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Should Canada adopt the LAV III (AKA: Stryker) as its primary armoured vehicle family?

RCA

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Hey Gunner-

"Wow, a FOO vehicle that will bring us into the 21st century"- don‘t you know we‘ve always had a dedicated FOO veh - the trusty Iltis with its trailer, what more could you want - it has wheels also and can go anywhere and it will start (most of the time) in the 21st century
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Now if we could get a LAV III for TSM/BSM‘s veh and a SP version for the 105 now your talking and don‘t forget a CP version. (that would be our best recruiting tool you could find.)
cool.gif
and to top it off it‘d be nice to happen before I pull the pin. Ah well wishful thinking

Keep your powder dry

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Ubique
 
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Yard Ape

Guest
With regards to Pat‘s mention of MLVW SEVs, and RCA‘s reference to the Iltis: Does anybody here really believe there is still a place for soft skinned vehicles in the F ech of a mechanised formation? It goes against the entire reasoning of acquiring the LAV.

btw Gunner: Korea was "only" a chapter 7 operation, and there was plenty of use for MBT‘s there.

:cool: Yard Ape
 

McG

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The Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL) is a modernized version of the M113 armoured personnel carrier with increased mobility and capacity. It will be used in field engineer, vehicle recovery and general purpose support roles.

On tracks and soft skin vehicles:

While better that the old M113‘s the MTVL will still lack the speed to keep pace with all LAV unit. The Engineer SEV, which would be more capable to keep pace w/the LAV, lacks the protection of an armoured vehicle and puts the section members (and therefore the mission) at greater risk.

A much better option would have been to replace both vehicles with a LAV III Engineer, and give the SEVs to the reservists.
 
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Gordon Dundas

Guest
Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80‘s in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.
 
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Gordon Dundas

Guest
As I recall the lynx did‘nt go on thechopping block until long after the Hvy.Recce concept went away .Further as I understood it ,it was to consist of 3 recce sqns of lynx/Iltis‘s (ilti?) and a sqn of leo‘s.
Originally posted by 2 Charlie:
Hi Brad,

Just to develop your comments, it was ironic that in the late 80‘s in CFE when it looked like the Armour Corp was next in line for new equipment after the Engineers, Inf, AD Arty and FMSU got their new kit. The concept of a Cdn Div Heavy Recce was tossed about. It was the principe that with new forthcoming generation armour in the order of battle, that the Leopards could be placed into a heavy recce role. Seeing as how the Lynx was on the chopping block, and the Iltis , well, you can guess.

Hmm, heavy recce, is that not when you have a tactical battle field superiority and you are attempting to draw the enemy into a confrontation, to eliminate them. Not using stealth and noise discipline too establish an enemies FEBA, especially if you happen to be in the middle of tactical NATO defensive withdrawl.

Never happened, thank god.

Just an example of the shoe horn theory, totally unsuited and impractical, but, with a bit of fine staff work and doctrine tweeking, it would have made sense, to someone.
 
Y

Yard Ape

Guest
I think McG has got it right on this one. You can use wheeled vehicles to support a tracked F ech, but not tracked vehicles to support a wheeled F ech. No amount of arguing will make an M113 or M548 (or MTVL) fast enough to keep pace with a LAV. Canada has chosen the wheeled route, now it must go all the way.

As for the original question about should Canada go all LAV III. The answer is no. The AVGP‘s and LAV II (bison and coyote) still have life in them. There is also the consideration of roles not well suited to the LAV III (in any of its 6x6, 8x8, or 10x10 configurations). With the iltis reaching the end of its life we should consider the need for an armoured security/liaison vehicle. The Mowag Eagle, Panhard VBL Scout, and armoured Land Rovers come to mind, but there are many other options on the market. We should also look for a Medium Armoured Logistic Vehicle Wheeled (MALVW?) to replace the M548 and in some cases the MLVW. Both vehicles are dated and in need of a fully armoured and wheeled equivalent in forward support roles. Perhaps the German Fuchs (I hear a 8x8 variant has been developed).

SwissArmy1_gross.jpg


:cool: Yard Ape
 
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2 Charlie

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From » Artillery » How inglorious ...

"To refer to the LAV program, yes I am glad that the equip (re-equipping is occurring), it will make it easier to maintain the fleet, and yes provide us with a modern mechanism to present a military presence whether PKO‘s or whatever. I have a concern as to the general acceptance, but if you starve someone long enough, what ever you give him or her will be greatly appreciated.

The LAV (MOWAG) family serves a very specific role, light, urban, mobile etc. I am concerned that we are adapting it for pretty much every front line function. However, the LAV family as originally designed has an inherent weakness with its top armour. We are strengthening the sides, etc, but the top remains a concern. Yes I am aware of our vision and mission, we have discussed this previously, I make my point again the, vision is vague and we are adopting a program with pro's and con's, no clear end solution

What does this have to do with wheel/tire probs. Simple, once the equip is deployed and manned, will this become a long forgotten issue until something goes wrong and someone gets injured or worse. Like the MLVW fleet, it was forgotten about until wheels started falling off.

To my AN, even we the CF have adopted a new anti armour weapon that is designed to strike the top of armour vehicles, the weakest point, hmm. "

Part of my comment re: the current wheel/tire issue. Reposted it to get a reaction about my LAV comments.
 
Y

Yard Ape

Guest
I took some quotes form an discusion on the future of the armoured corps on an official forum on LFRR. Just figured i could add some fuel to this fire. It is not so much LAV III yes/no? as it is a look at the tactical, doctrinal, and other such philosophical aspects that are relavent to deciding IF we should go all LAV or pursue other options. They bring up some good points, and some we have already seen.

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WO S MacDougall, 8CH

We can train for war with whatever we are given. It has always been so. The only question is how well we will be trained. In addition to training, we must also be equipped for war. An armoured cav veh does not miraculously turn itself into a tank when needed. A future conflict requiring a tank regiment needs a tank regts worth of kit prior to any commitment of forces. Three of four widely separated sqns of tanks, in different regts don‘t give us the ability to put a regt into the field when required. A battle group going up against an armour equipped enemy must have tanks, not ACVs. One tank sqn per brigade severely limits the brigade commanders options.

. . .

One more thing I must mention..the idea of anyone in the Army actually suggesting that we do more with less as if it were a policy upsets me greatly. Certainly, as soldiers we must persevere and work through whatever shortages we encounter. However, we should not be telling our political masters that in the future we can pretend that this or that will suffice as a bandaid for the real stuff. This only places another nail in the coffin of our effectiveness. I do not believe that pulling our punches when we talk about roles, tasks, capabilites or equipment is in the best interest of the nation. The Army needs a sufficient quantity of modern equipment to train for war, and to conduct operations in the future as part of any allianace or international force in which we are involved. This means that the Reserves must hold a certain amount of the same equipment and have access to more, in order to be prepared to do our part in any future operation or conflict.

. . .

Just answer (to yourself) this one question..who predicted any of the wars, police actions, conflicts or operations that this nation‘s military has participated in, over the last 100+ years, with enough lead time to create policy, doctrine and a budget to fit it? You continually preach the lesser prepared format because we don‘t know what we will be up against. That is the reason we must be prepared to participate in a broad spectrum of operations and tasks..we just don‘t know what will be next.

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G.M. Towhey

. . . Defence of Canada scenarios inevitably reduce to protracted guerilla-style defence in depth, demanding significantly increased anti-armour capabilities pre-positioned throughout the country.

Clearly, Canadian Forces also require the ability to project force abroad and in this role there is a definite need for armour in order to succeed. However, this suggests relatively modest numbers of ally-compatible, readily transportable, light or medium tanks. Again, anti-armour capabilities must also be improved.

Another truism is that Canadian Forces will not have a window of opportunity to buy new armoured vehicles once the decision has been made to commit to battle. The next shooting engagement will be a "come as you are war". Such was the case in Korea, Cyprus, the Gulf War, Medac, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and it will be the case next time.

The idea of training regular or reserve "tankers" in "tank trainers" a la Cougars is, was, and always will be simply ludicrous. How much of my infantry career was spent lining up my Grizzlies behind Cougars on the final assault? As if the Cougars offered any more protection than my own armoured shell.

Here was the Cougar: definitely not a tank, but rather a lightly armoured, relatively low-maintenance, low-cost vehicle, with an acceptable direct fire weapon system against soft-skin targets, capable of rapid deployment at up to 100Km/h on paved roads. A relatively decent direct fire support vehicle for infantry.

Did anyone ever develop a single comma of doctrine or tactical procedure that made any use whatsoever of the vehicle‘s capabilities? No. Never.

Instead, we pretended it was a heavy tank and taught blackhatters to lumber around the battlefield in swift, light vehicles as if they were 60 tonne behemoths going "toe to toe" with T-80‘s.

Whatever the weapon system assigned to future regular or reserve armour units, please God, let them have the sense to use it wisely.

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Maj BD Sallows, 12 Med Coy

I note the US Army is not completely moving to a more rapidly deployable structure in lieu of heavy armour. They are hedging by retaining heavy weight forces while they develop medium weight forces and the tank of the future. Perhaps it is appropriate, useful, and affordable for Canada to focus on a medium weight force, particularly the Regular Force - and this does not exclude armoured, tracked, turreted vehicles.

Having raised the question of whether tank trainers are of use, I agree they do not serve well in the "come as you are war", nor should we assume that in any future "struggle for national survival war" that we will have the luxury of being the only nation making demands on the industries of Canada and its allies. Whatever weapons required by our doctrine and force structure, we should always have some on hand.

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LCol Tom Burns

. . .

One of the themes that has emerged is the contention that, as we cannot accurately forecast the scope of future operations, we should re-focus our doctrine, training & equipping to be more "realistic" & affordable. The thinking goes like this: There is an operational continuum that starts at Humanitarian Assistance operations and extends all the way up to High Intensity(HI)war. We have not been involved in HI ops since Korea. We are pinched for funds. Therefore we would be wise to focus on, say, the mid 80% of the operational continuum. With such a focus, we can rationalize an Army that does not require the capability to conduct HI combat ops. Supporters of this line of thought cite the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) and the assymetrical nature of war in the 21st century as reasons we should cast aside HI capabilities in favour of lighter, more projectable forces tailored to the "niche" operations falling in the mid 80% of the Operational Continuum that we will undertake.This estimate is badly flawed for two reasons.

Firstly, the reason we have an Army is because, in a country like ours, the Army alone has the ability to respond to situations in which no other organizations can be effective. Situations like Op Abacus, Oka, Gustavson Lake, the Medak Pocket come to mind. These situations are put in that order because they span the Operational Continuum from low to high. In addition, they are all situations which started off as relatively minor issues and, through Assymetry, quickly escalated into major undertakings which strained Army capabilities.

The second flaw derives from the first. Why was the Army effective in dealing with those situations? It was effective because we are trained for HI ops. Because of that we retain the C3 capabilities to deal with any situation and the combat power to deal with a shooting war, however unforseen & undesired. If we ever lose our capapility to undertake HI ops, we will soon thereafter see the corresponding C3 capabilities deteriorate to the point of uselessness.

Given the Assymetry of War in the 21st Century, what do we see that provides comfort that HI ops will not be required? Nothing. What can undertake HI ops other than the well trained, well equipped & well led combined arms team? Nothing. Has the RMA rendered tanks, guns, engrs, sigs & inf supported by CSS obsolete? No.

. . .

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Sgt A Stagg

. . .

‘Trainer‘ vehicles are a next to useless cost savings. In Mob 1 deployments, the pers need to be completely re-trained to use the ‘real‘ vehicle. In 2/3/4 deployments, the required depth of vehs to actually deploy the tps simply doesn‘t exist. (Remember that UNIMOG took Rad Vans from almost every Sig Res unit in Canada to meet the op reqr. Image if it had been Leopards, SP Howitzers, or Coyotes that were required!!) Just as impotantly, a trainer veh has completely different logistics requirements. How much fuel does a track burn in moving 250km? How about a ‘trainer‘? Will the Res Officer who can‘t be trusted to lead the tps in battle know how much fuel is actually required when preparing the Log plan? (OK, trainers can be used to great advantage but it is essential the the actual kit be abvailable, assigned, and frequently used to ensure that pers are actually abnle to operate it. After that, we can work on saving money.)

. . .

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G.M. Towhey

. . . that the Army must train for worst case scenarios. I have often talked about the "myth of peacekeeping" in presentations I give here and there. The great myth is that peacekeeping is "nicer" than fighting. That peacekeepers are kinder than soldiers. The reality, even in Cyprus, was often more like: the best peacekeepers are the toughest SOB‘s on the block. Only combat-trained soldiers can effectively keep the peace, even in classic Cyprus style situations. In the new era where everything is called "peace" this or "peace" that, thinly disguised euphemisms for warfare, combat skills are even more important. The great irony is that the Canadian Forces all but invented the Myth of Peacekeeping, and it may prove to be their undoing. Alas, another discussion for another time.

. . . There never was a war where the soldiers crossed the start line with all the kit they wanted. There never will be such a war. The "give me tanks" or send me home argument doesn‘t really wash. I say, better to contribute a force that can win, than a force that looks good on an overhead slide. This means, tailoring the force structure to the likely missions. . .

. . .

Canada should equip its forces with the best available equipment to meets its strategic needs. Because they may ultimately have to defend Canada, we should equip our forces with the best equipment for this task. We should then look for opportunites to contribute in a meaningful way to our collective defence allies within the scope of our domestic defence abilities.
Tanks are the best weapon system to destroy other tanks. There is, however, no heavy armour threat to Canada . . .

To meet our own domestic deployment requirements as well as our strategy of forward action, our forces must be easily transportable. If the role we choose to fill as part of our collective defence agreements is light or medium armour, then we should offer that in force to NATO. If it‘s artillery, let‘s do that. If it‘s highly transportable, highly trained combat forces, as I believe it probably should be, let‘s do that.

Whatever it is, let‘s do it better than anyone else. Being perfect isn‘t necessary. Being better is.

. . .

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WO S MacDougall

. . .

I am CAVALRY. I will always be CAVALRY and I strongly believe that this army and the Armoured Corps need a light armoured, highly mobile, well armed vehicle, to be used in formations such as a Cav Btl Gp. I agree that we will never go to war, except as part of an alliance. I agree that we should use North American built equipment. Most of all, I agree that a specialization for our army, within the framework of our alliances would be best. However I think that we should not put all our eggs in one basket. One of our problems seems to be that we want all our formations to look the same.

Why does each Armoured Regt have to be the same. Why can‘t 1 Brigade be "heavy" and 5 Brigade be "medium" and 2 Brigade be "light". Why not have one Reg Force unit specialize in tanks, while the others specialize in light armour, while maintaining a small tank capability (1/2 sqn?). The Reserve units in the applicable area would train to augment the Reg Force brigade as required. Some units (Reg and Res) should have "national tasks" (especially in LFAA since there is no Reg Force formation).

I am not a proponent of busting the bank to outfit three full regts with M1 tanks. I am suggesting that the same number of tanks we have now, distributed differently, might be the plan. As for light armoured vehicles..first we would have to make up our (collective) min/motorized unit, the CAR was sent because it was "fair." So, we stripped a mech unit of vehicles and drivers (thus disabling a battalion) and re-trained the airborne in mech ops so they could be sent overseas. Would it not have made more sense to send the mech unit in the first place? Oh, yeah, sorry. It wasn‘t their "turn".

You‘ve identified a key structural design principle: Build to task.

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If you want to read through the whole thing it (and several other discusions on LFRR) is at:
http://www.army.dnd.ca/cgi-bin/forum/ultraboard.pl


:cool: Yard Ape
 
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Brock

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When I wrote this posting, I expected to get a bit of flack and a bit of acceptance and encouraging comments to my surprise my thoughts recieved more acceptance than I thought. I must affirm that I agree that the LAV III can not do everything, but I must point out that it can mount a 155mm howitzer and a 105mm cannon. I also insist that Canada simply isn‘t capable, financially, of fighting light, medium, and heavy mechanized. To all proponents I say look to our defence funding history in non total war scenarios. Unless we are in a total war scenario Canada‘s military will always be extemely strapped financially. We should do the best with what we have and accept that we will never have the capability to field a Patton armoured divison. I do not mean to sound arrogant, but stop wishing your wasting your time. The LAV III is simply the best multi-purpose combat capable armoured vehicle currently available and in production and Canadian (via Switzerland‘s MOWAG). I have read all of these articles before and agree they have merit, but not for Canada. We need doctrine that can fit the capabilities we can afford politically and financially. When we have these capabilities we must ensure their proper use. To all those that say wars are "come as you are" and advocate a heavy mechanized capability should take a look at why Canada couldn‘t go to Desert Storm, our equipment was too old. If we had been there would our soldiers want to go head to head with an Iraqi tank (T-72). Our training may be better, but no thanks. We likely would have suffered more casualities than any other allied force. We must accept that we do not have ability to field a properly equipped heavy mechanized force. As a military we will get far more respect politically and militarily, because we will be able to participate if we choose to provide what we can provide rather than not providing what we can. Just my thoughts (sorry for any sarcasm and forgive my editing)
 
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Brock

Guest
When I wrote this posting, I expected to get a bit of flack and a bit of acceptance and encouraging comments to my surprise my thoughts recieved more acceptance than I thought. I must affirm that I agree that the LAV III can not do everything, but I must point out that it can mount a 155mm howitzer and a 105mm cannon. I also insist that Canada simply isn‘t capable, financially, of fighting light, medium, and heavy mechanized. To all proponents I say look to our defence funding history in non total war scenarios. Unless we are in a total war scenario Canada‘s military will always be extemely strapped financially. We should do the best with what we have and accept that we will never have the capability to field a Patton armoured divison. I do not mean to sound arrogant, but stop wishing your wasting your time. The LAV III is simply the best multi-purpose combat capable armoured vehicle currently available and in production and Canadian (via Switzerland‘s MOWAG). I have read all of these articles before and agree they have merit, but not for Canada. We need doctrine that can fit the capabilities we can afford politically and financially. When we have these capabilities we must ensure their proper use. To all those that say wars are "come as you are" and advocate a heavy mechanized capability should take a look at why Canada couldn‘t go to Desert Storm, our equipment was too old. If we had been there would our soldiers want to go head to head with an Iraqi tank (T-72). Our training may be better, but no thanks. We likely would have suffered more casualities than any other allied force. We must accept that we do not have ability to field a properly equipped heavy mechanized force. As a military we will get far more respect politically and militarily, because we will be able to participate if we choose to provide what we can provide rather than not providing what we can. Just my thoughts (sorry for any sarcasm and forgive my editing)
 

McG

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As much as I do not like the thought of not having any heavy capabilities, it seems to be the generally arrived at consensus that it is outside our budget. However, I feel it is important to point out that most of the advocates of the RMA, that I have heard from, speak of light and intelligent v.s slow and dumb. Given the same recce and ew capabilities, a heavy unit can be just as "inteligent" as a light unit.

That being said, it is time to get on with how we will employ this new force. I feel it is time for a radical restructuring of the Bde Armour componet in our chosen direction. The Tank Regiment and Recce Sqn should be replaced with a single Cavalry Regiment. This regiment would consist of the current recce Sqn (in Coyotes) and a medium cavalry sqn (in LAV based armoured cavalry vehicles). The role of the recce sqn would not change from it‘s present. The medium sqn would serve as a guard/screen against enemy forces (with the primary gaol being to keep thier heavy forces "dumber" than our light), Convoy escort operations, and recce by force.

Fire support to the infantry would be provided by a battalion‘s direct fire support coy. The personel of a DFS Coy need not be infantry, they would be armour crewmen posted into the infantry battalion. The vehicle employed by the Coy would likely be the same LAV III mobile gun system that the US Interm Bde‘s are placing directly into the rifle companies.

Brock, I think you have missed the point of what was being said about the "come as you are" wars. The quotes were not suggesting that we are ready to go into a high intesity conflict as we are now. They suggest that when we select our equipment it must be capable of participating in whatever conlfict we go to, and we must buy enough of it to equip whatever formation we send (without borrowing short-falls from other units and making those units inoperational). At the time of the Gulf War and through to today, we have not been ready for the "come as you are" war. We will only be ready when we can say "were ready to go now, but fortunatly have nowhere to go."
 
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Yard Ape

Guest
I know 155 SP guns can be wheeled, but are you sure a LAV III could suport one? It is a big gun.

:cool: Yard Ape
 
B

Brock

Guest
Harry, you are in fact wrong about the LAV III being equipped as part of the US Army‘s Interim Armoured Vehicle (IAV) fleet. It is in fact an essential part of the fleet. However, it is not fully developed. The LAV III 155mm self-propelled howitzer will utilize a joint US-UK developed super light weight howitzer. It is fully developed as a towed howizter and will be modified for use on the LAV III. Previously without the 155mm howitzer was simply too heavy to be put on a vehicle the size of the LAV III, but now it is being integrated by British Aerospace defence systems for use on the LAV III. Check out http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/mav.htm

In regard to the come as you are war. I believe I am not missing the boat. The distinction between high, medium, and low intensity conflict must be made. All combat is high intensity when it occurs. I apologize for not being clear. I think Canada should focus on what it can contribute to combat scenarios, I believe that should focus on what we can actually provide. A light mechanized brigade, example 3500-4000 soldiers equipped with a LAV III baseline vehicle is suffficeint for all war scenarios, but must be utilized properly within that context. Our units should be fully trained and personnel levels should be at full strength at all times for combat units. Canada could then fight wars, maybe not every situation in all war intensity levels, but we could provide a credible combat force rather than no combat force as would be the case now. So I agree and apologize for being unclear.
 

McG

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Go to this site and you can see a picture of a LAV III TUA, which was discussed earlier in this topic. It is right of center on a colage of other LAV pictures. Also shown are the TOW/25mm turret I mentioned, and a US LAV TOW carrier.
http://www.delcodefense.com/index.htm
 
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Yard Ape

Guest
While we are into giving out links showing the LAV, I thought I‘d pass along this one.
Mowag Photos

It shows the whole family through all three generations (the AVGP is in there w/the first generation). Plenty of different configurations which support the arguments about the ability to make the vehicle fit most missions (is that LAV III 6x6 sporting starstreak AD missles?). I‘d like to take back my suggestion about a Fuchs 8x8 as a ALVW; the LAV III 10x10 looks good for the job.

6x6-III_05.jpg


10x10-III_09.jpg


:cool: Yard Ape
 
Y

Yard Ape

Guest
Okay, I cannot sit on this any more. If we are to be ready for anything, we must have heavy capabilities. I support the McG‘s model for the light mech Bde‘s, but we need atleast one heavy Bde! I would sugest using the current CMBG‘s as a starting point and increasing the tank regiment to two Battalions, and adding a fire support sqn (of light tanks) to the infantry battalions. I would then suggest selecting a modern tracked replacement for the M-113, and the best vehicle for the job would be the Swedish made CV-9030. We cannot limit our future options. Every combat vehicle in the heavy CMBG would be tracked, with the possible excepption of recce. If the threat to Canada changes there will not be time to replace our equipment so we must be ready now.

Combat Vehicle 9030
9030-9.jpg


CV 90105 light tank
90105-1.jpg


CV 90120
90120-5.jpg


:cool: Yard Ape
 
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Yard Ape

Guest
And let us not forget the need for a new MBT to replace to leopard I.

bw-leo2kws_04.jpg


bw-leo2-a5_003.jpg


:cool: Yard Ape
 

McG

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As I said in my last post, we have come to a general understanding that maintaining a Heavy Bde is outside the realm of fiscal reality in this country. That being said, Yard Ape, your fantastic design for a new and improved heavy CMBG is not (and will not be in the near future) affordable.

For those who are not content to stop beating this dead horse (or those who just want to know more), try reading through some of these related posts from the old War Diary:

Leopard and Cougar replacement

DND Orders Final Batch of LAV III Vehicles

100.jpg

LAV III IFV
 
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Yard Ape

Guest
Re: Leopard and Cougar replacement

When they pick the vehicle for the ACV I hope they ask themselves if they want a fire support vehicle for the infantry or an armoured cavalry vehicle which can perform independant of the infantry. I belive the LAV III MGS could perform well in the first role, but not in the second.

I think an armoured cavalry vehicle should take a look at a BMP-3 for variety of weapon systems. A 25 mm bushmaster, a 90 mm or 105 mm cannon, and TOW launchers like those on the Bradley. (I would suggest a 120 mm cannon instead of the 90 mm or 105 mm, and TOW; I do not think a LAV could support such a system though). This vehicle would be overkill for just a fire support to the infantry though.

If we replace the Leopard it should be with another MBT. The ACV should be seen as a replacement solely for the Cougar.

MGS_IAV-001.JPG
LAV III MGS

:cool: Yard Ape
 
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