- Reaction score
- 677
- Points
- 1,160
Sinking the navy
Wed Feb 7, 2007 7:02 pm (PST)
Flawed defence plan ignores critical needs
Sun Feb 4 2007
Peter Haydon
DEFENCE Minister Gordon O'Connor's new defence plan leaves too many
unanswered questions. It wasn't surprising that it quickly drew fire
from the naval community, which seems to have the most to lose. The
plan does indeed indicate a significant loss of capability for the
navy at some point in the future.
The so-called Canada First defence strategy recommends that the navy
get rid of its two fleet support ships, used for refuelling and
supplying combat vessels at sea. The plan would leave the navy unable
to refuel vessels at sea for at least two years until replacements
are built. The problem, of course, is that tenders have not been
issued for replacements and, given past practice, it will be tempting
for Ottawa to continue to delay issuing a contract as a cost-saving
measure.
The air force is also affected under the plan, which calls for the
elimination of six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. The cuts are
proposed as a way of funding other needed equipment.
Giving up the fleet support ships before their replacements arrive
probably spells the demise of the naval task group concept that has
served this country so well for the last 15 years. On their own, the
frigates don't have great endurance, perhaps some 11,000 kilometres,
and this limits their operating range as well as making them
dependent on refuelling stops in port or from one of the support
vessels if they are to be at sea for more than about 10 days. For the
navy to retain its traditional flexibility and mobility, it will have
to buy or lease a commercial tanker and fit it out for the fleet
support role. This is not difficult. The Australians have just done
that with HMAS Sirius, and the British have considerable experience
as a result of the Falklands War.
O'Connor also wants to phase out one of the three Iroquois-class
destroyers, which serve as command ships. The remaining two
destroyers are more than 40 years old and are near the end of their
service. The loss of the command ships needs to be put in
perspective. If there is no task group to command, because there are
no support ships, then the command ship is redundant.
The question we should be asking is whether 12 frigates is enough to
do the work that the navy has been called upon to do over the last 15
or so years. For instance, will there be enough ships to maintain a
frigate in NATO's standing naval force (as Canada has traditionally
done for most of the last 40 years), and keep another frigate
operating with U.S. and other Allied naval forces in the Middle East,
as well as keep one frigate on patrol in both the Pacific and the
Atlantic and also meet maintenance and overhaul requirements? That
will be a stretch and there won't be anything left over if a new
crisis arises or if someone suddenly decides that the task group
should be re-formed and deployed.
Getting rid of six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft makes absolutely
no sense. There is a need to gather information on what is going on
in all waters under our jurisdiction and an aircraft is an excellent
way of doing it. Trying to claim that it can all be done by unmanned
aircraft (UAVs) without first knowing if one can replace the other is
questionable. UAVs are very capable but are they very reliable when
flying over the major fishing grounds in storm? Can they drop rescue
equipment to sailors in distress? Maybe we should know some of those
answers before agreeing to the new defence plan.
Paying off a few ships and aircraft isn't going to save any real
money; it is naive to believe that. People are the major line item in
the budget and paying off a few ships isn't going to provide instant
savings in people who can be sent to Afghanistan. Anyway, what
happens to O'Connor's new army once the Afghan campaign is over? Will
it ever be used again? Is there any guarantee that Afghanistan is the
model for all future intervention operations? In all probability the
army will have to be reconfigured again, and in the meantime the
government will have thrown away air force and navy capabilities of
lasting and proven value. That seems to be short-sighted planning.
What O'Connor's new defence plan does achieve is a reduction in the
basic capabilities of the navy and air force but without having done
some solid research to determine just what capabilities are needed
for national security. Without being shown the analysis to support
the new plan, it might seem that "Canada First" is merely
becoming "Afghanistan First." In any event, long-term, national
security requirements should be driving our force structure and not
anything else.
Peter Haydon is a Senior Research Fellow with Dalhousie's Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies and
the Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Naval Review.
The Winnipeg Free Press
Wed Feb 7, 2007 7:02 pm (PST)
Flawed defence plan ignores critical needs
Sun Feb 4 2007
Peter Haydon
DEFENCE Minister Gordon O'Connor's new defence plan leaves too many
unanswered questions. It wasn't surprising that it quickly drew fire
from the naval community, which seems to have the most to lose. The
plan does indeed indicate a significant loss of capability for the
navy at some point in the future.
The so-called Canada First defence strategy recommends that the navy
get rid of its two fleet support ships, used for refuelling and
supplying combat vessels at sea. The plan would leave the navy unable
to refuel vessels at sea for at least two years until replacements
are built. The problem, of course, is that tenders have not been
issued for replacements and, given past practice, it will be tempting
for Ottawa to continue to delay issuing a contract as a cost-saving
measure.
The air force is also affected under the plan, which calls for the
elimination of six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. The cuts are
proposed as a way of funding other needed equipment.
Giving up the fleet support ships before their replacements arrive
probably spells the demise of the naval task group concept that has
served this country so well for the last 15 years. On their own, the
frigates don't have great endurance, perhaps some 11,000 kilometres,
and this limits their operating range as well as making them
dependent on refuelling stops in port or from one of the support
vessels if they are to be at sea for more than about 10 days. For the
navy to retain its traditional flexibility and mobility, it will have
to buy or lease a commercial tanker and fit it out for the fleet
support role. This is not difficult. The Australians have just done
that with HMAS Sirius, and the British have considerable experience
as a result of the Falklands War.
O'Connor also wants to phase out one of the three Iroquois-class
destroyers, which serve as command ships. The remaining two
destroyers are more than 40 years old and are near the end of their
service. The loss of the command ships needs to be put in
perspective. If there is no task group to command, because there are
no support ships, then the command ship is redundant.
The question we should be asking is whether 12 frigates is enough to
do the work that the navy has been called upon to do over the last 15
or so years. For instance, will there be enough ships to maintain a
frigate in NATO's standing naval force (as Canada has traditionally
done for most of the last 40 years), and keep another frigate
operating with U.S. and other Allied naval forces in the Middle East,
as well as keep one frigate on patrol in both the Pacific and the
Atlantic and also meet maintenance and overhaul requirements? That
will be a stretch and there won't be anything left over if a new
crisis arises or if someone suddenly decides that the task group
should be re-formed and deployed.
Getting rid of six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft makes absolutely
no sense. There is a need to gather information on what is going on
in all waters under our jurisdiction and an aircraft is an excellent
way of doing it. Trying to claim that it can all be done by unmanned
aircraft (UAVs) without first knowing if one can replace the other is
questionable. UAVs are very capable but are they very reliable when
flying over the major fishing grounds in storm? Can they drop rescue
equipment to sailors in distress? Maybe we should know some of those
answers before agreeing to the new defence plan.
Paying off a few ships and aircraft isn't going to save any real
money; it is naive to believe that. People are the major line item in
the budget and paying off a few ships isn't going to provide instant
savings in people who can be sent to Afghanistan. Anyway, what
happens to O'Connor's new army once the Afghan campaign is over? Will
it ever be used again? Is there any guarantee that Afghanistan is the
model for all future intervention operations? In all probability the
army will have to be reconfigured again, and in the meantime the
government will have thrown away air force and navy capabilities of
lasting and proven value. That seems to be short-sighted planning.
What O'Connor's new defence plan does achieve is a reduction in the
basic capabilities of the navy and air force but without having done
some solid research to determine just what capabilities are needed
for national security. Without being shown the analysis to support
the new plan, it might seem that "Canada First" is merely
becoming "Afghanistan First." In any event, long-term, national
security requirements should be driving our force structure and not
anything else.
Peter Haydon is a Senior Research Fellow with Dalhousie's Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies and
the Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Naval Review.
The Winnipeg Free Press
