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Please post all replies to the Defence budget rising Editorial here.
Responses to Defence budget rising Editorial
- Thread starter Mike Bobbitt
- Start date
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Here (thanks whiskey601) is the letter from Mr. Staples:
It is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.
It is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.
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The problem with saying as Ruxted Editor does, that DND must have the resources to complete whatever missions assigned it is that DND doesn't limit itself to spending on operationally essential people & assets. Hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars are spent annually on things that are non-essential. We can argue about what's essential and every program will have it's supporters and detractors but I know very few people that believe waste isn't widespread within DND.
Staples & Polaris want defence cuts but not efficiency. I think the latter could lead to the former but not without a revolutionary change in the way DND does business. I also think we have the capacity to deploy substantially more forces than we do now but only if major changes in DNDs organizational culture with regards operational readiness, deployments and training occur.
Staples & Polaris want defence cuts but not efficiency. I think the latter could lead to the former but not without a revolutionary change in the way DND does business. I also think we have the capacity to deploy substantially more forces than we do now but only if major changes in DNDs organizational culture with regards operational readiness, deployments and training occur.
George Wallace
Army.ca Dinosaur
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Steven Staples makes this comment, which really doesn't make any sense:
That would imply that in the past the Government of Canada raped the Defence Budget, and only now is it nearing what it was over ten years ago. Associated with that would be all the degradation of facilities, manpower and equipment and we are looking at quite a sad picture.
How can our Defence Spending have increased annually and yet we are still seven per cent below what we spent during the Cold War? I assume that is also in 1990 Dollars.
That would imply that in the past the Government of Canada raped the Defence Budget, and only now is it nearing what it was over ten years ago. Associated with that would be all the degradation of facilities, manpower and equipment and we are looking at quite a sad picture.
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Michael Shannon said:
But one man's junk is another's treasure.
I too believe that plenty of "dollars are spent annually on things that are non-essential." As you correctly point out, Mr. Shannon, every programme has supporters - many of the programmes I consider wasteful and prime target for reduction have supporters who have the ability, as the government-of-the-day, to impose them on DND - that makes them government requirements and means that DND must find funds within its budget for them, just like it finds money for salaries, ammunition, food and fuel.
You assert, Mr. Shannon, that you "know very few people that believe waste isn't widespread within DND." Maybe so; maybe you and they would like to enumerate the programmes and projects which can be cut. For my part I know some people who believe there is some waste in DND - probably about the same level of 'waste' as we might find in e.g. the Canadian Border Security Agency, General Motors, Nortel and Transport Canada. Big organizations are never waste free and when you cut some you can be sure that more still exists because what was essential, last year, to me, is waste, this year, in your eyes.
I agree with you, Mr. Shannon, that "Staples & Polaris want defence cuts but not efficiency." I am less inclined to propose revolutionary changes in the way DND does business. In 35+ years of service, from private soldier to senior officer, I saw my fair share of revolutionary changes - including, close up and personal, those introduced by Paul Hellyer; I am not persuaded that they were needed then or are needed now.
Finally, Mr. Shannon, I would be interested in your ideas about "major changes in ... organizational culture"; I have read some of your comments, such as: "This is about nothing but preserving units. Each arm has desperately tried to justify it's existing structure in the hope that the current farce will eventually change if they just hang on. I agree that a lot of effort has been put into justifying ad hockery but it's just staff officers trying to make the best of a bad situation given the limitations they have: no disbandments, no amalgamations and symmetry among the infantry regiments." (http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/16825/post-239425.html#msg239425 on 2005-07-14) Can you tell us more? Can you offer a clear, concise description of the changes in organizational culture you think are necessary?
Mr. Staples told us what he wants; some people disagree. What is your plan?
KevinB
Army.ca Relic
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I agree (walking the tight rope) with both Michael and Edward. The CF has a lot of areas where there is no operational reason to have land or personnel emplyed. However, most of those decisions are not strictly the CDS's or MD's. I dont agree with the Polaris issue/fiction at all, I too can cook the books with smoke and mirrors to make the CF seem poorly or well supplies with funding depending upon how one looks at it - Stats don't lie - it only the way they are presented and interpreted.
I understand the article by the Ruxted Group here to be in responce to The Stephen Staples/Polaris Institute article, and I will limit my remaining comments to saying I agree with the Ruxted postion - and am willing to debate/argue/fight over the other issues in another thread.
I understand the article by the Ruxted Group here to be in responce to The Stephen Staples/Polaris Institute article, and I will limit my remaining comments to saying I agree with the Ruxted postion - and am willing to debate/argue/fight over the other issues in another thread.
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I once heard that military organizations, optimized for campaigning, seem awkward and inefficient in peacetime - it's the nature of the beast. Combine that with a huge bureaucracy and the largest bit of discretionary spending in the governments pocket, and I can assure you that there are leaks in the boat.
Do Canadians get the 12-billion dollar military that they put their money towards? Probably not - but is cutting back the spending the key, as the Polaris Institute suggests? As the counter-editorial argues, advancing that claim while at the same time making arguments for a military capability free of dependency on other powers, is simple folly.
Do Canadians get the 12-billion dollar military that they put their money towards? Probably not - but is cutting back the spending the key, as the Polaris Institute suggests? As the counter-editorial argues, advancing that claim while at the same time making arguments for a military capability free of dependency on other powers, is simple folly.
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As well, if you look at the section of the pie that personal takes up, you'll notice that training and paying a short term volunteer and developing and paying the salary of a long-service professional (the crux of our capability) is huge - and for good reason. Another reason why Mr Staples' superficial look at raw numbers is out to lunch (as was Scott Taylor's comparison of the Turkish and Canadian militaries).
I'd imagine DND is not alone in asserting that they'd like as much money as possible for their particular area of responsibility. No doubt Steven will next do an "analysis" on those greedy folks over at Indian and Northern Affairs, Heritage Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, et al. It isn't even so much that I disagree with his claims; what bugs me is that so much of his work is so trite. He'll claim that Canadian military spending following the same general pattern as the U.S. is some sort of proof of U.S. influence and fail entirely to show patterns of our NATO allies. It may well be that circumstances were pushing up spending all across the board. Hopefully someone or some folks will rise to the occassion and offer a few counterpoints.
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Michael Shannon said:
What might be considered non essential people and assests today, could very well become an operational assest tomorrow.
The things I agree with:
no amount of money will be sufficent without some clear direction as to what is expected from the CF and how exactly we are to be employed within the Foriegn Affairs scheme.
no amount of money will be enough until politicians realize we can not do everything they expect us to do.
no amount of money will be enough without some serious retooling of the organization as it stands now.
no amount of money will be enough....
just like health care....no amount will fix all the problems.
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"... we want fewer soldiers, sailors, airmen, out of harm's way... so little Canada can hide behind America's
skirts."
That phrase from the article pretty well says it all. Hiding behind America's skirts is what we've always done.
It's the biggest reason why Canada has no real sovereignty even though it repeatedly claims otherwise.
It takes its orders from Washington, its economy is pretty much entirely US-owned, and thanks to its repeated refusal to shoulder its share of the collective defence burden it is no longer held in the esteem it once was by its allies.
When the Americans and others come for Canada's water and natural resources, who will defend Canada?
skirts."
That phrase from the article pretty well says it all. Hiding behind America's skirts is what we've always done.
It's the biggest reason why Canada has no real sovereignty even though it repeatedly claims otherwise.
It takes its orders from Washington, its economy is pretty much entirely US-owned, and thanks to its repeated refusal to shoulder its share of the collective defence burden it is no longer held in the esteem it once was by its allies.
When the Americans and others come for Canada's water and natural resources, who will defend Canada?
KevinB
Army.ca Relic
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Eland said:
Not so; we have, in the not too distant past, done our full and fair share and more.
While a certain (low) level of social anti-Americanism has long been part and parcel of Canadian society, the more recent institutional and overtly political anti-Americanism dates from about 1967/68. It is the step-daughter of an un-stated but increasingly present anti-capitalist tendency in Canadian political discourse (which has the same birth-date) – a tendency which is totally and completely devoid of intellectual merit but which is highly popular with an increasingly ill-informed electorate.
The nonsensical phase “the world needs more Canada” is at the root of our weak kneed little Canada response to the world’s challenges – that and a historic parsimony: we Canadians say we are caring and sharing while, in fact, our predominant national characteristics to Afghan and Americans alike is greed and envy – remember how offended so many Canadians were when, having taken no role in the US funded liberation of Iraq, our corporations were denied opportunities to be prime contractors on US funded Iraqi reconstruction projects. We prefer to talk (even cheering is to much for most Canadians) from the sidelines and then complain when we are ignored.
We are, indeed, hiding, shamefully, behind America’s skirts – because we choose to.
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A good book dealing with who it was that destroyed our military was written by J.L Granatstein called "Who Killed The Canadian Military" It dicusses many of the things mentioned on this thread such as Defence spending fron the Cold War to present and how each successive government has done little to turn around the slow and steady decay of the armed forces.Has anyone read it?
One of my feelings on how we arrived where we are today has do with Canadas push towards all things U.N. When the government and the population that elects it feels that peacekeeping is all we need to be capable of doing then of course defence spending is going to decrease. Training a soldier how to observe a conflict costs a whole lot less than training a soldier to fight and be effective in conflict.
Some might think this post belongs somewhere else such as book reviews or something,but I think it goes well here. J.L. Granatsein would make an excellent MND to bad he is not a politician.
One of my feelings on how we arrived where we are today has do with Canadas push towards all things U.N. When the government and the population that elects it feels that peacekeeping is all we need to be capable of doing then of course defence spending is going to decrease. Training a soldier how to observe a conflict costs a whole lot less than training a soldier to fight and be effective in conflict.
Some might think this post belongs somewhere else such as book reviews or something,but I think it goes well here. J.L. Granatsein would make an excellent MND to bad he is not a politician.
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I know this is resurrecting an old thread but I think it fits.
Prof. (LCol (Armd) Ret’d) Doug Bland of Queens University wrote a piece in today’s National Post (which I cannot find on the web site)* echoing General Hillier’s recent plea for a thorough overhaul of the defence procurement system.
This may be the most important item on the CDS’ shopping list. There is little point in adding more and more money for equipment programmes if that new money is going to follow the old into the decrepit, confused, old procurement ’system’.
In Canada, defence procurement has little to do with defence; it is, mainly, about spreading government funds around the ridings in which the government-of-the-day thinks it might win votes in the next general election; it (defence procurement) harks back to 19th century Canadian democracy where barrels of beer were put out in front of the polling stations and party workers supervised the vote of the thoroughly soused electors. It is, in a word: corrupt.
One of Prof. Bland’s suggestions is to streamline the ’system’ by centralizing it – getting rid of the vast array of inter-departmental committees and groups which, currently, heap delay upon amendment to slow the process until the needs of this, that or the other client (special interest, never the CF) is met.
Using national defence as a partisan political tool is not new in Canada: Major General Middleton complained of it in 1885. Using it for regional economic development began, in earnest, in the early ‘70s when Canada ‘invented’ industrial offsets - which were a major, maybe deciding factor in the CP-140 and Cougar/Grizzley wheeled armoured vehicle contracts. Industrial offsets were, and still are, a stupid idea; only the terminally dumb really believe that we ever get something for nothing. I am here to say, based upon several years of observing contracts from the top end of ADM (Mat)’s empire 20+ years ago, that we pay, usually 110%, for every single industrial benefit. They are nothing more than an inefficient, expensive regional welfare programme. The industrial benefits idea almost came a cropper early when real political corruption entered the picture, but the scandals did not stick in Canada – only Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Lockheed were caught – so the ‘worst’ that happened was some salacious gossip, and, sadly, the programme survived and prospered because Canadian voters are so very, very easily bribed with their own money – greed and envy being our only two distinct national attributes.
Anyway, rant ends.
The procurement business used to be fairly simple and, even, efficient – back in the days of C.D. Howe who created a Department of Defence Production from the wartime Department of Munitions and Supplies and then, quite unashamedly, used defence procurement as both a national economic development and as a (partisan) regional rewards tool. The wheels began to fall off after the Korean War when the Department of Defence Production began the process of morphing (with the Department of Public Works) into what is now Supply and Services Canada: a large and largely inept government wide procurement agency.
The secrets to DDP's relative efficiency and effectiveness included:
1. Unity – one minister/department had sole and complete responsibility for one function;
2. Clarity – one complete function was under the jurisdiction of one minister;
3. Purpose – there was a clear goal: suitable (adequate, not necessarily the ’best’) and affordable equipment for the CF when needed.
In my view all three need to be re-invented in a new defence procurement agency. Other countries, notably Australia and the UK, have reformed their procurement – see: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DPA/WhatWeDo and http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/about/index.cfm . We should examine these and other models but, I believe that the Australian model overloads the Defence Department/Minister of National Defence – CD Howe was wise to separate the two functions. The MND and his DM and staff and the CDS should manage the Department as it is and fight the wars – someone else can buy the kit. The UK model might be more suitable but an executive agency which is, somehow subordinate to the Minister still seems unnecessarily burdensome to me.
I, personally, favour a return to the 1951 model. All defence procurement, planes and pencils, alike, should be centralized in one agency – no common procurement should apply to any DND contracts, not even when it makes good sense to do so. The Department of Defence Production can negotiate ‘tag along’ contracts for stationary and landscaping services, if it wishes but it must be 100% independent. Equally, no other government departments should be allowed any access to defence procurement. The cabinet can direct the Department of Defence Procurement to take account of issues and policies, even stupid and wasteful policies like regional industrial benefits but it should never, ever require inter-departmental cooperation, or worse.
This will require that CF personnel are employed by another government department – nothing strange there, it happened to me and my people and I’m 99.99% sure it still happens now. Whole Project Offices would be transferred from DND to DDP with their Blue Book (approved by Parliament) spending authorities.
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* But MarkOttawa did and he posted it here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/42212/post-368272.html#msg368272
Edit to add link to Prof. Bland's article
Prof. (LCol (Armd) Ret’d) Doug Bland of Queens University wrote a piece in today’s National Post (which I cannot find on the web site)* echoing General Hillier’s recent plea for a thorough overhaul of the defence procurement system.
This may be the most important item on the CDS’ shopping list. There is little point in adding more and more money for equipment programmes if that new money is going to follow the old into the decrepit, confused, old procurement ’system’.
In Canada, defence procurement has little to do with defence; it is, mainly, about spreading government funds around the ridings in which the government-of-the-day thinks it might win votes in the next general election; it (defence procurement) harks back to 19th century Canadian democracy where barrels of beer were put out in front of the polling stations and party workers supervised the vote of the thoroughly soused electors. It is, in a word: corrupt.
One of Prof. Bland’s suggestions is to streamline the ’system’ by centralizing it – getting rid of the vast array of inter-departmental committees and groups which, currently, heap delay upon amendment to slow the process until the needs of this, that or the other client (special interest, never the CF) is met.
Using national defence as a partisan political tool is not new in Canada: Major General Middleton complained of it in 1885. Using it for regional economic development began, in earnest, in the early ‘70s when Canada ‘invented’ industrial offsets - which were a major, maybe deciding factor in the CP-140 and Cougar/Grizzley wheeled armoured vehicle contracts. Industrial offsets were, and still are, a stupid idea; only the terminally dumb really believe that we ever get something for nothing. I am here to say, based upon several years of observing contracts from the top end of ADM (Mat)’s empire 20+ years ago, that we pay, usually 110%, for every single industrial benefit. They are nothing more than an inefficient, expensive regional welfare programme. The industrial benefits idea almost came a cropper early when real political corruption entered the picture, but the scandals did not stick in Canada – only Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Lockheed were caught – so the ‘worst’ that happened was some salacious gossip, and, sadly, the programme survived and prospered because Canadian voters are so very, very easily bribed with their own money – greed and envy being our only two distinct national attributes.
Anyway, rant ends.
The procurement business used to be fairly simple and, even, efficient – back in the days of C.D. Howe who created a Department of Defence Production from the wartime Department of Munitions and Supplies and then, quite unashamedly, used defence procurement as both a national economic development and as a (partisan) regional rewards tool. The wheels began to fall off after the Korean War when the Department of Defence Production began the process of morphing (with the Department of Public Works) into what is now Supply and Services Canada: a large and largely inept government wide procurement agency.
The secrets to DDP's relative efficiency and effectiveness included:
1. Unity – one minister/department had sole and complete responsibility for one function;
2. Clarity – one complete function was under the jurisdiction of one minister;
3. Purpose – there was a clear goal: suitable (adequate, not necessarily the ’best’) and affordable equipment for the CF when needed.
In my view all three need to be re-invented in a new defence procurement agency. Other countries, notably Australia and the UK, have reformed their procurement – see: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DPA/WhatWeDo and http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/about/index.cfm . We should examine these and other models but, I believe that the Australian model overloads the Defence Department/Minister of National Defence – CD Howe was wise to separate the two functions. The MND and his DM and staff and the CDS should manage the Department as it is and fight the wars – someone else can buy the kit. The UK model might be more suitable but an executive agency which is, somehow subordinate to the Minister still seems unnecessarily burdensome to me.
I, personally, favour a return to the 1951 model. All defence procurement, planes and pencils, alike, should be centralized in one agency – no common procurement should apply to any DND contracts, not even when it makes good sense to do so. The Department of Defence Production can negotiate ‘tag along’ contracts for stationary and landscaping services, if it wishes but it must be 100% independent. Equally, no other government departments should be allowed any access to defence procurement. The cabinet can direct the Department of Defence Procurement to take account of issues and policies, even stupid and wasteful policies like regional industrial benefits but it should never, ever require inter-departmental cooperation, or worse.
This will require that CF personnel are employed by another government department – nothing strange there, it happened to me and my people and I’m 99.99% sure it still happens now. Whole Project Offices would be transferred from DND to DDP with their Blue Book (approved by Parliament) spending authorities.
----------
* But MarkOttawa did and he posted it here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/42212/post-368272.html#msg368272
Edit to add link to Prof. Bland's article
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