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Report lambastes core '3-D' principle of Canadian foreign policy

Spr.Earl

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A very interesting read.

http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2005/07/25/1147171-cp.html
 
I had a bit of a laugh with the "5-D" comment, maybe we should just beam up the bad guys while we are at it.

On a more serious note, I think the British approach is the best way to go about it: we (the military) form the shield behind which the other two "D"s can work behind. In military terms this is known as "Clear and hold", the townspeople will rarely encounter military units since they will be in the hills hunting down Taliban and AQ elements.

As time passes, the towns should become inhospitable for the Jihadis, providing fewer and fewer recruits, material support and so on, while the military elements prevent active Jihadis from linking up with each other or sympathisers in the towns. Starved of logistical support and intelligence, they will become far less effective and can be defeated in detail.
 
Thats why we have set up SIMIC.
We retaliate as the intel and action'ss of the day dictate,but it does not stop us from mooching about so to speak. ;)
 
From the original article, I note "...  The Institute for Research on Public Policy is an independent, non-profit think-tank based in Montreal. The organization is funded by an endowment fund established in the early 1970s."

It sure would piss me off if it turns out IRPP is one of these organisations the Auditor-General has been warning us about (i.e. several billion dollars of taxpayer money have been stashed away in organisations "untouchable" by either audit or government review ... how deliciously ironic that one would turn around and nibble on the hand that feeds them ... at a time when we can least afford a Fifth Column ...)
 
I don't mind the IRPP; I get their monthly rag, Policy Options, in the mail.  Not bad reading on Canadian politics.
 
This is a case of bureaucratic penis envy.

Foreign Affairs and CIDA both believed that they would have large and leading roles in Kandahar.  They will, if, big IF Canada stays there long enough for the (allied) military forces to tame the region.  Until the military is, generally, unnecessary, however, it will have the lion's share of the responsibility and it will lead - locally.

The quotes, from a supposedly 'closed' conference also betray the institutional anti-Americanism which renders so much of the Foreign Affairs establishment not just non-effective but counter-effective.

I hear, on the rumour net, that the longer term plan sees:

"¢ A national HQ - maybe in Kabul, more likely in the Gulf, headed by a very senior civil servant, probably at ambassador level, who will have national control authority over all Government of Canada elements, including military forces, in the region; and

"¢ ABC - which means "Anybody But CIDAâ ? - on the ground in Kandahar.  The military is rumoured to want a few NGOs to come to the region and work quasi-independently (as in the British model) while CIDA stays in Ottawa and doles out large gobs of cash.

The national HQ idea is, according to the rumour mill, highly popular in FA; popular enough, perhaps, to convince them to consign CIDA to the trash heap.  The FA bureaucrats would sell their mothers for a promotion; selling out their colleagues is only a small step.
 
I would appreciate if somebody satisfied my curiousity but are there not assets apart from security that the CF can provide?

Transportation, Basic medicine, communications and capacity building(ie: engineers building roads) all come to mind as areas of expertise that are of benefit to affected civilian populations. As mentioned that is where the aspect of CIMIC comes into play but it seems that there is always a 'pissing contest' of some sort going on in Ottawa.

Personally, I do not understand why there is institutional opposition to an idea that could profoundly increase our global presence. Once the growing pains are over, does this approach (3-D) add capabilities  to the CF that they couldn't financially achieve on their own. What I mean is do these "big  honking helicopters, planes and ship" :P give rationalization to our budgetary expendtures on the forces? I understand that some issues of sovereignty come to mind, like the Sudan but aren't we mostly going to operate in areas that have already given permission or under the auspices of greater international entities (UN, Nato,etc.).

 
sheikyerbouti said:
I would appreciate if somebody satisfied my curiosity but are there not assets apart from security that the CF can provide?

The question should actually be, who is the best person/organization to provide a certain service? Engineer troops can build roads and bridges, but given the small number of engineering assets in the CF, and the fact they are meant to build roads and bridges to support "our" operations, would it not make more sense to hire a company like Kellogg, Brown and Root to do the construction work for the local people? They can supply an army of skilled workers, loads of machinery, hire on locals to kick start the economy, AND, free the military engineers to perform military tasks. You can make similar arguments for virtually every service; the reason the military has doctors, photo techs, vets or postal workers is so the force can be self contained; not to help out unfortunate people who have somehow lost all their postal workers.

Indeed, if our supporting assets are being stripped away to do the sorts of work you suggest, the end result will be the service members on the "sharp end" will be without the support they need, weakening the very security tasking they are supposed to fulfill. Alternative Service Delivery (ASD), where civilian contractors are supposed to provide these services to deployed soldiers illustrates the principle in reverse, soldiers have to be held in camp to provide security for the contractors, rather than out in the woods performing the broader task.

The best way to do "3D" is to have deployed soldiers with their own integral support supplying security, and contractors, NGOs and government agencies working behind the shield to improve things. This goes in permissive, semi permissive and non permissive environments.
 
Sounds like we need to revive the East India Company
 
I did not mean to infer that this approach would strip assets away from core-critical areas but would 3-D not provide an opportunity to boost the personnel and materiel in areas that fulfill a CIMIC function?

I am personally opposed to introducing corporate entities such as KBR or SNC-Lavalin as the profit incentive required by these entities is detrimental to ongoing reconstruction efforts, let's face it they are not in this game to make themselves feel better. Another reality is that these groups rely heavily on sub-contractors to fulfil their contracted obligations. How difficult is for our own groups to conduct the same strategy of subbing out requirements?

What I envision would be something along the lines of say, de-mining efforts in Cambodia. While providing an humanitarian benefit to civilians, does this not provide effective training for all the integral assets to such an operation? Transport assets moving in route clearing vehicles and heavy equipment to provide high quality training to our engineers while at the same time aiding others in need fulfils many motives at the same time as justifying basic requirements for personnel and materiel.

To me this seems like a win-win situation for all parties concerned.
 
sheikyerbouti said:
I did not mean to infer that this approach would strip assets away from core-critical areas but would 3-D not provide an opportunity to boost the personnel and materiel in areas that fulfill a CIMIC function?

Considering the very small pool of trained soldiers and equipment that we have to draw from, this is simply not possible, unless you are willing to do rotations every six months (and for years at a stretch). Even with the mandated "one year" pause between deployments, high demand trades like the Engineers get burnt out, and the soldiers simply release from the CF. Either way is a loose loose situation for the CF.

I am personally opposed to introducing corporate entities such as KBR or SNC-Lavalin as the profit incentive required by these entities is detrimental to ongoing reconstruction efforts, let's face it they are not in this game to make themselves feel better. Another reality is that these groups rely heavily on sub-contractors to fulfil their contracted obligations. How difficult is for our own groups to conduct the same strategy of subbing out requirements?

We do subcontract out a lot of our own in theater support, who are also not there because they want to "feel good". This places an additional load on the soldiers, who have to do their jobs by day (so to speak), and also pull camp security by night. If we are going to hire subcontractors anyway, put them on the "street" to do civil engineering with the locals and free the soldiers to look for the bad guys.

What I envision would be something along the lines of say, de-mining efforts in Cambodia. While providing an humanitarian benefit to civilians, does this not provide effective training for all the integral assets to such an operation? Transport assets moving in route clearing vehicles and heavy equipment to provide high quality training to our engineers while at the same time aiding others in need fulfils many motives at the same time as justifying basic requirements for personnel and materiel.

Oddly enough, a lot of demining is done by specialized contractors as well (usually ex military people who know the job and are happy to do it for you for the right price). Another way is to hire and train locals to be your prodders and markers, conserving your skilled people to do the higher level work.  In practice, a combination of methods is used, but given the mismatch between the scale of the jobs being asked of us (demining, civil infrastructure rebuilding, reconstituting the civil authorities etc.) and the actual resources we have available, asking the military to shoulder this kind of burden and carry out military and security related tasks is simply impossible.

 
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