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Reconstitution

I would warn the current Business Management trends like DEI or "culture change" are about to peak. The coming economic storm is going to run head first into the modern management culture. Companies like Blackrock and their CEO Fink are going to be in a world of hurt. Their DEI culture cascade though the S&P is not getting them the returns they have hoped for.

In an org like the CAF should not be using business management ideas.

Wouldn't it be great if the CAF actually understood what those ideas were all about first, before discarding them?

OTOH....

I recall attempting to introduce some simple process mapping into an annual planning process with a HQ group. This is something widely practised, and valued, in the public and private sectors outside the CAF.

None of them had ever seen it or experienced it before, and this was literally just using post it notes and a sharpie pen to map out a sequence of activities on a white board and get everyone involved in playing with a few options.

They regarded it as some kind of alien black magic, immediately discarded the approach, and carried on with a pretty dysfunctional planning meeting where the highest rank just laid the law down.

Of course, the result included the usual incoherent PPT slide with a badly done Gantt chart.

"Invented by Henri Gantt" I tired to interject, but to no avail ;)
 
We've done a lot of process mapping, and generally found there is a 'theoretical process' a 'process that works' and then the 'what we are supposed to be doing' process.

Pretty typical for the process development people to not talk to the user base, or if they do, use a specific user as a model for the rest, and doesn't work. They also frequently seem to just talk to the big giant heads who don't use the processes when developing improvement plans, so we've gotten an onion of bureaucratic inefficiencies layered all over the place over the 20 years I've seen of 'strategic initiatives'. Usually all done with no consideration for the associated LOE or introduction of net new work.

I showed it to one of our lean six sigma black belt contractors who was working on something else as a joke at one point, but after he recovered, he understood why things took so long, and why I hated life some days. If you process plan looks like a rube goldberg machine it's probably not a great indication. Initially he thought I had made it up and it was a joke, but no, the 11x14 multipage process map in size 8 font was the actual process.
 
I showed it to one of our lean six sigma black belt contractors who was working on something else as a joke at one point, but after he recovered, he understood why things took so long, and why I hated life some days. If you process plan looks like a rube goldberg machine it's probably not a great indication. Initially he thought I had made it up and it was a joke, but no, the 11x14 multipage process map in size 8 font was the actual process.

So you have trimmed the fat out of the process?:ROFLMAO:
 
The last "optimization" exercise I was consulted took a process from about 180 to 160 days.

The majority of that time savings was realized by moving 30 days outside the process. So comparing apples to apples, the optimization added roughly two weeks to the process.
 
We've done a lot of process mapping, and generally found there is a 'theoretical process' a 'process that works' and then the 'what we are supposed to be doing' process.

Pretty typical for the process development people to not talk to the user base, or if they do, use a specific user as a model for the rest, and doesn't work. They also frequently seem to just talk to the big giant heads who don't use the processes when developing improvement plans, so we've gotten an onion of bureaucratic inefficiencies layered all over the place over the 20 years I've seen of 'strategic initiatives'. Usually all done with no consideration for the associated LOE or introduction of net new work.

I showed it to one of our lean six sigma black belt contractors who was working on something else as a joke at one point, but after he recovered, he understood why things took so long, and why I hated life some days. If you process plan looks like a rube goldberg machine it's probably not a great indication. Initially he thought I had made it up and it was a joke, but no, the 11x14 multipage process map in size 8 font was the actual process.
Bah, that's nothing. The proposed business process dreamed up for us by a "tiger team from Ottawa" spanned about 15' of wall in our office, when laid out on 11"x17" paper. A one page decision matrix went to 25 pages. Thankfully it died when the CPC came in.
 
No, but a customer centrict approach focused on increasing profits doesn't really make sense. And some aspects of the culture are unique to militaries because we fundamentally do different things, and if you only consider it from the lens of what makes sense for a business you can drop important aspects of why it works in one context but not in another.

Screws and bolts both turn, but it's better to use the right tool.

Relevant example, the RCN is trying to implement commercial classification standards, while giving the RCN the ability to disregard it as long as they 'accept the risk', with no ability for the technical side to drop the hammer.

Classification works on commercial ships because they can order things fixed or the ship will lose insurance and not allowed to leave the harbour. We're adopting the rules without those controls, and basically the defects keep piling up with no checks and balances as long as there are individual risk assessments. We don't do big picture risk assessments, and if anyone thinks they understand the cumulative risk of 1500+ defects, missed maintenance routines and broken things per ship, they are kidding themselves.

Its like all things government, they have to give themselves a out, but there is also sometimes justification. For example the CAF doesn't have to follow speed limits. We are ordered to follow speed limits, but we could also order ourselves to disregard them as needed, such as war time.

In a war we may need to disregard proper safety standards because the risk of sailing not up to spec is lower than the strategic impact of not having that ship in the fight. That being said in peace time with no real reason to disregard the risk other than we refuse to put the money needed into the ship, it is a weak justification for the CoC. Not to mention if/when it goes wrong I doubt the CoC will fall on their sword for it.

We can't afford to box ourselves into a bunch of self inflicted restrictions in case of the event we actually have reasonable justification to ignore it. That being said we need to have the organizational fortitude to make ourselves follow the guidelines when we can't reasonably justify ignoring them instead of taking the easy way out.

Customer centric just means making sure the customer (i.e. government) gets what they need. Where I work as a maintenance machinist my customer is the place I am working. It isn't so much about cost as making sure the product we provide them is what they need to get that equipment running whether or not it 100% matches the print. Ours as the CAF is ensure the crown is getting what they need out of us for the missions they require of us.
 
But in very real terms, beating the hell out of ships in peace time and falling below basic commercial standards means that they are falling apart when wartime kicks in that you can't possibly fix in time to be effective. We definitely need to have flexibility, but should also not pull that card out everytime someone wants to do a fishpat or other peace time bit of sailing around.

The invasion of UKR is a perfect example, but similarly happened when things were going on in Syria and we had ships just far enough offshore to be in international water (but still within weapons range for shore batteries). In each case the ships deploy with things below SOLAS, which directly impacts the battle damage recoverability (which is another step above and beyond basic safety). That's not even considering basic combat capabilties like CBRN, and we were sitting off Syria a month after they gassed their own citizens with plastic trunking and duct tape holding it together and hoping for the best, if you want a concrete example of how systematic degradation of basic capabilities impacted getting a deployed HR ship up to real combatant capability. And because it's so normalized, when we sent back an OPDEF with pictures, people just shrugged.

We are surging continually just to do basic sailing, so there is no resiliency left to fall back on. I think if one of them took battle damage in real combat, we would lose ships and have a lot more injured/dead as a result, where we may have otherwise been able to contain it and limp back home.
 
But in very real terms, beating the hell out of ships in peace time and falling below basic commercial standards means that they are falling apart when wartime kicks in that you can't possibly fix in time to be effective. We definitely need to have flexibility, but should also not pull that card out everytime someone wants to do a fishpat or other peace time bit of sailing around.

The invasion of UKR is a perfect example, but similarly happened when things were going on in Syria and we had ships just far enough offshore to be in international water (but still within weapons range for shore batteries). In each case the ships deploy with things below SOLAS, which directly impacts the battle damage recoverability (which is another step above and beyond basic safety). That's not even considering basic combat capabilties like CBRN, and we were sitting off Syria a month after they gassed their own citizens with plastic trunking and duct tape holding it together and hoping for the best, if you want a concrete example of how systematic degradation of basic capabilities impacted getting a deployed HR ship up to real combatant capability. And because it's so normalized, when we sent back an OPDEF with pictures, people just shrugged.

We are surging continually just to do basic sailing, so there is no resiliency left to fall back on. I think if one of them took battle damage in real combat, we would lose ships and have a lot more injured/dead as a result, where we may have otherwise been able to contain it and limp back home.
100% which is why we need to have the option to disregard the standards, but the fortitude not to unless it is legitimately required. And if we so choose to disregard them, we need to justify that action.

We have a 'yes man' culture in the CAF. People who dare to speak out against the company line are put in the corner, well those who say everything is fine and there is no issue get promoted and moved higher. Best example of this failing us hard I can think of being the Airborne regiment where CO 1 said no they weren't ready, was removed from command and CO 2 said it was good to go with all of us knowing the fallout of that poor decision.
 
100% which is why we need to have the option to disregard the standards, but the fortitude not to unless it is legitimately required. And if we so choose to disregard them, we need to justify that action.

We have a 'yes man person' culture in the CAF. People who dare to speak out against the company line are put in the corner, well those who say everything is fine and there is no issue get promoted and moved higher. Best example of this failing us hard I can think of being the Airborne regiment where CO 1 said no they weren't ready, was removed from command and CO 2 said it was good to go with all of us knowing the fallout of that poor decision.

There, FTFY ;)
 
"Ready Aye Ready" is destroying the Navy, because we'll move heaven and earth to get ships to sea, regardless of how inconsequential the task nor how dire the impact on material and personnel.

Because we're not actually ready. We just go anyways.
 
"Ready Aye Ready" is destroying the Navy, because we'll move heaven and earth to get ships to sea, regardless of how inconsequential the task nor how dire the impact on material and personnel.

Because we're not actually ready. We just go anyways.
I was trained as a Marine Systems Engineering Officer. My memory is that the technical authority for ship engineering resides in NDHQ under what was called Director General Maritime Engineering and Maintenance (I expect names have changed but roles probably haven't changed much). DGMEM was ultimately responsible for the mechanical fitness of the ships.

The people posting here on the front end continuously point out substantial deficiencies yet the ships still sail (from what I understand).

It should be DGMEM speaking up and making things right. Has that position lost its authority? Is DGMEM just afraid to speak up?

Perspective from someone in that group would be helpful.
 
I was trained as a Marine Systems Engineering Officer. My memory is that the technical authority for ship engineering resides in NDHQ under what was called Director General Maritime Engineering and Maintenance (I expect names have changed but roles probably haven't changed much). DGMEM was ultimately responsible for the mechanical fitness of the ships.

The people posting here on the front end continuously point out substantial deficiencies yet the ships still sail (from what I understand).

It should be DGMEM speaking up and making things right. Has that position lost its authority? Is DGMEM just afraid to speak up?

Perspective from someone in that group would be helpful.
It's Naval Engineering and Maintenance now, but it's their subunit, Fleet Technical Authority (FTA) that produces a risk assessment based on the technical state of the ship. However, FTA just produces a risk assessment and recommendation. Ultimately it's the line chain of command that decides whether or not to assume the risk. Who actually owns the risk at which points/level of risk, I'm not sure, but I've seen waivers be approved by both the Fleet Commander and the Formation Commander.
 
But in very real terms, beating the hell out of ships in peace time and falling below basic commercial standards means that they are falling apart when wartime kicks in that you can't possibly fix in time to be effective. We definitely need to have flexibility, but should also not pull that card out everytime someone wants to do a fishpat or other peace time bit of sailing around.

The invasion of UKR is a perfect example, but similarly happened when things were going on in Syria and we had ships just far enough offshore to be in international water (but still within weapons range for shore batteries). In each case the ships deploy with things below SOLAS, which directly impacts the battle damage recoverability (which is another step above and beyond basic safety). That's not even considering basic combat capabilties like CBRN, and we were sitting off Syria a month after they gassed their own citizens with plastic trunking and duct tape holding it together and hoping for the best, if you want a concrete example of how systematic degradation of basic capabilities impacted getting a deployed HR ship up to real combatant capability. And because it's so normalized, when we sent back an OPDEF with pictures, people just shrugged.

We are surging continually just to do basic sailing, so there is no resiliency left to fall back on. I think if one of them took battle damage in real combat, we would lose ships and have a lot more injured/dead as a result, where we may have otherwise been able to contain it and limp back home.
Not to mention we have the shipyards to do the refit work. I see a post that Davie did a good job on a refit as did VSY out here on the WestCoast. We just need the will and money to maintain them.
 
Retired GOFO sends... again.

He's clearly been too long at the Port (and Starboard) bottle ;)

Comment: The military should focus on protecting Canada​


Canada should reorganize its Armed Forces to focus more on its first two missions: first to defend Canada and second to defend North America.

Roger Cyr, OMM, CD

A commentary by a retired naval commander who lives in Victoria.

The Canadian Forces should focus on protecting Canada. The mission of the Forces is to provide combat-effective, multi-purpose forces at home and abroad to protect Canada and Canadians, the first element is to defend Canada, the second is to defend North America, and the third is contribute to international peace and security.

Defending Canada includes assisting civil authorities in responding to a wide range of threats, from natural disasters to terrorist attacks.

Canada is not a major military-oriented country, it supports a rather modest level of military forces that are somewhat diffidently equipped. This has always been the norm in the past, except when world situations required nations to boost their military involvement for the common good.

Canada’s military then came to the forefront in situations such as the Second World War, the Cold War, and various United Nations and NATO peacekeeping initiatives. The country then went on a military build-up that was truly astonishing, given the rather diminutive size of its regular military and defence industries.

Looking at the Second World War, at the start in 1939, the Royal Canadian Navy consisted of 13 combat ships. But when the war ended six years later, it had more than 450 ships.

Of course, the ships of those days do not reflect the superior technology of today’s ships. But then again, the shipyards that built them did not have the industrial capabilities of today’s yards. After the war, the Canadian military and defence industries shrunk to their peacetime levels.

Over the past numerous decades, Canada has relied on a relatively small military force during normal times, but when situations required a buildup, this was undertaken readily. However, the country does not appear to be facing a world crisis at this time and would not appear to need to go to a catastrophic acquisition of combat-capable systems.

The North Warning System upgrade is a normal defence and surveillance action that needs to take place to ensure the protection of Canada and the United States.

The NWS is a joint American and Canadian early-warning radar system for the atmospheric air defence of North America. It provides surveillance of airspace from potential incursions or attacks from across North America’s polar region. It replaced the Distant Early Warning Line system in the late 1980s.

The NWS consists of both long-range and short-range surveillance radars, operated and maintained by NORAD. There are 13 long-range sites and 36 short-range sites. In Canada, the station sites are owned or leased by the government of Canada, which also owns most of the infrastructure.

Canada should curtail acquiring major weapon systems at this time since there are no global requirements. This would happen, as it did in the past, when a need materializes.

It should now reorganize its Armed Forces to focus more on the first two missions, first to defend Canada and second to defend North America. The first mission should include responsibility for aid to the civil authorities, such as search and rescue, and the physical protection of the homeland from a law-and-order perspective.

The structure and resource allocation of the Forces should emphasize the first and most vital mission, which is to defend and protect Canada.
In past years, when disaster struck Canadian regions, some military personnel were seen helping as best they could to provide assistance to local authorities. For floods, we saw some members filling sandbags with a shovel, or we may have seen some rescuing people with inflatable boats.
These military rescues should be seen as a true military operation. The rescue missions should reflect military might and should be shown as resourceful, effective and precise.

After all, this is really Canada’s last effort against disasters and unrest and should be attacked by the military in that context. The Forces must accordingly structure and resource itself to cover its critical home front role.

As for the defence of the continent, this should be handled in co-operation with the United States and the NWS. The U.S. has the resources and capabilities, Canada does not. A treaty should be concluded with the U.S. to that effect.

It is ludicrous to think that Canada could provide for the defence of its territory from a major power such as Russia and China. Especially now that the Arctic is becoming a sought-after territory by these two world superpowers.

The U.S. is also interested in the Arctic, but it would certainly not be confrontational to Canada. The third mission, contribute to international peace and security, will continue as in the past with participation in NATO and United Nations taskings.

If the world situation dictates a major buildup of weapon systems, then it will occur as it has always done in the past.

 
Roger Cyr wasn’t a GOFO. He was a three-ringer (Commander, a salt-water LCol-equivalent)

oh

Season 9 Reaction GIF by The Office
 
Canada should curtail acquiring major weapon systems at this time since there are no global requirements. This would happen, as it did in the past, when a need materializes.
Not a student of Rumsfeld, is he?

:unsure:
 
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