, get the Bde and Staff confirmed End May, have ⅓ of the Staff posted at APS, and we'd be breaking in a new Bde Staff on CAX in September.

Doing that for 6 years as a Cpl/MCpl Siggie is enough to make you want to take the 8th Floor VR option.
 
This is true to form for Reg F units as well. We used to call it "Ex Maple Groundhog Day" for a reason. We'd do the R2HR with one set of Bde Staff, spend 2 months on Ex, get the Bde and Staff confirmed End May, have ⅓ of the Staff posted at APS, and we'd be breaking in a new Bde Staff on CAX in September.

Doing that for 6 years as a Cpl/MCpl Siggie is enough to make you want to take the 8th Floor VR option.
Oh trust me I’m way to familiar with regurgitating combat team attacks through the PDA, only to have the Bn reorg post APS so we start from scratch on TMST because none of the next leadership have “seen the troops in the field.” Then deployment, re org again and we start from scratch yet again. The fact we don’t align our readiness cycle with APS is baffling to me.
 
Oh trust me I’m way to familiar with regurgitating combat team attacks through the PDA, only to have the Bn reorg post APS so we start from scratch on TMST because none of the next leadership have “seen the troops in the field.” Then deployment, re org again and we start from scratch yet again. The fact we don’t align our readiness cycle with APS - or a looming WW3 - is baffling to me.

There, FTFY.

Right then, head back in the sand ;)

 
The fact we don’t align our readiness cycle with APS is baffling to me.
We used to. All my unit training during the 70s and 80s was based on annual training cycles that commenced immediately after Labour day notwithstanding the fiscal year. Admittedly budgets were not a big issue then but you did have to sometimes prepare to adjust a bit if the new year's ammo allotment, which came out just before the big spring exercises, wasn't quite what was anticipated.

Mind you we weren't pulled from pillar to post by deployment requirements. Our biggest interference was career courses for key officers and senior NCOs that took them away from the unit and left holes to fill.

🍻
 
Oh trust me I’m way to familiar with regurgitating combat team attacks through the PDA, only to have the Bn reorg post APS so we start from scratch on TMST because none of the next leadership have “seen the troops in the field.” Then deployment, re org again and we start from scratch yet again. The fact we don’t align our readiness cycle with APS is baffling to me.
Sorry, I’ve been out for just over a decade. What is APS?
 
Regarding Collective Training (CT), we do use APS as the "New Year's Day." The Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) cycles from 1 Jul to 30 Jun, with bleed-over as required. It is known that there will be turnover each APS.

Units should conduct Foundation Training (FT) regardless of their phase of the MRP. For the Reg F, This means that units should train to Level 4 (sub-unit) each year. Units in the Build Year conduct Level 5 (Combat Team/Combined Arms Team) and above with Validation occurring. This training is covered by the Enhanced Warfighting Proficiency directive that units in the Build Year will follow.

The FT order states that "there is no need for a wholesale restart in the training progression cycle", but a commander may deem that their unit needs to go back and cover a given Level/Battle Task Standard (BTS) given their assessment of the situation. If a unit comes out of the Build Year more or less intact, then it should be able to continue to conduct build on what was learned rather than restart. If there was lots of churn then there will likely need to be restart in some areas.

Asking the serving/recently serving members, what Collective Training would you adjust while remaining relatively resource neutral?
 
So what is the difference between the Volunteer Fire Fighter and the Primary Reservist?

At risk of starting another bruising -

The Volunteer Fire Fighter has a day to day responsibility in support of his or her community. They understand the need for their services and their community welcomes and support that service.

The Reservist - toils (perhaps too strong a word) in obscurity. The community seldom even knows they are there. And the Reservist, more often than not, is focused on doing things that appeal to the Reservist but has little application to the community. For some it is a shortcut to the rifle range - bypassing the aggravation of a full time career.

The Volunteer Fire Fighter is focused on a real life task. And the community helps to maintain that focus.
Which is why Reserves work better in Europe where threats are a tad more real.
 
Which is why Reserves work better in Europe where threats are a tad more real.
Also a lot of those Reserves are sourced from those releases from national service periods.
A common standard of training and expectations.
 
The CAF has had Reg F shortages mitigated by employment of Res F mid-rank personnel at rates well north of 40% for a decade or more; it is just now that the true decrepit nature of the attraction, selection, recruiting and ab-initio training system for the Reg F is coming to light. The issues are not novel or complex; there have just always been convenient methods for Reg F leadership to ignore the depth of the problem and resort to inaction and/or hope as the only COA until now when the problems can no longer be papered over.

Professionalization of the HR function is needed, as is professionalization of the force development and structural management functions. Today's Reg F structure is impossible to fill, due to decisions / inertia. Rather than a VCDS doing their job (which sometimes requires telling whiny GOFOs up to and including the CDS "No"), successive occupants of that chair have punted that problem to the future, or decided that "We'll just ask for more Reg F PYs to mismanage" is a viable COA, rather than displaying leadership and making hard decisions.
 
Which is why Reserves work better in Europe where threats are a tad more real.

Threats there are real - and they are perceived as such. It makes sense to want the government to supply a C6 and a half dozen N-LAWs for the top of your street and teach you how to use them.

In Canada there is no such imperative. There is no perceived threat. And perception is reality.


On the other hand Canadians do perceive other threats: fire, flood, plague, pestilence, snow, ice, wind, hail, earthquakes, volcanoes.

Both sets of threats require society to organize.

What I heard Gen Eyre pitching to parliament that the Value Added Proposition of the CAF was its ability to Organize. Well do that. Organize. But organize the Reserves around logistics and local security.

Leave the Kabinett Wars to the professionals hired to assist Global Affairs Canada.
 
That I could get behind, there’s probably an easy way to track that.

That would take effort that DGMC does have the people or inclination to do anymore. I remember early in my career my unit had a rash of releases right around the same time (IIRC it was 3 or 4) in my trade and the CM made a visit to my unit to figure out what the hell was going on. He talked to all of us and all the leadership in an attempt that solve the problem. Fast forward 15 years and every CM is getting yelled at by corporals and MCpls telling them they are quitting because of the culture at the unit. Absolutely nothing changed. We never heard from a CM until next year when they were different people. Maybe some emails were sent or a phone call or two made but as far as we were concerned nothing happened.

In the first example, I couldn't tell you what changes were made but I can tell you that someone actually cared enough to address it. In the second, we got answers like "that's not really my area" and "have your tried talking to your CoC?"

I won't even get started at SOAs. I haven't heard from an SOA in almost a decade. I know they don't care about the feelings of the people in the trade because they would have to talk to some of them to actually have any idea what those feelings are.
 
The CAF has had Reg F shortages mitigated by employment of Res F mid-rank personnel at rates well north of 40% for a decade or more; it is just now that the true decrepit nature of the attraction, selection, recruiting and ab-initio training system for the Reg F is coming to light. The issues are not novel or complex; there have just always been convenient methods for Reg F leadership to ignore the depth of the problem and resort to inaction and/or hope as the only COA until now when the problems can no longer be papered over.

Professionalization of the HR function is needed, as is professionalization of the force development and structural management functions. Today's Reg F structure is impossible to fill, due to decisions / inertia. Rather than a VCDS doing their job (which sometimes requires telling whiny GOFOs up to and including the CDS "No"), successive occupants of that chair have punted that problem to the future, or decided that "We'll just ask for more Reg F PYs to mismanage" is a viable COA, rather than displaying leadership and making hard decisions.

On the first point, the reason the ResF got a pay raise was because they held so many RegF positions. My old man was complaining about the Military using the ResF as a discount military rather than a surge force more than 2 decades ago.

As for the second point, I think I might disagree to a point. I think part of the problem we are having is bring too many civilian processes into the military. A military has to be bloated to a certain extent because if we work at full capacity during slow periods we have no one we can send to war without decimating (or thirdimating in reality) a unit's ability to Force Generate or perform regular maintenance. A military can not, and should not, be run like a corporation.

On the other hand, I'm taking a HR course right now and, much like my organizational behaviour course, the military is going backwards on the things that industry is realizing is important. My topic for the week is creating a culture of life long learning and why it is important for organizations to focus on training their employees. In both those areas, the CAF was better 20+ years ago while industry has realized the importance of supporting employees as they gain new skills or knowledge. Interestingly, I was just telling my wife that this may be my last course because the new program is so much harder to get funding with.
 
The CAF leadership do not understand CAF HR. They do not understand that MWOs and Majs don't magically appear. Nor do they understand that if the GoC tells you you have 71,500 all in for Reg F PYs that you must fit all your Reg F needs within that PY limit. They do not understand federal legislation. They can't tell the difference between legislation, regulation and policy, nor who holds what authorities. They don't understand compensation and benefits, either as strategic leaders or as tactical transactional managers.

A CAF GOFO in CMP needs to understand the AMOR to SIP to attract to select to recruit to train to develop to PME to retain to release process, end to end.

A CAF GOFO in the Army needs to understand the pers management they are accountable for, and needs to get fired when (for example) a release file sits for a year because a CBG is too fucking lazy to do their job.

The CAF needs professionals for management, and needs some public executions for those who fail to perform.
 
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