RUMINT of Canada wanting more C-17's

[Cloud Cover]

Remember the USAF buys in numbers to do that and provide deep redundancy.

We have to start thinking beyond unit and school TO&Es.

You cant beat sea lift for mass delivery. But both air and sea lift are 100% requirements if we want to have a seriously deployable Army. I see sea lift as more strategic (future, staging and reinforcement) and air lift as more tactical (now).

Pre Positioning and forward logistics/maintenance facilities enters the chat.
Whatever options are undertaken, they will be expensive and require a candid defence white paper. What’s happening now with defence spending is unsustainable without clear and thoughtful disclosure.
Otherwise they’ll weld 1500 meters lane space on Asterix and sign a 10 year contract for that.

 

[MacNav63]

Yeah. The question goes to the CA. What do they believe would be vanguard element that needs to move quickly during a scenario of escalating tensions resulting in mobilization. The rest would/should go be sea and reach 2 weeks later.

I think the US Army, for example, has/had a requirement to be able to move a Stryker Brigade to Europe in 96 hrs. To that end, their C-17 and C-5 Wings are designed to meet that requirement.

Serious question, but given the number of times I've read the phrase "the CA needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up" on other threads (apologies to @FJAG and @KevinB but not sure which of you coined it) has there ever been a time since the Second World War when the army articulated a clear vision for moving forces in mass to Europe, or anywhere else for that matter. I know the carriers were whipped into service for Suez and Cyprus and there was the one "proof of concept" exercise of the CAST brigade that ended the concept, but has there ever been any more of an in depth plan and strategy to resource it?

 

[KevinB]

Yeah. The question goes to the CA. What do they believe would be vanguard element that needs to move quickly during a scenario of escalating tensions resulting in mobilization. The rest would/should go be sea and reach 2 weeks later.

We’ve ‘argued’ this before, but I believe one needs to give up the idea of moving heavy equipment by air. Having ocean going RORO’s available for the CA is much more valuable to move Tanks etc. Your point about Ocean Ferries later is well stated.
But @Cloud Cover pointed out a major key being pre-positioned equipment.

To me the key is how to move the GRTF somewhere within the GoC mandated time frame, support other CAF operations, and maintain a reserve to all the above.
Of course that comes down to nailing down what the expectations of the GRTF is for both Areas of Operations, and the size of that entity. What CANSOF and other stakeholders need for lift in times of crisis as well as standing standard support.
Right now as I understand it the GRTF has three LIB taskings, that theoretically could be simultaneous requirements.

I think the US Army, for example, has/had a requirement to be able to move a Stryker Brigade to Europe in 96 hrs. To that end, their C-17 and C-5 Wings are designed to meet that requirement.

There are a few other requirements, moving a XVIII ABN Corps Division globally inside 48hrs is one.
The 82nd ABN is fairly easy, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) is a lot less.
But 252 C-17 and 50 C-5M give one some decent depth especially when augmented by the C-130 fleet.

Also the Joint Forceable Entry requirement soaks up a lot of airframes, as combat loaded paratroopers and supplies take up a lot more room than standard passengers.

 

[KevinB]

I’m also of the opinion that Canada needs a stand alone JFE capability.
Mainly as recent events have shown that there may be times where Canada needs to conduct NEO/PR in a non permissive environment, that allies don’t have the same skin in the game.

 

[Kirkhill]

We’ve ‘argued’ this before, but I believe one needs to give up the idea of moving heavy equipment by air. Having ocean going RORO’s available for the CA is much more valuable to move Tanks etc. Your point about Ocean Ferries later is well stated.
But @Cloud Cover pointed out a major key being pre-positioned equipment.

To me the key is how to move the GRTF somewhere within the GoC mandated time frame, support other CAF operations, and maintain a reserve to all the above.
Of course that comes down to nailing down what the expectations of the GRTF is for both Areas of Operations, and the size of that entity. What CANSOF and other stakeholders need for lift in times of crisis as well as standing standard support.
Right now as I understand it the GRTF has three LIB taskings, that theoretically could be simultaneous requirements.



There are a few other requirements, moving a XVIII ABN Corps Division globally inside 48hrs is one.
The 82nd ABN is fairly easy, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) is a lot less.
But 252 C-17 and 50 C-5M give one some decent depth especially when augmented by the C-130 fleet.

Also the Joint Forceable Entry requirement soaks up a lot of airframes, as combat loaded paratroopers and supplies take up a lot more room than standard passengers.

Are you sure about the 101st Kev?

One way of looking at te 101st is that it, like the 82nd, is just another light infantry division, complete with ISVs, but with an extra ration of helicopters. I believe all divisions, light and heavy, have an aviation brigade.

The 101st appear to have adopted the structure of three Mobile BCTs on ISVs, each comprising an HHC headquarters company and an MFRC multi-function recce company as well as three infantry battalions. The DivArty now consists of three field battalions and an air defence battalion.

And some of that helicopter support is self-deploying, at least over some distances. Especially in the Western Hemisphere.

 

[KevinB]

Extra extra ration of Helicopters.
Non SOF birds down here aren’t setup for AAR, so there are limits to self deployment. Plus crew rest and maintenance issues.
@Good2Golf can tell stories about 160th folks not being too thrilled about self deployment’s over long distances.

Sending the 82nd to jump in somewhere is vastly different than sending the 101st, as typically the 101st gets sent for the Air Assault option.
Now sometimes 101st Bde’s get send separately as Light Infantry, but if you task the Div, it’s generally with an eye for the Air Assault capability.

10th Mountain can get the nod generally if you just want Light Infantry.


However it can also depend on who the Div Commander is, as some deployments have been made solely due to the CG’s ‘past life’.

 

[FJAG]

Serious question, but given the number of times I've read the phrase "the CA needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up" on other threads (apologies to @FJAG and @KevinB but not sure which of you coined it)

@KevinB coined it first and I've plagiarized it shamelessly and often since

has there ever been a time since the Second World War when the army articulated a clear vision for moving forces in mass to Europe, or anywhere else for that matter.

Back in the 1960s and into the 1980s we had 4 CMBG - a heavy mech brigade - with all its kit there albeit it was downsized in around 1970 (the year of the Trudeau slaughter). 4 CMBG was basically stand alone at first (together with the air arm). Back in Canada we had three light formations albeit fully equipped. 1, 2 and 5 Combat Groups (CG - i.e. bdes) and the Airborne Regiment. Around 1976 the Airborne moved to Petawawa and together with 2 CG formed the Special Service Force.

Throughout this time 2 CG had the ACE Mobile Force role to fly a battle group over to Norway (at times some of their equipment was prepositioned) We were pretty good at flyovers and practiced it frequently. The Airborne Regiment was quite good on air moves.

At the same time 5 CG had the role of the filling the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade group - initially also to Norway. That was only exercised once and the time involved in staging it and moving by RORO was clearly excessive. 5 Bde was then changed over to operating with 4 CMBG in Germany under a newly reformed 1 Cdn Div. Again, the exercising of that role - in full - never happened to the best of my knowledge - I'd transferred to the legal branch by then so didn't pay to much attention to it beyond flying over for the odd court martial. We were pretty good at staging a battlegroup but a brigade group was a bridge too far.

I know the carriers were whipped into service for Suez and Cyprus and there was the one "proof of concept" exercise of the CAST brigade that ended the concept, but has there ever been any more of an in depth plan and strategy to resource it?

Basically that's it. ACE Mobile was actually pretty adept and attuned to flyovers. The army did rotos to Cyprus and then after the Yugoslavia events we got pretty tied into doing rotos there until Afghanistan blossomed. Things pre the 1990s were better - we had equipment, roles, trained okay. After that things went to hell in a handbasket as money dried up, equipment wore out, training was curtailed. Yugoslavia wore the army out - rotos are killers and, IMHO should not be done. I favour prepositioned equipment with an OUTCAN command and maintenance team and frequent flyovers for exercises. It's a lot easier on the troops but expensive for equipment.

 

[MacNav63]

@KevinB coined it first and I've plagiarized it shamelessly and often since

Back in the 1960s and into the 1980s we had 4 CMBG - a heavy mech brigade - with all its kit there albeit it was downsized in around 1970 (the year of the Trudeau slaughter). 4 CMBG was basically stand alone at first (together with the air arm). Back in Canada we had three light formations albeit fully equipped. 1, 2 and 5 Combat Groups (CG - i.e. bdes) and the Airborne Regiment. Around 1976 the Airborne moved to Petawawa and together with 2 CG formed the Special Service Force.

Throughout this time 2 CG had the ACE Mobile Force role to fly a battle group over to Norway (at times some of their equipment was prepositioned) We were pretty good at flyovers and practiced it frequently. The Airborne Regiment was quite good on air moves.

At the same time 5 CG had the role of the filling the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade group - initially also to Norway. That was only exercised once and the time involved in staging it and moving by RORO was clearly excessive. 5 Bde was then changed over to operating with 4 CMBG in Germany under a newly reformed 1 Cdn Div. Again, the exercising of that role - in full - never happened to the best of my knowledge - I'd transferred to the legal branch by then so didn't pay to much attention to it beyond flying over for the odd court martial. We were pretty good at staging a battlegroup but a brigade group was a bridge too far.

Basically that's it. ACE Mobile was actually pretty adept and attuned to flyovers. The army did rotos to Cyprus and then after the Yugoslavia events we got pretty tied into doing rotos there until Afghanistan blossomed. Things pre the 1990s were better - we had equipment, roles, trained okay. After that things went to hell in a handbasket as money dried up, equipment wore out, training was curtailed. Yugoslavia wore the army out - rotos are killers and, IMHO should not be done. I favour prepositioned equipment with an OUTCAN command and maintenance team and frequent flyovers for exercises. It's a lot easier on the troops but expensive for equipment.

Thanks for that. And I guess, at least through the 80s with the Rendezvous exercised the army was also at least engaging in the mass movement of brigade level formations, if not to Europe at least across the continent.