Status on Victoria-class Submarines?

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Colin,

The BArbel's were not nuke boats. They were one of the last US diesel boat, but they were considered at the same time as the "o" boats. They were more expensive but clearly superior to the "o" boats.

It's only in the time of Mulroney that we considered nuclear boats seriously, and then the wall fell.

The highly specialized skills required for assembling and welding pressure hulls makes it near impossible to efficiently develop the capability for a very small number of boats, as the Australians discovered.

However, any boat that satisfies the requirements of Australia would normally satisfy our needs also. The Collins replacement boats program would be a perfect fit: By the time the last Australian boat would hit the water would correspond to the timeline for replacement of our first boats.

 

[dapaterson]

It's only in the time of Mulroney that we considered nuclear boats seriously, and then the wall fell.

It was never serious; it was a sop to the pro-military base of a political party.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

OGBD thanks, I do realize the Barbel were Diesel-Electric and according to the book the first choice of the RCN, although apparently a proposal was floating around to replace 1/2 of the surface fleet with nuke subs for hunting Soviet subs, I can imagine the bun fighting that caused. It appears by the time we got our act together the Barbel door was shut, shame seem like really nice boats.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbel-class_submarine

 

[Edward Campbell]

It was never serious; it was a sop to the pro-military base of a political party.

Actually it was serious, all the way up to and including Minister Beatty.

What wasn't serious was the money allocated. The authors of the White Paper, mostly from Toronto, did a good enough job on getting decent life cycle costs for the French Rubis class boats and those costs would have covered a smaller number of Brit Trafalgar class boats, too.

Where they dropped the ball was on infrastructure costs which, in a long into the night brainstorming session led by two two stars (a RAdm and a MGen, both engineers), we calculated to be, at the very, very minimum 125% of the capital and life cycle costs ~ so we needed $20-25 Billion, not $10B, and we needed a lot of it to be front loaded.

It died a pretty quick death when we offered those numbers ...

 

[dapaterson]

Actually it was serious, all the way up to and including Minister Beatty.

What wasn't serious was the money allocated. The authors of the White Paper, mostly from Toronto, did a good enough job on getting decent life cycle costs for the French Rubis class boats and those costs would have covered a smaller number of Brit Trafalgar class boats, too.

Where they dropped the ball was on infrastructure costs which, in a long into the night brainstorming session led by two two stars (a RAdm and a MGen, both engineers), we calculated to be, at the very, very minimum 125% of the capital and life cycle costs ~ so we needed $20-25 Billion, not $10B, and we needed a lot of it to be front loaded.

It died a pretty quick death when we offered those numbers ...

If you haven't costed it out and received approval of the cost, it's not serious.  Until the money is in hand, it's an idea, not a plan.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Actually it was serious, all the way up to and including Minister Beatty.

What wasn't serious was the money allocated. The authors of the White Paper, mostly from Toronto, did a good enough job on getting decent life cycle costs for the French Rubis class boats and those costs would have covered a smaller number of Brit Trafalgar class boats, too.

Where they dropped the ball was on infrastructure costs which, in a long into the night brainstorming session led by two two stars (a RAdm and a MGen, both engineers), we calculated to be, at the very, very minimum 125% of the capital and life cycle costs ~ so we needed $20-25 Billion, not $10B, and we needed a lot of it to be front loaded.

It died a pretty quick death when we offered those numbers ...

Was that the refueling facility costs?

 

[Edward Campbell]

That was part of it. NDHQ had limited input to that White Paper; a lot of Conservative members (also members of the RCMI) in Toronto had too much say.

They simply didn't understand how much it would cost to develop the infrastructure before the first nuclear boat arrived ...

As dapaterson says, they had a Big Idea but they were amateur (armchair) strategists and a White Paper needs engineers and accountants to get it right. (I know that offends some who think that the engineers and accountants should dance to the operators' tunes but that's not how it works and it hasn't worked that way since about 1570 (when Elizabeth I and John Hawkins made a deal with the dock workers at Chatham).)

 

[Underway]

That was part of it. NDHQ had limited input to that White Paper; a lot of Conservative members (also members of the RCMI) in Toronto had too much say.

They simply didn't understand how much it would cost to develop the infrastructure before the first nuclear boat arrived ...

As dapaterson says, they had a Big Idea but they were amateur (armchair) strategists and a White Paper needs engineers and accountants to get it right. (I know that offends some who think that the engineers and accountants should dance to the operators' tunes but that's not how it works and it hasn't worked that way since about 1570 (when Elizabeth I and John Hawkins made a deal with the dock workers at Chatham).)

The prelude to battle is the work of the engineering dept....

This is one of the reasons that the FELEX radars are what they are.  The operators wanted two new 3D radars and one of them was to be the SMART L.  They got one 3D radar which was the SMART S (though now the argument is that the volume search radar should have been 2D and the tracking radar be 3D...).  Because of cost and engineering issues (mostly cost though).

Its also a reflection of the current shopping list that no one told them about costs or even in some cases the tactics involved.  Massive armed ice breakers?  That was an election promise that had to be changed when it ran up against costs and navy requirements.

My biggest concern is for the continued existance of the sub fleet.  It's easy to explain the need for tanks to Canadians and to be perfectly honest the army is cheap to run (relatively).  Subs are a big price tag with the associated sticker shock.  Every naval expert out there understands and has no disagreement on the need for subs.  It's a bizzare situation.  Due to the political football that was the subs the public now percieve subs as a waste of money with little to no advantage.  IF one could get under ice capable non-nuclear subs that would probably be a game changer.  That would be a capability that the gov't could easily sell and clearly demonstrate something that no other military asset could do.  Currently no AIP can be run with enough confidence for under ice.  It's probably an endurance issue,  I could see under edge ice (which we probably do now) but not full ice cap ice.  This article is a good indicator on how the submariners view AIP.

SEA 1000
CONVENTIONAL AIR INDEPENDENT PROPULSION

Byline: Rex Patrick / Sydney

AIP for Australia
In January 2008 Captain (Ret) James Patton, USN, published an article in the US Naval Submarine League’s quarterly journal reporting on a submarine conference he’d attended in Europe in late 2007. He mentioned in the article a conversation he’d had with an RAN submariner Commodore and Commander. Asked about the likely role of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) in Australia’s future submarine force, the Commodore indicated that he didn’t think that Australia would be interested in AIP from an operational point of view. The Commander then offered a “Yeah, but …” opinion that some form of AIP would be valuable as a contingency system – like parachutes for fighter pilots or fire extinguishers and active sonars on submarines – something that wasn’t intended to be used, but when pinned down in some shallow water or bay with the battery running low, it would be nice to have a week or so of emergency propulsion to extricate oneself from adversaries. At the time the Commander represented the entirety of the RAN’s future submarine project “team” and he knew the Commodore was mistaken. In the shadow of his superior officer, and in the best interests of the RAN, he had delicately tried to correct the faux pas.
AIP is an essential capability in modern conventional submarines. Today it is utilised in German, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Pakistani, Portuguese, Singaporean, South Korean and Swedish submarines and will soon be found on Indian, Israeli, Spanish and Turkish submarines. In the past ten year, the only countries that have signed contracts for non AIP submarines are new entrant navies or those that have or are developing a nuclear capability, itself a form of AIP.

 

[Baz]

I know that offends some who think that the engineers and accountants should dance to the operators' tunes but that's not how it works and it hasn't worked that way since about 1570 (when Elizabeth I and John Hawkins made a deal with the dock workers at Chatham).

Being an operator, and one of the people who believe engineers and accountants need to stay in their lanes, I'll rise to that challenge.

... and state that so do operators (need to stay in their lanes).

Engineers and accountants win wars, operators win battles.  And by winning wars I mean that they are absolutely required to focus the resources of the nation to the overall effort.  Operators would have you believe that money is not important in combat... it absolutely is; when you run out, you lose.

Even in peacetime, anything most operators come up with is not supportable in the medium to long term... that's why the MR process is flawed.  It results in operators spending a lot of money patching holes, and not very effectively.

Unfortunately, Canadian engineers and accountants don't seem able to get it right either!

What I will say, and have written papers right, is that Engineers and Accountants don't know how to:
- design a usable system; operators need to be involved.  And it shouldn't be through operator's embedded at the project offices.  It should be by specing a modern development process, which uses agile methodology, and has the contractor human factor types have direct, robust access to real operators.  Which the projects office hate because, left unchecked, leads to scope creep (perfect example: F-35);
- lead in combat: they just don't do well wrapping their heads around the human component.

What really confuses me is operators that honestly don't care if the system is capable of doing its job; aren't they the ones who will be taking the risks if we have to use it in its design role.  The engineers and accountants have the luxury of saying "hmm, that didn't go well, fix it up and find some more saps, er I mean operators..."  At best case the operators will be left sitting in the life raft going "hmm... that didn't go well, now what do we do?"

Last point: I hate the term operator; it implies I exist to support the weapon system.  I prefer how the Americans say it: warfighter; which implies the weapon system is their to support me fighting.


ERC: how's that, do I sound like an operator?

 

[Kirkhill]

Back to Pugh, folks.

Every system is doomed to fail unless the owner (the person using the tool) is satisfied.  Engineers exist to satisfy the owner.  Accountants are a necessary evil.

Most jobs start with the owner saying "I need to get this job done, by this time and I have this much money to spend".

Then the spiral starts.

Roto 0: Here's what I'd like. Here's what is possible. Here's what it costs.
Check against budget
Roto 1 Here's what I can live with. Here's how you could do that. Here's what it costs.
Check against budget
Repeat as necessary.

The thing is - you have to go round that spiral three or four times before you can even consider setting a proper budget - much less establishing a project.  And your vendors should expect that.

The Duke University study "THE NSPS SHIPBUILDING VALUE CHAINS" does an excellent job of explaining the process. 
http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/NSPS_GVC_Analysis_Jan2013_01282013.pdf

The thing is for you lot - how many times can you get around the spiral before your decision makers change and you have to start all over again?

PS - WRT the quality of Canadian engineers.

Canadian engineers are as good/bad as anybody else's.  The issue is how many mistakes have they made in the past.  I like engineers that have made a lot of mistakes.  That means that they have put a lot of systems into production.  Engineers that have not made mistakes are engineers that not produced systems... and in many fields, due to the small Canadian market many Canadian engineers have not had the opportunity to make mistakes.

The real definition of quality is do the engineers have enough knowledge to guide the user through the realm of the possible and how do they manage their mistakes.

Equally though, it is a great help if the client is a qualified client and knows what they are asking for and how it might be used.

I get the strong sense that in Canada, due to long intervals between major defence projects and the demand for defence projects to be nationally sourced we end up with the worst of both worlds:  neophyte engineers and neophyte clients/owners/users/operators.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Being an operator, and one of the people who believe engineers and accountants need to stay in their lanes, I'll rise to that challenge.

... and state that so do operators (need to stay in their lanes).

Engineers and accountants win wars, operators win battles.  And by winning wars I mean that they are absolutely required to focus the resources of the nation to the overall effort.  Operators would have you believe that money is not important in combat... it absolutely is; when you run out, you lose.

Even in peacetime, anything most operators come up with is not supportable in the medium to long term... that's why the MR process is flawed.  It results in operators spending a lot of money patching holes, and not very effectively.

Unfortunately, Canadian engineers and accountants don't seem able to get it right either!

What I will say, and have written papers right, is that Engineers and Accountants don't know how to:
- design a usable system; operators need to be involved.  And it shouldn't be through operator's embedded at the project offices.  It should be by specing a modern development process, which uses agile methodology, and has the contractor human factor types have direct, robust access to real operators.  Which the projects office hate because, left unchecked, leads to scope creep (perfect example: F-35);
- lead in combat: they just don't do well wrapping their heads around the human component.

What really confuses me is operators that honestly don't care if the system is capable of doing its job; aren't they the ones who will be taking the risks if we have to use it in its design role.  The engineers and accountants have the luxury of saying "hmm, that didn't go well, fix it up and find some more saps, er I mean operators..."  At best case the operators will be left sitting in the life raft going "hmm... that didn't go well, now what do we do?"

Last point: I hate the term operator; it implies I exist to support the weapon system.  I prefer how the Americans say it: warfighter; which implies the weapon system is their to support me fighting.


ERC: how's that, do I sound like an operator?

Baz, you sound like one of the (precious few) good guys, like some of the best operators I knew: HC Pitts, Jack Vance, Lyn Mason and Larry Murray, and I'm sure a few other Old Timers could add a few more names to that list. I see nothing much with which I could disagree ... and I used to work (1980s) for the chief engineer, and I'm pretty sure he would agree, too.

En passant: There were some engineers (using that term to describe people from branches like e.g. RCE and RCCS, in  the Army) who could lead (still can, in the cases of e.g. LGen Thibault and MGen Neasmith (both personal friends, I am, almost certainly, biased)), but I agree that it's far, far less than the norm.

 

[Old Sweat]

There usually is more than enough blame to be shared in development programmes. Note: Mods, perhaps this could be a separate thread.

I just finished Adrew Godefroy's new book, In Peace Prepared, on the Canadian Army's combat development process, which was a rigorous, well-disciplined but lengthy approach. This prompted me, after reading the above commentss, to google Bobcat Armoured Personnel Carrier, which was the Canadian Army's attempt to produce a designed and made in Canada APC. The project was conceived in 1952, but it took until 1956 to come up with an approved requirement document. A few test models were built, but serious design flaws appeared and eventually in late 1963 the project was cancelled. We bought 961 of the M113A1 family of APCs instead.

Personal notes:

In 1959 or maybe 1960 our troop in 4 RCHA was tasked to support live firing trials of the 105mm SP version. I think we provided a gun detachment and CP crew including me as a young arty tech. I may have been on the artillery board and produced the firing data to be put on the sights. Anyway, away we went and the first round was fired, at which point the tracks broke. Back we went to camp, leaving various contractors, engineers and the like to pick up the pieces and take it back to Ottawa. A year or two later (see above years) I was an officer cadet in Shilo when the SP appeared again for testing at the artillery school. Our course officer arranged for our class to see it and we went out and clambered all over it. Maybe it was all my fault and I jinxed it, because the tracks failed again.

Personal opinion: Even if it had been a flawless design and the best APC in the world, we could not have sold it to the Brits or the Americans, both of whom were developing their own. Thus, like the Avro Arrow, we would have ended up with a relatively few very, very expensive APCs. Unlike ship or aircraft building, the production run, technological boost  and jobs created would not have been enough to get much political support in any case.

 

[Edward Campbell]

But there's another problem or, at least, another spanner in the works, which is a) why I joined a discussion about nuclear submarines, and b) why I mentioned Chatham and 1570: it is the government of the day, the queen's (people's) treasury, not the admirals and generals, who decides what equipment you're going to get, how much money will be spent on it, and, even, why you're going to get it (rather than something you want/need). Any ideas about the military's operational requirements and procurement strategies must be viewed through that political lens or your just blowing smoke up one another's arses.


Edit: punctuation

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Reading the book on the subs shows that we are wonderfully consistent in mucking up procurement of subs. I wonder if we can convince Christy Clark to follow in the footsteps McBride?  8) 

 

[Underway]

A very good video on the Victoria.

HMCS VICTORIA:  A Long Beginning  Distribute widely as it seems the navy is now taking the proper route to selling submarines to the Canadian public.  Giving them information to make up their own minds. (yes I know this was on youtube over a year ago I just thought it was cool and topical ;D)

I particularly like the WG information.  It's one of the gems in the RCN's training system that's not talked about enough IMHO.  Combined CAN/US operation and it does an amazing job.

 

[larry Strong]

At approx. 11.04 there is a member running a key board at the Mk 48 weapons station wearing camo "Medical" epaulette??????




Cheers
Larry

 

[RedcapCrusader]

At approx. 11.04 there is a member running a key board at the Mk 48 weapons station wearing camo "Medical" epaulette??????




Cheers
Larry

It appeared to be blank. Might indicate that they're a First Aider?

 

[larry Strong]

It appeared to be blank. Might indicate that they're a First Aider?

Good point....hadn't thought of that. That would make sense.

Thanks
Larry

 

[medicineman]

It's the boat's Physician Assistant - part of their job on a sub is plotting surface targets and assisting with fire control, when they're not driving and playing Doc.

MM

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Posted it to FB along with a suggestion to read "Through a Canadian Periscope"  8)