Senate Committee Report Excerpt: "Creating Real Reserves"

[Bobbyoreo]

Another point is for the Reg's to stop sending their problem people to do RSS postions. I know the last two ones Ive dealt with are not wanted back into their units so they sent them to the Res

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

I'm just wondering if those with inside knowledge would be good enough to design an alternative model that you think is more appropriate given what you see as the future requirements of the armed forces.

Assume you have no restrictions re: structures/politics and that the overall armed forces budget will increase 7.5%-10% per year for the next 5-years.


Matthew.    

 

[COBRA-6]

Another point is for the Reg's to stop sending their problem people to do RSS postions. I know the last two ones Ive dealt with are not wanted back into their units so they sent them to the Res

Don't paint all RSS with that brush. In my experience most of the RSS staff I've worked with have been excellent.

 

[Dissident]

I completely understand the "why do I bother" sentiment expressed by some RSS staff who spend weeks organizing an exercise, only to have a pl(-) show up out of a supposed company of troops.

From my understanding, the authorized manning level of a reserve service Bn is about equal to maybe a company. So, with some people not being to attend, the Bn ends up showing a overstrenght platoon size for exercise.

15 MP coy is attached to 1 brigade. Our budget is not typical of other reserve unit and we have a higher authorized manning level. As I speak, my platoon has 52 troops on paper, 2 short of ou maximum authorized. On top of that, our attendance is excellent, we only went out once this year and we were well over 90%.

By giving our unit more money, our unit has been able to force generate an inordinate amount of troops for deployement, class B and training per dollar.

It is tragicaly hilarious to hear reg force personnel complaining about the quality of the militia, while they ostracizing its members and deny us the support that would make us effective.

 

[couchcommander]

Shouldn’t Reservists be available for short-term active duty, as individuals or formed units in emergencies, unless there is some compelling reason they cannot be?

From the POV of an outsider looking in, and rehashing some of what has already been said, yes, this is fundamentally a sound judgment. Reserves that cannot be used for the purposes they were created for are rather useless. At the same time, there are major obstacles to this as well that I have been made aware of, some of which have already been pointed out.

a) Job protection. How can you expect someone to heed the call for an emergency deployment for a few months if his or her entire livelihood is going to be destroyed as a result? It would have to be a pretty big emergency.

b) Training. A lot of professionals CANNOT, I repeat, CANNOT no matter how much they'd like, take the time required to attend several week long courses (I'm one of those people, my job precludes it... yes I have 3 weeks paid vacation... but I only have 3 weeks vacation, no more, and even then I need to be able to leave from wherever I am on a moments notice if something happens - cost of working in a mission critical environment). Secondly, you cannot expect someone without proper training to be able to do the jobs required of them. Thus, we need a "reserves" training system that fits into the needs of the modern part time soldier, i.e. training on evenings and weekends (understanding that this is "not the same", but it would be an improvement over nothing).

c) Issue more order-in-councils. With the above in place, the government should not be so hesitant to order reserve units to stand up in the case of domestic crises. Yes, use volunteers if possible, but when the situation warrants it, don't be afraid to use the resources. We would be able to do this because of the previously mentioned changes, namely that people will be able to return to their jobs when the crises passes, and that they will be adequately trained to respond.

.02 from a civvie from looking in...

 

[Bobbyoreo]

You are right Cobra...not all of them are bad.

 

[dglad]

Time to expand on my comments I guess - with a silent reminder to myself not to post after Happy Hour. :-X

First, in the Army we have a militia, not a reserve - and all that seemingly pedantic splitting of semantic hairs means.  As such, they respond well and are well suited to domestic / regional based emergencies and form an excellent base for mobilisation (not that I can see a circumstance that would overcome the political penalties of enacting said mobilisation).  A militia force is also well suited to supplementary reinforcement of the Regular Force, which we are doing now with acceptable results.

A Reserve on the other hand would be formed to allow larger scale reinforcement of the Reg Force, both in a supplementary and complementary role.  The US model is based on that approach.  A complementary role (think CIMIC et al) can be usefully assigned to a Reserve if those reserves have the sort of legislative protection that allows them to respond to a "call-out" without penalty.

Seeing as we have a militia, and not a Reserve, I believe that legislative protection is not warranted - and unlikely to come to pass (for various reasons, mostly political).  One could argue that we should separate the supplementary from the complementary and offer them protection, but an equally valid argument would be that we avoid being half pregnant - and not assign complementary roles to the militia.

Well intentioned is a given - and I believe that poorly trained is also a given (although I perhaps could have chosen a slightly less pejorative modifier than "poor").

As to the "embarrassing degree" that we rely on the militia, I simply mean that a) we have too few infantry Battalions (all of which are under-manned to a critical degree) to fulfill our assigned tasks and b) that I believe that some of the complementary roles are too important to be sole sourced from the Reserves.

The wording in my original post was blunt - but hey, so am I.

Dave

Blunt is good, and I'd expect no less from an infanteer.

Thanks for the reasoned reply.  Actually, I really don't disagree with much of what you say, except maybe regarding the reserve/militia distinction.  I think our "militia" has actually taken on many of the attributes of a "reserve" (using your definitions); more problematic is whether this was by design, or the op tempo that's evolved over the past decade or so has simply caused it to happen.  I think it's some of the former, but more of the latter, myself.

Since the point of discussion seems to be more around job legislation, I'll offer my 2 cents...as I stated above, I think we'd need to consider the U.S. model very carefully, and then examine other models around the world.  Basically, the problem with job protection is that employers stand to lose personnel--some cases, key personnel i.e. the only person in the machine-shop who can run the new computerized lathe--on short notice, and for and extended period of time.  So, you lose the support of employers...and especially small employers, who provide most of the job creation in our economy (many large employers, such my own--the Ontario Public Service--have relatively generous military leave provisions).  A way to offset this is to offer something as employer support i.e. subsidies to hire back-fills, tax incentives, or other measures to encourage employers to accept the job protection legislation that applies to their Res F employees.  The cost?  Money.  And probably a fair bit of it.  Is that feasible?  Maybe.  A lot of work needs to be done to determine EXACTLY how this could be made to work, if at all.

Part of the problem is, I think, the "all or nothing" reality of what we have now.  You are either a Reservist, or in the Reg F...you do this as a career, or for 37.5 days per year.  Recent discussions around terms of service have tossed around the idea of allowing more mobility from one state (for discussion's sake, call it "regular service") to another (call it "reserve service").  My experience has been that Reservists typically change in terms of their interest and availability as life goes on.  The kid out of high school may be willing to invest a year or two in full-time service (currently, the only way of doing that is by becoming that thing called the "militia bum"), but then goes to university and can't be a full-time soldier.  University finishes, maybe back to full-time, then marriage, family and a full-time job come along--back to part-time.  The kids get older, some financial security is obtained, and another stint of full-time ensues.  And this can be a two-way street--the soldier who starts off out of high-school as a full-timer on "regular service" decides, ten years down the line, it's time to have some kids and settle down for a bit--so he migrates into "reserve service" for a while.  I will grant that there are many, many devils in the details of this, but a "sliding scale" of readiness might be a reasonable solution, avoiding the sledgehammer approach of legislation.

And, as for your choice of words--yeah, "poor" is a bad one (I can be blunt, too).  Reservists aren't "poorly" trained; in the context of the training that they're provided, they're trained very well.  Naturally, that training can't approximate what a Reg F soldier gets (if we could train a Res F soldier to be exactly equivalent to a Reg F soldier in about 38 days a year, there really WOULD be something wrong).  Res F soldiers are, for the most part, dedicated and motivated men and women who do the best job they can.  The result is soldiers are who at a lower level of readiness than their Reg F counterparts.  Give the Res F soldier the training to fill in the missing delta, and you'll get a soldier who is close to being as good as a member of the Reg F (the Regs will always have the advantage of living, breathing, eating and sleeping in the military culture, doing all those various things that make up day to day military life, and developing that cohesion that comes from working together over long periods of time).

I absolutely do agree with you about the undermanned state of our Reg F inf bns.  That needs to be fixed.  But we can do that, and still make and manage an effective Res F to support them.

 

[tomahawk6]

I really agree with the Senate report. The current reserve/militia model isnt helping the OPTEMPO of the Canadian Forces. What the US has been able to accomplish in Iraq particularly,would never have been possible if we could not have deployed National Guard and Reserve units. If a nation is goig to keep small standing armies it becomes imperative to have well trained reserve units that can be called to active duty to spell regular force units. As a result of OIF the entire US Army has more combat experience throughout the force than at any time since WW2.

US reserve components transition from their "part time" status to active duty after just a few months of intensive training before shipping off to Iraq. Our part time troops train 2 weeks in the summer and 1 weekend a month so its similar to the Canadian reservist.

What the Canadian reservist needs is a job guarantee if called up. Punishable under the law. At the sametime employers need encouragement with tax breaks for supporting reservist employees. Reservists need to have a quality retirement program.

Primary reserve units that would deploy as units [Cat I] would be brought up to full strength [3 manuever companies,HHC and CSS company]. Tier II units, the militia, would be used as fillers and for domestic emergencies. I think it would be smart to reorganize militia battalions so they would be at full strength. If it wasnt possible due to geography then battalions should be reformed as full companies.

 

[Gunner]

But you can't just "leave it there".  This is an important statement, but I don't know if I'm really getting your intent, and am really interested in pursuing it.  What I'm asking is some clarification around the statement that the "army is relying on the Reserves to an embarrassing degree".  What does this mean, exactly?  Is the implication that the army shouldn't have to rely on the Reserves at all?  Okay, that gives us one structural model.  Or, is there a "non-embarrassing" degree, and if so, what is it (right now, it's about 20%, so I'm assuming this threshold is less than 20%.  But how much less)?  That's another structural model.  I am involved in force generation (intimately), so I know quite well the many challenges of producing the combat power we need, when and where we need it (this goes for Reg F and Res F).   Our combined Res and Reg F TF's generally seem to do well on ops (based only on what I've been observing, at a distance, in Afghanistan, but on my own experience in Bosnia), so I'd be really keen to hear more about this.  Is it something substantive, or more a belief that the Reg F should be able to stand on its own, without Res F augmentation, on expeditionary ops?  And do you believe this same statement would hold true for domestic ops?

PPCLI Guy has already answered your post.  The 20% worked ok for the relatively benign late Bosnia rotations but it hasn't been achieved in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons.  I'll have to see what the current percentage is but it will not surprise me if it is quite abit lower.  I'll have to follow this up.  Don't misinterpret my overall comments, there is certainly a place for reservists on international deployments but they are far from being the type of "reserve" envisioned by the senate report.  As you are intimately involved in force generation, I'm sure you will agree the skill sets, not the state of readiness, has become far too divergent between the reg and res.

Cheers

 

[COBRA-6]

PPCLI Guy has already answered your post.  The 20% worked ok for the relatively benign late Bosnia rotations but it hasn't been achieved in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons.  I'll have to see what the current percentage is but it will not surprise me if it is quite abit lower. 

I have been doing this type of research lately on the CFTPO, for A'stan rotos, the average is closer to 10%.

 

[54/102 CEF]

The Senate Defence people are sitting on De Fence; the reserves come last of 7 items. Nor does it respect the governments emphasis in In Canada operations as Primo - a whole bunch of real neat stuff comes first.

The first 3 paras reflect a persistent something for nothing attitude from the Report writers who I suggest are not connected with the govt or DND. Senators wise up - you get nothing for nothing. Remember we have no global deployments like some other allies so should be and could be has never worked. How better to confuse the issue I do not know.

The report needs editing

Consider

Page 84
But over the past 60 years, many Reservists could not or would not respond to national emergencies to.

To what? This is inflammatory writing that would have got an a$$ kicking when I was writing for some favourite Senior Officers

It should not be up to the government to invoke a special Order-in-Council to require service. MAJOR CREDIBILITY PROBLEM ON THE COMMITTEE`S PART - Lets assume - OK its not - so lets ditch Confederation. Of course that won't work. So Hon Senators - put some teeth into it - accountability is required - get trained to a higher level - maintain your skills or face separation. Very good. Now follow up. Remember in Gulf War 1 – run down the US reserves – not ready – not worth it. How the worm has turned with what 40% reserves deployed? Other forces have checked their Cold War preconceived notions at the door. I believe we have too, but we are still resource poor.

But even after that - it remains the Governments role to call out the troops........ and they do mobilise well - in 2003 the fire crews in BC filled up with little or no moaning despite what this POS report says is the norm. Remember - Canadians don't support the Senate which is why I as a reservist and Canadian refuse to tolerate such slanted writing. Did the CDS comments
“They do make the 30,000 foot recommendation and if, as the Chief of the Defence Staff has stated, that the aim is to have all members of the CF available for overseas deployment," -------- imply that he’s at the bottom of the barrel for manpower - of just combat arms? Opening the pool to all is one thing - building more capability is another - the report shies away from the real cost of these missions. Evading the bill though, is a normal bureaucratic response - where are the calls for WE NEED MORE FIELD SOLDIERS? DND and the CDS just say they will re-role recruits in the system ------ this is a short term - chase your tail response. Chasing your tail will only work for a while.

See evading the bill --- http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/06autumn/freier.htm

re write it in a Canadian context

3 questions
Since the end of the Cold War, has Canada corporately devoted the requisite intellectual and political energy necessary to truly understand its own relative position in detail and the real obstacles, risks, and costs associated with maintaining that position over time?

Has Canada developed a consensus grand design that employs all of the enormous potential embodied in its instruments of power in order to secure its strategic position and influence effectively against direct and indirect challenges to both?

If one believes the previous two questions can be answered in the affirmative, have the nation’s strategy elite identified and articulated the principal aspects of the resultant grand design and have they assessed and accounted for the REAL COSTS associated with pursuing it in a meaningful way? Reasonable analysts will conclude that the answer to all three questions is no.

But don’t think I am negative on the report part of the reserves - the JTF2 stuff stinks - leading questions, innuendo - spell it out - the report lays out a minefield that the government no has to plough or avoid. Read the Arctic stuff - it truly makes one’s head hurt that A - you don’t need the forces there - B - the NAVY can place sono buoys at choke points and C we can do it all from satellite surveillance.

All in all the report is 323 pages long - I have not read it all - but what I have read I see as a politically charged document by the rear guard of the Red Menace which got the CF to where it was when the current government took over.

My answer to the short fall ------ BUY MORE COMBAT POWER TROOPS AND EQPT ----- the low level market they are operating in is telling us we are not doing this properly from a resource point of view. What if two Afghanistan’s open up? And we get the level of support we are alleged to be getting from 100 plus million people east of Calais France? Some parts of this forest fire have to be allowed to burn out.

Will there be follow up? I doubt it. I think this report was dead on the Frankenstein Table that created it.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

The 20% worked ok for the relatively benign late Bosnia rotations but it hasn't been achieved in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons.  I'll have to see what the current percentage is but it will not surprise me if it is quite abit lower.  I'll have to follow this up.  Don't misinterpret my overall comments, there is certainly a place for reservists on international deployments but they are far from being the type of "reserve" envisioned by the senate report.  As you are intimately involved in force generation, I'm sure you will agree the skill sets, not the state of readiness, has become far too divergent between the reg and res.

I'm reluctant to wade into this discussion, partially because I have some fairly strong opinions - gained from some fairly extensive experience - on this subject.  However, with that caveat, here goes:

Gunner is exactly right.  IMHO, the initial drive to deploy PRes sub-units to Bosnia was almost entirely politically driven, and only remotely linked to a real operational requirement.  The effort to mount Reserve companies was enormous and, for the second LFWA rotation (Roto 12) required a national sourcing effort for a single infantry company.  This despite the fact that the skill sets required were, by and large, already resident in the Reserve Force and the training delta was minimal, partially because Bosnia was such a benign environment near the end.

Fast forward to Afghanistan.  I still believe that there are "political" reasons for assigning force generation of sub-units to the PRes.  However, the Army has come to rely on such force generation to relieve a crushing operational tempo, right at the time when the training delta is increasing rather than decreasing.  Take my own Corps as an example.  The Reserve Armour Corps has abandoned any pretext of being compatible with the Regular Force and has instead attempted to adopt a niche role - Light Recce - that may or may not be useful on operations.  They cannot backfill the Regular Army without extensive retraining and have adopted a role that may or may not be required in theatre.  Indeed, we're looking to deploy "light recce" at exactly the same time theatre is examining pulling G Wagons (the primary equipment for light recce troops) off operations entirely. 

Thus, we've created an enormous problem for upcoming rotations.  As indicated earlier, TF 1-08 is expecting to take approximately 400 reservists to Afghanistan.  This represents a very significant challenge:

• the TO&E is likely to change, increasing the training delta and introducing even more items of equipment completely unfamiliar to Reservists. 
• adoption of niche roles limits the utility of reservists (in some trades) outside a very narrow scope - unless extensive PCF training is undertaken
• single Area sourcing means that all of these 400 will be expected to come from one Area.  Experience indicates that this will pose a significant force generation problem and that we're unlikely to get the numbers required
• as indicated in an earlier post, the number of Reservists actually capable - for valid reasons - of deploying to any operation is quite limited

So what does this mean?  First, I think that job protection legislation is a red herring.  Reservists who wish to deploy (in our purely voluntary system) tend to be younger and looking for a life experience, without relying on the approval of a civilian employer.  The older Reservist who would take advantage of such legislation is much less likely to wish to go overseas.

Secondly, I firmly believe we need to focus our efforts on the immediate problem:  bringing Regular Force units up to proper strength (the CLS recently stated he wanted Regular units up to War Establishment); anything that detracts from that effort should be regarded as secondary.  In the current operational context, the brunt of the focus will always be on Regular units and they should receive the commensurate amount of institutional support.

Finally, I've never agreed with the concept that we should be routinely deploying Reserve sub-units on operations.  To my mind, Reserves should be just that - reserves - to be utilized en masse in emergency situations.  This doesn't preclude the use of Reservists on operations on an individual, voluntary basis - quite the contrary, such experience is extremely valuable and can only help the operational readiness of Reserve units improve.  However, assigning niche roles and creating the expectation that the bulk of a capability will come from a voluntary Reserve deployment is a very dangerous thing.

The Army is expecting a great deal from the Reserve Force without the accompanying commitment to compatible training and equipment.  My fear is that they're expecting too much...

Teddy

 

[Rockhound]

This thread has made many interesting points many of which I am struggling with having had some exposure to the Reserve “lifestyle”.  First let me say +1 with the bulk of the content with 54/ 102 CEF’s last post.  Second I wish to address some thoughts as to the question posed in an earlier post – “what should the reserve look like?”  The better question is WHAT broader purpose do they serve? – This is a better question for the Senate- the one I think was the intent (although it missed the mark)

My understanding of why the Militia – now Reserve, was formed, it was originally strictly as a base for mobilization.  If this is the case, it is understandable why the Government/ DND would keep the training and resources to the most tolarable minimum.  Our current construct is based on the Cold War.  In this model it would be essential that mobilization is a long way off and easily predicted – with the premise that levels of trg/readiness/ equipping would increase closer to the time required.  Is this true today?  PPCLI Guys seems to suggest Mobilization unlikely.  Is this truely the case?  Consider CSIS openly states that on the matter of a terrorist attack in Canada it is a question of WHEN, not IF.  WHEN Canada is hit,  how long will it take for the political rule book PPCLI Guy refers too, to be thrown out the window?  Just how predicable is this kind of event?  I argue not very therefore, if mobilization is the purpose of the reserve, then perhaps it is time to increase equipping and trg to account the less predictable environment.

If I am wrong and the Reserve is a “temp agency” for the Reg F, the situation we are seemingly at right now, then some comments from Cobra-6 make some sense, as do those in support for job protection.  Having a base for mobilization does not matter, and the unit/ sub-unit HQs should be consoldiated into fewer administrative HQs.  I know many would like to see this and it is already happening to varying degrees.  I believe in light of the uncertainties of the world (and Canada’s Role in it)  this perspective is VERY short sighted, driven out of the very real shortfall the Army is experiencing right now.  If this is where we are to be at then the individual needs to be given better trg – this requires more equipment, better Reg F support, and More focused low level trg (ie. BTEs for the reserves should be outlawed). 

In both cases the primary reason for the “delta” with the reserve from where they should be at is driven by the severe lack of resources, and leadership being held accountable (especially at the Sub-unit and unit level).  It is only now physical fitness is being demanded, after years of “excuses” as to why it could not be in a formal way. 

Regretfully I have not offered any real answers, but I think the following suggestions would help some of the issues raised here:

1. TERMS OF SERVICE CONTRACT – to resolve attendance, and annual certifications

This should be a year to year employment contract with expectations from the soldier to attend all parade days (perhaps with the allowance for ??3 sick days), pass the personal weapons test, the fitness test, and other IBTS requirements.  This would go a long way to battling the age old issue – “you don’t know who is coming to the ex until the Friday noght of the ex” – and go a long way to building teams (a critical element of all army trg)

2. JOB PROTECTION – not the US model, will need to have carrots, and sticks.  The business community would provide the best insight to the most effective “carrots”.  The business communities burden should be met with a commitment by the Government to the Business community to restrict call-ups outside of time of war to no more than year, every 5?? years, per soldier.  Given current tours are going beyond this length is a challenge...

3.  MORE EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES to the reserve.  Given the Army figuratively does not even have two nickles to rub together, this is a problem.  The Army is doing the RIGHT thing by putting priority of what we have to those who are in theatre or training to go next.  Uncontrollably, the net result of this situation is the delta of the reserve grows, because the resources do not exist to improve trg quality.  Unfortunately because of this and reserve demands for more resources, it results in a “protectionsist” mindset in the Reg F what we assets have, it really should not be this way, but c’est levie.  This is truely more of a political issue than an Army one – If we are to be a world leader there is a huge cost.       

I hate to post long posts, I hope there is something nugget of value in some or all of my thoughts,

 

[Rockhound]

I am choked at the suggestion commonly made in this thread that some or "older" reservists are less likely to want to go on tour- it is flatly FALSE.  Every older reservist I know truely wants to serve their country and do there duty in the form of a tour, but are torn with some realities they MUST consider.  One - their spouse/ wife usually did not "sign-on" to the Reg F lifestyle - so marriage may be at stake.  Two - Employers do not like prolonged absences from a career, no matter what the reason, 1 year is tolarable, more is not.  Proffessional associations may also put your standing in jeporady.  Three - If you have to quit your job (like many reservists) it MAY put your ability to be rehired in jeoporady (when other comparable candidates are considered with your application) - if this is your primary means to put food on the table for your family when you return and the Reg F is done with you - Is it not a dispproportionate burden to the reservist should they be unable to find work?    Note to that while it may only have been a couple of weeks - Several reservists answered the call to Op Perigrine in BC, 2003, despite the fact that they used ALL of their annual vacation to do it.  Same can be said for formal trg courses. 

Lastly, while there are some like myself who have not YET gone on tour, more than 90% of the Snr NCOs, and Capt/ Majors I know have.  Just how many tours do they have to do to be considered "worthy" and "contributing".  I, like others who have not yet gone, WILL go but the risks to the family must be acceptable.  In the interim, If the world falls of the edge of an abyss and plunges into a larger scale war, I stand ready to protect Canada when and if the country "REALLY" needs me.

 

[dglad]

Some very interesting discussion here.  And I appreciate the extent to which some of the previous points have been clarified.  I find it difficult to disagree with much of what's been said; what it really comes down to is a lack of clarity in what we want our Res F to actually do and be.  The Senate document offers one approach...but I don't think it really appreciates how much it will cost to enact any form of job protection that won't actually do more than harm than good.  I work with businesses of all sizes in my civ job, so I get to hear, first hand, about the challenges of running a competitive operation in today's increasingly integrated and globalized economy.  I can guarantee that new legislation that's perceived as just another instance of red tape and bureaucratic obstacle-building (i.e. a new, unfunded mandate) by the government will NOT get a warm welcome from the business community.

On the other hand, we can stay with the status quo but, as has been previously mentioned, that leaves us with a training delta that may be unreasonably large.  In this scenario, generating Res sub-units for expeditionary ops will be a real challenge--may not be worth the effort--and may be better dropped in favour of keeping up indiv augmentation.  We could "tweak" this, of course, and focus Res F deployment primarily on more benign ops, so we can focus our scarce Reg F resources on places like Afghanistan.  And superimposed on this is our need to man domestic ops--something else that should probably be the purview of the Res F more than the Reg F, again to allow the latter to keep their eye on the more demanding, high-risk ball.  I don't favour just marking time like this, myself...I think some fundamental changes are required.  Maybe not quite as radical as the Senate report, but probably more than the various institutions involved in the Res F can absorb very quickly (unfortunately).

So, agreed that the main effort probably needs to be getting and keeping the Reg F units up to reasonable strength.  But concurrent with that has to be some serious thinking about the Res F and how we want to employ it, and then action to follow.  Someone said our Res F was organized for Cold War mobilization; I'd argue it was actually organized for something more like WW1 mobilization, and hasn't changed a great deal since.    Whether we invest a great deal of money and time in following the Senate recommendations, or take some other path, we need to DO it.  The real problem is that the status quo isn't properly serving anyone properly.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

I am choked at the suggestion commonly made in this thread that some or "older" reservists are less likely to want to go on tour- it is flatly FALSE.

Which is why I said:

as indicated in an earlier post, the number of Reservists actually capable - for valid reasons - of deploying to any operation is quite limited

Emphasis added.

And if 80-90% of officers and senior NCOs in the Reserve Force already "have tours", you're in a different Army than I am.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

I am choked at the suggestion commonly made in this thread that some or "older" reservists are less likely to want to go on tour- it is flatly FALSE.  Every older reservist I know truely wants to serve their country and do there duty in the form of a tour, but are torn with some realities they MUST consider. 

Which may or may not be solved by job protection...

One - their spouse/ wife usually did not "sign-on" to the Reg F lifestyle - so marriage may be at stake.

 

Job protecton can't help you there - either be an Army guy or don't - and that goes for wives too.  There is no short cut answer here that can be provided by Parliament.  Either commit, or don't.

Two - Employers do not like prolonged absences from a career, no matter what the reason, 1 year is tolarable, more is not.  Proffessional associations may also put your standing in jeporady.

 

Granted - job protection may help here - but I doubt it.  This is not an 80's economy.

Three - If you have to quit your job (like many reservists) it MAY put your ability to be rehired in jeoporady (when other comparable candidates are considered with your application) - if this is your primary means to put food on the table for your family when you return and the Reg F is done with you -

Simple solution - become a professional soldier.  Problem solved.  Postings paid for.  Joyous postings to Kamloops, Wainwright, Gagetown and Cornwall abound.

Is it not a dispproportionate burden to the reservist should they be unable to find work?    Note to that while it may only have been a couple of weeks - Several reservists answered the call to Op Perigrine in BC, 2003, despite the fact that they used ALL of their annual vacation to do it.  Same can be said for formal trg courses.

 

Twice the citizen.  Suck it up - and thank you.

Lastly, while there are some like myself who have not YET gone on tour, more than 90% of the Snr NCOs, and Capt/ Majors I know have.

 

Ahem.  Really?  How many of them are half pregnant - you know - Class B full timers...

Just how many tours do they have to do to be considered "worthy" and "contributing".  I, like others who have not yet gone, WILL go but the risks to the family must be acceptable.  In the interim, If the world falls of the edge of an abyss and plunges into a larger scale war, I stand ready to protect Canada when and if the country "REALLY" needs me.

Good.  Well done you.  So you are a militiaman - and that is a good thing...

In the meantime, the country is at war, and as we don't have a reserve, and  we are not about to mobilise the mo, how about we stop talking about throwing money at the militia, and fill up the infantry battalions instead.

Look.  I am not being rude here.  I spent 8 proud years in the militia as a soldier and an officer, 3 years RSS, 2 years 10/90, and 2 years dedicated to providing the best training the militia has ever seen (Im Not so Humble O) as a senior staff wallah in an Area HQ.

I have no interest whatsoever in igniting a res vs reg flame war - cus lets face it, they are boring, and add little to the debate.

Lets just stop deluding ourselves, okay?  The reserves (truely, a milita) as they stand, can FG individual replacements of an astoundingly high quality. 

Great. 

Thanks. 

How about we recognise that fact, and fund and plan accordingly.  No pie.  No sky.  Just reality.  20%?  Great.  Keep it coming.  Just don't ask for more funds or a bigger slice of the pie to do that.  A long look in the mirror whilst shaving might help - you know - 60-80% HQ / support / senior leadership to generate that 20% adding to the fight.

But what do I know...

Dave

 

[dglad]

How about we recognise that fact, and fund and plan accordingly.  No pie.  No sky.  Just reality.  20%?  Great.  Keep it coming.  Just don't ask for more funds or a bigger slice of the pie to do that.  A long look in the mirror whilst shaving might help - you know - 60-80% HQ / support / senior leadership to generate that 20% adding to the fight.

But what do I know...

Dave

Sheesh, I wish you'd stop being so coy and oblique, and just come out say what you mean.

(yes, there should be a smiley after that line, but I really hate the damned things)

I think you're right.  We have to get the inf bns up to strength--and keep them--there as our main effort.  That's a challenge on many fronts, not least of which is going to be recruiting and training these new soldiers efficiently.

However, as I said above re the Reserves (or militia, if you prefer that term), the status quo is not a reasonable option.  The system is doing okay force generating indiv augmentees, but in many ways, that's in spite of, rather than because of, the way the Res F is currently organized.  In fact, it's really a testament to the supreme efforts of a subset of certain soldiers and leaders, who work much more than 37.5 days, on TOP of a full time civ job or school.  Since you've worked with Reservists, I assume you know what I mean; there are the nearly NES types who show up for the odd parade night, certainly, but there are also the ones who come in over lunch from their civ job, work off evenings or weekends or even take army work home, to school or to work with them to do, often without signing in.  Maybe these folks should become professional soldiers, sure, but not all of them have that option, for various reasons, at that point in their lives; their choice is to be a Reservist, or just not be a soldier at all.

In tandem with the main effort of beefing up the inf bns, we need a supporting effort of reorganizing--in fact, in many ways, redesigning--the Reserves.  It doesn't necessarily require new $, because the issues largely aren't $-driven.  It's a job that's going to require close cooperation between the Res and Reg F leadership, because a properly functioning Reserve, that reflects a focus on the modern security environment rather than the remote possibility of 1914-style mobilization, will be to everyone's benefit.

 

[Dissident]

How about we recognise that fact, and fund and plan accordingly.  No pie.  No sky.  Just reality.  20%?  Great.  Keep it coming.  Just don't ask for more funds or a bigger slice of the pie to do that.  A long look in the mirror whilst shaving might help - you know - 60-80% HQ / support / senior leadership to generate that 20% adding to the fight.

I dissagree. More resources equals more deployable troops. At a cost cheaper than a reg force counterpart. Again, 15 MP Coy is showing what could be expected from the reserve, if they had proper support and resources. And that is over 3-4 year span since the Coy was stood up.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

I dissagree. More resources equals more deployable troops. At a cost cheaper than a reg force counterpart. Again, 15 MP Coy is showing what could be expected from the reserve, if they had proper support and resources. And that is over 3-4 year span since the Coy was stood up.

Well, before you hoist 15 MP as the paragon of all that the Reserves could be, remember that they're filling a very specific role, with very specific limitations.  Could 15 MP deploy en masse - tomorrow - to an operational theatre to conduct policing duties?  I suggest not.

By the way, you earlier suggested that there's a relationship between 15 MP Coy and 1 CMBG.  There isn't.  15 MP Coy works for 1 Area Support Group and is the only Reserve Force unit in that formation.