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Story states a new book claims Canadian efforts fell short in Kandahar

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The following story from the Toronto Star claims the Americans felt Canadian efforts fell short in Kandahar. Without reading the book or the excerpts published in the Washington Post, I cannot comment on it. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.

U.S. military thought Canadian efforts fell short in Kandahar

Published On Fri Jun 22 2012
By Mitch PotterWashington Bureau

WASHINGTON—American reluctance to confront Canada over its weak military hold in the Taliban heartland of Kandahar province was among the costlier blunders of the war in Afghanistan, a new book alleges.

Excerpts published Friday by The Washington Post describe the rising concerns of a team of U.S. military advisers who were stunned in 2009 when an unnamed senior Canadian intelligence official in Kandahar told them, “I have no idea what’s going on inside the city.”

The sheer thinness of Canadian boots in Kandahar — only 2,830 soldiers, mostly assigned to headquarters and support roles, with fewer than 600 going on patrol — contrasted against more than 9,000 British soldiers deployed in the less populated and less strategically important neighbouring province of Helmand, Washington Post senior correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran writes in Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.

But when the U.S. reassessment team returned to Kabul to learn why more Canadians had not been deployed, they were told by the U.S. Maj.-Gen. Michael Tucker, then the director of operations for all NATO troops, “It is wrong to tell a (Canadian) commander, from this level, to put troops in Kandahar city.”

Sitting next to Tucker in that Kabul meeting was Andrew Exum, an influential counterinsurgency strategist and former Army Ranger platoon leader, battle-hardened by earlier deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Exum’s notes from that Kabul encounter are excoriating. “This guy is a jackass,” Exum wrote of Tucker’s hesitance to direct the Canadians. “Kandahar — not Helmand — is the single point of failure in Afghanistan.”

When Exum and his reassessment team investigated further, the book alleges, they were told by U.S. Army Brig.-Gen. John “Mick” Nicholson, that the Americans were reluctant to ruffle feathers in Ottawa.

“(Nicholson) emphasized that the Kandahar mission was Canada’s largest overseas deployment since the Korean War. Military leaders in Ottawa were reluctant to ask for more help — some were convinced that security in Kandahar was improving, others didn’t want to risk the embarrassment,” writes Chandrasekaran.

“To Exum and others on the team, however, it seemed that U.S. commanders thought that managing the NATO alliance was more important than winning the war.”

Exum, a fellow with the Washington-based Center for a New American Security, was brought on as part of a group of outside advisers convened by Gen. Stanley McChrystal when he was appointed the top commander in Afghanistan in 2009.

But the Americans had their own reasons for wanting to avoid Kandahar at the outset of the Obama administration, Chandrasekaran writes in Little America, which is based on more than 70 interviews with U.S. government and military officials directly involved in Afghan war policy.

Foremost among them was the Pentagon’s own struggles in locating senior troop commanders willing to dispatch thousands of additional forces to Afghanistan after so many years of rolling deployment to the region.

One of the few with a “zeal for Afghanistan” was Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway. But Conway “drove a hard bargain” with his Pentagon counterparts, insisting that any fresh Marine deployment must involve “a contiguous area” where the U.S. Marines would wield total control, including support from Marine helicopters and supply convoys.

“These stipulations effectively excluded Kandahar,” writes Chandrasekaran. “The geography of the province, and the Canadians’ desire to hold on to the key districts around Kandahar city, made it nearly impossible to carve out a Marine-only area there.

“Helmand was the next best option, even if it was less vital.”

By that time, the Canadian military had already asked for help in Kandahar province, although the number of reinforcements requested was still small compared to the presence in Helmand province.

In January 2008, an independent panel led by former Liberal deputy prime minister John Manley issued a report recommending that Canada extend its mission in Afghanistan beyond February 2009, on the condition that NATO deploy a battle group of about 1,000 additional soldiers to back up Canadian troops in Kandahar.

The report also called on the Canadian government to provide troops with surveillance drones and large helicopters as another condition for extending the mission.

Canada managed to secure those extra troops – and thereby meets its conditions for extending the mission to 2011 – when the United States committed to sending 1,000 soldiers to the southern province after France decided to join the war efforts.

The Americans took control of Kandahar City in 2010 following a decision by U.S. President Barack Obama to flood southern Afghanistan with troops.

Canadians troops were left in charge of Panjawai, Dand and Daman districts until Canada ended its combat mission there in July 2011.

A spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay responded to the allegations by praising the work of Canadian troops in Afghanistan.

“Canada has played a leadership role in the UN-mandated, NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, both through the previous combat mission in Kandahar and our current training mission centred in Kabul. Working alongside our international partners, our Canadian Forces personnel have made tangible strides to improve the lives of the Afghan people, and have made great progress in helping them to increase their nation’s safety and security,” MacKay’s press secretary, Joshua Zanin, wrote in an emailed statement on Friday.

With files from Joanna Smith
 
Little America’ excerpt: Obama’s troop increase for Afghan war was misdirected
The Washington Post

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Published: June 22
Excerpted from “Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.”

The day after he arrived in Kabul in June 2009, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, then the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, gathered his senior officers to discuss the state of the war. They barraged him with PowerPoint slides — the frequency of Taliban attacks and their impact; the number of local security forces; and an evaluation of the Afghan government’s effectiveness in each province. The metrics were grim, the conclusion obvious: The Americans and their NATO allies were losing.



http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/little-america-excerpt-obamas-troop-increase-for-afghan-war-was-misdirected/2012/06/22/gJQAYHrAvV_story.html
 
In reading the above post, I could not help but to think of that mini-sized, mega-ego imbecile Michael Yawn. One sided, full of holes and drafted by a team of morons. You guessed it... I will not be wasting my money on that "Only the Americans can do it right" crap.
 
I'm wondering how this was a surprise to them in 2009, considering we had the same number of troops in 2006 when we went down there in the first place.
 
Teeps74 said:
In reading the above post, I could not help but to think of that mini-sized, mega-ego imbecile Michael Yawn. One sided, full of holes and drafted by a team of morons. You guessed it... I will not be wasting my money on that "Only the Americans can do it right" crap.

Reading the WaPo excerpt, that's not really the crux of the book - it was more of an attack on why the US planned surge deployments the way they planned. Particularly the vast quantity of troops that were surged into the sparsely populated Helmand province rather than Kandahar, and it seems there were several dynamics.

I was recently at Camp Leatherneck, the USMC base in Helmand - it's massive, with a huge force deployed there, and interestingly enough, even before seeing this book's take, several of us there were musing about why the base is there with such a massive force when there were probably other priorities.
 
Fair enough... But from a COIN perspective, do we really want more in an area? Remember, the appearance of being an occupying force can have very strong negative consequences. We did make many mistakes in Afghanistan (different subject, I could go on and on and on....). At the tactical level though, our troops proved time and again to be amongst the best and most capable in that environment.

Perhaps an argument could and should be made that we deployed with too much tail and not enough teeth... But, how do we resolve the "teeth" question? Increase the length of tours? More reservist commitment? (Probably could get more, I know several who did multiple tours willingly.).

Maybe I will read it for a bit in Chapters then... If I am still seeing shades of Yawn, the book will not make it to the counter... (Speaking of Chapters...).
 
Teeps74 said:
Fair enough... But from a COIN perspective, do we really want more in an area? Remember, the appearance of being an occupying force can have very strong negative consequences. We did make many mistakes in Afghanistan (different subject, I could go on and on and on....). At the tactical level though, our troops proved time and again to be amongst the best and most capable in that environment.

Huge bases far removed from the population would generally be considered "bad COIN". As was alluded to in another thread, a more successful approach is a smaller presence amongst the population to build relationships. The USMC presence (at least at Camp Leatherneck) doesn't really accomplish that.

I didn't read anything that criticized the work of Canadian soldiers - rather that there wasn't enough of them there to do the job, and that neither the Canadians really did enough to seek help nor the Americans do enough to provide for fear of offending them.

Teeps74 said:
Perhaps an argument could and should be made that we deployed with too much tail and not enough teeth... But, how do we resolve the "teeth" question? Increase the length of tours? More reservist commitment? (Probably could get more, I know several who did multiple tours willingly.).

Maybe I will read it for a bit in Chapters then... If I am still seeing shades of Yawn, the book will not make it to the counter... (Speaking of Chapters...).

Number of forces deployed seems more the problem vice the teeth:tail ratio, but who knows, not I. As for the book, sounds like a good plan of attack.
 
Redeye said:
Huge bases far removed from the population would generally be considered "bad COIN". As was alluded to in another thread, a more successful approach is a smaller presence amongst the population to build relationships. The USMC presence (at least at Camp Leatherneck) doesn't really accomplish that.

Huge bases is a signified of occupation but putting soldiers on every village doorstep isn't?  How would you 'build relationships' with the Canadian government if a Pakistani Army platoon was stationed in your subdivision?

As for the article, I don't see anything inaccurate in any of the premises.
 
According to Amazon.ca the book is being released 26 June. I ordered a copy this morning and will let you know what it says in due course.

A few random thoughts on the matter:

a. the enemy strength in Kandahar was grossly under-estimated from the start. Ian Hope among others noted that the CG of 10 MD believed the main effort was elsewhere.

b. as I recall we were pretty well all aware that we did not have the numbers, and the NATO tourist principle was in effect many years ago.

c. the CF may not have been able to generate large numbers but our force did grow in both numbers and in improved kit in response to the thread.

d. at the time I had a wtf moment when the Marines went into Helmand.

d. despite the enemy strength in Kandahar our forces were being pulled to come to the aid of the Brits in the early years, especially around Sangin and FOB Robinson. Pte Costall was killed there early in 1-06 and C Coy 1 VP went to the aid of a coy of 3 Para there a bit later. The next year a tp of D Bty (actually all three tps in rotation) spent a fair amount of time in FOB Rob. In the same roto - 1-07 - we had a considerable force engaged working for the US SOF up near the Belly Button feature. Initially there was a tp of D Bty with TF 31 and then a cbt tm based on a Strathcona sqn (-) and H Coy 2 RCR (-) was also commited.
 
Yes to all.  2006 was essentially a force-on-force meeting engagement - it is what goes on in 2007 and after that is interesting.

I've put up a link to a document entitled "The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar".  It should be read.  Of note, the Canadians are fixed in Zharei/Panjway while NATO is fixated on Helmand.  Meanwhile, the Taliban are aiming for Kandahar City the whole time.
 
Infanteer said:
I've put up a link to a document entitled "The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar".  It should be read.  Of note, the Canadians are fixed in Zharei/Panjway while NATO is fixated on Helmand.  Meanwhile, the Taliban are aiming for Kandahar City the whole time.
And here's the thread where the report's at.....
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/90836.0.html
 
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/talibans-campaign-kandahar
 
Infanteer said:
Huge bases is a signified of occupation but putting soldiers on every village doorstep isn't?  How would you 'build relationships' with the Canadian government if a Pakistani Army platoon was stationed in your subdivision?

Kind of why COIN has rarely worked. Insurgency starts as an idea, has some public support, and few resources. COIN usually starts with tons of resources, but has few ideas and is looked on with suspicion by the public. The attempt at legitimizing Karzai was a nice try, but most still don't buy it.  The Taliban wasn't stupid and destroyed or prevented the development aid that would have won us the war.  You would think that their commanders read their Mao and studied other successful 20th century revolutions.

IMO war fighting needed to be on a much larger scale on arrival. Then those fighters  needed to leave. Followed by massive development and peacekeepers in different uniforms holding the ground. The "mowing the grass" model was a waste of resources.

,...Or just blame the Canadians  ::)
 
I can only assume that the creators of South Park were engaged as ghost writers:

Blame Canada:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOR38552MJA
 
Infanteer said:
Huge bases is a signified of occupation but putting soldiers on every village doorstep isn't?  How would you 'build relationships' with the Canadian government if a Pakistani Army platoon was stationed in your subdivision?

That's the difficult balance - being insulated/isolated from a population doesn't do much to built any sort of rapport, nor of course would you want to dominate their area unless as a reasonably clear path to handing over to HNSF who can further build on those relationships - that's basically the thrust of the Clear-Hold-Build concept with all the add-ons like Village Stability Ops, Stability Working Groups, etc. The sort of presence I understood was the aim in places like Zhari/Panjwaii (in part from reading about your experiences) seemed like an effort to strike the balance - to interact with the locals, to work to slowly gain some trust, and eventually to be able to have ANA and ANP viewed as legitimate. In other places the ALP has been the effort to do so, spurred from local initiatives mostly.

One of the better sets of lessons learned comes from the Australians in the Mirabad Valley in Uruzgan, who produced a series of videos about their learnings - when they actually went from living outside the green zone and simply patrolling into it to actually moving from compound to compound (which they often had to make look "forced" when they generally discreetly sought cooperation and paid for it) but being in the presence of the locals, being responsive to their needs and goals, and generally working to gain legitimacy which only comes from the populace. The problem then becomes one of transitions between rotations, but ideally as a transition process happens to a more permanent HNSF presence that gets mitigated.

3 ACR in Tal Afar isn't a bad example either - they totally isolated the town with strong population and resource controls (including an 8' sand berm around the city to force all people entering and exiting through checkpoints), and then immediately set to work on reorganizing and retraining the police force, replacing corrupt leadership with outsiders and addressing ethnic issues by bringing all three groups present into the police. I'd argue that in Iraq they had more of a foundation to work with than rural Afghanistan, however, it's still a good framework.

Nemo - WRT Afghanistan, I tend to side with the argument made by many that you can't assess COIN as a strategy here because it wasn't really done - especially not at the beginning. What the Taliban did right was simple: while "we" were busy building a government from the top down which still was reaching much of the population, "they" carried on doing what they always did from the bottom up - providing swift justice, resolving disputes, and so on. They kept their bonds with a lot of the population while GIRoA wasn't set up to do the same.
 
Redeye said:
Nemo - WRT Afghanistan, I tend to side with the argument made by many that you can't assess COIN as a strategy here because it wasn't really done - especially not at the beginning. What the Taliban did right was simple: while "we" were busy building a government from the top down which still was reaching much of the population, "they" carried on doing what they always did from the bottom up - providing swift justice, resolving disputes, and so on. They kept their bonds with a lot of the population while GIRoA wasn't set up to do the same.

I'm not schooled in COIN by any means; I've read some stuff and have mulled a bit, but I won't pretend to be anything but a rank amateur.

Intuitively though, your last para hints at something. If COIN is going to be in part predicated upon building a viable state, then part and parcel of that must seem to me to be a very simple, face value question- at the lowest level, the dude in the street - what are the most common interactions betwen the citizen and the state? This isn't an Afghan specific thing; it's the same question that pops into my head during a municipal or provincial election. Who are these dudes asking for my support, how do they differ from all the ther swinging dicks and what do they have to offer to my life in the real, practical sense?

I'm sure there are properly bureaucratic terms for this kind of analysis and that if I were PSYOPS or CIMIC I'd already 'get it'. You speak of the Taliban fulfilling the role of the police and judiciary. De facto, they are essentially the executive and the legislative in many areas.

Are we too focused on big picture, grand strategy, 'what-consultant-shall-we-hire-for-this' stuff to have maintianed focus on the simple reality of 'walking the walk', and 'deeds not words'?

The discourse around counterinsurgency seems to be getting more and more in depth and complex. Frankly it seems increasingly prone to the masturbatory academia that seems to attend any effort to figure groups of people out and why they do stuff we don't like (my degree is in something along these lines. Ugh.) It strikes me that there are many with a vested interest in convincing our powers that be how things ought to be done in the context of a theoretical ideal, as opposed to simply going out and *interacting* with the populations we operate within, discerning through those interactions what *they* want- and consciously NOT trying to extrapolate.

Is COIN itself flawed in that it tries to suck strategy as high as possible as often as possible? Again, to my very amateur eyes it seems that, more than anything else we've been in, this is where intelligent, culturally aware junior leaders- company level at highest, ideally at the platoon level embedded in a community - ought to be trusted to figure out what the most local portion of the population needs, wants, and expects, and to communicate that up and to act on it as much as is possible, as locally as is possible, and as quickly as is possible. We seem to like easily doctrinalized solutions, where maybe there needs to be mroe acceptance of each situation being different, contributing under 'mission command' to a bigger intent, but with MUCH less bloody interfrence in how it's done at the local level.

Am I wrong in thinking that CIMIC, etc, have perhaps lost perspective on themselves as enablers? That, as opposed to being an end unto themselves, with the consequential upwards-sucking of authority, responsibility, command, and decision making - they ought to be pushing assets as low as is possible to leave enablers at the greatest disposal of those with the highest resolution of local 'feel'?
 
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