Welcome aboard Rusty. Good post, it certainly helps to develop the debate; but I remain unconvinced that killing professionalism is a way to eliminate careerism (which I gathered was the true intent of Mr English's proposal).
The army he appears to 'want' is the one we had in WWII â “ raised in haste, poorly trained in Canada and then, while waiting for a year or two or even three (for the 1st Division) properly trained and re-trained at battle schools which were the next best thing to combat. The cadres in the battle schools were the best the British had â “ (recent) battle hardened officers and NCOs with reputations as 'quick' thinkers and doers. That army, eventually, acquitted itself admirably in battle. English's thesis, with which I agree, is that we did well despite having generated only a very few first rate senior leaders in World War II: all young men with only limited prewar military service. Most of the Canadian senior leadership, the admirals and generals from the 'regular' navy and army were, at best, second rate â “ many were worse.
Sure, but I don't think the nature of today's "come-as-you-are" wars will give us the opportunity to be properly trained for a year or two while waiting for the "Second Front" to be reestablished. As an expeditionary force, we need to have professionals, ready and trained to fight, on hand to be dispatched to the "conflict of the week" if directed by our civilian leaders.
I think English sees, in our turn of the century forces, a repeat of 1938 â “ an old, decrepit, ill equipped, poorly led army; good young men (and women, now) to be sure, but a force which is not prepared to fight at anything above company level.
Ok, in many respects sure. But I think there is one important caveat. Our current leadership (both Officer and NCO) has seen non-stop deployment since the end of the Cold War. Due to overstretch and small resources, there are definite negative aspects of this; however, we cannot ignore the fact that our leadership has an amazing degree of operational experience - some guys have 6 - 8 different tours under their belts. Granted, none of this has been high-density manoeuvre operations in the face of an organized enemy, but it is still operational experience in a hostile environment (in many circumstances a two-way shooting range).
As opposed to 1938, when we had leadership that promoted amateurism (McNaughton, Crerar) and rested on the laurels of what they did 20 years prior on the Western Front, today's leadership has had constant exposure to the ever changing phenomenon of modern conflict. As opposed to suffering from the abject amateurism of the 1920's and 30's (and to an extent, 40's), we've got commanders who have commanded troops at various levels in a variety of operational settings.
Sure, we are facing the same problem with underfunding for equipment and training as we did in the 1930's, but I think our leadership is eons ahead in terms of professional experience. If given the ability to do so, I think our leadership would be more then capable of getting a grip on preparing to fight; the fact that we had a senior officer as 2ic of a formation in Iraq or that we have Officers in American HQs in Afghanistan is a testament to this.
It seems to me, from afar (a great distance in time) I hasten to point out, that we do have too much deadwood scattered throughout the armed forces in every rank from corporal through to general. I argued, many years ago, that we were drifting away from a vocational model of soldiering to an occupational one ... soldiering was, I feared twenty-five years ago, becoming a job, rather like being a bus driver. It was the old 1950s/60s recruiting slogan, â Å“A career with a futureâ ? taken to extremes. I felt then that we placed far, far too much emphasis on the (legitimate) recruiting, training and retention needs of the technical support trades and too little on the needs of the army's combat arms and the navy's 'hard' sea trades â “ many of which are very technical. I was concerned then that our personnel 'business plan' was excluding too many people from small towns and, especially, aboriginal communities; our (commendable) desire to reduce the costs of training and to be more inclusive had unintended consequences â “ consequences which I believed and argued, way back when, were detrimental to the army's long term operational needs.
I'll agree with this to a certain extent. Although it is purely semantics, I'd say the movement is from a
professional model of soldiering based upon
productive output of combat power to an (inefficent and undesirable)
occupational model which is based upon
functional administration of peacetime management. In essence we may tend to look inwards when to role of the military demands it looks outwards to be properly prepared to fight. As well, I wouldn't say this movement is monolithic; different areas of the Forces are experiencing it to different degrees.
I think this may provide a framework with which to work out a better solution then eliminating the notion of professionalism grounded upon time/experience. Using the basis of a professional model based upon productive output of combat power, promotion and accession should be based upon merit alone. For senior leaders, this would depend upon a balanced assessment of both command in the field and staff duties.
The purpose of further emphasising merit is to eliminate "the driftwood" as efficiently as possible (Driftwood does not mean someone who has no desire to seek higher positions, but rather is professionally incapable of contributing to the output of combat power). A combination of objective and subjective evaluation for leaders will be used to determine merit; some of the methods that could be utilized would be:
- results of free-play, force-on-force exercises (can the commander successfully do his job at his level without getting his soldiers wiped out?)
- examinations for promotion (why we got rid of rank examinations, I'll never know)
- character evaluation reports (a modified PER which, rather then relying on checked boxes, is a written evaluation of character with input for superiors, peers, and subordinates).
Whatever the system for promotion and accession is, it has to be focused on the outward-looking objective of producing combat power. This should help to eliminate careerism to a great extent as focus is not internalized at "how can I make myself look good" but rather externalized at "how can I improve upon the performance of this unit".
I believe, still, that we need a young army. I do not mind having a few 60 year old generals but I doubt that anyone from brigade commander on down should be or needs to be too much over 40.* It was my firm belief then â “ and I have read, heard, or seen nothing to change my mind, that an officer is ready to command a ship, regiment, battalion or fighter/bomber squadron after about 10 to 15 years of commissioned service in peacetime â “ at the age, for most, of about 35. I believed then and still do that a young man can be ready to command a tank or a rifle section after about two years of good hard training and experience, and that a platoon/troop 2IC (sergeant) should be about 30 â “ with about ten years of experience.
I agree with you here as well. Although there is nothing wrong with maintain personnel in positions for a period of time, I've argued before that it would good to promote faster. The British Army seems to do well for itself and it promotes section 2ic's after 3 years and section commanders at 5-6. The Militia does this as well (although out of necessity).
As well, I've also seen good ideas for a career structure which takes the best officers (determined on merit) out of the conventional career track and accelerates them faster then their peers. It is in effect the peacetime effort to get the Gavins', the Simmonds', and the Rommels' to senior command at a much quicker pace. Sure, jumping over their peers and superiors may conflict with our notions of fairness and a good career, but leadership and operational brilliance is an art - some are naturally good at it and some have no hope while many will be able to eventually do it competently if trained right. As Von Balck said "Not every painter can be a Raphael or a Michelangelo."
I think that Jack English wants a young, fit, decidedly operationally oriented army. Such an army might want to start with a series of two or three year enlistments, each requiring some 'up or out' performance by individuals, so that we have a quality sieve which allows the best and brightest to be retained and moved up through the ranks â “ getting the best officers and NCOs to lead the young, short service rank and file.
Most of my research and reading has led me to understand that their is no replacement for time/experience in the development of a professional soldier. The Germans knew full well that they needed a certain amount of time to train a good commander or a decent staff officer; as a result, officer training was barely compromised in WWII, even when the manpower shortages began to be felt. Unlike the American approach of filling TO&E spots which created an abundance of under-qualified Officers (distributed poorly amongst the various trades), the German's believed in having no officer rather then a poor one - the professional NCO Corps could step in if required.
As such, I believe that Canada, as primarily an expeditionary force, needs to have its core mostly composed of career professionals. Like the legions of Rome, the state demands the abilities that only a professional force can offer, as the notion of the citizen-soldier, serving when needed, is insufficient to meet the security demands of the international arena. I do believe there is a place for a certain percentage of "short-service" rank and file; these would be attracted by the Canadian version of the Montgomery GI Bill. Attracted to a post-secondary education fund in return for three years of good service, this could help to "fill out the ranks" and expose many more Canadians to the Canadian Forces. Those at the end of a Basic Engagement are free to leave with their (well earned) tuition, while those that wish to stay sign an Immediate engagement contract for another 22 years, for a full 25 year career.
As well, I will strongly debate your idea for an "up-or-out" system. Most of the literature on the subject seems to indicate that the American experience with the up-or-out system is bad. It is harmful to morale and, when combined with a poor promotion system (which is not focussed on merit) the process leads to significant increases in "careerism", something we are attempting to get rid of with this debate.
Anyways, welcome to Army.ca and good post,
Cheers,
Infanteer
