Replacing the Subs

[KevinB]

As an outside observer, I cannot help but notice that the (few) Conservative MPs with strong military roots (O'Toole, Ruff) do not have strong "voices" on 'Team Poilievre.'

Would you accept the addition of ‘currently’?

Because he’s going to get a fist rammed up his rear end from down here to make a change - the only question will be ‘Vaseline or Baby Powder’ for how much it hurts.

 

[Underway]

As an outside observer, I cannot help but notice that the (few) Conservative MPs with strong military roots (O'Toole, Ruff) do not have strong "voices" on 'Team Poilievre.'

Because they aren't populists. And unless they want to drag something to the guillotine its not getting airtime. And its not an election cycle yet either. Skippy doesn't want to talk about his tax review/reform either, saved rounds for the election campaign. And if "fixing the books" is the issue (which I think isn't really an issue, we're no where remotely close to 1990's situation), then defence is the largest chunk of discretionary spending.

We know that Skippy isn't taking pensioners dental plan away from them.

 

[Underway]

Of note, I read today in the newspaper (online of course) that the Conservatives support "the immediate replacement of the Victoria Class submarine". That's all I got. So we know that they intend for the sub program to survive in one form or another if they form government.

 

[Kirkhill]

Of note, I read today in the newspaper (online of course) that the Conservatives support "the immediate replacement of the Victoria Class submarine". That's all I got. So we know that they intend for the sub program to survive in one form or another if they form government.

I anticipate the rapid approval of Clean LNG and Clean H2 export facilities shortly after the next election. Money for defence will not be a problem.

 

[Czech_pivo]

I anticipate the rapid approval of Clean LNG and Clean H2 export facilities shortly after the next election. Money for defence will not be a problem.

That's a very good point. I read yesterday that the Germans were informing Trudeau that the 'window for shipping LNG to Europe is closing'. Fits perfect with the Conservative plans.

Adding a link to the article referred to above:

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/germany-canada-natural-gas-hydrogen-1.7330043

 

[Underway]

That article says to me don't bother. Any LNG facility that can be built won't be done in time. Also there is no such thing as clean hydrogen. Electrolysis is extremely energy inefficient and the cost effective way to make it is by mixing steam with natural gas giving H2 and CO2. So not so greenhouse clean.

 

[Kirkhill]

That article says to me don't bother. Any LNG facility that can be built won't be done in time. Also there is no such thing as clean hydrogen. Electrolysis is extremely energy inefficient and the cost effective way to make it is by mixing steam with natural gas giving H2 and CO2. So not so greenhouse clean.

Clean enough....

White, green, blue, grey or black? Or just natural gas enriched with H2?

And there are always these things

Floating LNG | Shell Global

www.shell.com

The world's first floating natural gas plant - FLNG

In South Korea, construction of the world’s first floating liquefied natural gas plant is under way. When completed it will allow natural gas to be harvested in difficult-to-reach or otherwise constrained underwater locations and processed directly on site. Alfa Laval technology is part of the...

www.alfalaval.com

https://www.bv.com/industries/oil-gas/floating-liquefied-natural-gas-flng/

Africa leading growth of FLNGs in mid-late 2020s

Only five FLNG units with combined capacity of 12.1 MMt per year are in service worldwide, nearly 12 years after Shell took FID on its Prelude FLNG off northwest Australia, according...

www.offshore-mag.com

With Canadian First Nations

Second proposed Indigenous-led floating Canadian LNG project moves to engineering stage

Second proposed Indigenous-led floating Canadian LNG project moves to engineering stage as global LNG investment booms

www.canadianenergycentre.ca

....

Further to - the Hydrogen Spectrum

The hydrogen colour spectrum| National Grid Group

From green to pink hydrogen, we reveal the rainbow of hydrogen colours and the different types of technology used to produce each. Here’s our guide to unlocking the current hydrogen colour code.

www.nationalgrid.com

....

And Hydrogen Enriched Natural Gas

Hydrogen-enriched natural gas, H2NG or HENG, is a mixture of hydrogen and natural gas - Energy Gases

 

[childs56]

It it to bad that Justin and supporters did not support Pieridae Energy who was going to build the Goldboro LNG facility in Nova Scotia with plans to ship LNG to Germany. In the in term they had a off shore platform they were going to use to get things going sooner then later. IT was not part of Justin's green energy program of building wind farms to power hydrogen plants.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It it to bad that Justin and supporters did not support Pieridae Energy who was going to build the Goldboro LNG facility in Nova Scotia with plans to ship LNG to Germany. In the in term they had a off shore platform they were going to use to get things going sooner then later. IT was not part of Justin's green energy program of building wind farms to power hydrogen plants.

LNGCanada being finished here was grandfathered in under the Environmental regs put in place by the Harper Government. Hence why it went through. Since Bill C69, resource development here have basically stopped. That's a feature, not a bug of JT government.

 

[childs56]

LNGCanada being finished here was grandfathered in under the Environmental regs put in place by the Harper Government. Hence why it went through. Since Bill C69, resource development here have basically stopped. That's a feature, not a bug of JT government.

That projects intent was to move western Canadian LNG to the Eastern and European markets.
Justin' s decision had a direct impact on this projects viability. Especially when he said Natural Gas has no future, but Hydrogen does. Then tried to cut a deal with Germany over providing hydrogen instead of NG.

Similar to what he did to Japan

 

[OldSolduer]

That projects intent was to move western Canadian LNG to the Eastern and European markets.
Justin' s decision had a direct impact on this projects viability. Especially when he said Natural Gas has no future, but Hydrogen does. Then tried to cut a deal with Germany over providing hydrogen instead of NG.

Similar to what he did to Japan

Follow the money.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Milestone reached in German-Norwegian Type 212CD submarine program​

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has reached an important milestone in the German-Norwegian submarine program: the design phase for the six Type 212CD submarines has been successfully concluded on schedule with the “Critical Design Review” (CDR).​

Both Germany and Norway are considering increasing the number of submarines on order. Christian Rogge emphasizes: “We are pleased with the positive signals from Germany and Norway. This underscores the need for our products. The latest advances in the design process have shown that we are meeting customer requirements and that the technical conditions are in place. We also have sufficient production capacity. We are ready when further option boats are needed.”

That phase "considering increasing the number of submarines on order." potentially will negatively impact this model from being selected. There is little to no room to add 12 Subs from Canada into the mix to meet our timelines, let alone Norway/Germany's timelines if they increase their number ordered.

Milestone reached in German-Norwegian Type 212CD submarine program - Naval News

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has reached an important milestone in the German-Norwegian submarine program: the design phase for the six Type 212CD submarines has been successfully concluded on schedule with the “Critical Design Review” (CDR).

www.navalnews.com

 

[Underway]

That phase "considering increasing the number of submarines on order." potentially will negatively impact this model from being selected. There is little to no room to add 12 Subs from Canada into the mix to meet our timelines, let alone Norway/Germany's timelines if they increase their number ordered.

Milestone reached in German-Norwegian Type 212CD submarine program - Naval News

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has reached an important milestone in the German-Norwegian submarine program: the design phase for the six Type 212CD submarines has been successfully concluded on schedule with the “Critical Design Review” (CDR).

www.navalnews.com

Not necessarily. TKMS may be signaling to Canada "hey we got spare capacity...".

 

[Czech_pivo]

Not necessarily. TKMS may be signaling to Canada "hey we got spare capacity...".

Have a look at the productions slots and timelines. Yes I'm aware that this is Wikipedia and these timelines may mean nothing but I think they don't have the capacity to add our time complete sub by 2035 into the mix.

Type 212CD submarine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

List of boats​

[edit]
The submarines are being procured by the Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency Forsvarsmateriell (six submarines)[30] and the German Armed Forces Procurement Agency BAAINBw (two submarines).

U-37	S187	3rd	Under contract [31]	30 Aug 2021[31]	2031 [31]
U-38	S188	5th	2034 [31]
–	Minimum of 4 planned future fleet [32]	As part of the Zielbild der Marine ab 2035 (target of the fleet from 2035), Germany plans to have a total of 6 to 9 Type 212 CD, therefore 4 to 7 additional submarines to be ordered.[32]
–
–
–
–	Up to 3 additional expected [32]
–
–

Royal Norwegian Navy (4 ordered + 2 planned to be ordered)

TBD	TBD	1st	Under construction [33][34]	30 Aug 2021[31]	12 Sep 2023 [33]	2027 [35]	2029 [31]
TBD	TBD	2nd	2030
TBD	TBD	4th	Under contract [31]	2033
TBD	TBD	6th	2035 [36]
TBD	TBD	Approved for order by parliament [37]	Approved in Jun 2024, waiting for order confirmation [38]
TBD	TBD

​

​

 

[KevinB]

Another option.

Austal USA wins contract to expand submarine module production capacity - Naval News

Austal USA has been awarded a US$450 million contract by General Dynamics Electric Boat to expand its submarine module production capacity.

www.navalnews.com

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Another option.

Austal USA wins contract to expand submarine module production capacity - Naval News

Austal USA has been awarded a US$450 million contract by General Dynamics Electric Boat to expand its submarine module production capacity.

www.navalnews.com

They have to help the Aussies first.

 

[KevinB]

They have to help the Aussies first.

Yes 3 VA are going there, but as the USN only wants 1 VA/year currently, and the VA’s to the Aussies are supposed to be some of the older VA’s, there seems to be some room.

Albeit USN SSN Math is a little hard to understand (see below as to how the CBO and HASC and SASC agree that it is hard to understand):

We current have 1 688 LA Class, 23 688i Improved LA Class SSN, 3 Seawolf, and 23 774 VA class boats for a total of 60 SSN's

By 2043, that is supposed to be 66 VA, (and maybe still the 3 Seawolf), and all the LA and iLA boats paid off, and the SSN(X) iVA replacement is supposed to start going into the water in 2044 (stop me if you have heard that one before)

The 23rd boat of the VA class was commissioned this month, the New Jersey, the 24th - 26th (Iowa, MA, and Idaho) are launched, conducting pre commissioning trials. The USN wanted only to take the Iowa next year, but the Massachusetts is going to get commissioned as well it appears.
1 LA Class is currently sitting in the dugout to be retired this year, and the last of the non iLA should be put to bed next year when the Iowa comes on line.

However all but 1 iLA Class have had fairly recent reactor replacements (one last year, and the last in class scheduled for next year) and have 15-39 years of service life left (and theoretically 40 for the last boat when it gets done - the original reactor was supposed to get 30 years, but was found to be a 40+ life span). So in the next 19 years the USN is supposed to pay off those iLA Class boats - and while some will be at EoL, almost 1/2 of them will have another 10 or more years on their reactors.

In the next 19 years, we are supposed to get 43 more VA (the three Aussie VA aren't counted against that as they are to be sold back to the USN when the AUKUS boats come on line).

So we need 2.263 VA Class a year to reach the 66 VA mark by 2043, 12 have been authorized past the Idaho, and 1 further one announced (I mean why wait for funding right?)

BUT currently the USN only wants to take 1 a year, so one can see what I mean about USN SSN math...

Which would provide 42 VA Class in 2043, 3 Seawolf, and 19-21 iLA (depending on the 60-66 number) -- however only 10-12 iLA would likely still be in the water (unless the reactor replacement schedule is continued and more dry dock time set aside).
Which if using the 60 boat number, leaves 15 required and a delta of probably 5 from the remaining available iLA.

Now despite what the article in my previous post mentioned GD-EB has shown the ability to do 4 VA a year (3-4 year run up required before able to commission 4 year without gaps).

IF we do 2 a year for the next 4 years (8), and then go to a 3 a year build till 2043 (45) that provides potentially 53 more VA/iVA boats.
Deducting the 3 for Australia, that is 50, or 7 more boats that required (or 10 if you don't deduct the Aussies).
If we do 2 year for the next 4 years (8), and then go to a 4/year built till 2043 (60), you get 68 more VA/iVA boats
Which we clearly don't need to do - but could -

What is clear is that the 1 a year USN plan isn't a way to get to the, mandated 66 boat number by 2043.

Side note SSN(X) is expected to be another Seawolf type (debacle) being over 3B a piece due to the size and munitions requirements.


And random SSN porn a glass my wife got me at the USS New Jersey commissioning earlier this month.

 

[KJK]

That's a nice glass but it needs some whiskey or Navy rum.

 

[KevinB]

That's a nice glass but it needs some whiskey or Navy rum.

I'm unfortunately still working. Apparently the world has conspired to decide that Friday is a solid 15hr work day for me today (kind of like last Friday too)

 

[Kirkhill]

Andrew Latham at Real Clear Defence.​

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/10/02/canadas_submarine_plan_1062314.html

​

He's a fan.

​

Canada's Submarine Plan​

By Andrew Latham
October 02, 2024
DoD

Canada's Submarine Plan: Necessary but Fraught with Challenges​

Canada has set its sights on acquiring up to 12 new conventionally powered submarines as part of a long-overdue effort to modernize its defense capabilities. The strategic rationale is clear: these submarines are essential for Canada to play a meaningful role in safeguarding the security of the North Pacific, Arctic, and North Atlantic regions. These three theaters are becoming increasingly interconnected as geopolitical tensions rise, driven by a resurgent Russia, an assertive China, and the impacts of climate change on Arctic navigation. However, despite the necessity of this move, Canada's track record in defense procurement raises serious questions about whether the country is capable of executing such an ambitious plan effectively.

Canada’s vast geography presents unique defense challenges that few other nations must face. With coastlines stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and a northern frontier increasingly accessible due to the melting polar ice cap, the country’s security environment demands a capable and flexible maritime force. The submarine fleet represents the only asset that can operate undetected across vast distances and perform critical missions ranging from intelligence gathering to deterring potential adversaries. For Canada to meet its various treaty obligations, and to contribute meaningfully to the defense of its own sovereignty, a modern, capable submarine fleet is no longer a luxury but a necessity.

The North Pacific: Confronting an Assertive China​

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the central theater of global power competition, with China’s military expansion and assertiveness becoming the dominant security concern for the Western alliance. Canada’s Pacific coastline, while distant from the core of the Indo-Pacific, is part of the broader North Pacific security architecture. With the United States and its allies increasing their naval presence in the region to counter China’s growing influence, Canada cannot afford to remain a peripheral player.

Submarines are particularly valuable in this context. Their ability to operate undetected in contested waters makes them a potent tool for intelligence collection, surveillance, and if necessary, striking enemy naval assets. In conjunction with the United States and other regional partners, Canada could use its submarines to bolster deterrence against Chinese expansionism, protect sea lines of communication, and ensure the free movement of goods and energy resources. But this contribution hinges on having a fleet that is both modern and functional—something that Canada’s current fleet, consisting of four Victoria-class submarines purchased secondhand from the UK in the 1990s, can no longer credibly offer.

The Arctic: Protecting Sovereignty in a Changing Environment​

Perhaps the most pressing reason for Canada to invest in new submarines lies in the Arctic. As the region’s ice recedes, new shipping routes are opening, and its vast reserves of untapped natural resources are becoming more accessible. This is attracting the attention of great powers like Russia and China, both of which have articulated Arctic ambitions. Russia, in particular, has been building up its military presence in the region, reactivating Cold War-era bases and deploying its own advanced submarines.

For Canada, maintaining sovereignty over its Arctic waters is not just a matter of territorial integrity but of national identity. While icebreakers and surface ships have their role to play in asserting control, submarines are indispensable. They can patrol beneath the ice, monitor underwater activities, and deter any attempts by foreign powers to challenge Canada’s claims. Without a robust submarine capability, Canada risks ceding influence in the region to other players, potentially including adversaries.

The North Atlantic: Bolstering NATO’s Maritime Defense​

Canada’s historical role as a key player in North Atlantic security is rooted in its deep integration with NATO. While the focus of global defense attention has shifted somewhat from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, NATO’s mission in the North Atlantic remains as critical as ever. Russia’s submarine activity in the North Atlantic has increased in recent years, posing a threat to vital undersea communication cables and allied naval operations. NATO’s ability to deter Russian aggression and maintain freedom of navigation in this region depends in part on Canada pulling its weight.

A new fleet of submarines would allow Canada to contribute meaningfully to NATO’s maritime defense strategy. By deploying modern, stealthy submarines, Canada could help track and counter Russian submarine movements, protect sea lanes, and ensure that NATO forces can operate unimpeded in the North Atlantic. This would reinforce Canada’s longstanding commitment to collective defense and enhance the security of the transatlantic alliance at a time of heightened geopolitical uncertainty.

Can Canada Get the Job Done?​

While the strategic need for new submarines is clear, there is considerable skepticism about Canada’s ability to actually deliver on this ambitious plan. The country’s history of defense procurement is littered with delays, cost overruns, and suboptimal outcomes. The Victoria-class submarine program is a prime example. Originally expected to be a cost-effective solution, the secondhand submarines were plagued by technical issues and spent much of their early service life undergoing repairs and upgrades. As a result, Canada’s submarine fleet has been largely unavailable for much of the past two decades, undermining the country’s ability to meet its defense commitments.

The acquisition of new submarines will be a complex, expensive, and time-consuming endeavor. Modern submarines are among the most sophisticated and costly military assets to produce and maintain. If Canada is to succeed, it will need to avoid the pitfalls of past procurement efforts, ensuring that timelines are met, costs are controlled, and the fleet is fully operational upon delivery. This will require not only political will but a rethinking of how Canada approaches defense procurement altogether. The federal government must prioritize transparency, accountability, and long-term planning if it is to avoid the mistakes of the past.

Moreover, there is the question of industrial capacity. Canada does not currently have the infrastructure to build submarines domestically, meaning it will likely need to rely on foreign suppliers. This introduces additional risks, including potential delays and vulnerabilities related to supply chain disruptions. The government will need to carefully manage these challenges to ensure that Canada’s submarine fleet is ready to meet the security challenges of the coming decades.

Conclusion​

Canada’s plan to acquire up to 12 new submarines is a necessary and overdue step toward addressing the country’s defense needs in the North Pacific, Arctic, and North Atlantic. The strategic rationale is sound: submarines are indispensable tools for asserting national sovereignty, deterring adversaries, and contributing to collective defense efforts in these interconnected regions. However, Canada’s history in the defense procurement domain raises serious doubts about whether it can get the job done. If the government is serious about bolstering Canada’s maritime capabilities, it will need to learn from past failures and commit to a disciplined, transparent, and accountable procurement process. Otherwise, Canada risks falling short once again, with serious consequences for its national security and international standing.

---

Professor Latham is a professor of International Relations specializing in the politics of international conflict and security. He teaches courses on international security, Chinese foreign policy, war and peace in the Middle East, Regional Security in the Indo-Pacific Region, and the World Wars. He was formerly the Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament Fellow at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and a lecturer at the Canadian Armed Forces School of Aerospace Studies. Professor Latham has also been publiched in outlets such as The Hill, The Diplomat, Canadian Defence Quarterly, Public Discourse, First Things, Genealogies of Modernity, Providence, and Crisis.